Kant, Hume, and the ‘ontological arguments’.

Kant’s <italic>Beweisgrund</italic> criticizes the Cartesian ontological argument while promoting another ontological argument – the ‘possibility proof’. It is widely recognized that Hume’s reflections on ‘existence’ are a precursor to the <italic>Beweisgrund</italic>’s objections to the Cartesian proof, but there is scepticism about whether the former influenced the latter. This is because it is believed that Hume reflects upon ‘existence’ only within the <italic>Treatise</italic> and not the <italic>Enquiry</italic>, and that Kant read only the latter and not the former. This paper argues that the objection that existence is not a predicate is contained within the <italic>Enquiry</italic>, that the <italic>Beweisgrund</italic> was influenced by the latter, and that the ‘possibility proof’ is intended to answer the <italic>Enquiry</italic>’s claims about the indemonstrability of existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]