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In the Cratylus, Plato addresses the question of the orthótes onomáton, the “accuracy” or “adequacy” of names regarding what they would name. Two positions come into play regarding such adequacy (the conventionalism of Hermogenes and the naturalism of Cratylus), both of which are dismantled by the Platonic Socrates. But only two? Isn’t there in the Cratylus at least an indication of a possible Platonic “adequacy”? This paper presents that possible “adequacy”. For this, the difference between name (or “natural” name) and word is discussed, as well as the need to anchor designation in essences; above all, it is shown that it is necessary to consider the question of name in relation to that of logos. For that purpose, an interpretation of the Cratylus is articulated with some passages from the Phaedo and the Sophist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Hypnos is the property of Hypnos / Instituto Hypnos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Ιn this paper, I compare the two conceptions of the “lawgiver” in the Platonic dialogue Cratylus. I present both the idea that words constitute imitations of things (resemblance naturalism) and the claim that names are tools which “separate” and “teach” being (the tool analogy). Then I examine the respective figures of the lawgiver (nomothetes) appearing in each of them. These are the lawgiver of the tool analogy (one who makes names on the model of a craftsman producing tools), and that of the lawgiver who introduces names constituting phonetic imitations of things. I argue that with respect to name giving, the former is in a much better position than the latter, and that mimetic naturalism faces the insuperable “paradox of institution.” My main claim is that, read in conjunction with the tool analogy, the notion of ἒθος introduced in 434e, offers a helpful framework for successfully overcoming the challenge of establishing the first names. Furthermore, the adoption of this perspective by Socrates allows him to navigate a complex position. This is a position that steers clear of both Cratylus’s “resemblance naturalism” and Hermogenes’s unadulterated conventionalism.

In this study, I attempt to shed light on whether some passages from the Platonic dialogue Cratylus that deal with language correspond to Karl Popper’s theory on the third world. Specifically, I attempt to prove that Plato’s third world contains both divine and human properties, something that is provided through language, that is, through the human rational and developing in objective terms construction. In the four subchapters of my study, I basically investigate the relationship between the thinking subject and the noumenon as well as the role of the coiner of names and the dialectician with respect to the scientific foundation of the names. The most important conclusion drawn is that according to Plato these two are responsible for connecting a thinking subject with a noumenon by adding objective certainty to the meaning of everything is said. I also investigate how Plato’s archetypal Ideas could be considered to be the third world.

The current paper contains a comparative reading of the Phaedrus and the Cratylus. Some of their central topics are here contrasted in order to highlight the characteristic traits of Platonic thought present in both dialogues. The description of dialectic in the Phaedrus fits well with a Socratic definition in the Cratylus which clearly specifies that names are tools at the service of the dialectician. This evidence leads us to the conclusion that --besides being the main mechanism to control and judge rhetoric-- dialectical technic appears in the dialogues as the only correcting procedure that makes it possible to verify any sort of proposition and bring speeches and depictions of reality closer to the truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims at providing a summary account of the main contents of David Sedley’s book Plato’ Cratylus, through a review with a primarily descriptive purpose and some critical observations at times. The speculations on language formulated by the author are grouped into three theoretical strands – result of a personal choice – concerning (1) the etymological section; (2) the theory of flux and Forms and (3) a linguistic account of the dialectical method, in order to clarify the fundamental theses supported in Sedley’s work. The paper concludes with a more comparative part, in which – taking up the themes mentioned above – an attempt is made to place the author’s writing within a brief status quaestionis of the famous Platonic dialogue, subject of linguistic interest since ancient times until nowadays. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) is the property of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In Greek polytheism, choosing the name of the divinity is a fundamental step in any interaction between humans and non-humans. If, for a large number of deities, it is in relation to the adjective which will complete the deity’s name, it happens that, for certain deities, the theonym is itself the object of this choice. Athena is a striking example of this. The goddess has indeed another name, “Pallas”, which is attested in Homeric epics. This paper will focus on the place of the name “Pallas” among the profusion of designations of the goddess Athena. For this purpose, we will analyse the uses of Athena’s “other name” in the various Athenian textual documents, both epigraphic and literary.

