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The question that animates this article is what feminists ought to do once they find themselves in the wreckage of internal feminist critique brought on by Women of Color and deconstructive feminism. What I seek to do here is controversial, and this is because the argument I will make, in its simplest form, is in keeping with Flavia Dzodan's provocative words that contemporary feminism "will be intersectional or it will be bullshit." More boldly, my argument also rests on an even more divisive feminist position, especially for feminists appearing in Judith Butler and Joan Scott's 1992 edited volume Feminists Theorize the Political : that feminism needs foundations. While purporting to disavow feminist foundations outright, even deconstructive feminists embrace a form of antifoundational foundationalism, or the foundational commitment to antifoundationalism as feminism's normative and methodological imperative. In place of this faux antifoundationalism, I turn to early Women of Color feminists to advance an unabashed, and far more promising, feminist foundation—a political foundation rooted in intersectional feminist commitment buoyed by a traveling and dialogical epistemology. Advancing this uncompromising definition of feminism is a particularly pressing exercise because, in addition to withstanding internal blows since the 1970s, we find ourselves bearing witness to the culmination of a decades-long external onslaught against the feminist gains of the 1960s and 1970s, culminating in the Supreme Court's reversal of Roe v. Wade. The intersectional feminism of early Women of Color feminism, I argue, is vital to meeting contemporary challenges such as these. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the one hand, I show that the later Wittgenstein's practice‐based approach to meaning, including the idea that the meaningfulness of mathematics ultimately is rooted in the everyday 'applications' it emerged from, as well as his insistence on the variability in and contingency of mathematical and mathematics‐like practices, foreshadows more recent work in Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (PMP), although Wittgenstein's approach was more radically practice‐based than what is prevalent in present‐day PMP. On the other hand, I also show that Wittgenstein's work on mathematics is driven by a pervasive critical attitude towards some key characteristics (monism, foundationalism and exceptionalism) of mainstream philosophical discourse about mathematics (then and now), which is mostly absent from present‐day PMP, and I argue that this aspect of Wittgenstein's work on mathematics could inspire present‐day practitioners of PMP to rethink the identity of their discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vasubandhu's Twenty Verses (c. 400 CE) and Descartes's Meditations (1641 CE) each begin by questioning commonsense beliefs about the external world. Yet these texts reach different conclusions: Vasubandhu concludes that human experience is misguided due to the error of subject-object dualism, whereas Descartes restores his faith in human experience via epistemological foundationalism and a reaffirmation of Christianity and commonsense. What might we learn from reading these texts in juxtaposition? Could placing Vasubandhu in dialogue with Descartes be a good way to introduce philosophy teachers and students to the riches of South Asian Buddhist philosophy? How do these two texts guide students toward deeper insights about religion, skepticism, and human experience? What might Vasubandhu and Descartes teach their readers—students and teachers alike—if we were to listen carefully? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethical intuitionism traces its roots back to the early eighteenth century in the field of ethics. Despite apparent distinctions, intuitionism, especially in its recent development by Huemer, bears a striking resemblance to robust versions of rationalist foundationalism. In this paper, we will argue against the perspective of robust intuitionism. Furthermore, we commit to reviewing what theorists operating within the field of study known as Dual Process Theory hypothesize about intuition. Nonetheless, we do not claim that the origin of our moral beliefs is unreliable or discreditable. On the contrary, we entertain the prospect of reviving intuitionistic themes by leveraging the concept of a Kantian scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article intervenes in the debate over the noetic structure of empirical beliefs required for epistemic justification, focusing on the choice between internalist foundationalism and coherentism. Analysing the link between noetic structure and the introspective accessibility of essential justifiers, I argue that coherentism has greater doxastic plausibility than foundationalism. To deepen my account, I constructively develop ideas from the late-period Edmund Husserl to propose a first-order epistemological theory that I term 'Lifeworld Coherentism'. I argue that, especially through the idea of the epistemic agent's 'doxic horizon', this theory can overcome some of the worries surrounding the introspective awareness of belief coherence. Finally, in order to extend the second-order dimension of the debate, I introduce 'Tradition-Based Perspectivalism', a meta-epistemological theory that Erik Baldwin uses to address concerns about the social grounding of epistemic theorising. Though supportive of Baldwin's reading of Alasdair MacIntyre