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The succession of economic and financial crises, the migration crisis, and, of course, Brexit have raised many questions about the future of the European Union. Such crises present challenges for teaching and learning European Studies. This article discusses the question how to maintain a relevant study programme while taking into account ever-changing societal developments. Based on a survey conducted among students of a Bachelor in European Studies, and a subsequent focus group discussion, we look at programme relevance and programme capacity to deal with societal change in the context of a problem-based learning environment. Our study reveals that problem-based learning, when applied consistently and correctly, is a good educational approach to ensure that a study programme is relevant and capable of capturing societal change. At the same time, students seem to prefer a more guided version of problem-based learning, which presents challenges concerning its possible contribution to teaching and learning in times of crises. While we discuss the situation in one specific BA programme, we will do so in light of general challenges in the fields of European Studies, International Relations, and Politics.

This article aims at understanding the challenges of tackling complex policy problems in multilevel governance. In order to better grasp the multilevel regulation of complex policy problems, it is needed to understand how uncertainty and scientific expertise are dealt with. We investigate this via the regulation of pandemics by the EU and the WHO, with the H1N1 pandemic of 2009 as critical case. The analysis of the multilevel practice reveals that the attitude toward uncertainty fundamentally differed between the global (WHO) and the European level. At the global level a classic speaking truth to power approach involved the denial of uncertainty, while at the EU level the assigned role of providing scientific expertise was interpreted as a necessity to openly communicate about uncertainty. While the global approach was heavily criticized, the uncertainty communication at the European level was much appreciated.Este artículo busca comprender los desafíos de abordar problemas políticos complejos en la gobernanza multinivel. Para comprender mejor la regulación multinivel de los problemas políticos complejos, es necesario comprender cómo se aborda la incertidumbre y la experiencia científica. Investigamos esto a través de la regulación de pandemias por parte de la UE y la OMS, con la pandemia H1N1 de 2009 como un caso crítico. El análisis de las prácticas multinivel revela que la actitud hacia la incertidumbre era fundamentalmente diferente entre el nivel global (OMS) y el nivel europeo. A nivel global un método de “decir la verdad al poder” incluía la negación de la incertidumbre, mientras que a nivel europeo el papel asignado de proporcionar experiencia científica se interpretó como algo necesario para comunicarse abiertamente acerca de la incertidumbre. Aunque la aproximación global fue fuertemente criticada, la comunicación de la incertidumbre a nivel europeo fue muy valorada.本文致力理解多层次治理中应对复杂政策问题时面临的挑战。为更好地把握复杂政策问题的多层次监管, 需要明白不确定性和科学技术是如何加以处理的。笔者以2009年HINI流感爆发作为案例, 用欧盟和世界卫生组织(WHO)针对流行病的监管规定对此进行了调查。通过对多层次实践的分析显示, 全球(即WHO)和欧盟对不确定性的态度存在根本差异。在全球层面上, WHO用“对权力说真话”这一经典实践来否定不确定性, 而欧盟则运用科学技术, 将其作为公开交流不确定性的必备手段。结果则是, WHO实践受到严厉批评, 而欧盟对不确定性的公开交流受到赞赏。.

Contains fulltext : 179935.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) This article analyzes the implications of European integration for national regulatory enforcement. More specifically, it tests the Eurolegalism thesis, which holds that the tendency of using more detailed, prescriptive European Union (EU) regulation combined with more public and private enforcement leads to a convergence in national enforcement styles. It does so by developing and applying a fine-grained conceptualization of enforcement style. This conceptualization forms the basis of a focused comparison of enforcement of the highly detailed and strict EU Packaging Waste Directive in the Netherlands and Germany – two countries known for their opposed enforcement styles. Our analysis shows that although convergence toward a more insistent enforcement style seems to have taken place, the two countries have arrived at this position in markedly different ways. By identifying differences in style underneath the surface of convergence, the article qualifies the Eurolegalism argument, thus, advancing the literature on EU enforcement styles and deepening our understanding of the subtle and divergent ways in which common international regulatory inputs may affect domestic enforcement. 01 augustus 2016

En the implementation of european union law is not without problems, and there are many potential solutions to address this situation. This article analyzes the impact of information disclosure by the european union (eu) on the application of eu policy in the member states according to domestic regulators. By comparatively analyzing eu directives on air safety and pollution prevention in the netherlands, poland, and portugal, this study illustrates that domestic street-level actors hold mixed perceptions about the utilization of information. Eu-level disclosure is only perceived to be effective when the information is collected by a trusted external actor, and when it is discussed confidentially among stakeholders.

Risks are omnipresent in contemporary international security. Despite a long tradition in security studies going at least back to Von Clausewitz, we consider that the topic of risk remains under-examined. This forum seeks to advance the research agenda on risk in security studies by showcasing work of scholars using advanced concepts of risk, based on insights from sociology, biology, psychology, and safety studies, to better understand the role of risk in international security. As a way of introduction, this short article sets out the main debates.

