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Hume devised a third way between Hobbes and Locke that bolstered the former's defense of stability and the latter's defense of rebellion. This feat remains underappreciated. Hume's third way rests on the idea of the public conscience, which, like Hobbes's idea of the public conscience, derives from communication and consensus. The public conscience orients us toward the public interest, which, in Hume's theory, is the authoritative standard by which individuals and government alike must abide. In this paper, I elaborate on the moral psychological principles that underlie Hume's concept of the public conscience, which is liable to both conservative liberal and progressive liberal interpretations. And I argue that Hume's third way provides valuable insight into the logic of public political discourse in liberal societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article contrasts the way that laws are regarded by some philosophers of science with the way that they are regarded by scientists and science educators. After a brief review of the Humean and necessitarian views of scienfic laws, I highlight difference between scientists who regard laws as being merely descriptive and philosophers who generally regard them as being explanatory and, in some cases, as being necessary. I also discuss the views of two prominent philosophers of science who deny any role for scienfic laws. I conclude that science educators should be wary of adopng the necessitarian view of scienfic laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the connection between Hume's view of "laws of nature" and his view of miracles by addressing three foci. First, it presents arguments that Hume construed "laws of nature" as merely beliefs in perfect or imperfect causal uniformity. So construed, laws of nature can be violated, so miracles are possible. Second, it shows that Hume's criteria for evaluating human testimony are found in the popular textbooks of logic of the time. Hume explicitly used these criteria to criticize nonbiblical reports of miracles. Finally, the article shows that Hume took John Tillotson's examination of transubstantiation to reduce scripture to apostolic testimony and to collapse the distinction between divine and human testimony. This implies that educated Christians entertain inconsistent beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay discusses Hume's views on suicide and the value of life, also with an eye to their relevance to the present debate on euthanasia. I will first take a look at some of the more personal remarks Hume made in his letters on these subjects and the role they played in his own life. Next I will discuss his essay "Of Suicide" and look at what Hume aimed at with this, in his day certainly controversial, essay. For further clarification I compare Hume's views with those of Kant on the same issues and discuss their influence on today's views on (assistance with) suicide and the value of life as found in the European Declaration of Human Rights and in relevant court rulings. Finally, I will illustrate the relevance of the views of both Kant and, increasingly, of Hume to the current debate on some of today's most vital end-of-life questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hume argues that priests feign knowledge of the strange theological country they supposedly represent and so are hypocrites, conceited because they think themselves better than the multitude whose minds they fill with superstitions and keep in ignorance to encourage their veneration as envoys from God. They thus work against the public interest in having an informed and educated citizenry. The nub of his concern, as he wrote in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, was that when we consider theological matters, we have moved beyond "the more solid and natural arguments, derived from the senses and experience," and must be more than "apprehensive, that we have here gone quite beyond the reach of our faculties." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship of Hume's thought with Calvinism is complex and difficult to pin down. He is mordantly critical of the theology and morality of the "predestinarian doctors" and out of tune with the rational theology of Francis Hutcheson and even with that of his friends, Enlightened Ministers of the Church of Scotland such as Hugh Blair and Robert Wallace. Nevertheless, a few of his key philosophical tenets are almost indistinguishable from the main ideas advanced in Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion. I argue that for this reason Hume's philosophy of religion is an Enlightened form of Calvinism. These strongly parallel doctrines must be considered in any evenhanded interpretation of the chief principles of Hume's philosophy of religion that are set forth in "Of Miracles," in The Natural History of Religion, and in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. This approach also opens a thoughtful understanding of the main conclusions of the Dialogues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some consider Hume's denunciation of what he calls the "monkish virtues" an unwarranted attack, redolent of an anticlerical bias. Hume rejects these virtues as antithetical to his own conception of happiness, so the complaint goes, without considering the possibility that