on this point, I argue that Tradition-Based Perspectivalism is a better fit to Lifeworld Coherentism as a first-order theory than to his own preferred Proper Functionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article problematizes Santiago Castro-Gómez's rupture with genealogy in favor of normative political philosophy. This rupture is characterized by a turn toward a political ontology that transforms political concepts into ontological categories that allow Castro-Gómez to posit a category of "the marginalized" as the ultimate foundation of political normativity. Through a dialogue with Frank Wilderson and Frantz Fanon, this article argues that such an ontologization of political categories, Castro-Gómez's political ontology, leads to the reinscription of a colonial foundationalist logic of the terror of exclusion and leads Castro-Gómez to erase the specificity of incommensurable struggles and to constrain political imagination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wilfrid Sellars' 'myth of the given' had a momentous influence on 20th-century epistemology, putting under pressure the internalist foundationalism so prominent in early analytic philosophy. In this paper, I argue that the core themes in Sellars' argument are anticipated in the work of the London philosopher and psychologist Beatrice Edgell (1871-1948). Edgell explicitly argued that "'knowledge by acquaintance' is a myth invented by epistemology" ("Is there 'Knowledge by Acquaintance'?", 196). In some respects, however, Edgell's argument against the myth of the given is even more compelling than Sellars' - or so I will argue. The core of the paper logically reconstructs and historically contextualizes Edgell's line of argument, as emerging out of a critique of Russell's epistemology, with the goal of showing that the 'myth of the given' effectively predated Sellars by four decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robust metanormative realists think that there are irreducibly normative, metaphysically heavy normative facts. One might wonder how we could be epistemically justified in believing that such facts exist. In this paper, I offer an answer to this question: one's belief in the existence of robustly real normative facts is epistemically justified because so believing is indispensable to being a successful inquirer for creatures like us. The argument builds on Enoch's (2007, 2011) deliberative indispensability argument for Robust Realism but avoids relying on an overly pragmatic account of the sources of basic epistemic justification. Instead, I suggest that the sources of basic epistemic justification are those belief-forming methods which are indispensable for zetetically indispensable projects, that is, projects which are constitutive of being a successful inquirer for embodied, agential creatures like ourselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a post-Trump, post-Covid-19 world, it is clear that truth is contested by fake news outlets and misinformation. Less clear is how to navigate the vicissitudes of intersectional discourse without devolving into a Richard Rortyan relativism that denies truth altogether. This paper considers the epistemic commitments of foundationalism and coherentism before turning to pragmatist Susan Haack to explore whether there are convergences between the two. The goal of this paper is three-fold: (1) to clarify how truth and fact feature in foundationalist and coherentist epistemic thinking; (2) to offer a pragmatist "foundherentist" intersection between foundationalism and coherentism; and (3) to use (1) and (2) to highlight the untenable position Rortyan relativism represents, specifically in relation to education formally understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A foundationalist account of our empirical thinking divides propositions we accept into two classes, basic and derivative, and sees the warrant of derivative propositions as accruing to them through their derivation from basic propositions. Such an account needs to answer two questions: which propositions are basic, and whence do basic propositions acquire their warrant? A natural and ancient answer to these questions is that basic propositions are observational and that these propositions gain their warrant from perceptions. I critically examine this view and also a variant view offered by Wilfrid Sellars. I put forward an alternative conception, dialectical foundationalism, that sees the distinction between the basic and the derivative as issuing from a distinction between two kinds of reasoning, derivational and dialectical. This type of foundationalism provides a more accurate account of our empirical thinking, I argue, than its traditional and Sellarsian counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios de Derecho is the property of Estudios de Derecho and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cogency: Journal of Reasoning & Argumentation is the property of Cogency Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article, I examine al-Ghazālī's methodological skepticism and its role in establishing foundational knowledge.1 Despite the considerable scholarly attention given to The Deliverance from Error (al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl), the foundationalism present in it has received relatively limited investigation. Al-Ghazālī established the foundations of knowledge by taking his methodological skepticism to its logical conclusions. His engagement with the sources of knowledge, namely, taqlīd, sense