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Abstract One of the most destructive tropical cyclones ever to strike the U.S., Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Mississippi coast on 29th August 2005. The Mississippi-Alabama (MS-AL) barrier islands were subjected to storm breaching, area reduction, and vegetation loss caused by a number of parameters including salt spray, saltwater flooding, mechanical damage (e.g., ablation of bark from tree trunks), removal of plants and their soil substrate by scouring, burial under sand, and a 10-month, post-storm period of low rainfall. Repeated acquisitions of remotely-sensed data served as an essential tool in quantifying vegetated and total land area before and after the storm, and post-storm ecological community type and topographic elevation. Vegetated land area continued to decline on some islands in the first year following the storm. However, by November 2007, only 2.2 years after the storm, total vegetated land area had recovered to 72, 96, 77, 93, and 82%, and total subaerial land area to 97, 94, 33, 100, and 104%, of pre-Katrina values on Cat, W. Ship, E. Ship, Horn, and Petit Bois islands by natural re-growth and sediment accretion, respectively. Comparing ecological community-type maps that were developed from field and remotely-sensed data with LiDAR-derived digital elevation models determined that year 2010 ecological community type changed distinctively at the decimeter scale as mean surface elevation ranged from 0.1 m to 1.2 m. Storm-related changes in ecological community type included subtidal to supratidal sand flat, low marsh to wet or dry herbland, and woodland to wet herbland/shrubland. Graphical abstract Unlabelled Image Highlights • Vegetated and total land areas were determined before and after Hurricane Katrina. • Areas grew to roughly pre-storm values after 2.2 years except on the smallest island. • Ecological community type was associated with dm-scale differences in elevation. • By natural processes the islands are resilient to catastrophic storm impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The breached levee system at the 17th Street Canal has been independently studied by conducting total and effective stress analyses. Performance of the levee system during the hurricane duration was investigated with special attention focused on the formation of a gap between the levee fills and the floodwall, and on the localized shear strain in the lacustrine clay layer. In contrast to the total stress analyses conducted by the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) and the Independent Levee Investigation Team (ILIT), the effective stress analysis presented in this paper considered the soil--pore water interaction, and demonstrated evidences of initiation and mobilization of the localized shear strain. Key words: effective stress-based analysis, total stress-based analysis, soil - pore water coupling, gap, shear strain localization. Le systeme de levees ayant cede au niveau de la 17th Street Canal a ete etudie de facon independante par la realisation d'analyses de contraintes effectives et totales. La performance du systeme de levees durant la periode de l'ouragan a ete etudiee avec une attention particuliere sur la formation d'un espace entre les materiaux de la levee et le mur contre les inondations, et sur les deformations en cisaillement localisees dans la couche d'argile lacustre. Comparativement aux analyses de contraintes totales realisees par l'Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) et l'Independent Levee Investigation Team (ILIT), l'analyse de contrainte effective presentee dans cet article considere l'interaction sol - eau interstitielle, et demontre des evidences de l'initiation et de la mobilisation des deformations en cisaillement localisees. Mots-cles : analyse basee sur la contrainte effective, analyse basee sur la contrainte totale, couplage sol - eau interstitielle, espace, localisation des deformations en cisaillement. [Traduit par la Redaction], Introduction The 17th Street Canal is one of the three large drainage canals through swampy ground at the northern end of metro New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, which all flow into [...]

BACKGROUND: As a result of Hurricane Katrina, > 100,000 homes were destroyed or damaged and a significant amount of sediment was deposited throughout the city of New Orleans, Louisiana. Researchers [...]

Separated by continents and cultures, survivors of the Asian tsunami and Hurricane Katrina share a common bond in their extreme trauma and ensuing struggles. The authors discuss and illustrate core [...]