For quite some time parliaments were seen as the losers of European integration. As a reaction, several parliaments have sought to exert more control over the executive branch in EU decision-making. An alternative venue for 'clawing back' these lost powers is by influencing the domestic transposition of EU policies. Surprisingly, this opportunity for greater parliamentary involvement has not received much scholarly attention. Under what conditions do the parties in parliament engage in ex post scrutiny over transposition? To shed light on this question, this article provides a detailed study of scrutiny by the Dutch parliament over the transposition of two social policy directives, investigating four hypotheses regarding vote-seeking, policy-seeking and office-seeking incentives for parliamentary oversight. The analysis shows that the ex post scrutiny that takes place can mostly be summarised as low-profile scrutiny aimed at information-gathering and position-taking, especially by opposition parties.

The centralised authorisation of GMOs in the European Union (EU) has received considerable academic attention in recent years, partly due to the fact thatMember States have not been able to agree on authorisation decisions in the comitology committee. As a consequence, these authorisations are given by the European Commission. These decisions are invariably in favour of authorisation despite the fact that Member States had been divided on this issue. Apart from the on-going discussions on a possible reform of the GMO authorisation (allowing for national restrictions or prohibitions), the new comitology rules brought about by the Lisbon Treaty are of equal importance as they might affect the authorisation of GMOs. In this article we discuss some of the changes to comitology and present empirical material on the first authorisation decisions after the entering into force of the new comitology rules. By drawing on delegation theory we will argue that, for the time being, the level of politicisation ofGMOauthorisation is unlikely to change.

This article examines banks' positions on the 2014 proposals for EU banking structural reforms. Centralization of authority in banking regulation and supervision has been a legislative priority in the European Union (EU) since 2008 in order to address regulatory shortcomings in the aftermath of the global finanical crisis. European decision makers have introduced more stringent capital adequacy requirements and transferred greater powers to the European Supervisory Authorites. In 2014, the European Commission put forward a proposal for banking structural reforms comprised of two elements: a ban on proprietary trading and mandatory separation of some trading activities from the deposit-taking entity. We refer to 'regulatory cascading' in order to conceptualize the rapid and successive introduction of legislative packages designed to fix problems and gaps in the EU banking regulatory framework. Our analysis shows that the majority of European banks and financial services associations are opposed to further banking structural reforms at the EU level. We find evidence that banks domiciled in member states that have already passed reforms prefer those over EU alternatives. Large internationalized banks are most opposed to further EU banking structural reforms.

European Union agencies are increasingly used to stimulate domestic compliance with EU law, without concrete evidence for whether and how these bodies actually realize this. Through in-depth analysis of the European Railway Agency, this article enhances our empirical understanding of the working and functioning of EU agencies, and advances our thinking about compliance in international settings. It leads us to the insight that – in order to be capable of stimulating domestic compliance – agencies should be flexible to resort to a mix of compliance strategies in order to be able to cope with the varying domestic compliance situations.

Parents of newborns and small children have recently been confronted with labels indicating that their purchases of a baby bottle, teethers or sippy cups are now ‘Bisphenol A-free’ (BPA). A synthetic chemical used in the production process of polycarbonate (plastics), Bisphenol A is currently making headline news in the US and the EU. Its questioned safety in food plastics, baby bottles and children's toys has turned plastics into a political issue as it is systematically framed as a risk in media coverage.Apart from regulatory exposure limits (Tolerable Daily Intake levels (TDI), Bisphenol A is currently not subject to any restrictions in use yet (although BPA will be subject to a ban on the EU level from spring 2011 onwards). However, with the REACH framework (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation of Chemicals), a new regulatory framework for EU's chemical policy in place since June 2007, these exposure limits may be reviewed and BPA may face regulatory action. This article aims to analyse the regulatory process of Bisphenol A in the EU as an example of an uncertain risk dossier. On the basis of document and media analysis and interviews, the main aim is to gain an understanding of how uncertain risks are being regulated in the European Union. To that end, the self-regulatory behavior of industry is also considered. On the basis of the current regulatory tools in place and the current state of affairs, as well as developments in the controversy around BPA, the paper concludes by presenting four scenarios that illustrate the dynamics of the case and its possible regulatory outcomes.

The chemical sector is confronted with risks pertaining to accidents involving dangerous substances. At the European level, a set of regulations – the Seveso regime – aims at controlling such risks. This article explores how this regime is put into practice, by analyzing the local practices of enforcement by Dutch inspectors and compliance by Dutch chemical companies. These empirical insights demonstrate that the classical ‘positivistic risk paradigm’ – which treats all risks as calculable, controllable and reducible – seems to dominate in the Seveso regime. The analysis in this article shows that this can lead to ‘uncertainty blindness’; a regulatory regime where only yesterday's accidents are managed and salient future risks are potentially overlooked. We suggest that both regulators and regulated should start accepting the possibility of uncertain risks, which implies a cultural change in the current regulatory regime to ‘uncertainty tolerance’.

