Search

Canadian courts treat foreign law as fact. When foreign law governs a dispute as a result of choice-of-law rules, the parties must plead and prove its contents, typically through expert testimony. The trial court assesses the evidence and applies the law, as it was proven, to the case at hand. But what happens when a litigant disagrees with the trial court's view of foreign law and appeals its decision? Appellate courts do not interfere with findings of fact unless the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error. Conversely, appellate courts are free to impose their views on questions of law. Should appellate courts defer to the trial judge or get the final word on issues of foreign law? This article addresses the disagreement between appellate courts over this issue, which the Supreme Court of Canada dodged in a recent case. It delves into the complex features of foreign law, insisting on the distinction between its evidentiary treatment (as fact) and its nature and function in litigation (as law). It makes the case for a nuanced approach to the standard of review which accounts for the many ways in which problems of foreign law present themselves to the courts. As a result, appellate courts should characterize specific questions of foreign law as questions of fact or questions of law rather than attempting to pigeon-hole foreign law itself, an abstraction capable of being both. Ultimately, correctness and deference should coexist in the appellate review of foreign law findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canadian courts treat foreign law as fact. When foreign law governs a dispute as a result of choice-of-law rules, the parties must plead and prove its contents, typically through expert testimony. The trial court assesses the evidence and applies the law, as it was proven, to the case at hand. But what happens when a litigant disagrees with the trial court's view of foreign law and appeals its decision? Appellate courts do not interfere with findings of fact unless the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error. Conversely, appellate courts are free to impose their views on questions of law. Should appellate courts defer to the trial judge or get the final word on issues of foreign law? This article addresses the disagreement between appellate courts over this issue, which the Supreme Court of Canada dodged in a recent case. It delves into the complex features of foreign law, insisting on the distinction between its evidentiary treatment (as fact) and its nature and function in litigation (as law). It makes the case for a nuanced approach to the standard of review which accounts for the many ways in which problems of foreign law present themselves to the courts. As a result, appellate courts should characterize specific questions of foreign law as questions of fact or questions of law rather than attempting to pigeon-hole foreign law itself, an abstraction capable of being both. Ultimately, correctness and deference should coexist in the appellate review of foreign law findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the intricate relationship between law and geography and how this relationship is explored through the lens of comparative law and legal geography. Topics include the origins and aims of the special issue, the need for interdisciplinary engagement, and the impact of external factors on legal practices.