This case study on the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet earthen berm/spoil bank (EBSB) illustrates a method to quantitatively analyze wave-induced lateral erosion and breaching through the flood side of coastal flood protection levees with grass armor prior to overtopping. Lateral wave-induced erosion was evaluated based on a three-step process: (1) velocity profiles were generated using a general purpose transient dynamic finite element program; (2) resistance to wave-induced erosion as a result of grass cover (turf) on the flood face of the EBSB was estimated and no wave-induced erosion was applied until the grass cover protection failed; and (3) estimated soil erodibility characteristics were used, in combination with the estimated wave-induced flood face velocities, to estimate the magnitude of lateral erosion. This case study identified that soil erodibility characteristics directly impact coastal flood protection levee performance, grass/turf armoring provides erosion protection for a limited duration, and identification and evaluation of pre-overtopping wave-induced erosion is an important failure mode to be considered in order to ensure reliable coastal flood protection. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)WW.1943-5460.0000033 CE Database subject headings: Berms; Erosion; Hurricanes; Levees; Scour; Simulation; Storm surges; Waves; Mississippi River; Floods. Author keywords: Breaching; Earthen berms; Erosion; Grass armor; Hurricane; Levees; Scour; Simulation; Spoil banks; Storm surge; Waves.

Shortly after Hurricane Katrina's landfall in August 2005 and the reports of rampant looting of businesses in the city, we became curious about the extent of Katrina looting as compared to that after other major storms that hit New Orleans in 1947 and in 1965. Using burglary as a proxy variable for looting, we discovered that the burglary rates in the month before and the month after Katrina were significantly higher than those before and after the other two hurricanes. We then investigated the socioeconomic conditions in the city in an effort to explain these numbers. Population loss and high unemployment rates, coupled with a decline in high-paying manufacturing jobs and an increase in low-wage food and hotel service jobs generated severe economic inequality in the city that exacerbated the situation created by Katrina. Our current analysis of the impact of public school desegregation and the oil bust suggests that both events contributed to population loss and the increase in low-wage jobs prior to the storm. We believe that this type of research can assist in the recovery of New Orleans by providing an understanding of the city's pre-Katrina social and economic conditions and make clearer which post-Katrina changes are desirable.

This paper addresses damage caused by Hurricane Katrina to the main Orleans East Bank protected basin. This basin represented the heart of New Orleans, and contained the main downtown area, the historic French Quarter, the Garden District, and the sprawling Lakefront and Canal Districts. Nearly half of the loss of life during this hurricane, and a similar fraction of the overall damages, occurred in this heavily populated basin. There are a number of important geotechnical lessons, as well as geo-forensic lessons, associated with the flooding of this basin. These include the difficulties associated with the creation and operation of regional- scale flood protection systems requiring federal and local cooperation and funding over prolonged periods of time. There are also a number of engineering and policy lessons regarding (1) the accuracy and reliability of current analytical methods; (2) the shortcomings and potential dangers involved in decisions that reduced short-term capital outlays in exchange for increased risk of potential system failures; (3) the difficulties associated with integrating local issues with a flood risk reduction project; and (4) the need to design and maintain levees as systems; with each of the many individual project elements being required to mesh seamlessly. These lessons are of interest and importance for similar flood protection systems throughout numerous other regions of the United States and the world. CE Database subject headings: Louisiana; Hurricanes; River basins; Floods.

The failure of the New Orleans regional flood protection systems, and the resultant catastrophic flooding of much of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, represents the most costly failure of an engineered system in U.S. history. This paper presents an overview of the principal events that unfolded during this catastrophic hurricane, and then a more detailed look at the early stages of the event as the storm first drove onshore and then began to pass to the east of the main populated areas. The emphasis in this paper is on geotechnical lessons and it also includes broader lessons with regard to the design, implementation, operation, and maintenance of major flood protection systems. This paper focuses principally on the early stages of this disaster, including the initial inundation of Plaquemines Parish along the lower reaches of the Mississippi River as Katrina made landfall, and the subsequent additional early levee breaches and erosion along the eastern flanks of the regional flood protection systems fronting Lake Borgne that resulted in the flooding of the two large protected basins of New Orleans East and St. Bernard Parish. Significant lessons learned include (1) the need for realistic assessment of risk exposure as an element of flood protection policy; (2) the importance of considering erodibility of embankment and foundation soils in levee design and construction; (3) the importance of considering all potential failure modes; and (4) the problems inherent in the construction of major regional systems over extended periods of multiple decades. These are important lessons, as they are applicable to other regional flood protection systems in other areas of the United States, and throughout much of the world. CE Database subject headings: Louisiana; Hurricanes; Floods.

