Search

Byline: L.C. Hunter, D.J. McCormack, R.J. Rimmer In the past, constant pay rates and piece-rate systems were applied to reward employee effort. Now pay adjustments may vary between employees on the basis of subjective judgements of performance. Consequently, employees may feel that they are unfairly treated. Conflict follows with managers or supervisors who are enforcing corporate goals on production, quality and cost containment. A theoretical framework is proposed within which to study interactions between employees and employers over effort. Four features are demonstrated. Firstly, management can simulate the effects of policy alternatives. Secondly, many theories can be analysed within the framework. A theory of conflict over pay is considered. Then, in effort-wage bargaining chaotic outcomes are demonstrated. Finally, even with such complex outcomes, conventional human resource strategies are shown to moderate the variability of employee responses when remuneration is considered inequitable.

The article examines the use of arbitration during periods of incomes policy. It details the nature, scope and procedure of arbitration and discusses the problems posed by arbitration during periods of income policy. The options for government which is aggrieved by arbitration awards or unwilling to take the risk for contravention in its incomes policy are enumerated. The article explores the "public interest" conflict between the requirements of an independent arbitration function and of government objectives pursued through incomes policy.

Describes and discusses a method of evaluating the locus of collective bargaining in multi-plant companies in Great Britain. Optimum level of bargaining within multi-plant firms; Analysis of internal company situations; Labor relations in multi-plant companies.