Introduction Tessa Fox, Marjolein B.A. van Asselt, Esther Versluis and Ellen Vos Part 1: The European Union in Context 1. Regulating Food Trade in the Enlarged European Union Karolina Zurek 2. EU Risk Governance of 'Cloned Food': Regulatory Uncertainty between Trade and Non-Trade Maria Weimer 3. Risky Politics: A Socialogical Analysis of the WTO Panel on Biotechnological Products Renata C. Motta 4. Pre-Empting Precaution: GMO Trade Conflicts, Uncertainty Intolerant Risk Assessment and Precaution-Based Risk Management Boryana Ivanova and Marjolein B.A. van Asselt Part 2: Risk Regulation in the European Union 5. Between Politics and Science: Accommodating National Diversity in GMO Regulation Vessela Hristova 6. The Politics of Risk Decision-Making: The Voting Behaviour of the EU Member States on GMOs Madjar Navah, Esther Versluis and Marjolein B.A. van Asselt 7. Regulating the Use of Bisphenol A in Baby and Children's Products in the European Union: Trade Implications and of an Uncertain Risk Tessa Fox, Esther Versluis and Marjolein B.A. van Asselt Part 3: Taking Stock of Policy Fashions 8. Agencies as Risk Managers? Exploring the Role of EU Agencies in Authorization Procedures Jinhee Kim, Christoph Klika and Esther Versluis 9. The Precautionary Principle in Court: An Analysis of Post-Pfizer Case Law Anne-May Janssen and Marjolein B.A. van Asselt 10. The Scientification of Participation Frank Rodrigues 11. Synthesis Marjolein B.A. van Asselt, Tessa Fox, Esther Versluis and Ellen Vos

The chemical sector is confronted with risks pertaining to accidents involving dangerous substances. At the European level, a set of regulations - the Seveso regime - aims at controlling such risks. This article explores how this regime is put into practice, by analyzing the local practices of enforcement by Dutch inspectors and compliance by Dutch chemical companies. These empirical insights demonstrate that the classical 'positivistic risk paradigm' - which treats all risks as calculable, controllable and reducible - seems to dominate in the Seveso regime. The analysis in this article shows that this can lead to 'uncertainty blindness'; a regulatory regime where only yesterday's accidents are managed and salient future risks are potentially overlooked. We suggest that both regulators and regulated should start accepting the possibility of uncertain risks, which implies a cultural change in the current regulatory regime to 'uncertainty tolerance'.

In line with the trend of 'agencification' in Western countries, European Union (EU) agencies have been put forward as an instrument expected to improve the way rules are applied in the EU. So far, evidence confirming this expectation is lacking. By assessing the implementation of European transport legislation, this article provides an empirical insight into the role played by two EU agencies - the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). The analysis shows that these EU-level agencies, although created as independent entities to enhance uniform implementation, remain highly dependent on the member states and the Commission. In terms of (legislative) enforcement their contribution has thus been limited. EU agencies such as EMSA and EASA currently seem to add more value by stimulating mutual learning processes among national regulatory authorities.

After lengthening the duration of patents to twenty years in 1984, the pharmaceutical industry has turned to data exclusivity as a major vehicle for extending market protection, even after patents expire. Such protections give companies the power to tax consumers for innovation by charging above-market prices. This article draws upon unique information to describe how key actors lengthened data exclusivity for patented drugs to postpone generic competition in the European Union (EU) just before ten new members joined it. We explore the political route and the interests of different actors to understand the process by which industrial interests are translated into legal realities in the world's largest harmonized market. Several factors influenced the outcome, including the role of the pharmaceutical unit of the Directorate General for Enterprise of the European Commission in promoting the interests of the innovative branch of the industry, the time pressure to find a viable compromise before EU enlargement, and the heterogeneous preferences of the other actors. The case illustrates the inherent tension between the desire of both health care administrators and patients for high-quality, low-cost medicines and the objective of the innovator pharmaceutical industry to find and approve new drugs that are price protected and sell them in a way that maximizes revenues.

While considerable attention is paid to the legal aspect of implementation of European directives, the practical ‘street-level’ implementation of EU law remains to a large extent a ‘black box’. This article sheds light on this black box with a study on the implementation of the Safety Data Sheets Directive in the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain. This cross-national analysis reveals that different phases in the implementation process leave different traces. Although the member states correctly and completely transposed the directive, compliance by the regulated leaves something to be desired and enforcement by regulators is rare and varies considerably between and within the countries. This article looks into the factors that explain why even rules do not necessarily lead to even practices and argues for more attention for the phase of practical implementation.