The failure of the New Orleans regional flood protection systems, and the resultant catastrophic flooding of much of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, represents the most costly failure of an engineered system in U.S. history. This paper presents an overview of the principal events that unfolded in the central portion of the New Orleans metropolitan region during this hurricane, and addresses the levee failures and breaches that occurred along the east-west trending section of the shared Gulf Intracoastal Waterway/ Mississippi River Gulf Outlet channel, and along the Inner Harbor Navigation Channel, that affected the New Orleans East, the St. Bernard Parish, and the Lower Ninth Ward protected basins. The emphasis in this paper is on geotechnical lessons, and also broader lessons with regard to the design, implementation, operation, and maintenance of major flood protection systems. Significant lessons learned here in the central region include: (1) the need for regional-scale flood protection systems to perform as systems, with the various components meshing well together in a mutually complementary manner; (2) the importance of considering all potential failure modes in the engineering design and evaluation of these complex systems; and (3) the problems inherent in the construction of major regional systems over extended periods of multiple decades. These are important lessons, as they are applicable to other regional flood protection systems in other areas of the United States, and throughout much of the world. CE Database subject headings: Louisiana; Hurricanes; Floods; Failures.

The failure of the levee and floodwall section on the east bank of the 17th Street drainage canal was one of the most catastrophic breaches that occurred during Hurricane Katrina. It produced a breach that rapidly scoured a flow pathway below sea level, so that after the storm surge had largely subsided, floodwaters still continued to stream in through this breach for the next two and a half days. This particular failure contributed massively to the overall flooding of the Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin. Slightly more than half of the loss of life, and a similar fraction of the overall damages, occurred in this heavily populated basin. There are a number of important geotechnical and geoforensic lessons associated with this failure. Accordingly, this paper is dedicated solely to investigating this single failure. Geological and geotechnical details, such as a thin layer of sensitive clay that was laid down by a previous hurricane, proper strength characterization of soils at and beyond the toe of the levee, and recognition of a water-filled gap on the inboard side of the sheet pile cutoff wall are judged to be among the most critical factors in understanding this failure. The lessons learned from this study are of importance for similar flood protection systems throughout other regions of the United States and the world. CE Database subject headings: Louisiana; Hurricanes; Floods; Failures; Levees; Drainage.

Failures of I-walls during Hurricane Katrina were responsible for many breaches in the flood protection system in New Orleans. Six breaches were examined in detail by Task Group 7 of the Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce. Four of these failures and breaches, which occurred before the water levels reached the top of the wall, were not caused by overtopping erosion. The failure of the I-wall at the 17th Street Canal resulted from shear through the weak foundation clay. The south failure of the London Avenue I-wall was caused by subsurface erosion, which carried massive amounts of sand inland, and removed support for the wall, leading to catastrophic instability. At the north breach on London Avenue, the failure was caused by high pore pressures, combined with a lower friction angle in the loose sand, which resulted in gross instability of the I-wall under the water pressure load from the storm surge. Looking back, with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, these stability and erosion failures can be explained in terms of modern soil mechanics, exploration techniques, laboratory test procedures, and analysis methods. An important factor in all of the cases investigated was development of a gap behind the wall as the water rose against the wall and caused it to deflect. Formation of the gap increased the load on the wall, because the water pressures in the gap were higher than the earth pressures that had acted on the wall before the gap formed. Where the foundation soil was clay, formation of a gap eliminated the shearing resistance of the soil on the flood side of the wall, because the slip surface stopped at the gap. Where the foundation soil was sand, formation of the gap opened a direct hydraulic connection between the water in the canal and the sand beneath the levee. This hydraulic short circuit made seepage conditions worse, and erosion due to underseepage more likely. It also increased the uplift pressures on the base of the levee and marsh layer landward of the levee, reducing stability. Because gap formation has such important effects on I-wall stability, and because gaps behind I- walls were found in many locations after the storm surge receded, the presence of the gap should always be assumed in I-wall design studies. CE Database subject headings: Walls; Louisiana; Hurricanes; Failures; Levees; Floods.