In Plato's Cratylus, Hermogenes contends that the correctness of names is conventional. Appealing though this claim sounds to modern ears, it does not meet with approval in the Cratylus. Why? I argue that the conventionalism promoted by Hermogenes is discredited by unacceptable relativist implications because it incorporates the mistaken assumption that correct names are individuated exclusively by their phonetic composition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cratylus is quite puzzling as to how it ends its discussion of the justification of names, asking the question of how to know things in themselves. Thus, the unveiling and clarification of the Platonic position contained in the dialogue could not but be the subject of many disputes and studies. This article is intended in particular to contradict the view that Socrates, at the end of the work, adopts the conventionalist position of names, something that is argued by Ademollo in his important commentary on dialogue. To this end, we will make a short analysis of the naturalistic and conventionalist positions contained in the discussion between Hermogenes and Cratylus, so that, later, we will be led to a reinterpretation of what we call here the "socratic way", taking into account the various textual elements that are present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Cratylus' main concern is to outline and evaluate the competing views of language held by two characters, Hermogenes and Cratylus, who disagree about whether convention or nature (respectively) are the source of onomastic correctness. Hermogenes has been thought to hold two radically different views by different scholars, one extreme conventionalism whereby all names are correct relative to their speakers, and another modest conventionalism according to which distinct naming actions – establishment and employment – explain why some names are correct and others are not, depending on the speaker. In this paper I argue that, though Hermogenes ultimately endorses a conventionalism of the latter kind, it is a mistake to assign him this position from the outset. Rather, to understand the structure of the conversation about conventionalism, we must view Hermogenes' position, and Socrates' understanding of it, as developing instead of settled. For it is only by discussing the matter that Hermogenes comes to express a moderate conventionalist view and Socrates comes to appreciate the position Hermogenes actually holds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to examine the implications of Plato’s use of the term stoicheion, since his awareness of stoicheion’s polysemy reveals his view of the origin, the complexity and, at the same time, the order of reality. Moreover, his use of stoicheion allowed him both to inherit and to detach himself from his predecessors. I begin by presenting the history of the notion of stoicheion; then, since one of the meanings of stoicheion is ‘letter of the alphabet’, I focus on the Cratylus, which contains the first of several passages where Plato employs the alphabet as a paradigm for the structure of a complex system. Finally, I turn to the Theaetetus, where Plato, for the first time, uses stoicheion in the sense of ‘element’ and where, through the relation letters/syllables, Plato clarifies that enumeration and juxtaposition are not sufficient to attain the real knowledge. I will argue that only thanks to these steps can we understand the occurrences of stoicheion in the Timaeus, where Plato first states that air, earth, fire and water are not stoicheia tou pantos, and then reveals that, instead, the basic triangles are ‘the elements of the universe’.

This paper offers arguments against Francesco Ademollo’s redundancy thesis about the notion of the correctness of names in the Cratylus. The paper distinguishes between two versions of the redundancy thesis and provides arguments against each of them. In addition to supporting the rejection of both versions of the redundancy thesis, the arguments provide new interpretations of important issues inside and outside of the Cratylus. These issues include the philological evidence from the Classical period (e.g. Nicomachean Ethics, VI.9, 1142b6–12, on euboulia as a kind of correctness), the view of correctness expressed by Plato’s Socrates in other dialogues, and Socrates’ initial discussion with Cratylus (in particular 428e–429b).

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In recent years, the Cratylus has been added to the list of Plato’s writting filling the field of investigation concerning the reception of Plato at the Stoa. But it was to only investigate its influence over the Stoic theory of language. In this paper, we will study in particular three etymological sequences (on Zeus, 396a-b, on the soul, 399d-400b, on the just, 412d-413c), which find a striking echo in Stoic theory of causality (notably in Stobaeus, Ecl. I, 13, 1c, in Seneca, Ep. 65, and in D. L. VII, 138-9 and 147). This analysis will allow us to glimpse the existence of a Stoic use of Cratylus in the context of the elaboration of a new theory of causality without the Forms, proposing a demiurgic model in competition – according to the ancient commentators – with the Timaeus .

This article is an attempt to explain the relation of language to knowledge according to Plato’s Cratylus. In this dialogue, Plato examines and then refuses the two views concerning the correctness of words: conventionalism (denoting that correctness of each word is by convention) and naturalism (denoting that each word reveals the nature of the thing named by it). Moreover, he offers a series of etymologies seemingly to show that we should not rely on analyzing the words in search of truth. Finally, he concludes that we should learn the truth independently of words. This negative conclusion, specially due to its brevity in comparison with the whole dialogue, gives rise to different interpretations in the light of Plato’s other works. The result of this research is that, according to Cratylus, any method connected to language falls short in providing pure knowledge.