when judged from the monkish point of view, they are both useful and agreeable. Only prejudice could explain such blatant question-begging. We argue, to the contrary, that when one reads Hume's critique in light of his views on natural religion, it becomes apparent that the monkish, as Hume understands them, cultivate their virtues for ends other than happiness but unwisely. If Hume is right, the monkish virtues are worse than useless for monkish purposes, making them vices rather than virtues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to G.E.M Anscombe's paper 'Modern Moral Philosophy', modern moral philosophy has introduced a spurious concept of moral obligation, and has therefore made a mistake that the Greeks, and Aristotle in particular, avoided. Anscombe argues that the modern concepts of obligation, duty, and the moral 'ought' are the remnants of an earlier, but post-Aristotelian conception of ethics, and that they ought to be abandoned. An examination of Anscombe's historical and philosophical claims shows that we have no reason to take them seriously. In particular, they rest on a misinterpretation of Scholastic views on 'ought' and obligation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In A Treatise of Human Nature , Hume argues that morality pertains primarily to character, and that actions have moral content only to the extent that they signal good or bad character. I formalize his signalling theory of moral/immoral actions using simple game-theoretic models. Conditions exist under which there is a separating equilibrium in which actions do indeed credibly signal character, but conditions also exist in which there is only a pooling or semi-separating equilibrium. A tradeoff is identified between the signalling value of actions, and the consequentialist goal of incentivizing all character types to choose beneficial actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay develops a naturalist framework based on Hume, Darwin, and Wittgenstein against postmodernist constructivism. That framework claims universal features of human biology, cognition, and behavior to explain our cultural histories, running contrary to two core constructivist doctrines of postmodernist scholarship: mutual opacity and epistemic violence. Mutual opacity posits the incommensurability of systems rooted in differing contexts, cultures, and group identities, while epistemic violence morally impugns the extension of the knowledge claims of any such system beyond its strictly localized boundaries. This is the extension that universalist approaches, like naturalism, are recriminated against owing to their claims to discover encompassing standpoint‐independent and transcultural features of human constitution and modes of life. Comparative evaluation of these approaches exposes the failure of postmodernist constructivism to explain parallel practices, conventions, and institutions across human cultural histories, which universalist naturalism succeeds at, while moreover revealing how this failure undermines its agendas of social justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant’s Beweisgrund criticizes the Cartesian ontological argument while promoting another ontological argument – the ‘possibility proof’. It is widely recognized that Hume’s reflections on ‘existence’ are a precursor to the Beweisgrund’s objections to the Cartesian proof, but there is scepticism about whether the former influenced the latter. This is because it is believed that Hume reflects upon ‘existence’ only within the Treatise and not the Enquiry, and that Kant read only the latter and not the former. This paper argues that the objection that existence is not a predicate is contained within the Enquiry, that the Beweisgrund was influenced by the latter, and that the ‘possibility proof’ is intended to answer the Enquiry’s claims about the indemonstrability of existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hume criticizes Malebranche for endorsing an "abstract theory of morals" founded on reason that leaves no role for sentiment. One response in the literature argues that although Malebranche started by endorsing the kind of "abstract" morality Hume rejects, he increasingly replaced this with an incompatible "sensible" morality based on "physical motives" deriving from pleasure. However, I argue that a basis for both moralities is present in Malebranche from the start, and indeed that they are compatible parts of a single morality. In developing this argument, I draw particularly on his contribution to the dispute in early modern France over a Quietist account of "pure love." This contribution reveals that although he did accept the sort of theory of moral truth that Hume criticized, Malebranche at the same time endorsed a theory of moral motivation that is similar in important respects to what we find in Hume. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Hume depicts his Treatise of Human Nature as an anatomical work, in the final paragraph of the Treatise, he discusses the corresponding roles of the philosophical anatomist and painter within his philosophy. This article reclaims both aspects of Hume's thought, which helps us delineate the relationship of the Treatise to his various works. First, we look in-depth at Hume's discussion of the anatomist and painter in three texts: the Treatise of Human Nature, a letter by Hume to Frances Hutcheson, and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Second, we focus on situating Hume's historical interests, mainly The History of England, within his anatomical and artistic philosophical vision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study develops a view of Hume's is/ought distinction as an extension of Scottish jurisprudence that, in turn, was influenced by Pufendorf's discussion of entia moralia. Further, it investigates the unique role that Hume's sentimentalism played in the production of elements in the context of liberalism under the rule of law, independently of previous philosophical traditions. First, we observe that Hume's is/ought distinction corresponds to a distinction between uncivilized and civilized entities, rather than between amoral rationality and moral passions. Next, analyzing Hume's argument for "moral evidence," we find that such evidence is necessary for various activities, such as consent or trading, in the field of moral entities as civil societies. Finally, a study of Hume's stance with respect to civil and common laws shows that his moral sentimentalism, which includes the is/ought distinction and moral evidence, suggests a new possibility for social development that is distinct from previous rational forms of jurisprudence. From this discussion, a unique sprout of modern liberalism can be seen in Hume's theory of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores Spain's positioning in the shifting currents of the later Enlightenment through the polemic works of lawyer and satirist Juan Pablo Forner. Forner's attempts to prove the existence of an autochthonous tradition of Spanish pragmatism and empiricism form an index of the penetration of intra‐Enlightenment debates into Spanish thought in the late eighteenth century. Forner, profoundly aware of tensions between Cartesian rationalism and Lockean sentimental empiricism across Europe, intervenes on the side of empiricism, insisting that Cartesianism is nothing but a guise of Scholastic hyperrationalism. The article disputes scholarly perceptions of Forner as a Christian reactionary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Kant-Studien is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Para David Hume, a religião se tivesse algum papel a desempenhar seria o de corromper a natureza humana e perturbar a harmonia social em vez de contribuir para a própria moralidade. Na interpretação de Hume as crenças religiosas levam à degradação da conduta humana, reconhecendo que elas geram dois efeitos perniciosos: a Superstição e o Entusiasmo. A nossa problematização é: por que para Hume é uma consequência necessária da religião as suas corrupções, para moralidade, mesmo quando prega tantas virtudes? Para respondermos a presente problemática utilizaremos o ensaio Da Superstição e do Entusiasmo e a obra Tratado da natureza humana. For David Hume, if religion had any role to play, it would be to corrupt human nature and disturb social harmony instead of contributing to morality itself. In Hume’s interpretation, religious beliefs lead to the degradation of human conduct, recognizing that they generate two pernicious effects: Superstition and Enthusiasm. Our problematization is: why, for Hume, is its corruptions a necessary consequence of religion, for morality, even when it preaches so many virtues? To answer this problem, we will use the essay On Superstition and Enthusiasm and the work Treatise of Human Nature.

Em resposta ao desafio cético de David Hume, Kant através de sua “Filosofia Crítica” alterou o eixo da “doutrina do conhecimento”, da realidade externa, para as “condições de possibilidade da experiência”. Ele usa deste elemento conceitual afim de constituir uma ideia de objetividade mais avançada que o “racionalismo metafísico” pregresso, especialmente relacionado à noção de “representação”. Como resultado, o fenômeno apreendido corresponde ao objeto do conhecimento crítico e a coisa-em-si, dada como exterior a cognição, é tomada como incognoscível. Mas com isso, restou a cena filosófica subsequente perguntar-se: sendo os dados da cognição “fenômenos mentais” (e através delas, as condições de possibilidade do sujeito) o domínio próprio ao conhecimento, como ele pode estar certo de corresponder ao objeto e satisfazer a demanda do saber científico? Deste nexo problemático Reinhold, Fichte e outros buscaram expor o caráter científico do conhecimento filosófico, partindo das contribuições do projeto crítico de Kant, enquanto outros tentaram dissuadir de vez a filosofia da ideia de se manifestar enquanto ciência.

Hume notoriously pursues a constructive science of human nature in the Treatise while raising serious skeptical doubts about that project and leaving them apparently unanswered. On the perspectivalist reading, Hume endorses multiple incommensurable epistemic perspectives in the Treatise. This reading faces two significant objections: that it renders Hume’s epistemology inconsistent (or at least highly incoherent) and that it is ad hoc. In this paper, I propose a perspectivalist account of epistemic justification in the Treatise that addresses, to a significant degree, these concerns. Hume has available to him an account—what I will call epistemic dispositionalism—that is internally consistent, allows for epistemic continuity between perspectives, and is thoroughly grounded in his naturalism.

