Search

Focussing on “writtenness” can sharpen our sensibility of how liberally the German legal system allows the Federal Constitutional Court, as well as other courts, to acknowledge legal norms or principles whose textual basis in the Grundgesetz is far from obvious – which in other jurisdictions might be put into the area of norm-free, principle-oriented argumentation, i.e. whose constitutional quality is being problematized.

Nachdenken über Leitideen und Inhalte, Geschichte und Praxis.

Dr. Elisabeth Selbert, who took her A levels in self-study and completed her law degree in six semesters, did her doctorate – ahead of her time – on the principle of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. As a member of the Parliamentary Council, she was one of the four ‘mothers’ of the German Constitution. The inclusion of ‘Men and women shall have equal rights’ in Art. 3 (2) of the Basic Law (‘Grundgesetz’) is her merit. On the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the ‘Grundgesetz’, this contribution aims to portray her life, achievements and impact in a short profile.

In einer Gesellschaft, die sich über alles Mögliche mit zunehmender Aggressivität streitet, scheint das Grundgesetz, dessen 75. Geburtstag jetzt allenthalben begangen wird, eine Art letzter Fixpunkt des Konsenses zu sein. Man hält sich an ihm fest und ist dafür dankbar. Dies ist auch deswegen erstaunlich, weil dieses Grundgesetz ja nicht sonderlich weit entfernt vom politischen Streit operiert. Es ist kein viel geliebtes Kulturgut wie die Bilder Caspar David Friedrichs oder die deutsche Nationalmannschaft in ihren besseren Zeiten, sondern das Medium in dem und um das gestritten wird. Tatsächlich gibt es viele Indizien dafür, dass es mit dem Konsens um das Grundgesetz nicht weit her ist.

Immanuel Kant, born on April 22, 1724, would have celebrated his 300th birthday this year. And the German Constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) turns 75 years old in a few weeks. What do these two mean to each other? What does Kant's philosophy have to do with the Basic Law?

