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The British launched numerous punitive expeditions in the decades before the international scramble for Africa. Often portrayed as 'wars against nature', such campaigns in fact posed considerable challenges, not least because they were conducted to tight deadlines and were expected to result in low-cost victories. Yet it was often difficult to define clear military objectives. This article explores punitive expeditions' demands upon their commanders and the ways in which commanders found suitable culminating points, in the absence of decisive battles, when victory might be declared and celebrated. Victory had to be defined for the intervening army, for the people and leaders of the country being attacked, and for politicians and the public at home. Defining victory was thus a complex process, reflecting the range of military, political and public pressures upon commanders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the years before 1914 the novels of William Le Queux provided a catalyst for British debates about the economic, military and political failures of the empire and featured plots that embodied fears about new national and imperial rivals. For Le Queux, the capture of London was integral to German military occupation. Representative of the nation's will to resist, or its inability to withstand attack, the vitality of London was always at issue in his novels. Drawing on contemporary fears about the capital and its decay, this article considers the moral panics about London and Londoners and their relationship to Britain's martial decline reflected in his stories. Engaging with images of anarchist and foreign terrorism, and drawing on fears of covert espionage rings operating in government circles, this article probes the ways in which Le Queux's fiction expressed concerns about London as a degenerate metropolis in the process of social and moral collapse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key text of the pre-First World War invasion fiction genre, William Le Queux's The Invasion of 1910 (1906) is often assumed to have sold in vast quantities and provoked major controversy. This article investigates the circulation and social impact of this divisive, polemical work before and during the war to provide a more accurate account of its reception. Using Marie Corelli's proven bestseller The Sorrows of Satan (1895) as a comparator, the article shows sales of The Invasion of 1910 were similar to other bestselling novels, though not comparable to Corelli's phenomenal sales. Le Queux's text, however, punched above the weight of the typical bestseller in terms of its social influence, receiving parliamentary censure, extensive newspaper coverage, wide satire and polarised reader responses. Overall, this analysis provides insight into the workings of the popular fiction industry and the nature and extent of invasion fears in the early twentieth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a detailed examination of the politics of William Le Queux. It argues that he is best understood as a product of the Edwardian radical right. Firstly, through exploring the politics of pre-1914 invasion anxieties and invasion-scare fiction, the article will question the idea that such literature was fundamentally Tory in quality. Instead, this emerging genre of popular fiction will be placed to the right of Edwardian Conservatism. Approaching Le Queux through his position as the most prominent author of British invasion literature at this time, the article will re-examine the available biographical evidence, highlighting the challenges scholars face in pinpointing his political leanings. Le Queux's numerous invasion-scare novels will be interpreted through the disparate ideas of the radical right. Although Le Queux's writing had little intellectual influence on radical right thinking in Britain, his novels provided this developing ideology with a prominent popular platform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 55 B.C. Julius Caesar crossed into Britain and was immediately engaged in a unique style of warfare. The Iron Age Britons used sturdy and fast two-horse chariots to respond to Roman invasion. This article looks at the tactics of and analyzes aspects of the battle chariot. It assesses the capabilities of the people who fielded the chariot and the means used to sustain their resources and gauge their capabilities. Drawing on both classical and archaeological sources, this article presents a fuller account of Caesar's two trips to Britain in 55-54 B.C. and the British warfare he encountered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One hundred years after the battle of Hastings (1066), two historians wished to ask new questions about what the experience of the battle was like. Their approach – both sophisticated and seemingly modern – supplemented existing knowledge with imaginative recreation to fashion a fuller historical account of the battle. This article analyses the reporting of the 'Malfosse' incident, a deadly quasi-legendary episode in the encounter, in Wace's Roman de Rou and the anonymous Chronicle of Battle Abbey, in relation to their sources and the Bayeux Tapestry. It argues that the prospect of historical detachment galvanized chroniclers into narrating the battle in a way that centred on experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One hundred years after the battle of Hastings (1066), two historians wished to ask new questions about what the experience of the battle was like. Their approach – both sophisticated and seemingly modern – supplemented existing knowledge with imaginative recreation to fashion a fuller historical account of the battle. This article analyses the reporting of the 'Malfosse' incident, a deadly quasi-legendary episode in the encounter, in Wace's Roman de Rou and the anonymous Chronicle of Battle Abbey, in relation to their sources and the Bayeux Tapestry. It argues that the prospect of historical detachment galvanized chroniclers into narrating the battle in a way that centred on experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the questions to Prime Minister Clement Attlee about German intentions to invade England in 1940. Cross-Channel invasion; German style of warfare; Successful invasion of England; British reaction to the threat of a full-scale invasion after 1940.