Some scholars claim that epistemology of science and machine learning are actually overlapping disciplines studying induction, respectively affected by Hume's problem of induction and its formal machine‐learning counterpart, the "no‐free‐lunch" (NFL) theorems, to which even advanced AI systems such as LLMs are not immune. Extending Kevin Korb's view, this paper envisions a hierarchy of disciplines where the lowermost is a basic science, and, recursively, the metascience at each level inductively learns which methods work best at the immediately lower level. Due to Hume's dictum and NFL theorems, no exact metanorms for the good performance of each object science can be obtained after just a finite number of levels up the hierarchy, and the progressive abstractness of each metadiscipline and consequent ill‐definability of its methods and objects makes science—as defined by a minimal standard of scientificity—cease to exist above a certain metalevel, allowing for a still rational style of inquiry into science that can be called "philosophical." Philosophical levels, transitively reflecting on science, peculiarly manifest a non–empirically learned urge to self‐reflection constituting the properly normative aspect of philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hume is considered the first in the modern era to deny the powers that God has assigned to causes, reducing the relationship between cause and effect to mere contiguity, succession, and association. This stance had a profound impact on subsequent philosophers and philosophies. Utilizing weak arguments, Hume's views significantly influenced science, civilization, religion, and ethics. This research aims to demonstrate the fallacy of Hume's claims, the reasons behind his assertions, their impact on his successors, and to refute his misconceptions. It also addresses the reactions to his views. The study concludes that Hume’s denial of the effects of causes amounts to sophistry and a denial of facts, necessities, and innate primary instincts, deviating from what is commonly accepted by rational people across all ages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is little consensus about whether Kant intends his Critique of Pure Reason to change the mind of a skeptical empiricist such as Hume. I challenge a common assumption made by both sides of the debate. This is the thought that Kant can convince skeptics only if he does not beg the question against them. Surprisingly, I argue, that is not how Kant sees things. On Kant's view, skeptical empiricism is an inherently unstable and unsatisfying position, which skeptics cannot help wanting to escape. Kant's Critique , and especially its Transcendental Deduction, offers thinkers like Hume an appealing means of escape, by explaining a possible relation of the mind to the objects of knowledge that skeptics have overlooked. On Kant's view of skeptics as inherently dissatisfied with their position, the offer of an explanation can change their minds while neither refuting nor appealing to their skeptical empiricism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since John Leslie Mackie's 'popularization' of moral error theories in meta-ethics, increasing attention has been focused on how to escape the force of nihilism. For many opponents of the moral error theory, 'moral nihilism' is used as a derogatory synonym associated with immorality and selfishness, but such a defamatory usage of the label is obviously not very helpful for a serious philosophical examination of the view. The goal of this paper is to draw on insights by David Hume and other Humean philosophers such as J.L. Mackie, Richard Joyce, and Richard Garner, in order to turn 'moral nihilism' from a term of abuse to a 'badge of honour'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) holds that the senses, imagination, and passions aim at survival and the satisfaction of the body’s needs, rather than truth or the good of the mind. Each of these faculties makes a distinctive and, indeed, an indispensable contribution to the preservation of life. Commentators have largely focused on how the senses keep us alive. By comparison, the imagination and passions have been neglected. In this paper, I reconstruct Malebranche’s account of how the imagination contributes to the preservation of the body by compensating for the limitations of the senses. First, the imagination represents non-actual states of affairs, such as probable or possible future states. Second, the imagination forges new and often helpful associations based on past experiences. Third, the imagination (mis)represents that objects will cause pleasure and pain, thereby imbuing them with emotional significance they would otherwise lack. Together, these features flesh out Malebranche’s view that the imagination is necessary for the preservation of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the beginning of Philosophy till today, many different disciplines and research are being developed to apprehend human phenomena, which include psychoanalysis, sociology, neurosciences, neuromarketing, anthropology, neuroeconomics, biopolitics, governmental research, posthumanism, transhumanism and so on. Can philosophy have a position withinside the want for an explanation of today's human statuses and express useful categories for the full realization of individual and collective expression? Philosophers analyzed emotions, the functioning of the mind, the mechanisms of language, ethical dilemmas, the scope of sciences and every aspect of life. From Hume to Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault, it is clear that subjectivity takes place through a connection with beliefs and truth (the term "belief " refers to the attitude we have to recognize a proposition as true), causing behaviors and norms. The focus on beliefs by epistemology and philosophers of mind would be very beneficial and make the foundation of BCM in Philosophical practice. Each human is unique and irrepetible, and his or her world is not always expressible in logic assertion this is why art, song and poetry are essential to life, even though that is essential as well as a rational auto-comprehension of the self and personal route. Between imagination and reason, at each step of life, beliefs are in action and recognizing them could be very effective, fruitful and liberating. It isn't always something of which we're constantly conscious due to the fact that beliefs are regularly inherited as an implicit result of the surroundings wherein we stay or we're grown. Beliefs determine the thoughts about us and others and, consequently, behaviours related to them, can block destiny and lock us up in the past, and can affect mental and bodily health, happiness and unhappiness. My method (BCM) in philosophical practice is aimed toward supporting clients to make clear which beliefs influence their lives and (if necessary) deconstruct and/or modify their beliefs approximately their lifestyles to triumph over the crisis. In this paper, I will pay particular attention to the role of cultural beliefs (among another kind of beliefs) into the developement of subjectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans and many animals are capable of learning and learning how to learn better. We are concerned here with one way that reinforcement learners might learn how to learn better. In an experiment described by Harlow in (Psychol Rev 56:51–65, 1949) a group of rhesus monkeys learn a new way of learning in the context of a specific type of problem. We will consider how such agents might coevolve a new learning dynamics and new attendant saliences. To this end, we propose a self-tuning dynamics that illustrates one way that a reinforcement learner might acquire forms of learning that are well-suited to context-specific problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Çukurova Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi (CUIFD) is the property of Cukurova Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi (CUIFD) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

RESUMO Neste artigo, pretendo oferecer uma interpretação evolucionária do conceito de simpatia na teoria ética de Hume com base nos preceitos gerais da teoria ética evolucionária contemporânea. Ao apresentar os arcabouços conceituais que compõem estas teorias, meu argumento envolve especificar que, para ambas, o mecanismo psicológico da simpatia parece figurar como um traço evolutivo essencial do comportamento moral e altruísta na espécie humana. No contexto da biologia evolucionária, dois modelos evolucionários foram desenvolvidos para explicar a lógica do comportamento altruísta humano: i) seleção de parentesco e ii) seleção multinível. Argumento, com base em evidência textual na obra de Hume, que o mecanismo psicológico da simpatia parece ser mais adequadamente explicado pelo modelo de seleção multinível. Concluo, então, destacando algumas contribuições importantes que esta interpretação evolucionária pode oferecer para a plausibilidade geral da teoria ética de Hume.