Ervedosa's article demonstrates from a cultural perspective that the categories 'Südländer' (Southerner) and 'südländisches Aussehen' (Southern looks) in German police reports are discriminatory since they challenge the central principles of the German constitution. They infringe the fundamental right in Article 3.3, that is, the right not to be racially discriminated against, the fundamental rights of human dignity (Article 1.1) and human equality (Article 3.1), as well as the constitutional right to be a German citizen regardless of one's skin colour (Article 116). It argues that the terms are a form of skin-colour racism in that the police carry out their work—investigations, searches, inquiries and so on—on the basis of the perpetrator's racialized phenotype. The categories basically stand for 'Mediterranean looks'—even referred to in the past as the 'Mediterranean race'—and phenotype: dark hair, dark eyes and so-called 'skin type IV', that is, 'olive or brown skin'. They are the product of a tradition of racialized, exclusionary thinking that collides with the humanistic and democratic values of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sozial Extra is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Public Law / Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Recently, extremist 'populist' parties have succeeded in obtaining large enough democratic electoral mandates both to legally make substantive changes to the law and constitution and to legally eliminate avenues to challenge their control over the government. Extremists place committed liberal democrats in an awkward position as they work to legally revolutionize their constitutions and turn them into 'illiberal democracies'. This article analyses political responses to this problem. It argues that the twin phenomena of legal revolution and illiberal democracy reveal a latent tension between the constitutional commitments to democracy and liberalism, that is, the equal chance to have one's political goals enacted into law and individual basic rights. Political extremists make the latent tension real when they use the procedures of democratic legal change to abrogate constitutional commitments to liberalism, among other things. Although the two commitments normally coexist side by side, exceptional times raise an existential dilemma for liberal democracies: is it constitutional to democratically amend liberalism out of the constitution? After analysing the moral legitimacy of both the democratic and liberal arguments, this article concludes that liberal constitutionalism is constitutive of genuine democracy. In other words, it is unconstitutional to abrogate basic liberal commitments and it is legitimate to adopt constitutional mechanisms to guarantee liberalism – even if it means constraining democracy to do so. This article then situates 'constrained democracy' within the liberal current as a way to conceive of and respond to this pressing problem. It concludes by discussing four constitutional mechanisms – inspired by the German Grundgesetz – to guarantee liberalism: unambiguous lexically prior commitment to liberalism, limits on negative majorities, the eternity clause and party bans. It concludes that constrained democracy is an important constitutional guarantee of liberal democracy and that the four mechanisms, among others, are essential to enact constrained democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Public Law / Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Public Law / Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In diesem Beitrag wird der Vorschlag, die soziale Marktwirtschaft im Grundgesetz zu verankern kritisch diskutiert. Nachdem kurz an die zentralen Funktionen von Verfassungen erinnert wird, werden drei Fragen diskutiert: (1) Kann die Aufnahme der sozialen Marktwirtschaft in das Grundgesetz zu einer wirksamen Beschränkung der relevanten Verfassungsakteure führen? (2) Inwieweit würde ein zusätzlicher Verfassungsartikel zu einer zusätzlichen Handlungsbeschränkung der relevanten Akteure führen? (3) Würde ein solcher Artikel dazu beitragen, die zentrale Funktion von Verfassungen besser zu erfüllen? Alle drei Fragen werden mit nein beantwortet und der Vorschlag wird somit abgelehnt. The proposal to include the social market economy explicitly into the German constitution is critically discussed. After briefly mentioning the main functions of constitutions, three questions are asked: (1) Would the inclusion of the social market economy into the German constitution be conducive to an effective restriction of the relevant actors? (2) To what degree would an additional constraint in the constitution function as an additional constraint of the relevant actors? And (3) Would such an article be conducive to a better fulfillment of the constitution's functions? All questions are answered negatively and the proposal is thus rejected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nachdem die Soziale Markwirtschaft jahrzehntelang als selbstverständliche Wirtschaftsordnung in Deutschland akzeptiert wurde, wird sie in jüngerer Zeit zunehmend in Frage gestellt. Interventionistische und planwirtschaftliche Eingriffe nehmen zu, vor allem im Wohnungsmarkt, im Arbeitsmarkt und in der Energie- und Umweltpolitik. Das deutsche Grundgesetz bietet keinen Schutz vor solchen Tendenzen, denn es lässt die Frage der Wirtschaftsordnung prinzipiell offen und erlaubt in Artikel 15 sogar ausdrücklich die Vergesellschaftung von Boden und Produktionsmitteln. Eine Gruppe von mehr als 50 Ökonomen setzt sich deshalb dafür ein, diesen Passus zu streichen und stattdessen die Soziale Marktwirtschaft in der Verfassung explizit zu verankern. Der Beitrag diskutiert die Pro- und Contra-Argumente für diesen Vorschlag aus ökonomischer und juristischer Sicht. Er kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass eine Einfügung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft in das Grundgesetz analog zu den Europäischen Verträgen sowohl sinnvoll als auch notwendig wäre. While the Social Market Economy was generally accepted as the German economic constitution for decades, it is more and more challenged in recent times. Both intervening and economically controlling interventions are constantly on the rise, in particular in housing, in the labour market, and concerning energy and environment policy. The German basic law does not provide protection against such tendencies, because it is not specific about the economic constitution and even allows socialisation of both land and means of production in article 15. For these reasons, a group of more than 50 economists stands up for an explicit anchoring of the social market economy in the constitution. The paper discusses the pros and cons of this proposal from both the economic and the