perception, and self-evident truths form the cornerstone of his skepticism. To understand how al-Ghazālī finds deliverance from his skeptical impasse, and ultimately establish foundational knowledge, the concepts of "divine light" and fiṭra will be discussed. Unlike Greek skepticism, al-Ghazālī's skepticism was not a denial of the possibility of knowledge about the nature of reality, nor was it a denial of Muslim doctrine, but a methodological approach to establish the foundations of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is commonly held that the most laudable research is constructed around a healthy interplay among theories, methods, and data. Despite this long-standing consensus, many scholars have voiced concerns that theoretical frameworks are too often given inadequate attention and are generally underdeveloped. This impression has yet to be expressed with an empirical basis. For this reason, we evaluate this apparent disciplinary situation by creating a dataset made up of 217 articles from general sociology journals, as well as 22 US graduate-level classical theory syllabi. Through various means, we assess how often and to what extent sociologists apply classical theory in their research. Rather than intensive theorizing and/or earnestly striving to elevate historical consciousness, we find that sociologists typically reduce the theoretical dimensions of their analyses to thin commemorations of foundational texts. To our knowledge, this is the first empirically based assessment of the degree to which classical theory is used and cited in sociological research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rendón Rojas has recently defended the idea that disciplines and particularly, information science, need some kind of foundation for their development. At the same time, in his attack on anti-foundationalism, he refers to the fact that it is not possible because it is unfeasible to evade the principle of sufficient reason, and that its adoption leads to relativism and subjectivism. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to develop a critical discussion of Rendón Rojas's proposal, from an antifoundationalist perspective. To do this, a literature review is carried out and are analyzed the various variants of foundationalism as a philosophical current, in order to establish the main criticisms that have been made of it. Sellars' arguments are presented when considering foundationalism and the myth of the given. The criticisms of relativity and subjectivity made to anti-foundationalism are examined. A critical discussion is carried out on the principle of sufficient reason as a bastion for the disciplines, it is sustained that its presentation is an area of controversy and debate. Also, it presented an anti-foundationalist vision for information science. It is concluded that anti-foundationalism offers a fertile field when it comes to thinking about how scientific disciplines are consolidated, how they achieve consensus and community agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the epistemological trajectory of the philosophy of Religion, contemporary religious epistemologists seem to have undertaken the task of attestation of religious beliefs, their defence, ascertainment and justification, resorting to sanctioned methods of epistemic justification. The models of epistemic justification of religious beliefs they have adopted were intended to bring in a kind of objectivity into the religious realm and make meaningful assertions on shared experiences. The acclamation of such esteemed epistemic attempts should be viewed as feverish attempts made by religious epistemologists to subject religious beliefs to standard epistemic treatment. In this paper, three contemporary models of justification of religious beliefs by three outstanding religious epistemologists, namely, Alvin Plantinga, whose theory of proper basicality and the warrant, the epistemological holism with the application of Lakatosian principle in Philosophy of Science by Nancey Murphy and the cumulative case evidentialism by Richard Swinburne are critically analysed using the parameters of logical consistency, methodological acumen, norms of belief formation, the role of subjectivity, features of religious language and the hermeneutic dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has recently been argued that foundationalists, those who take grounding to be well-founded, should not understand the well-foundedness of grounding as the condition that every grounding chain terminates in the downward direction, because this interpretation of well-foundedness fails to correctly classify certain complex grounding structures. Some structures that plausibly would be acceptable to the foundationalist are classified as not well-founded and others that plausibly would not be acceptable to the foundationalist are classified as well-founded. In this paper I provide a characterisation of well-foundedness in terms of termination that correctly characterises all these difficult cases. This acts as a response to these recent arguments. Furthermore, it allows us to better evaluate their importance: these arguments have not shown that foundationalists are wrong to harbour the intuition that grounding chains must terminate in the downward direction, rather, they have shown that foundationalists need to be more clear about this intuition and how it is born out in more complex grounding structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I analyse Agrippa's trilemma, an old