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Journal of business economics: JBE 91(2), 123–125 (2021). doi:10.1007/s11573-021-01034-z special issue: "Special Issue: Sustainable Operations / Special Issue editors: Günter Fandel, Peter Letmathe, Thomas S. Spengler, Grit Walther", Published by Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg

This article focuses on the question how optimal decisions in a two-firm supply chain can be determined and influenced when the lot size planning of the two firms is expanded to include investment decisions and to coordinate the just-in-time-delivery with the lot size planning on the basis of the Harris- or the Wagner/Whitin-approach. The link between these planning aspects is new. As an approach to a solution of the investment problem we examine a biform game, and consider the solution concept of the core and the cooperative Nash solution in resolving the cooperative game on the second stage of the biform game. We discuss on what terms the two strategic players make their investments. The lot size planning of the supplier (firm 1) is firstly coordinated with his just-in-time-delivery on the basis of the Harris-approach. Then, in a second step, we check to what extent the coordination can be improved if we apply the Wagner/Whitin-approach instead of the Harris-approach because of the dynamic demand structure of firm 1. For all of these decision cases we specify the payoffs of the biform game and look for optimal solutions of the two players. As a special result of the methodological consideration turns out that disposition benefits by Wagner/Whitin will lead to dominant solutions.

Suboptimal business decisions lead to corporate cost increases. The basis of the following study is a game theoretical model of Fandel and Trockel (Eur J Oper Res 226:85–93, 2013a), which analyses the relationship between bonuses and financial penalties in a three-person inspection game and the measures that counteract suboptimal decisions. In the present article we investigate from evolutionary perspectives whether the strategic behaviour of the actors described in an inspection game can be invaded by mutants and what risks emerge as a result. In a first step each of the three decision variables of the players will be discussed. It will become apparent that corporate optimal behaviour is realised when the actions of the business management or the controlling department are fixed. In a second step it will be shown that in games with three strategic variables mutations can undermine the solutions. In a third step we will investigate the model in consideration of monotonic payment and monotonic positive payment functions and divide the area of the solutions into octants to which we will allocate the influence of the mutations and demonstrate the circumstances under which a solution tending towards optimal corporate behaviour can be generated.

This article applies the Cobb/Douglas production function to measure synergy effects of a Public Social Private Partnership (PSPP) project. Following a short overview of the literature on Public Private Partnership and in particular on Public Social Private Partnership the microeconomic approach of the Cobb/Douglas production function is presented which can be interpreted in this context as a generalised Nash solution of cooperative games and opens up the possibility of allocating the synergy effects to the partners of a PSPP project. The Cobb/Douglas production function is at first briefly analysed with regard to its assumptions, implications and consequences, and then applied to the PSPP project Anschub.de that was initiated by the Bertelsmann Stiftung. The empirical analysis uses real data and is based on a survey on the project cooperation partners whereby the resources and budget contributions spent are investigated. With the help of these budget contributions it is possible to determine relative success variables or synergy effects for the partners.

It is important for manufacturing companies to optimise purchase order quantities. Inaccurate lot size planning raises costs and lowers profits, which top management of course attempts to avoid through controlling processes. The lot size decision becomes even more relevant in the case of just-in-time delivery within a supply chain. The interaction between lot sizing and auditing can be described in terms of a modified inspection game. This paper considers how probabilities, which are the basis for the mixed strategies at equilibrium in the inspection game, will change if the level of penalties accruing to the two players (material manager and controller) depends on the cost deviation caused by the material manager's poor lot-size planning. It is evident that the Nash equilibrium shifts to the strategy combination (methodically determined decision and low auditing level), if the penalties imposed on the controller and material manager increase. Penalties that depend on such deviations, and an accurate audit of the controller's report by top management, prove to be the best instruments for avoiding mismanagement by the material manager and poor controller work, both of which lead to high costs.