This article aims to explore the approaches taken by U.S. federal courts in handling disputes over extraterritorial evidence gathering in civil and commercial matters. In the mid-to-late 20th century, the U.S. Supreme Court issued two judicial opinions discussing how to regulate extraterritorial evidence-gathering activities that might cause conflicts of laws among different nations. A significant feature of its litigation system, U.S. courts encourage parties to actively disclose evidence before trial, a practice unwelcomed by many (though not necessarily out of sound justifications given the recent changes in practice) as overly broad "fishing expeditions." The two Supreme Court precedents discussed how courts should exercise their power to compel the disclosure of information when the requested information is located within another nation, and when forcing the disclosure of such information may lead to a violation of that nation's laws. It is worth noting that the core issues involved in these two cases are not of the exact same nature. One case, indeed, concerned the extent to which U.S. courts should require parties to comply with the procedures set forth in the Hague Evidence Convention, as opposed to whether the information may be discovered at all. By far the most influential multilateral treaty in the field of cross-border civil and commercial evidence gathering, the application of the Evidence Convention in individual cases is undoubtedly crucial in reconciling the conflicts between U.S. discovery orders and foreign laws. Upon analyzing the two Supreme Court cases and a series of subsequent lower court opinions, this article finds that U.S. courts have applied rather similar analytical rules and reasoning to resolve discovery disputes both involving and not involving the Hague Evidence Convention. Given that the factual backgrounds out of which these disputes arise are often quite similar, it is possible that courts have failed to fully appreciate the changes in the underlying inquiries. Consequently, the Hague Evidence Convention is used much less frequently in real life than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to conduct extraterritorial discovery. In order to improve the status quo, this article aims to build a clearer and more sensible analytical framework to help courts better navigate the issues concerning the applicability of the Hague Evidence Convention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is common in Hong Kong courts to apply cases from multiple common law jurisdictions regarding the same principle at the same time--a phenomenon that is less frequently seen in other jurisdictions. The courts adopt suitable ones as applicable law, not just quoting them for mere comparisons. The obvious, tempting benefits of having a greater pool of re/drenee materials have already been well-established by existing literature, so this Article is instead the first tofocus on the drawbacks. In particular, the courts have failed to spot that sometimes the cases are actually inconsistent, which hampers clarity, certainty. and proper development. Three illustrative examples are discussed to show that this pit#ill exists and is not one-of. To avoid this, it is suggested thal whenever authorities. from multiplejurisdiclions are cited concurrently, court and counsels should be skeptical and actively check for inconsistency. No matter how similar the principle may seem, there should never be any rash assumption of consistency. The judiciary should consider introducing a practice direction-which has already been done by Singapore and the United Kingdom-that requires counsels to cite local authority flrst. This Article also explains why it is not helpful to limit the number of jurisdictions referred to, hire judicial assistants, and rely on comparative secondary sources. The insights will be helpful to other common law courts that occasionally refer to Foreign precedents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Federal courts are required to apply the laws of foreign countries in a variety of different cases which range in complexity. The Supreme Court has urged federal courts to treat the determination of foreign law as similar to the determination of domestic state law. And yet, judges receive no specialized training in how to determine foreign law and the resources for conducting independent research on foreign law are not as extensive as those available for researching domestic law. In this article, I review the methods used by federal district courts to ascertain foreign law and determine that judges have largely not conducted independent research when resolving questions of foreign law. Instead, these courts have relied on partisan expert testimony. Although the failure to conduct independent research indicates that federal courts are not treating foreign and domestic law similarly, I argue that this not problematic because foreign law falls into a separate third category that requires courts to use procedure for both questions of fact and law, including relying on expert testimony. The reliance on expert testimony carries the potential for bias since such experts serve as part of a party's case team. I suggest four overlooked resources--similar to those adopted by other countries--that judges can implement to reduce the effects of such bias by making the process for engaging with the foreign legal issues easier and more efficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article demonstrates the difference between the textual justification of legal opinions and what motivates judicial decisions. It analyzes several judicial approaches to augmenting or interpreting the law. It focuses on foreign laws to demonstrate the tension experienced by scholars and judges when laws do not correspond to their values. The Gadamerian approach is used to interpret domestic laws borrowed from foreign countries.

The article discusses various ways of approaching the law from a comparative perspective. First, a comparative law study may focus on the socio-political context that led to the elaboration of similarities or differences in the protection of rights. In this respect, a study of comparative law is by definition an interdisciplinary study. It involves studying the social context which led to the emergence of legal rules, understood as a subcategory of social rules.

The article discusses Roots of Normativity (Roots) is the last work Joseph Raz published before his death in May 2022. Like many of his books it is a collection of papers. Some focus on issues that will likely be of most interest to philosophers of mind and ethics, topics such as the nature of intention, the binding force of a promise, the components of human well-being and the theoretical significance of the notion of a reason.