skeptical argument that questions the possibility of justifying any arbitrary belief p and its paradox about justification. Assuming that neither infinitism nor skepticism are satisfactory positions, the main alternatives available to face the problem (foundationism, coherentism and epistemic externalism) are outlined, as well as some central arguments that show the serious difficulties they face. In the case of foundationalism, these problems arise from two dilemmas, which work together with the trilemma to make our philosophical life even more difficult: the so-called Sellar's dilemma and Bergmann's dilemma--although the latter is a very general attack on internalism. The former calls into question the intelligibility of a key idea of standard foundationalism: the notion of justified basic belief. The second casts doubt on the rational sustainability of epistemic internalism, which is a usual presupposition of the presentation of the trilemma. I explore a Humean way out of the trilemma that also manages to escape such dilemmas. Like any position in this difficult territory the way out has costs. However, they do not seem unaffordable. Here I only intend to tentatively present the idea, as a possible way out of our difficulties, which deserves to be seriously discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This inquiry examines the structure of knowledge of nationalism. While numerous studies on nationalism focus on the nature and defining elements of nations, this research explores nationalism discourse from a purely epistemological viewpoint and asks two overarching questions: what are the constitutive beliefs in these various theories and how are they structured? The first section outlines a contemporary foundationalist argument and analyzes two widely accepted theories of nationalism from this theory of knowledge. The study finds that the linear constraints of a foundationalist approach, resting on the existence of non-inferentially justified beliefs, provide a weak framework for understanding the knowledge structures of nationalism. No single element alone can be deemed to be a sufficient basic belief of nationalism that is self-justified. The second part of this research utilizes contemporary coherence theory to assess the interconnected beliefs embedded in nationalism. Examining several theories of nationalism which arguably adopt coherentism, this particular theory of knowledge is shown to provide a more holistic approach. The study concludes that the very definition of nationalism incorporates interconnected beliefs and ideas about ideology, ethnic basis, shared culture and history, as well as unity and autonomy which imply a befitting epistemological refocus away from foundationalism and towards coherentism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized by proponents of the notion that grounding can be, indeed is, overdetermined. Moreover, it seems safe to suppose that something of a consensus has emerged: grounding is overdetermined and there is nothing about it that we ought to find concerning. Not only is the overdetermination apparently not problematic, metaphysically speaking, but that grounding is overdetermined is not problematic, conceptually speaking, either. From a small sampling of alleged cases, however, no such conclusions can responsibly be drawn. And without an account of when a fact is technically overdetermined, we are unable to reasonably answer questions about the acceptability of that overdetermination either. In this paper, I attempt to understand when a fact is technically metaphysically overdetermined. I argue that such an exploration reveals that nothing as regards the overdetermination of grounding is straightforward, and that the phenomenon is deserving of much more philosophical attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A prominent Thomistic cosmological argument maintains that an infinite regress of causes, which exhibits a certain pattern of ontological dependence among its members, would be vicious and so must terminate in a first member. Interestingly, Jonathan Schaffer offers a similar argument in the contemporary grounding literature for the view called metaphysical foundationalism. I consider the striking similarities between both arguments and conclude that both are unsuccessful for the same reason. I argue this negative result gives us indirect reason to consider metaphysical infinitism as a genuine possibility, the view that chains of ontological dependence or ground can descend indefinitely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper is a critical survey of John Kekes' perspective on the recent trends and future prospects of epistemology. The three fundamental issues in contemporary epistemology that engaged the attention of Kekes are intimately connected to justification: foundationalism, skepticism and rationality. The paper argues that Kekes' epistemic survey of these issues is on the one hand commendable as his analysis clearly reveals a sound awareness, understanding and apprehension of the recent trends and future prospects in epistemology. On the other hand, the paper critically exposes the conceptual flaws and problems that fraught Kekes' epistemic survey in the final analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International development higher education is a distinct space in a vibrant and growing field of higher education studies. This paper examines international development higher education scholarship to highlight its thematic, disciplinary, methodological, and