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The conflicting evaluations given to moral issues beg for an explanation. Can such an explanation be found in the invisible presence of competing rationalities that result in intractable disputes? This essay seeks to explore how the work of Alasdair MacIntyre can be useful in making visible the way competing traditions of moral inquiry hamper our attempts to make tractable currently intractable disputes in the field of moral theology. A comparison between the approach of MacIntyre and Charles E. Curran aims at developing a methodology for evaluating such competing modes of inquiry.

The call of the Second Vatican Council for the renewal of moral theology has received very divergent responses. This article identifies and compares three such proposals. The underlying presupposition for this analysis is that each proposal begins with a divergent understanding of where the tradition went awry. Hence, the proposed cures ended up irreconcilable. This article seeks to describe ‘as precisely as possible the nature of the confusion and its sources, showing where attention must be directed if a solution is to be discovered.’1

Over a long career of teaching and writing in the area of moral theology Charles E. Curran has experienced large areas of agreement with John Paul II on issues of social justice even while in other areas of personal and sexual issues the two are in serious disagreement. This phenomenon of agreement/disagreement has suggested to Curran that the pope is guilty of using a double methodology in his moral theological writing. Curran's book, The Moral Theology of Pope John Paul II, seeks to uncover and substantiate the root of their agreements and disagreements. This article seeks to evaluate Curran's theory. This analysis is done in two parts: first, an examination of the evidence that Curran presents to support his charge against the pope, and second, an examination of the alternative possibility that it is Curran who has the double methodology rather than the pope.

In response to the proposal justifying the morality of homosexual acts offered by Todd A. Salzman and Michael G. Lawler, this paper seeks to make intelligible the reasoning used by the New Natural Law Theory and others that arrives at the opposite conclusion. This article proposes to explore the weaknesses in the arguments offered in justification. By proposing an expanded notion of human nature so as to include sexual orientation as one of the factors from which to draw moral norms, the authors have adopted the central proposition of the Old Natural Law Theory defended by Francisco Suarez and others, viz., that human nature as such was a fit source from which to draw moral norms. Thus the New Natural Law Theory, formulated by Germain Grisez to answer the charge of the naturalistic fallacy, has curiously found itself being refuted by a reformulation of the Old Natural Law Theory. This article seeks to show how the proportionalistic reasoning used by Salzman and Lawler leads inevitably to a revival of the naturalistic fallacy.

A case of a foreign body granuloma to polytef (Teflon) appeared as a mass on the left side of the neck and clinically simulated carcinoma of the thyroid. Autopsy results demonstrated that the intracordal polytef extended through the cricothyroid membrane via a fistulous tract forming a suprathyroid nodule.