Euthydemus is included neither in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker by Diels-Kranz nor in Sofisti. Testimonianze e frammenti by Untersteiner nor in Early Greek Philosophy by Laks and Most. Likewise, the great twentieth century works on the Sophists do not give space to him, at best mentioning him briefly. Yet Euthydemus is the author of a fragment, which was quoted by Plato in his Cratylus, and on which again there is no modern study. This paper sets out to study this fragment in depth, to review and discuss the various translations, both existing and possible, to study the context of Plato's quotation, to clarify the exact meaning and the theoretical scope of this important fragment, and lastly to place Euthydemus in the Protagorean tradition, of which he is a notable product. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I aim to discuss the notion of δήλωμα which can be found for the first time in the extant Greek literature in Plato, Cratylus 423 b, by analysing the philosophical argument of bodily imitation and language. I aim to show that this portion of text in particular contains extraordinary original material which has no parallel in other Platonic works. I shall also discuss the notion of δήλωμα in critical relation to μίμημα and σημεῖον, with reference to the Cratylus, the Sophist and other philosophical works posterior to Plato.

Against the background of a conventionalist theory, and staged as a defense of a naturalistic notion of names and naming, the critique of language developed in Plato’s Cratylus does not only propose that human language, in contrast to the language of the gods, is bound to the realm of myth and lie. The dialogue also concludes by offering a set of reasons to think that knowledge of reality is not within the reach of our words. Interpretations of the dialogue’s long etymological sections often neglect this critique and tend to end up with an overly optimistic assessment of the theory of language on offer. In the light of one of the dialogue’s central etymological accounts, Socrates’ etymology of the name Hermes, this paper discusses two recent and influential versions of such a view: David Sedley’s theory of onomatopoetic encapsulation and Franco Trivigno’s qualified referentialism. It argues that the complex relation between language and reality expressed in the Cratylus cannot be exhaustively captured by either of these theories because Plato considers all names to be semantically underdetermined until they are put to use. It suggests that Plato rather works with a functionalistic notion of names and naming, and that the dialogue’s account of natural and correct naming is to be understood in these terms.

Examining the dialogue in Cratylus from a dramatic perspective allows a new understanding of the work. Accordingly, in intermediating between Hermogenes and Cratylus, Socrates’ main task is to overcome the injustice created by his interlocutors’ improper use of language. To do so, Socrates must foment a degree of balance in the power relations between the two interlocutors in terms of language. This task will require, from the philosopher, heroic levels of fortitude and perseverance, which can only be reached in a state of divine inspiration. The journey through the so-called “etymological section” can then be understood as the deployment of the hermeneutic action, which is the only way that the relations of justice, as they appear in language, can be reconstituted.

Ao final do diálogo Crátilo de Platão, deparamo-nos com a constatação de que os nomes não seriam capazes de dizer a essência das coisas, o que parece pôr em xeque a tarefa da filosofia pensada como atividade de busca do conhecimento presidida pelo lógos. O presente artigo pretende mostrar que é possível entrever, a partir da própria construção dos elementos que compõem o diálogo, sobretudo em sua dimensão dramática, indicações de que a linguagem não é destituída de seu papel de viabilizar o conhecimento.As we reach the end of Plato's dialogue Cratylus, we face the conclusion that names would fail to express the real essence of things, which seems to question the task of Philosophy conceived of as an activity in search of knowledge controlled by logos. The present paper attempts to show that it is possible to perceive, from the very construction of the elements that make up the dialogue itself, mainly with regard to its dramatic dimension, clues which suggest that language is not unable to play its part as knowledge maker.