As recent case law has become more restrictive towards the extraterritorial applicability of American law, the peculiar statutory mechanism under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 has taken on greater importance as a means to bring foreign actions without losing access to United States (U.S.) discovery. In essence, Section 1782 exports U.S. discovery to foreign jurisdictions as if the disclosure mechanism is available independently of other legal infrastructure. As a result, this statute creates a hybrid legal system where U.S. discovery can be combined with the laws of other countries. By combining Section 1782 discovery with favorable elements of foreign law, international litigants may achieve outcomes that would otherwise be unavailable in non-U.S. forums. However, Section 1782 often conflicts with policy considerations behind the laws of other countries. Such mismatches need to be resolved primarily by foreign tribunals due to American courts' reluctance to examine non-U.S. law. If left unchecked, these mismatches may encourage the filing of entrepreneurial lawsuits by those who wish to take advantage of differences between the laws of the United States and other jurisdictions. On the other hand, the exporting of U. S. discovery could also correct the imbalance of laws in foreign countries, thereby inspiring legal changes across national boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often argued that courts avoid foreign laws because they prefer local law. It would make sense if they did—after all, foreign law can be hard to understand and complicated to employ, and it is also... foreign. Aiming to investigate this assumption through a qualitative analysis of all available cases on one question and comparing the findings with the approach towards local matrimonial property cases in Israel, this Article finds something rather different. At least as regards Israeli judges discussing matrimonial property, it appears that sometimes judges do not prefer the lex fori but something else. The Article discusses one case that reveals what could be described as a judicial mutiny, where judges chose to apply neither foreign law nor local law per se. In the case of matrimonial property, a particular legal norm seems particularly close to the judges' hearts. So much so that despite legislative intervention designed to change the judicially-shaped law, the courts continue to apply their own, judicially created law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication. We draw on the ideas of wide reflective equilibrium and public reason in order to defend an engagement model of comparative adjudication. According to this model, the judicial use of foreign law is justified if it proceeds by testing and mutually adjusting the principles and rulings of our constitutional doctrines against reasonable alternatives, as represented by the principles and rulings of other reasonable doctrines. By this, a court points to a wide reflective equilibrium, justifying its own interpretations with reasonable arguments, i.e. arguments that are acceptable from the perspectives defined by other constitutional doctrines, as endorsed by other courts. The point of a judicial engagement of this sort is to work out an overlap between different, reasonable, doctrines in the judicial forum, as part of a liberal forum of public reason. Here, the exercise of public reason filters out the premises of comprehensive doctrines so as to leave us in the region of an overlapping consensus: a region of mid-level principles that can be shared, notwithstanding the fact of legal pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The field of comparative law prioritizes the ascertainment of universals or commonalities across laws, two chimerical pursuits. In the process, comparative research abides significant distortion of information, not always in good faith, and a correlative loss of intellectual warrant. This article urges acknowledgment of such serious epistemic deficit, of its detrimental impact on comparative law, and of the need to restore intellectual integrity to comparative research in law through a radically different approach to foreignness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many contracts that contain a forum selection clause also contain a choice of law clause. This raises the issue of whether to apply the parties' chosen law to questions of forum selection clause interpretation, such as whether the clause is mandatory or permissive and how far the scope of the clause extends. The recent trend has been for courts to apply the law selected by the parties in their choice of law clause to govern these interpretation issues. This Article argues that the law has gone in the wrong direction and that courts should apply forum law to questions of forum selection clause interpretation. This Article challenges each of the stated rationales in favor of applying the parties' chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause: the party autonomy argument; the intention of the parties argument; the certainty and predictability argument; the substance versus procedure argument; the "part of the contract" argument; and the forum shopping argument. None of the purported arguments in favor of applying the parties' chosen law stand up to closer scrutiny. Additionally, this Article examines the myriad complications presented by interpreting a forum selection clause in conjunction with a choice of law clause. Foremost among these is the sheer complexity of the exercise. Particularly when it comes to applying foreign country law, there is uncertainty over exactly what the "chosen law" is. If the parties have selected the law of a European Union country, for instance, there are a variety of possible laws that could apply: internal domestic law, the Brussels Regulation, the Hague Choice of Court Convention, or some combination thereof. Additional complications are presented by structural dynamics of the choice of law endeavor: the principle of party prosecution and the differential treatment of forum selection clauses in a contract without a choice of law clause. Finally, when one examines what courts are doing in practice, it is clear that they are not particularly adept at ascertaining and applying the parties' chosen law to interpret a forum selection clause. The net result is a hodge-podge interpretation of mixed U.S. and foreign law. The choice of law exercise is complicated enough. This Article suggests that we need not make it any more complicated by using the parties' chosen law to interpret a preliminary issue. Ultimately, the responsibility is on the parties to draft forum selection clauses clearly and without ambiguity. If they do so, then none of this is an issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2008, Lord Reed in his paper 'Foreign precedents and judicial reasoning: the American debate and British practice' noted the lack of full scholarly consideration of judicial comparativism in the UK. Ten years later, judicial reference to foreign judgments is still a very common phenomenon in this jurisdiction, however very little has been written about it. This paper assesses the UK Supreme Court's constitutional law jurisprudence in light of the main themes and arguments underlying the international debate concerning judicial comparativism. I argue that: (i) the use of foreign law is constitutionally legitimate where clear statutory language is respected; (ii) transferability concerns are mitigated by the interwovenness of the global common law system; and (iii) methodology concerns are mitigated by the UK Supreme Court's flexible, humble approach, which applies careful scrutiny to the foreign authorities put before it. Foreign judgments, I conclude, are never followed blindly or arbitrarily, and perhaps this is why there is no domestic debate about judicial comparativism, not even in the constitutional sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

