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This article examines the reports on the Russian army by the French military attachés in St. Petersburg to the General Staff in Paris and the intelligence estimates compiled by the Russia specialists of First Bureau (Allied Armies), 1904-14. Officers seconded to the Russian army reported on the remarkable progress made after the war with Japan. French intelligence indicated any Russian offensive against Germany would occur only after the decisive battles in the west and would only tie down limited German forces. The Russian success at the start of the war and resulting transfer of German forces from the Western Front therefore were unexpected by the French General Staff. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the overtures of French President Emmanuel Macron to Russia . Topics discussed include the promotion of a rapprochement between the European Union (EU) and Russia; the strengthening of the EU and the protection of the European civilization; and the readjustment of Macron's objectives with respect to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

European Union member states have been notoriously divided in their attitudes towards Russia. These national positions have, however, too often been essentialized, thereby obfuscating nuances and foregoing the possibility to discern or explain change. Considering its strong political and economic links with Russia, its past positions and the fact that Ukraine had never registered prominently on its foreign policy radar, France's reaction to the Ukraine crisis has been firmer and more active than most could have forecast. This article examines the content, determinants and evolutions of France's policies towards Russia before, during and beyond the crisis. Contrary to traditional explanations, which tend to emphasize historic, cultural, economic or domestic political factors, I argue that these policies have been mainly—and continuously—driven by France's broader milieu goals in international and European politics. These considerations help to account for the policy shift revealed during the Ukraine crisis. Following the emergence of Russia as a central actor in Syria and the correlated politicization of the Russia question in the 2017 French presidential election, the Macron administration has adopted a new diplomatic approach towards Moscow. Yet a different policy direction has not emerged, as the administration has not fundamentally put into question the previously established assessment of how Russia's current foreign policy collides with France's milieu goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1970s, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was the cornerstone of French foreign policy regarding East-West relations. It was considered by Paris as the best way to maintain dialogue with Moscow as well as an instrument to reach the Gaullist goal of overcoming the European status quo. This double objective explains why the French adopted an ambiguous attitude during the CSCE: even though their goal was to challenge the Brezhnev doctrine and initiate a process to meet the aspirations of peoples under Soviet domination, they knew that this would be a lengthy process. For them, it was necessary to avoid provoking the Soviets by putting forward expressively liberal proposals. The French leaders of the 1970s saw the CSCE as the multilateral prolongation of the Gaullist policy of 'détente, entente, cooperation'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article considers popular opinions in France towards Russia during the fin-de-siècle which helped lead towards the Dual Alliance military treaty between the two countries. Topics explored include the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, a comparative study of autocratic Tsarist Russia and France's democratic Third Republic, salons by pan-Slavic activists Olga Novikova, Princess Liza Trubetskaia, and Juliette Adam.

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The Treaty of Portsmouth could not solve all the diplomatic problems between Russia and Japan, and dissenting voices were heard in both countries. Nevertheless, Russo-Japanese relations went in the direction of not only normalization, but also building an alliance. That radical change from hostility has not often happened in history and needs careful research, in particular the early stages of this process after the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth. The construction of an alliance was not the primary goal at the beginning of Russo-Japanese negotiations after the war between the two nations. This goal appeared during the process of solving different problems, and so the international situation is extremely important to understand changes in Russo-Japanese relations. This process had several facets. First, there was the deterioration in Anglo-German relations with a corresponding realignment of British policy towards Russia. Second was the resolution of problems in Central Asia between Russia and Great Britain. Third, there was the mutual interests Japan and Russia had in China, in particular rail interests, which were related to the organic unity of the northern part of the Russian railroad in China. Finally, Russia had the desire to keep relations with France as a corner-stone of foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Military expenditures and the number of service personnel are the two most common features used to compare national military power. However, to what extent they reflect the real world remains a question. This article aims to provide the answer by using data on the great power conflicts in the last 160 years. The Correlates of War data are utilized to highlight that the relation between pre-war military expenditures and the numerical strength of armies on one hand and the outcome of the war on the other is blurred to say the least. States with higher military expenditures prevailed only in six great power conflicts out of nine. Only four of them were won by the state with a numerically stronger peacetime army. The case of the Franco-Prussian war is then used to illustrate that not even superiority in both categories can safely prevent a crushing defeat, still less ensure victory. A nation's military power stems from its ability to adapt effectively to the realities of modern warfare. That is what neither the sheer number of soldiers, nor high military expenditures can guarantee. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses a deal being negotiated between Wagner Group, a private military company linked to the government of Russia, and Mali, which would send military personnel to Mali to train its troops and senior figures. Topics discussed include the implications of the deal for Russia's conflict with France, concerns of the governments of Great Britain and Germany on the deal, and a brief history of the Russia-Mali relations.

The article looks at French attitudes toward Russia during the early 19th century. According to the author, French government propaganda and private correspondence and memoirs by French soldiers in the Napoleonic Wars contributed to a negative perception of Russia. Details on the ways in which travel literature influenced soldiers' accounts are presented. Other topics include Russian geography and French perceptions of the Russian Army.

The article focuses on celebrations that took part in the Czech Republic and Russia dedicated to the 200th anniversary of the victory of the Battle in Kulm that took place in August 1813. The author pays special attention to the contribution of Russian soldiers in the Battle of Kulm to Russo-Austrian alliance's military victory against Napoleon. An account of the author on the commemorative events held in Czech republic us also presented.

This article examines a set of marques de fabrique or trademarks pertaining to Russia registered at the Tribunal de commerce de la Seine between 1857 and 1894, and aims to define the evolution in the types of representations of Russia or Russians from after the Crimean War and before the official Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. This time span marked a critical transition in Franco-Russian relations, as well as changes in French national identities as France passed from the Second Empire to the Third Republic. The study argues that the visual representations found in the marques de fabrique in fact broaden our understanding of the Alliance and stances that France was compelled to cultivate in the face of a Bismarckian Germany and within the context of a colonial empire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]