This paper presents a reading of the political dimensions of Plato's Cratylus. Following Sallis, I argue that Socrates' claim that we can achieve a direct access to being unmediated by language is ironic. There is a comedic element to the attempt to transcend language in order to test the names given by the 'lawgiver' against a pure awareness of the nature of beings themselves. I show that this account of human life, as always mediated by logos, has a political dimension. Specifically, the paper argues that the mediation performed by Socrates in the dialogue is intended to get us to turn toward one another in the formation of communities of philosophical discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cuestiones de Filosofia is the property of Universidad Pedagogica y Tecnologica de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

At Alcibiades I, 133b-c, the reader expects, but does not according to the MSS find, the return of the mirror-motif that had supposedly explained the true meaning of the Delphic injunction. Hence it remains unclear why anything viewed within the soul should act in any way that resembles a mirror. I argue that the substitution of a single letter in one word, about which the manuscripts and modern scholars in any case disagree, can restore the necessary reference to a reflective surface, though not specifically to a mirror, since the term for a mirror could only be applied to sight. A failure to understand the underlying intertextual allusion to Cratylus 408c had resulted in a safe but unsatisfactory substitution by Late Antiquity, and other modifications followed thereafter in an effort to give meaning to the text. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows that our principal ancient source for the metaphysical views of the second-century Platonist Harpocration of Argos drew on his interpretation of Plato's Cratylus. This is important because there is no other evidence of the Cratylus being read for its metaphysical content until Proclus, 300 years later. It also changes our understanding of Harpocration: he is generally supposed to share the metaphysical views of Numenius, but his exegesis of the Cratylus reveals him to be a faithful student of Atticus. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For Plato, the crucial function of human cognition is to grasp truths. Explaining how we are able to do this is fundamental to understanding our cognitive powers. Plato addresses this topic from several different angles. In the Cratylus and Theaetetus, he attempts to identify the elemental cognitions that are the foundations of language and knowledge. He considers several candidates for this role, most notably, perception and simple meaning-bearing concepts. In the first section, we will look at Plato's worries about semantic instability and its epistemic consequences. The central role of basic cognitions in Plato's account of knowledge in the Theaetetus will be explored in the second section. In the final section, the relevance of Plato's conception of cognition to modern discussions in the philosophy of language and epistemology will be noted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Discusiones Filosóficas is the property of Universidad de Caldas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Contextual reading is a way of studying these fragmentary texts that concentrates on the structure of the arguments put forth by pre-Socratic philosophers, without ignoring the microtextual aspects (in other words, it seeks to clarify what textual needs use of the fragment responds to). This involves looking for biases and paradigmatic elements that may be revealing when trying to reconstruct the philosophic thinking of the author in question. In this case, I will concentrate on what Plato says about Heraclitus, particularly in Cratylus, to show how contextual reading sheds light on the creation of an interpretative tradition that gained predominance in the case of Heraclitus; namely, the doctrine of perpetual flux. Inasmuch as that interpretation has been called into doubt by many Heraclitian scholars, I propose, as a final step, to compare it to another interpretative tradition that reflects elements in common and allows us make universal use of the testimonies we still have on the philosopher of Ephesus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Near the beginning of the Cratylus (385e-387d) Plato's Socrates argues, against his friend Hermogenes, that the standards of correctness for our use of names in speech are in no way up to us. Yet this conclusion should strike us, at least initially, as bizarre. After all, how could it not be up to us whether to call our children by the names of our parents, or whether to call dogs 'dogs'? My aim in this paper will be to show that, although Plato's argument does not succeed in establishing this apparently bizarre conclusion, it may well succeed in establishing an equally momentous conclusion: that the standards of correctness for our use of concepts in thought are in no way up to us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examining the dialogue in Cratylus from a dramatic perspective allows a new understanding of the work. Accordingly, in intermediating between Hermogenes and Cratylus, Socrates' main task is to overcome the injustice created by his interlocutors' improper use of language. To do so, Socrates must foment a degree of balance in the power relations between the two interlocutors in terms of language. This task will require, from the philosopher, heroic levels of fortitude and perseverance, which can only be reached in a state of divine inspiration. The journey through the so-called "etymological section" can then be understood as the deployment of the hermeneutic action, which is the only way that the relations of justice, as they appear in language, can be reconstituted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study contrasts two writings to demonstrate how semiotic discourses serve as sources of inspiration leading beyond academic responses to the creative composition of fictional texts. It will be shown how Saussure's theory of the sign purveyed the raw material for a short story by Peter Bichsel and how Plato's Cratylus provided the blueprint for two central characters in a novel by Joseph Roth. Using the conspicuous example of Bichsel's short story as a springboard to outline the creative technique called semiomimesis, the indepth analysis of Roth's Hotel Savoy affords a full explanation of what constitutes semiomimetic art. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]