United States courts are demanding that businesses break foreign laws at an exponentially increasing rate. A practice that was virtually unheard of only 30 years ago is now so widespread that U.S. courts are ordering foreign lawbreaking in the most trivial discovery matters. When a court receives a discovery request that violates a foreign law, it applies the 5-part Aérospatiale balancing test--a test where 4 of the 5 factors are left to the subjective decisions of the judge. By ordering foreign law breaking, our courts--often biased in favor of United States discovery rules--are encouraging abusive litigation tactics, undermining the rule of law, and causing friction with foreign nations. In this article, I update my original work on court ordered law breaking by analyzing these orders over the last three years, and I conclude that the Supreme Court needs to resolve the circuit split regarding the proper way to handle requests for information that violate foreign laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This amicus brief for China Chamber of International Commerce was filed on 4 April 2018 in Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. No. 16-1220 in the US Supreme Court, which was decided on 14 June 2018. The brief argues that: I. Rule 44.1 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses only what materials may be used in determining foreign law, not what effect to give to these materials, which effect must be determined on considerations outside the Rule, and is consistent with whatever effect properly derived, including "binding deference"; II. A distinction must be made, among the materials used to determine foreign law, between what may count as applicable law and the subsidiary means for determining applicable law, and the interpretation or characterization of Chinese trade law by MOFCOM counts as applicable law; III. The Pink precedent demands that binding deference be given to the interpretation or characterization of Chinese trade law by MOFCOM as the authoritative decision-maker in this area; IV. The act of state doctrine as reflected in Sabbatino also supports binding deference to the interpretation or characterization of Chinese trade law by MOFCOM as the authoritative decision-maker in this area; V. Alternatively and subsidiarily, the interpretation or characterization of Chinese trade law by MOFCOM as the highest administrative authority on trade law in China should be given substantial deference analogous to Chevron deference; and VI. The alleged inconsistency between China's representations to the WTO and its position in this case, even assumed to exist, does not affect the validity of its position in this case as a matter of domestic law and therefore the binding deference due to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explain the 'new' regime of allegation and proof of foreign law in the Spanish courts following the International Legal Cooperation in Civil Matters Act.1 As foreign law has historically been considered by our case law as a 'procedural fact', the International Legal Cooperation Act comes to enshrine this system in Art 33. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The public policy doctrine in the conflict of laws has been often characterised as uncertain and ambiguous. This article aims to examine the doctrine at common law from a theoretical perspective in order to: first, determine whether the substantive considerations which courts have invoked under the public policy doctrine are theoretically justifiable; second, discern principled boundaries around the courts’ exercise of the defence. Through a study of case law and an examination from first principles of the normative basis for the recognition of foreign laws and judgments, this article proposes a set of principles that can form the theoretical underpinning of the public policy doctrine, and will examine how the proposed principles can provide practical guidance to judges in their application of the public policy doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article highlights the significance of this inter-court dialogue and the use of foreign law and practice in domestic courts in the U.S. Topics discussed include influence of the U.S. Supreme Court on the Court of justice of the European Union; cultural and ideological connections between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the U.S. Supreme Court; and transnational dialogue among courts, migration of constitutional ideas, and judicial comparativism as judicial diplomacy.