analytical eclecticism. At the heart of international development higher education is the assumption that the world can be made better by the human effort invested in higher education. This paper offers a novel conceptualisation of the ways in which higher education's contributions to development can be understood. The bulk of the existing literature essentialises higher education's role in the advancement of human capital and the modernisation of societies. In contrast, anti-essentialist understandings can include various conceptualisations of how higher education can contribute to the realisation of human rights and capabilities to pursue the freedoms people value. A holistic understanding of university contributions to development would encompass all of the essentialist and anti-essentialist, as well as post-foundationalist ways of looking at this important but empirically elusive link. The paper suggests to delink development from 'international' and reframe development as 'glonacal', thus allowing scholars and practitioners to be less bound by nation-state borders, and more conscious of the local nuance and the global connectedness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The expression "from metaphysics to rhetoric" immediately takes us back to the centuries-old confrontation between metaphysical philosophy and rhetoric. In the context of contemporary thinking and the so-called "rhetorical turn", the challenges that this change implies in terms of the image of thought are analyzed. How does the assumption of the rhetoricity of language lead to abandoning the representationalism, essentialism and foundationalism characteristic of the metaphysical gesture? And what shifts does this cause in epistemological terms? Who in Portugal approached this philosophical theme in greater depth and what developments gave continuity to it in terms of rhetorical-argumentative theory? Why is an argumentative image of thought necessary? Here are some questions that this article proposes to address. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In “The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils,” Jacques Derrida writes: “Today, how can we not speak of the university?” This article pursues this question, the problematic ways Derrida frames this question, and the persistence of his frame. At issue are several implications: for the forms of writing we pursue—hence a discussion of genre; for thinking about “thought” as fundamental to the formation of the university, as Derrida (glossing Heidegger) thought; for considering what kinds of governmentalities, especially technological governmentalities, and forms of governance and deliberation elude or circumvent the “watchful eye of the Principle of Reason”; for considering less grand and more pragmatic forms of philosophical engagement and institutional deliberation that might matter for contesting increasingly instrumental notions of the contemporary university once “thinking about thinking,” having abandoned utility, has also lost the assumption of tenure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Henry Giroux's critical pedagogy, and explores the interconnections among education, democracy, and hope. Whereas critical pedagogy rejects foundationalism, it still requires a normative foundation to criticise oppressive situations and pose a vision of the future. Giroux rejects foundationalism and regards oppressive force such as neoliberalism as an enemy of both hope and democracy. He regards hope as an act of imagination, something to be cultivated, which can be regarded as a medium of mobilisation. This seems inconsistent with the tenets of critical pedagogy, as mobilisation is often thought to suppress individual human agency, which Giroux and other critical pedagogues have emphasised heavily. This paper solves this inconsistency via the radical democracy advocated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and Gramscian insights regarding hegemony and education, and redefines the role of hope in Giroux's theory. Giroux's framing of hope moves us towards certain normative claims and mobilises people to desire democracy as a normative foundation for society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Usually, the criticism of the modern foundational epistemological project and the representational conception of knowledge is associated with the philosophies of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. However, in an epigone of British idealism such as Michael Oakeshott, one can also recognize a singular position against philosophical foundationalism, representational epistemology, the theory of truth as correspondence and universalist rationalism. This article aims to reconstruct Oakeshott's philosophical inquiries into the conditions of human experience and understanding. Through the exegesis of his philosophical essays, we propose an integral reading of his systematic reflection on the modalities of human knowledge, which coherently combines idealistic, skeptical, and hermeneutical motives beyond the temptations of traditional epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on contemporary epistemology, infinitism, and coherentism treated as serious theoretical contenders. Topics include systematic defense of the viability not only of a kind of first-order ontological non-foundationalism but also of a second-order non-foundationalism about truth; and Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy without ever mentioning Madhyamaka philosophers, texts, concepts or arguments.