Following Hurricane Katrina an extensive investigation of the performance of floodwalls in the New Orleans area was undertaken by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and others. This investigation included detailed study of failures of cantilevered sheet pile 'I-walls' during the hurricane. An important lesson from this investigation was that gaps can form on the canal side of I-walls as the water rises in the canal and causes the I-wall to defect. Once formed, these gaps filled with water, resulting in significantly higher loads on the walls. Gap formation was a key factor in several I-wall failures, and modeling such gaps correctly is clearly an important aspect of analyzing I-wall stability. This paper describes simple procedures for estimating the depths of gaps behind I-walls, for calculating the loads to which they are subjected, and for including them in stability analyses. The effects of gaps on the stability of the 17th Canal and the London Avenue Canal I-walls are discussed. CE Database subject headings: Hurricanes; Louisiana; Walls; Levees; Fills.

Centrifuge modeling of the 17th Street Canal and Orleans Canal North levees was performed in this study. During hurricane Katrina the levees on the 17th Street Canal failed, leading to breaches in the outfall canal in the city. Two mechanisms were observed in the centrifuge modeling that could cause a breach. First, a water-filled crack formed in front of the floodwall as the water in the canal rose above the top of the levee. The levees on the 17th Street Canal, which were supported on clay foundations, failed when this cracking led to a translational (sliding) failure in the clay layer commencing at the toe of the floodwall. The levees at Orleans Canal North, where failure did not occur, were also modeled to demonstrate that the model tests could successfully simulate failure and nonfailure conditions. The centrifuge model tests identified the importance of the crack formation in relation to the stability of the floodwall. These tests also confirmed that levee geometry, floodwall depth of penetration, and the underlying soil profile were all critical to the performance of the system under flood loading. CE Database subject headings: Centrifuge model; Floods; Levees; Hurricanes; Canals; Louisiana.

Erodibility of a soil is defined here as the relationship between the erosion rate of a soil dz/dt and the velocity v of the water flowing over it, or the relationship between the erosion rate of a soil dz/dt and the shear stress developed by the water at the water-soil interface. This is called the erosion function. The test used to measure the erosion function of the levee soils is the erosion function apparatus test. The test consists of eroding a soil sample by pushing it out of a thin wall steel tube and recording the erosion rate for a given velocity of the water flowing over it. Several velocities are used and the erosion function is defined. A new erosion category chart is proposed to reduce the erodibility of a soil or rock to a single category number. Twenty three samples were retrieved from 11 locations at the surface of the levees around New Orleans. Thirteen were samples from Shelby tubes while ten were bag samples. The results obtained show a large variation of erosion resistance among the soils tested. Some of the levees associated with the location of the samples resisted the overtopping erosion very well; others eroded completely. On the basis of the erosion test results and of the observed behavior of the levees during the hurricane, a chart is presented which can be used to select soils for overtopping resistance. Numerical simulations were performed using the program CHEN 3D to obtain the distribution of velocity vectors in the overtopping flow and of shear stresses at the interface between the water and the levee surface. The comparison of the numerical simulation results and of the erosion function gives added credibility to the proposed levee overtopping erosion chart. CE Database subject headings: Levees; Erosion; Louisiana; Hurricanes.

Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters in U.S. history. The effects of the hurricane were particularly devastating in the city of New Orleans. Most of the damage was due to the failure of the levee system that surrounds the city to protect it from flooding. This paper presents the results of centrifuge models conducted at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers simulating the behavior of the levees at London Avenue North and South that failed during Hurricane Katrina. Those levees failed without being overtopped by the storm surge. Also included are the results of a centrifuge model of one levee section at Orleans Canal South, which did not fail during the hurricane. The key factor of the failure mechanism of the London Avenue levees was the formation of a gap between the flooded side of the levee and the sheetpile. This gap triggered a reduction of the strength at the foundation of the protected side of the levee. The results are fully consistent with field observations. CE Database subject headings: Levees; Hurricanes; Centrifuge; Louisiana; Floods; Damage.