Copyright of Romanian Journal of Comparative Law / Revista Romana de Drept Comparat is the property of Universul Juridic Publishing House and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the actual criminal code system, the principle of fair evidence administration is a fundamental one. Within this principle, it is ruled the prohibition of the judiciary bodies to instigate, directly or indirectly, an individual to commit or continue to commit a criminal offence in order to obtain case evidence. Procedural loyalty or fairness is a corrective principle of the evidence freedom fundamental that allows usage of any evidence means which is not prohibited by law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The controversy regarding the power of Indian parties to agree on a foreign seat has been framed as follows: The Bombay High Court, in Addhar Mercantile Private Ltd v Shree Jagdamba Agrico (Decision of 12 June 2015), is said to have held that two Indian parties cannot agree to a foreign seat of arbitration and accordingly cannot apply foreign law to the substance of their dispute. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, however, in Sasan Power Ltd v North American Coal Corporation (Decision of 11 September 2015) has held to the contrary--that Indian parties are free to resort to foreign-seated arbitration. This article argues that the decision in Addhar has been misinterpreted, since it does not lay down a bar against Indian parties conducting an arbitration at a foreign seat or applying foreign substantive law. It further argues that the ordinary scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as well as its interpretation in the landmark 'BALCO' judgment, have not been disturbed by the rulings in Addhar or Sasan. It finally examines the policy implications of Indian parties effectively 'contracting out of' the Indian legal system by opting for a foreign seat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a question about why American antitrust law should supplant a foreign country's own determination of how to best protect customers from anti-competitive conduct by foreign companies in places such as Canada, Great Britain, or Japan. The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the 2004 class action case F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran SA is examined, along with antitrust laws in developing countries and the legal aspects of multinational cartels.

The article offers insight to the issues surrounding U.S. jurisprudence for guidance on interpreting its own religious freedom protections. Topics discussed include practice of consulting foreign precedent by the U.S. Supreme Court; European Court of Human Rights perspective of religion jurisprudence; and Mcculloch v. Maryland court case addressing the same.

This article looks at the rules on proof of foreign law before Icelandic courts. It provides a detailed discussion on the methods available to ascertain foreign law in civil proceedings, as well as a concise comparison to several relevant jurisdictions. The methods, consisting of party and witness testimony, assessment reports and documents and other visible evidence, are not equally suitable for the intended purpose. As fairly obvious, a party testimony is of little use in this respect. On the contrary, and perhaps less obvious for the international reader, Icelandic law does not allow for expert witness testimony on foreign law, unless the expert has been summoned by court to provide an assessment report on the issue. However, recent judgments show that Icelandic courts have begun giving consideration to unilaterally obtained legal opinions, contrary to accepted practise. This, whether down to inconsistency or a deliberate change of course, represents a more flexible approach then previously acknowledged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the achilles heel of private international law: how to access, understand and apply foreign law. As globalisation advances, so does the necessity to apply and interpret foreign law, but today even accessing it is still a challenge. This article examines the situation through an empirical study on the application of foreign parentage law by Belgian courts and non-judicial authorities. It also focuses on the use of two existing tools to ascertain foreign law, that is, the European Judicial Network website and the London Convention. The empirical data reveal that judges and non-judicial authorities have no objections in principle to applying foreign law. However, they lack structural support to properly carry out this task. Hence, Belgian courts use escape mechanisms to avoid having to apply foreign law. The article argues that the access to up-to-date and good-quality information on foreign law should remain a key concern of private international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the ways in which the U.S. constitution commit the U.S. to comply with international law. Topics discussed include stature of international law and the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs; the constitutional position toward international law; and history of international law compliance by the U.S. federal government.