In his Treatise of Human Nature Hume claims to demonstrate that simultaneous causation is absolutely impossible; all causes must precede their effects in time. I argue that considering Hume’s modal theory can reveal two important and previously unaddressed features of this argument. First, Hume’s modal metaphysics explains how he is able to infer from the claim that it is possible for some object to be simultaneously caused to the claim that it is possible for all objects to be simultaneously caused. This inference, I argue, is justified by Hume’s combinatorial modal theory for relations. Second, his distinction between absolute and natural modality raises a problem that has not yet been identified in the literature. Hume’s conclusion is that simultaneous causation is metaphysically impossible, but one of his premises relies on a mere natural impossibility (that every beginning of existence requires a cause). This is an intractable problem: Hume cannot get the conclusion he wants because it depends on an equivocation between two strengths of modality.

In recent years, a number of philosophers have promoted a quasi-realist (or projectivist) interpretation of Hume's theory of causation. In this paper, we argue against the quasi-realist interpretation of Hume, on the grounds that there is a direct clash between a fundamental element of Hume's system (his empiricist theory of content) and one of the main constraints that governs any form of quasi-realism (and so a fortiori, quasi-realism about causation). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The argument from design used to prove the existence of God is one of the arguments to which David Hume has devoted the most attention. On the one hand, this analogical reasoning is based on observational evidence. For that reason, it could be considered a particularly attractive type of argument for an empiricist philosopher. In fact, Hume uses this a posteriori argument in several of his works. On the other hand, Hume's position on this type of reasoning is not entirely clear. The philosopher defends this argument on several occasions and criticizes it on others. This paper aims to investigate Hume's analysis of the argument from design. In particular, we will highlight the peculiarities of the philosopher's remarks in the Dialogues on natural religion. We will analyze the significance of Hume's position in the Dialogues regarding the so-called "Philon's conversion". We will show that "Philo's conversion" at the end of the work could represent the positive scope that Hume attributes to this type of arguments in his theoretical philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hume describes skeptical philosophy as having a variety of desirable effects. It can counteract dogmatism, produce just reasoning, and promote social cohesion. When discussing how skepticism may achieve these effects, Hume typically appeals to its effects on pride. I explain how, for Hume, skeptical philosophy acts on pride and how acting on pride produces the desirable effects. Understanding these mechanisms, I argue, sheds light on how, why, when, and for whom skeptical philosophy can be useful. It also illuminates the value of skeptical philosophy for a humanistic education, giving us a reason to include Hume in curricula. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the significant contributions of Hume in the early twentiethcentury, focusing on his establishment of the first Western medical institutions in China and his deep engagement with Chinese medical communities. It explores how Hume’s experiences led to a profound appreciation for Chinese culture and medicine, marking him as a key figure in the introduction of Chinese medicine to the West. Through analysis of Hume’s interactions and the historical context of China’s modernization, the paper offers fresh insights into the East–West exchange and Hume’s transformation from a missionary to a pioneering advocate of Chinese medicine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I hope to demonstrate the value of a close reading Williams's 'Internal and External Reasons', and to provide a theory of error regarding the substantial body of work which seeks to, in various ways, defang the essay. I do this by providing some historical context for the paper, and sketching where, historically, internalism and certain sorts of moral realism became separated. It will likely not surprise the reader when I suggest that the modern scientific worldview has an important place in the discussion of the notion of external reasons. As mind, motivation, and perception have become less opaque to us, certain avenues for explaining our reasons have come closer to relying on hypotheses which may turn out to be falsifiable, and have thus been abandoned. What may come as more of a surprise is my suggestion that modern egalitarianism is an important factor as well. I suggest that impersonal reason has been used as an (implausible, but perhaps well-intentioned) alternative to the practice of some inflicting their reasons on others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Reid, I argue