This article takes a conceptual approach to an issue of pedagogical relevance—the presence of teaching and learning moments within educational environments. We suggest sources of philosophical confusions that design patterns for the classification and creation of typologies of classroom events. We identify three foundational assumptions with the way in which classroom events are analyzed: (1) Describing a classroom event (how it may be identified and described as a teaching and learning moment); (2) Devising a procedure for co-classifying events (introducing a typology distinguishing teaching and learning moments); (3) Repurposing decontextualized events to fit a preferred analytic model (distorting the phenomenology of events for the purpose of classifying these as teaching and learning moments). Hitherto these assumptions have obscured the phenomenal integrity of the learning environment; since the topic sought is based on critical incidents according to analysts' interests, but not on the actual identifying details of the setting as made available by the participants. While teaching and learning moments are generic issues, in methodological terms these matters have to be explored in their details. In our article, we align ourselves with particular research approaches, namely ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, that facilitate close analysis of 'perspicuous settings', such as classroom interactions, through which phenomena such as teaching and learning moments are made visible as collaborative accomplishments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conceptual engineering is commonly characterized as the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. Little has been said, however, on how best to construe these representational devices—in other words, on what conceptual engineering should be all about. This paper tackles this problem with a basic strategy: First, by presenting a taxonomy of the different possible subject matters for conceptual engineering; then, by comparatively assessing them and selecting the most conducive one with a view to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, that is, a method that can be applied effectively and consistently to specific case studies. The outcome is that conceptual engineering should be all about concepts on pain of pragmatic inconsistencies otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transatlantic field of global media ethics is premised on a search for the conceptual foundations of plurality. This article is a critique of this very endeavor. I offer this critique through works authored by moral anthropologists of Islam and through a close reading of the Urdu text Cyberistan: Muslim Naujavan Aur Social Media (Cyberistan: Muslim Youth and Social Media) authored by Sadatullah Husaini, the current president of the Indian reformist Islamic organization Jamaat-e-Islami Hind. My article is a post-foundational critique of the implicit foundationalism through which "Islam" and "plurality" are related to each other within inquiries into the ethics of digital communication. I take on digital communication because of its increasingly global and synchronic nature that rendered questions concerning plurality in media ethics particularly urgent. I argue that even though it is important to ask what difference means conceptually for a global media ethics today, it can only make space for radical plurality via the negative, by way of its contradictions and structural constraints. If a global media ethics is supposed to be based on openness and plurality, it can be so only by limiting and weakening its own ontological claims – beyond positive metaphysical groundings, cultures, civilizations, Islam, etc. In other words, it requires a reflexivity to its own position as an academic discipline that produces knowledge under certain historical conditions and an understanding of its own political practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we present statistical analyses of three textbooks used by Swedish teachers to support year one children's learning of mathematics. One, Eldorado, is authored by Swedish teachers, another, Favorit, is a Swedish adaptation of a popular Finnish series and the third, Singma, is a Swedish adaptation of a Singapore series. Data were coded against the eight categories of foundational number sense, which are the number-related competences literature has shown to be essential for the later mathematical success of year one learners. Two analyses were undertaken; the first was a frequency analysis of the tasks coded for a particular category, the second was a time-series analysis highlighting the temporal location of such opportunities. The frequency analyses identified statistically significant differences with respect to children's opportunities to acquire foundational number sense. Additionally, the time series showed substantial differences in the ways in which such tasks were located in the structure of the textbooks. Such differences, we argue, offer substantial didactical challenges to teachers trying to adapt their practices to the expectations of such imports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Richard Rorty's controversial works in various areas of epistemology, language, politics and philosophy have drawn intellectual attention worldwide. In Iran, Rorty's own distinctive way of thinking has attracted the attention of intellectual and philosophical circles. This article explores how his thought as received by Iranian intellectuals has contributed to the development of their ongoing debate on tradition and modernity. A few Iranian intellectuals have tried to find in Rorty's ideas a solution to what they perceive as their own society's problems. In particular, they believe his notion of anti-foundationalism and his idea of the priority of democracy to philosophy are ways to reconcile their own traditional philosophical and doctrinal conceptions