In September of 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans and caused sustained flooding. Limited pre- and postflooding tests indicated that the pavement structures tested were adversely impacted by the flood water. Consequently, the Louisiana Dept. of Transportation and Development hired an independent contractor to structurally test approximately 383 km (238 mi) of the region's federally aided urban highway system both inside and outside of the flooding area. Falling weight deflectometer (FWD) tests were performed every 161 m (0.1 mi) over each selected roadway, along with other field tests. The FWD data were imported into a geographical information system and plotted against a USGS geo-referenced map. Comparative analyses were made possible through the use of extensive flood maps made available through NOAA and FEMA. This arrangement made it possible to classify spatially and graphically all test points on the basis of flooding versus nonflooding, short flooding duration versus longer flooding duration, shallow flooding versus deep flooding, and thin pavements versus thick pavements. Three pavement types, asphaltic concrete, Portland cement concrete, and composite, were considered in this analysis. The statistical inference about the difference in the means of compared data groups was conducted with 95% confidence. CE Database subject headings: Hurricanes; Floods; Damage; Pavements; Statistics; Louisiana.

Hurricane Katrina (August 23-30, 2005) was one of the costliest and deadliest hurricanes to ever strike the United States, impacting low-lying coastal plains particularly vulnerable to storm surge flooding. Maximum storm surges, overland flow depths, and inundation distances were measured along the Gulf Coast of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. The vehicle-based survey was complemented by inspections with the reconnaissance boat along the Gulf Coast and the Mississippi Barrier Islands. The survey covered both the impact on the built and the natural environments. The storm surge peaked to the east of Katrina's path exceeding 10 m in several locations along the Mississippi coastline. The storm surge measurements show that the lower floors of specially designed buildings were damaged by the surge of seawater and associated wave action, while the upper floors sustained minimal wind damage. The storm surge measurements along New Orleans Lakeshore allowed the investigators to exclude overtopping as failure mechanism for the 17th Street outfall canal levee. Hurricane Katrina's storm surge distribution (Category 3 at landfall) is compared against Hurricane Camille's storm surge distribution (Category 5 at landfall). The land loss on the barrier islands and the increased vulnerability of the US Gulf Coast to future hurricane storm surges is discussed. CE Database subject headings: Hurricanes; Storm surges; Florida; Alabama; Mississippi; Louisiana; Reconnaissance; Surveys.

The system of flood protection surrounding New Orleans and its adjoining parishes prior to Hurricane Katrina evolved over a period of 280 years. The earliest drainage works sought to elevate the river's natural levees and excavate drainage canals leading towards Bayou St. John, the only natural break across the Metairie-Gentilly distributary ridge. An extensive zone of Cypress Swamps occupied the levee flank depression between the ridge and Lake Pontchartrain. 58 km of drainage canals were excavated across the natural levee backslope and through the swamp depressions bordering the lake between 1833 and 1878. These canals sought to drain the lower portions of the city, which suffered periodic outbreaks of yellow fever, which killed more than 100,000 people during the 19th century. The city has not suffered flooding from the Mississippi River since 1895, most damaging floods having emanated from hurricane surge off of Lake Pontchartrain. Since 1559, 177 hurricanes have struck the Louisiana coastline. A system of pump stations was constructed between 1895 and 1927, which pump water into the river, the lake, and adjacent bayous. The cypress swamps were replaced by the Lakeview and Gentilly residential districts, built after 1945. This old swamp zone has settled as much as 3 + m since 1895. After 1927 the Army Corps of Engineers assumed a leadership role in providing flood control infrastructure, supervising the Mississippi River & Tributaries Project in 1931-1972. In 1955 the Corps role was expanded to include the City of New Orleans, which included maintaining capacity and freeboard of the old drainage canals. After a series of lawsuits between 1961 and 1977, the Corps was forced to employ concrete flood walls along the subsiding drainage canals. These walls were constructed in the 1990s, though some transition elements remained incomplete when Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005. CE Database subject headings: Louisiana; Hurricanes; Floods; Canals.