in this paper, holds that the belief that the works of nature are the effects of an intelligent cause is an instinctive or natural belief that may also be rational. After presenting the details of Reid's design argument, I turn to his account of human perception of the inner states of other human beings. I argue that perceptual beliefs of inner states, and hence beliefs in mental qualities such as intelligence and wisdom, involve natural signs that are both instinctive and rational. Natural signs of this sort include behaviors, artifacts, or facial expressions, which lead to belief in intelligence or design in a mind. These natural instinctive/rational beliefs are of the same kind as those that arise when one considers order in nature, and they receive support both from a general principle about causal inferences, and from the conclusion of a design argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume retracts his claim that perceptions with the same object only vary with respect to vivacity. In material in the appendix that he tells his reader to insert in Book 1, he explains his reasons: the vivacity connected to belief is different in kind from that from the vivacity connected to poetry. Poetry can be more vivid, in its way, than belief. Since Hume’s main arguments for the thesis that beliefs are vivid ideas in the main body of the Treatise depend on the assumption that ideas with the same object only vary in vivacity, he owes us new arguments from his claim. He provides various arguments for a slightly revised thesis that belief is a sort of vivid idea at the beginning of the appendix. Three of these arguments, an argument from introspection, an argument from the involuntariness of belief, and an appeal to the explanatory power of his account are preserved in the first Enquiry.

The review of the works and the writings of philosophers regarding the origin of philosophical concepts and the origin of the concepts and imaginations before it are indicative of the gradual and influenced formation and importance of this issue from a series of ideas in both the west and Islam. In the western world, the idea of innate ideas raised by rationalists and the rejection of the same idea by empiricists finally leads the Scottish philosopher Hume, who is evasive from the mysterious philosophy,to tract the origin of concepts and adaptations and by presenting a plan to refer concepts and adaptations has beaten all philosophies and introduced them as illusory and invalid concepts,and appeals to justifying the existence of these concepts in the mind to psychological and imaginary bases. later and in the passing of time due to the entry of western ideas into Iran,especially in the contemporary era,the issue of the origin of concepts and ideas (in general) and the origin of philosophical(in particular) by Allamh Tabatabayi has doubled its value and importance. Allameh, like Hume while rejecting the idea of innate and preconceived notions of the mind and bringing science to the field of presence and emphasizing the inherent existence and discovery of science and by reference all concepts and ideas to present science the validity and epistemological value of the philosophical concepts which are in Hume's philosophical dictionary restores what was disappeared and gives new life to philosophy and its concepts.

This article argues that Bentham’s metaphysics has until recently been unfairly belittled, and that it in fact built on and surpassed that of David Hume, of whom Bentham was both an attentive student and a fierce critic. Bentham’s logic is metaphysically based, multi-levelled, and comprehensive. First, taking Hume’s empiricism as a starting point, Bentham developed the additional mechanism of “reflection” to facilitate a utilitarian pragmatic resolution to Hume’s skepticism. Second, unlike Hume, Bentham aspired to encyclopedic knowledge, especially of the human mind, which he believed allowed him to place his thought on a more solid and broader foundation. Third, whereas Hume focused on the passive understanding, Bentham captured the interaction between understanding and volition. Fourth, in relation to moral approbation, Hume adopted an approach which highlighted benevolence, whereas Bentham sought to reconcile self-preference with benevolence. Fifth, Hume’s common sense moral philosophy pushed him to associate justice with social convention, and helped to make him a conservative. Bentham developed the principle of utility to direct and push forward social reform for a better world.

In the 'Appendix' to the Treatise , Hume claims that he has discovered a 'very considerable' mistake in his earlier discussion of the self. Hume's expression of the problem is notoriously opaque, leading to a vast scholarly debate as to exactly what problem he identified in his earlier account of the self. I propose a new solution to this interpretive puzzle. I argue that a tension generated by Hume's conceptual scepticism about real 'principles of union' and his account of fictions of the imagination is the defect identified in the 'Appendix'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]