This article examines the contributions of the Miskitu people of colonial Nicaragua and Honduras to Britain's largest military intervention in interior Central America – the invasion of Spanish Nicaragua in 1780. Lacking the local skills and knowledge essential to offensive operations in the region, the expedition relied on an existing alliance with the Miskitu. Charting the evolution of this alliance, this article reveals not only the importance of indigenous manpower to colonial endeavours but also how intercultural campaigns generated powerful assumptions about martial skills and racial categorizations. These assumptions were highly vulnerable to misunderstandings that, in turn, had a profound effect on supposedly rigid European concepts of national policy, military planning, and strategic interests. The failure of British officials to appreciate the needs of their allies ended hopes of defeating the Spanish empire. But the failure also shaped understandings of the Miskitu and broader British interests in Central America. The raising of military labour was much more than the process of hiring soldiers. It was a broader process of negotiation, understanding, and misunderstanding that helped define the expansion of European empires in the new world. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The whole Middle East region passed through an upheaval and transformation for two weeks in the middle of July 2017. The event, now called: “The uprising of al-Asbat Gate,” not only took place in the heart of Jerusalem, one of the most important cities in the world, but also in the heart of al-Aqsa Mosque, one of the most heated and sensitive spots on earth. Those two weeks could be indeed considered as a milestone in the ongoing clash in the Holy Land. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims at analyzing the military and technical differences between the Norman army of Guilherme of Normandy and the Anglo-saxon army of Harold Godwinson in the Battle of Hastings in 1066. For this purpose, we use as our main research source the Bayeux Tapestry and the Chronicle of William of Poitiers as well as the military English history. In this way, we have observed that the differences in weapons and strategies between the Anglo-Saxon and Norman armies, influenced by their social and economical conditions, favored the victory of the invading Norman forces in the battlefield. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British Army, who had been defeated by the Turkish Forces during the First World War firstly in Gallipoli, opened up the frontier of Iran-Iraq to be able to recover their dignity and also possess valuable resources in the region. Their invasions at this frontier gained momentum very quickly. The British advanced into Iraq step by step as they had planned previously. First of all, they invaded Amara on June 3, and then Nasiriyah on July 24.Following this successful advance attained in a short time, General John Nixon, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force in Iraq, began to think of taking Baghdad. British were all dreaming of being in Baghdad on the Christmas Day.However, with the Battle of Ctesiphon, their rapid move ceased and the British under General Townshend's command had to take refuge in Kut Al Amara. Hoping that reinforcements would arrive soon, General Townshend decided to holdKut Al Amara. He took defensive measures in the town against the oncoming Turkish forces. On December 7, Turkish Army, under Colonel Nurettin's command, laid total siege around the British Army at Kut Al Amara.Inconclusive offensives carried out until 25 December showed the Turks that Kut Al Amara could not be taken so easily. As a result of this, large-scale offensives were abandoned and it was decided that it would be more appropriate to force the town to surrender by continuing the siege. The British troops at Kut Al Amara were expecting General Fenton Aylmer, the Commander of the British Relieving Force, to save them from that siege. They couldn't know that this wait would last too long, because all the attempts by General Aylmer, who was charged with the duty of relieving the British forces that were under siege at Kut Al Amara, were to end up in complete failure.Following General Aylmer's failure, General Gorringe was put in charge of the British forces. However, General Gorringe's relief operation also came to nothing. On 22 April, General Gorringe's final rescue effort in the Fourth Battle of Hanna failed and this led to the exhaustion of all the remaining hopes. As a last resort, they decided to send a ship (Julnar) loaded with food and ammunition up the river on the night of 24 April. This was the last rescue effort, which ended up in the capture of the ship by Turks. This hopeful wait ended up in frustration. Several rescue efforts carried out by the British Government and British-Iraq Army Command turned out to be inconclusive and now it was time for the British forces in Kut Al Amara to surrender. The British, who were surrounded by the Turkish forces at Kut Al Amara, could stand against it for 144 days. At the end of the 144-day siege, 13,309 soldiers surrendered and as they were hoping to save their troops at Kut Al Amara, the British losses were around 21973 during the entire siege process. What was more painful was not that the British were besieged at Kut Al Amara, but that all the operational attempts to put an end to that siege resulted in complete failure. General Townshend personally made a great contribution to these failures, because he had never attempted to break out of the encirclement and eventually was forced to surrender together with all his troops. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fought on a hillside in southern England in the fall of 1066, the Battle of Hastings has long been regarded as a seminal moment in British history, due to the profound changes the invading Norman conquerors brought to the British Isles. As such, the conflict has been the subject of significant historical analysis. One aspect of the battle that has not drawn much attention in academic accounts, however, relates to its location. To this point, observers have generally accepted that the site of the conflict was “Battle Hill,” pointing as evidence to the nearby presence of Battle Abbey, erected by the Norman leader, William the Conqueror, to commemorate his victory. Yet to this point, no archaeological evidence has been found to support the fact that a battle once occurred here. Furthermore, there are some local historians who believe that other sites are plausible. This study retests the case for Battle Hill as the site of the Battle of Hastings through a re-examination of historical data using a GIS-based multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) model. The results indicate that while Battle Hill is indeed a likely site for the conflict, another nearby location—Caulbec Hill is an equally if not more plausible contender. The study concludes by discussing the implications of this investigation for interdisciplinary research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using declassified British government files at the National Archives, the author shows how the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, which overthrew the radical government of Maurice Bishop and the New Jewel Movement, was not the first time that such an invasion was contemplated in Grenada's recent history. The UK had had an almost identical plan to land a battalion of troops on Grenada a decade earlier, on the very eve of independence, to ensure the continuation in power of the dictatorial Eric Gairy, should the widespread unrest across the island lead to his ousting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A case study is presented concerning the role and function of the Devon, England, militia during the Spanish Armada in summer 1588. The article discusses British military strategy to repel Spanish invasions, particularly the mutual aid strategy devised by the British Privy Council. It also discusses the roles of the late Earl of Leicester Robert Dudley and the late London, England, army commander Henry Carey during the invasion crisis.