A careful program of subsurface sampling and cone penetration test soundings was employed to characterize the geologic conditions beneath the failed portion of the 17th Street Canal levee in New Orleans, where a 150 m long section of the levee and floodwall translated up to ~ 16 m when flood waters rose to 1-2 m of the wall's crest on August 29, 2005, during Hurricane Katrina. The subsurface conditions are characterized by discrete layers of fill placed upon the historic cypress swamp, which is underlain by a deeper, prehistoric cypress swamp. These swamp deposits were consolidated beneath the levee, and in the area of the 2005 failure, the swamp materials infilled a natural depression believed to be an old slough, which dipped below the sheetpile tips for a distance of about 50 m, which corresponds to where the breach appears to have initiated. Detailed examination of the recovered soils suggest that recent hurricanes periodically inundated the swamps with saline and/or brackish water, which cause a mass dieoff of swamp vegetation and flocculation of suspended clays, due to the sudden increase in salinity. These conditions promote deposition of discontinuous clay seams beneath layers of organics, which are then covered by fresh water swamp deposits. This sequence is repeated, like a series of tree rings, throughout the swamp deposits. The cypress swamp deposits lying beneath the levee also exhibit high hydraulic conductivity. These materials contain corky wood, and recovered samples often exhibited densities less than water. Nine of the post-Katrina borings recovered intact samples of a basal rupture surface comprised of organic silty clay exhibited near zero residual shear strength after shearing 80 to 100 nun. CE Database subject headings: Levees; Failures; Swamps; Marshes; Hurricanes; Louisiana.

Causal attribution for one of the largest disasters in American history has undergone three major shifts. From August 2005 through November 2009, the principal explanation of the flooding of New Orleans was characterized by three distinguishable phases – reactive, organizational, and legal – as the catastrophic events of Hurricane Katrina were ascribed to natural, geotechnical, and environmental causes. From a monstrous storm, to failed levees, and ultimately the loss of wetlands through an insidious shipping channel, ‘what happened’ should be viewed as a technoscientific development in which media and litigation processes transformed the structural conditions for the production of knowledge claims. Video ethnography is used to examine causal transitions as structural conditions of inquiry changed. Levees – the most important symbol of failure – shifted from cause to consequence. Understanding of disaster cycled from nature to humans, and to nature once more. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The residential patterns of citizens of New Orleans based on race, ethnicity and class since colonial times are discussed. They have been highlighted due to the varied extent of damage caused by Hurricane Katrina in different areas of the city.

Researchers assert that the restoration of the ecosystem in the Mississippi Delta after the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 is of prime importance in saving New Orleans. Various proposals to restore the Mississippi River and the surrounding wetlands are discussed.

Floodwaters in New Orleans from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were observed to contain high levels of fecal indicator bacteria and microbial pathogens, generating concern about long-term impacts of these floodwaters on the sediment and water quality of the New Orleans area and Lake Pontchartrain. We show here that fecal indicator microbe concentrations in offshore waters from Lake Pontchartrain returned to prehurricane concentrations within 2 months of the flooding induced by these hurricanes. Vibrio and Legionella species within the lake were more abundant in samples collected shortly after the floodwaters had receded compared with samples taken within the subsequent 3 months; no evidence of a long-term hurricane-induced algal bloom was observed. Giardia and Cryptosporidium were detected in canal waters. Elevated levels of fecal indicator bacteria observed in sediment could not be solely attributed to impacts from floodwaters, as both flooded and nonflooded areas exhibited elevated levels of fecal indicator bacteria. Evidence from measurements of Bifidobacterium and bacterial diversity analysis suggest that the fecal indicator bacteria observed in the sediment were from human fecal sources. Epidemiologic studies are highly recommended to evaluate the human health effects of the sediments deposited by the floodwaters. Lake Pontchartrain | water quality

BACKGROUND: Two devastating hurricanes ripped across the Gulf Coast of the United States during 2005. The effects of Hurricane Katrina were especially severe: The human and environmental health impacts on [...]

A study on the importance of viewers' first impression of a crisis compares the television coverage of Hurricane Katrina by FOX News Network and Cable News Network (CNN). It finds that while FOX stressed the physical devastation caused by the storm and de-emphasized the human angle, CNN highlighted the human tragedy over the damage to property.

A study is conducted to compare the differences in crisis preparation, information seeking patterns and media use on the basis of race in the consequences of Hurricane Katrina. The study result found differences in crisis preparation and information seeking on the basis of race, which urges the creation of effective messages that encourage crisis preparation.