with modern democratic institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an attempt to read Waiting for the Barbarians from the standpoint of an approach which is critical of modern intellect and its underlying foundations including the belief in universalism and foundationalism. Taking the Empire as the material and intellectual manifestation of the modern intellect, I will focus on the way foundationalism and universalism are likely to lead to totalization. As a result, modern intellect, despite its pretensions to holding liberal and universal views, has become inevitably reductive and exclusionary in relating to the other. The desire for boundary-drawing and closure is named 'metaphysic of comprehension', a term introduced by Robert Eaglestone who has been inspired by Emmanuel Levinas's philosophy of ethics. I want to argue that Coetzee's novel lends itself to a reading in which this yearning for comprehension is exposed and criticized. The question of representation, the pursuit of truth and the implementation of justice are areas which my analysis will be concerned with. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That theological training, only, may not be in itself adequate to prepare priests for their leadership roles, is a subject which many in the church circles, prefer to avoid. Using Mumford's Leadership Capabilities and Osmer's Practical Theology theories, this study sought to assess the clergy's leadership capabilities in the Ethiopian Episcopal Church in South Africa, and to suggest solutions that could be implemented to mitigate the leadership competency gaps, should such be identified. The authors opted for a mixed-methods approach to the study, intending to first expose the respondents to information about what capabilities leaders needed to possess, to be effective. Following self-assessment, they were requested to suggest what might be done to improve their leadership capabilities and their capacity to lead the church. The most compelling findings were that the clergy largely confirmed the inadequacy of clerical training as well as their incapacity and supported the idea of additional capacitation to augment their theological training. This includes a crossdisciplinary approach to clergy development, interdenominational collaboration, formalisation of clergy development programmes and open discussions on the church's doctrine, vision and values. The study also found sizeable support for the regulation of admission to the priesthood and the setting of minimum entry qualifications for such admission to be effected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines that justice on the Supreme Court was a common law judge. Topics include reports that the common law still matters as it remains the foundation on which federal statutes are written; and considered that dispute seems at first to confront an ordinary problem of statutory construction, but in fact it requires linking the federal statute to foundational principles of the common law .

The article discusses the similarities and differences between Buddhist philosopher Srigupta and German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in their understanding of being and unity. Topics covered include how both philosophers embrace a metaphysical principle linking being and unity, Leibniz's argument in favor of a kind of idealist foundationalism, and Srigupta's argument for a rejection of full-blooded existence altogether.

The article focuses on Buddhist philosopher Candrakirti's concept of epistemic coherentism. Topics covered include the contrasts between coherentism and foundationalism in epistemology, Candrakirti's critique of the Pramanavada approach by Buddhist scholar Dignaga, and his insistence on pramana-prameya interdependence.

In this article, I offer a fresh perspective on John Locke's and Alexis de Tocqueville's religious statesmanship that sheds light on the moral and political problems facing America today. Both thinkers maintain that a firmly held set of religious beliefs must ground the popular mores, or character traits, that support liberty. According to most scholars, Locke considers popular enlightenment the best means for promoting these beliefs. I argue, however, that Locke mistrusts intellectual freedom and seeks to use authority to promote the core doctrines of reasonable Christianity, which is his preferred faith. I also compare Locke's version of religious foundationalism with Tocqueville's more well-known case for this concept and show how Tocqueville modifies reasonable Christianity to strengthen it against democratic skepticism. I conclude by briefly reflecting on the weakening of America's religious foundations today and on what this portends for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the scope of beliefs that people can form on the basis of perception remain fixed, or can it be amplified with learning? The answer to this question is important for our understanding of why and when we ought to trust experts, and also for assessing the plausibility of epistemic foundationalism. The empirical study of perceptual expertise suggests that experts can indeed enrich their perceptual experiences through learning. Yet this does not settle the epistemic status of their beliefs. One might hold that the background knowledge of experts is the cause of their enriched perceptual experience – what is known as cognitive permeation – and so their subsequent beliefs are only mediately justified because they are epistemically dependent on this background knowledge. I argue against this view. Perceptual expertise is not the result of cognitive permeation but is rather the result of perceptual learning, and perceptual learning does not involve cognition in a way that entails cognitive permeation. Perceptual expertise thus provides a means of widening the scope of the immediately justified beliefs that experts can form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]