The article presents an study of foreign sovereigns' filings as amici in the U.S. Supreme Court and it shows that such filings do and should have important influence on the Court's jurisprudence. Topics discussed include the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the case 'Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.;' Alien Tort Statute; and the Supreme Court's treatment of particular types of arguments by foreign sovereign amici.

The article discusses the idea of American exceptionalism in relation to the enactment of what the author refers to as state Anti-Foreign-or-International-Law (AFIL) statutes in the U.S. as of 2016, and it mentions how many Americans are resistant to the concept of allowing courts across the U.S. to consider foreign laws in litigation matters. The U.S. Constitution's Establishment Clause is examined, along with Oklahoma's anti-Sharia law Save Our State Amendment involving Oklahoma's courts.

Judicial citation of foreign law worries many people, including justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, politicians, and legal academics. The critics in the United States argue that judges "cherry-pick" foreign citations and use them to import foreign norms that do not accord with the Constitution or the will of the American people. This Article argues, based on insights from organizational theory, that the critics overlook another, much greater, concern: the danger does not come from citing or looking at foreign law, but rather, from other types of interaction, such as meetings at judicial organizations, judicial delegations, or judicial conferences. The result of these transnational judicial interactions will be convergence on certain practices of courts, especially in the way courts understand their national roles, the ways they present themselves to their national audiences, and the methods they use to do so. The adoption of these similar practices across national borders is likely to distance the courts from their national audiences and cause courts to lose their national support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the legitimacy of the practice of comparative constitutional law by American courts.

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Privado (00347922) is the property of Editorial Reus and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article explores the propensity of the South African Constitutional Court to engage in foreign law to deal with issues of religion and to determine the actual or potential influence of foreign cases on issues of religion in South Africa.

The article examines the increase in the U.S. courts ordering individuals and companies to violate foreign law. Topics discussed include discovery disputes related to order the violation of foreign law; involvement pro-forum bias ordering the violation of foreign laws; and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the case "Society Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa."

Non-governmental organisations ('NGOs') are key actors in international human rights law, in collaborating with international organisations and in lobbying domestic governments. This paper aims to shed light on the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersexual organisations' transnational advocacy. The first part of the paper focuses on the action of two NGOs operating in Australia and the United Kingdom, which extended their influence beyond the domestic borders, while the second part of the paper researches possible negative consequences of non-governmental advocacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examine family policy in European Union concerning private realm of marriage, family, and reproduction laws. Topics discussed include history of the European Convention on Human Rights, history of German Basic Law related to family policy, rise in the anti-authoritarian and antitotalitarian privacy norms, and decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case 'Lawrence v. Texas' concerning comparative and foreign Law in courts.

The article looks at the judicial citation of foreign law and the effects of citations that contrasts U.S. law with the laws of foreign jurisdictions. Topics discussed include relevance of foreign ideas to the U.S. law, negative citation of Islamic law kadijustiz in U.S. context, and the need of understanding Islamic legal tradition and its context for citations.

An essay on the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation is presented. Topics discussed include difference between state constitutional interpretation and federal constitutional interpretation; use of foreign law by American courts when interpreting domestic constitutional provisions and the U.S. Constitution; and laws governing individual rights and government structure as defined by the U.S. Constitution.

The article focuses on the British court case Fibria Celulose S/A v. Pan Ocean Co Ltd., which dealt with the validity of ipso facto clauses under British law. Topics include the anti-deprivation principle, the conflict of laws, and the governing law of contracts. Information is provided on the application of foreign law in English courts and jurisdiction.