Crisis communication research rarely highlights the voices of marginalized publics or their advocates whose interests are affected by crisis situations. We take a different approach by using a response to a natural disaster to expand our theorizing about crisis situations beyond those that hurt the bottom line. Using official statements from Senators Lanclrieu and Obama about events surrounding Hurricane Katrina as texts for analysis, we demonstrate how they used transcendence, rhetorically, and appropriated the Bush administration's key term--security--to garner more support for their positions, Katrina sufferers, and relief efforts. Implications of this strategy serve to broaden crisis communication theorizing, and to provide insights into ways to strengthen the quality of crisis emergency response planning and response protocols. Keywords: Crisis Communication; Hurricane Katrina; Emergent Agents; Transcendence; Issues Management; Public Relations; Security

Four propositions drawn from 60 years of natural hazard and reconstruction research provide a comparative and historical perspective on the reconstruction of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Decisions taken over its 288-year history that have made New Orleans so vulnerable to Katrina reflect a long-term pattern of societal response to hazard events--reducing consequences to relatively frequent events, and increasing vulnerability to very large and rare events. Thus Katrina's consequences for New Orleans were truly catastrophic--accounting for most of the estimated 1,570 deaths of Louisiana residents and $40-50 billion in monetary losses. A comparative sequence and timing of recovery provides a calendar of historical experience against which to gauge progress in reconstruction. Using this calendar, the emergency postdisaster period appears to be longer in duration than that of any other studied disaster. The restoration period, the time taken to restore urban services for the smaller population, is in keeping with or ahead of historical experience. The effort to reconstruct the physical environment and urban infrastructure is likely to take 8-11 years. Conflicting policy goals for reconstruction of rapid recovery, safety, betterment, and equity are already evident. Actions taken demonstrate the rush to rebuild the familiar in contrast to planning efforts that emphasize betterment. Because disasters tend to accelerate existing economic, social, and political trends, the large losses in housing, population, and employment after Katrina are likely to persist and, at best, only partly recover. However, the possibility of breaking free of this gloomy trajectory is feasible and has some historical precedent.

A US politician Robert Kennedy's actions in Mississippi offer an important lesson about the capacity of a single, politician, angry and determined to change the way the poor are seen. Comments are provided on the efforts taken by Robert Kennedy for the people affected by Hurricane Katrina.

People in New Orleans and South Louisiana know about the River and about hurricanes the way people in other places know about earthquakes or volcanoes and yet taxpayer-insured houses are built on barrier islands and in known floodplains. This shows the attitude toward certainties of very low probability since everybody knew that a Katrina might happen any time but short-run avarice always triumphs over long-run prudence and such interventions have unforeseeable consequences.

The tragedy of New Orleans is not exclusively a technological one since a political structure fraught with untruthfulness and a class system tinged with racial antipathy contributed to the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina. The key event was a technological failure, the collapse of the canal walls and hence it is up to the federal government at Washington to choose the science and technology and invest in the infrastructure that will make the city safe from other hurricanes.

Louisiana is prone to subsidence and holding Louisiana has been a major problem for the builders since the US Army Corps of Engineers assumed control of the New Orleans levees in 1917. In view of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the agency is faced with the problem of how to go about duplicating nature and allowing Mississippi to meander and spread its replenishing mud blanket across the Delta without disrupting navigation or risking a serious flood.

The public discussion focused on whether anyone was to blame for the suffering of Katrina Hurricane for which some suggested that the blame game is unproductive and that one should accept that when disaster hits, no humans are to blame for the hurt that follows. Senator Barack Obama, argued that blame is indeed unproductive, but all should think about the responsibilities of the government and citizens who have to people vulnerable in the face of natural disaster.

New Orleans a city with 70% African-American population has a subversive and unique culture of resistance. This is reflected in the way the city is slowly rising, standing up and fighting for its rebuilding and rehabilitation in the aftermath of floods.

New Orleans' educated middle class and underclass suffered the most in aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which totally destroyed the city. The little or literally no help that the affected African-Americans, who form a significant part of the inhabitants of the area, received from the hands of political authority has inspired a new or renewed civil right movement in the area.

New Orleans, which is recovering from the disater inflicted by Hurricane Katrina, presents a completely different sight, appearing whiter, older, and richer. The city has only progressed steadily, and rebuilding the city apears to be a long-drawn process, with obstacles in the form FEMA flood maps and insurance checks, impeding the process.