This article offers a look at the history of England. The early inhabitants, the Iberians, were later to be identified with fairies, brownies, and little people. In 54 B.C., Julius Caesar invaded England, but the Romans did not become established there until A.D. 43. From the 8th through the 11th century, the Anglo-Saxons contended with Danish raiders for control of the land. 1066 marked the only successful military invasion of Britain in history, and one of England's great turning points. Norman rule had an enormous impact on English society.

The article reports on Maryland and the British invasion of the Chesapeake Bay from 1780-178. It states that the survival of Maryland is dependent on the control of Chesapeake. The British naval forces had used blunt violence to dominate the Chesapeake, this is why Maryland governor Thomas Sim Lee wrote a plea to the U.S. continental Congress on July 28, 1780. The height of the enemy attacks in Chesapeake Bay intensified, badly affecting commerce and undermining efforts to restore the solvency of Maryland. The war between the U.S. and Great Britain only ended until the Treaty of Paris in September 1783.

The invasion of England in 1688 is conventionally interpreted in Dutch historiography following the Orangist and Republican Faction views, the latter being the mainstream account in traditional Dutch historiography. Jonathan Israel admirably supplemented these with his thesis, which is now the dominant interpretation in the English-speaking world. Israel focused on French political and commercial aggression which united the regents and brought about the rare and unique consensus in Dutch politics to support William III of Orange's invasion of England. Traditional Dutch historiography alleges that William took irresponsible risks and made secret preparations. He confronted the States General with an accomplished Fact. Taken by surprise, the States General consented to an incalculable venture. This article develops a distinctive interpretation within the Israel thesis by expanding research to all the provincial States instead of an interpretation based on 'Holland-centric' evidence. French Political aggression was the sole unifying Factor above anything else. The guerre de commerce affected Holland only, Amsterdam at the last minute. A distinctly different view emerges with the analysis of evidence of 'secret preparations' and 'astonishing Fait accompli'. Findings vindicate the proposition that the élite were well aware of the advent of the invasion, certainly no less than the French ambassador, Count d'Avaux. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the formation of Normandy Campaign by British Army to invade Europe in 1942. The ability of British army to generate and sustain fighting power during the Normandy campaign has attracted a good deal of criticism. According to the author historians in their post-war studies have devoted little attention to the preparations that the army undertook to prepare itself for the campaign before the landing. This article tries to shed new light on these criticisms by examining three neglected aspects of the army's preparations for the campaign.

Few subjects have been more passionately discussed recently than the question of whether the invasion force in AD 43 landed in Kent or on the south coast or simultaneously in both areas. Recently Professor Frere and Professor Fulford joined forces to produce a series of arguments, each independently, supporting a landing in Kent. It is argued here that while archaeological or strategic considerations do not exclude either theory, some of the new ‘evidence’ – especially Frere’s and Fulford’s logistical and linguistic arguments – is demonstrably incorrect. Furthermore, the Kent hypothesis relies on the assumption of an unmentioned far–distance embassy and other non–straightforward interpretations of our main textual source, Cassius Dio. It is, however, not the aim of this paper to replace one one–sided hypothesis by another, but to point out the dangers of dogma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the plan of Napoleon Bonaparte to invade Great Britain. Relationship between Bonaparte and engineer Pierre-Alexandre-Laurent Forfait; Role of Forfait; Involvement of Forfait in the building of warships and fortifying the ports of France.