legal side. The final conclusion is that, analogously to the European treaties, the social market economy should indeed be included in the basic law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Die Form des Religionsunterrichts in Deutschland beruht auf politischen Entscheidungen. Diese Entscheidungen stehen immer wieder in Frage. Auf der Jahrestagung der GwR 2019 waren die großen Parteien zum Gespräch geladen. Pascal Kober (FDP) hielt fest, dass der Staat die Religionsgemeinschaften und mithin den konfessionellen Religionsunterricht brauche, um selbst neutral sein zu können. Sevim Dagdelen (LINKE) widersprach dem, Religiöses sei gänzlich von staatlichen Zusammenhängen zu trennen. Daher sei ein Ethikunterricht für alle die Lösung. Friedrich Battenberg (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN) schlug demgegenüber vor, auf der Basis des GG eine Variante des Hamburger Modells flächendeckend zu etablieren. Ulrich Commerçon (SPD) plädierte für die jetzige Form und machte sich dafür stark, diese regionenbewusst auszugestalten. Tobias Utter (CDU) trat ebenfalls für das derzeitige Modell ein, wies aber auf notwendige Perspektivenwechsel hin, man könne auch formulieren: Deutschland gehört zum Islam. In Aufnahme der positiven Erfahrungen sei der RU auch weiterzuentwickeln. The framework of German RE is based on political decisions. These decisions are repeatedly matters of discussions. During the conference of GwR 2019 (Association for Research on Religious Education), representatives of major German parties were invited. Pascal Kober (FDP) emphasised that the neutral state needs reliable religious groups und denominational RE to provide the background for values while remaining neutral itself. Sevim Dagdelen (LINKE) disagreed; state and religious matters should be separated. Therefore, Ethics would be the right solution for everyone. Friedrich Battenberg (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN) suggested a variation of the paradigm practiced in Hamburg schools establishing "RE for all". Ulrich Commerçon (SPD) argued for keeping the present denominational RE but suggested regional variations. Tobias Utter (CDU) agreed with this; he pointed out the need for a change of perspective, e.g. it may be considered that Germany is a part of Islam (not only the other way around). Taking up the positive experiences, RE should be developed further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The legal basis of the relation between religion, religious communities and the state in Germany is one hundred years old the rules concerning this relation were taken over from the German constitution of 1919 by the German Basic Law of 1949. In the articles concerning religious education they clearly distinguish between the roles of politics and the state on one hand and religion and religious communities on the other hand: it is the task of religious communities, not the government, to define the religious content of religious education at state schools. Although religion has political implications which can be part of the teaching, this system only works when the religious background of political implications in religious education can be made clear. On the other hand, religious education can serve as a means of politics: in the present political discussion the introduction of islamic religious education at state schools is considered as a means of migrant policy. There are also tendencies to gain governmental control over the religious content of islamic education at state schools by making it part of the education of ethics: Although this cannot be ruled out as unconstitutional, it does not fit in the system of the distribution of responsibilities for religious education between religious communities and the state which is the background of the Basic Law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Politik is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Politische Vierteljahresschrift is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The following article deals with attitudes towards the religious education provided in German state schools in the context of the legal framework for religious instruction. This attitude analysis was conducted on the basis of the ALLBUS (German General Social Survey) data of 2014. Besides individual features such as the subjects' own religiousness, the importance given to religious instruction and their denominational affiliation, regional differences were taken into account. The context characteristic used here is, together with East-West differences, Article 7 of the German Constitution, which defines religious instruction as a part of the regular curriculum. This contribution primarily analyses the interactions of individuals' attitudes and social characteristics on the one hand, and legal requirements on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the question of how democracy and fundamental rights interplay, and compares German and South African law for this purpose. The author argues that democracy requires and presupposes fundamental rights, but that these two values do not always align, and then deals with the question of how to reconcile democracy and fundamental rights in case of conflict. The potential conflict between the two values is sometimes reflected in the relationship between Parliaments as the embodiment of democracy and the Constitutional Courts as the embodiments of fundamental rights (the so- called "counter-majoritarian dilemma"). However, the author rejects the recent critique by some scholars that the German Federal Constitutional Court structurally exceeds its powers visà- vis the German Parliament and that there is a permanent judicial overreach. On the contrary, the author argues that Constitutional Courts do not have sufficient tools to counter a democratic backsliding, i.e. the incremental erosion of democracy. Since the author considers democratic backsliding to be a greater and more acute threat to democracy than judicial overreach, he presents the view that the guarantee of the essential content of a right delineates the minimum of a fundamental right in a democratic society. This view is explained using freedom of expression as example. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cracow Studies of Constitutional & Legal History / Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa is the property of Jagiellonian University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Z Dziejów Prawa is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Slaskiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cracow Studies of Constitutional & Legal History / Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa is the property of Jagiellonian University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)