Kundenintegration ist bereits seit langerem Gegenstand der betriebswirtschaftlichen Forschung, insbesondere des Marketings. Begriffsgrundlage ist ein verandertes Verstandnis von der Rolle des Kunden beim marktlichen Austausch. Statt passiver Abnehmer zu sein leistet der Kunde aktive Beitrage vor, wahrend und nach dem Austauschprozess. Gegenwartig lassen sich vier verschiedene Anwendungs- und Forschungslinien zum Thema nachzeichnen: das industrielle Losungsgeschaft, Mass Customization, Co-Creation bei Dienstleistungen und Value-Co-Creation. Zukunftig ist zu erwarten, dass insbesondere die Moglichkeiten des Web 2.0 zur praktischen und konzeptionellen Weiterentwicklung der Kundenintegration beitragen werden. Web 2.0 manifestiert sich in Moderator-zentrierten Ansatzen wie Crowdsourcing, Schwarmkreativitat und Open Innovation zum einen und Community-orientierten Ansatzen wie Social Network Sites zum anderen. Fur die theoretische Durchdringung darauf aufbauender Zukunftskonzepte der Kundenintegration kommt der Theorie des Sozialkapitals und der Theorie der grenzenlosen Unternehmung eine herausragende Bedeutung zu.

Horst Albach has dealt in his research very often with problems of the quality of balance auditing (Albach 1992, 2003). Sometimes his considerations show close relations to the current crisis of the financial market and its consequences. Some of his contributions were already made in times, when it was not yet expected that the dependency of auditors from clients could once become a serious deficit of auditing. Those aspects also become relevant now in connection with the crisis of the financial market. The misgivings that arise continuously in this context with regard to the correctness of submitted balance sheets have sparked off intense discussions in two directions in the Federal Republic of Germany. Whereas the USA has already realised a prohibition of this nature to a great extent through statutory provisions, a broad spectrum of additional consultancy services is still permissible in the Federal Republic of Germany in spite of similar initiatives on the part of legislators. The present paper analyses methodically in the framework of an extended manager–auditor game how the Nash equilibrium is altered in a non-cooperative two-person game through the behaviour of the players, if the supervisory board, as an exogenous party, detects with a specific probability the incorrect certification of a substantively incorrectly prepared balance sheet. At the same time, payoffs from consultancy services for both players are included in the analysis here. However, with a greater probability of detection of an incorrectly certified incorrect balance sheet, and through the reductions of consultancy payoffs, the supervisory board can work towards the product of audit and publication quality being increased.

In diesem Beitrag wird vorgeschlagen, wie Synergieeffekte fur Projekte des Public Social Private Partnership (PSPP) bestimmt werden konnen. Nach einem Uberblick uber die Literatur zu Definition, Inhalt und Wirtschaftlichkeit von Public Private Partnership und im Besonderen eines Public Social Private Partnership wird ein methodischer Ansatz zur Synergiemessung vorgetragen, der im weiteren Sinne dem Konzept der Cobb/Douglas-Produktionsfunktion ahnelt. Die naheliegende Vorgehensweise, ihn gleichzeitig als verallgemeinerte Nash-Losung kooperativer Spiele interpretieren zu konnen, eroffnet die Moglichkeit, die Synergieeffekte den Partnern eines PSPP-Projektes zuzurechnen. Der mikrotheoretische Ansatz wird im Hinblick auf seine Annahmen, Implikationen und Konsequenzen analysiert und anschliesend auf das von der Bertelsmann Stiftung initiierte PSPP-Projekt Anschub.de angewendet. Der empirischen Analyse liegt eine Befragung der Kooperationspartner des Projekts zu Grunde, in der die Ressourcen und die Budgetbeitrage der Allianzpartner erhoben worden sind. Mithilfe dieser Budgetbeitrage gelingt es, relative Erfolgsgrosen bzw. Synergieeffekte fur die Partner zu ermitteln.

Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert Situationen, in denen die technische Ineffizienz von Produktionsaktivitaten das Ergebnis rationalen okonomischen Entscheidungsverhaltens sein kann. Insofern wurde eine Vorfestlegung der Betrachtung auf ausschlieslich technisch effiziente Aktivitaten zu okonomischen Fehlentscheidungen fuhren. Grunde fur die Rationalitat technisch ineffizienter Alternativen konnen dabei im nutzenmaximierenden Entscheidungsverhalten eines Individuums oder einer Unternehmung insgesamt liegen, oder aber durch die Konstellation exogen gegebener Marktparameter bedingt sein. Diese Falle werden zunachst betrachtet, bevor gezeigt wird, dass die Gutenberg-Produktionsfunktion das Auftreten technischer Ineffizienzen in der Dienstleistungsproduktion infolge rationalen Entscheidens erklaren und damit einen Beitrag dazu leisten kann, die Ansatze technischer Ineffizienz operationalisierbar zu machen.

In general, production-theoretical analysis aims at identifying an enterprise's (technically) efficient production alternatives. According to the principles of economy, achieving technical efficiency is considered as a prerequisite for a producer's further optimization behaviour and, therefore, as a matter of rationality. We will show in our article, however, that it might be economically unfounded to focus only on technically efficient production alternatives. Using a nonlinear inequality-constrained optimization framework, we demonstrate that a profit-maximizing production may imply technical inefficiency, i.e., in graphical terms, depending on the topology of the profit function the optimal input–output combination may be located in the interior of the producer's production possibilities set. In order to show this, we establish mathematical (and economic) conditions for the profit-maximization approach to yield a technically efficient or inefficient solution, respectively. In fact, inefficient solutions emerge when input or output prices are not strictly positive over the entire domain and/or the objective function is non-monotonic. We highlight some non-pathological economic situations that are likely to set the stage for technically inefficient profit maxima and provide an example that illustrates how an enterprise can make use of this approach in order to improve profits by choosing technically inefficient production points. In spite of those optimal inefficiencies, economic environments with positive prices and technical efficiency of the optimum shall remain the normal case.

Investitionsentscheidungen in einer Supply Chain sind fur die beteiligten Unternehmen von grosem Interesse. Das gilt insbesondere dann, wenn in einer Supply Chain mit einem Zulieferer und einem Abnehmer die Entscheidungen des einen Unternehmens die Entscheidungen und den Erfolg des anderen Unternehmens und umgekehrt beeinflussen und nicht geklart ist, wie gemeinsam erzielbare Erfolge untereinander aufgeteilt werden sollen. Diese Situation tritt regelmasig zutage, wenn die Wirksamkeit von Investitionen des Zulieferers in Kapazitatserweiterungen seiner Produktion zur Erreichung und Bereitstellung hoherer wirtschaftlicher Losgrosen davon abhangt, ob der Abnehmer in seine Marketingmasnahmen dergestalt investiert, dass sich seine Nachfrage und die daraus resultierenden Bestelllose steigern und diese nur durch die Kapazitatserweiterungen des Zulieferers gedeckt werden konnen. Die hierzu symmetrische Uberlegung tritt naturlich dann auf, wenn der Abnehmer uber die Wirksamkeit seiner Marketinginvestitionen nachdenkt.

The objective of this paper is to introduce a new perspective of strategic supply chain management to strategic planning. Strategic supply chain management is the long-term part of supply chain management, where the product program and supply chain network are determined. Here the traditional supply chain network of procurement, production, distribution and sales is extended to a product life cycle by the business processes of development and recycling. A general linear mixed integer model is designed considering the business processes of a product life cycle. Goal of this approach is to optimize after-tax profit of a company and to fix the product program and the extended supply chain network. Dynamic aspects are taken into account by the application of a two-step time structure, macro and micro periods, which is well known from general lot-sizing and scheduling optimization models. The main contributions of this new perspective of strategic supply chain management are to permit investment decisions between alternative products and development projects, to compare product life cycles with their development and recycling strategies and to analyze their impact on the supply chain network.