Search

IN THIS ARTICLE, I will chart the development of G. W. F. Hegel's concept (Begriff) in the Science of Logic (1812-16). (1) I show that Hegel could not possibly arrive [...]

While numerous studies have explored prevalence and determinants of intimate partner violence (IPV), one area that has yet to be sufficiently explored is whether men and women agree on the acts, behaviours, and attitudes that comprise IPV. Through the use of concept mapping, we examined the similarities and differences in the conceptualization of IPV among a diverse sample of men and women. Although men and women conceptualized physical and sexual violence similarly, men tended to rate non-physical behaviors related to control as less important to the definition of IPV than women. Moreover, even when men and women used similar labeling language for grouping of items, the statements included in each cluster were substantially different for non-physically abusive items. A greater understanding of similarities and differences in the conceptualization of IPV by gender can help inform appropriate gender specific IPV intervention and prevention efforts., Author(s): Patricia O'Campo [sup.1] , Yu Janice Zhang [sup.1] , Mairi Omand [sup.2] , Alisa Velonis [sup.3] , Michael Yonas [sup.4] , A. Minh [sup.1] [sup.5] , Ajitha Cyriac [sup.1] [...]

Aqainst Strong Cognitivism: An Argument from the Particularity of Love, HILLA JACOBSON According to the view we may term strong cognitivism, all reasons for action are rooted in normative features [...]

There are several different types of relations between concepts. In cases when one concept testifies of or excludes another, such types of relations are informative. Two logic operations for determining [...]

The Lures of Akrasia, AMELIE OKSENBERG RORTY There is more to akrasia than meets the eye. It can occur in speech and perception, cognitively and emotionally, as well as between [...]

When creating theory to understand or implement change at the social and/or organizational level, it is generally accepted that part of the theory building process includes a process of abstraction. While the process of abstraction is well understood, it is not so well understood how abstractions 'fit' together to enable the creation of better theory. Starting with a few simple ideas, this paper explores one way we work with abstractions. This exploration challenges the traditionally held importance of abstracting concepts from experience. That traditional focus has been one-sided--pushing science toward the discovery of data without the balancing process that occurs with the integration of the data. Without such balance, the sciences have been pushed toward fragmentation. Instead, in the present paper, new emphasis is placed on the relationship between abstract concepts. Specifically, this paper suggests that a better theory is one that is constructed of concepts that exist on a similar level of abstraction. Suggestions are made for quantifying this claim and using the insights to enable scholars and practitioners to create more effective theory. Keywords Conceptual systems * Theory building * Abstraction * Metatheory * Theory of theory, 1 Introduction I begin with the view that the social sciences have not yet developed theories that are unarguably highly effective in practical application. One reason for this lack of [...]

Metaethics is an especially illuminating context for exploring the relation between facts and values. There are good reasons in favor of a cognitivist, realist interpretation of moral value, and some of the elements of that interpretation suggest bases for rejecting the alleged fact/value distinction in social scientific explanations. Some of the main objections to the alleged fact/value distinction and to expressivist interpretations of moral value are articulated, with a view to showing their relevance to the understanding of social phenomena more broadly. Also, the way in which rationality inevitably involves normativity is discussed because it is a crucial consideration in regard to understanding the normative aspects of issues the social sciences seek to explain. Keywords Antirealism * Cognitivism * Metaethics * Noncognitivism * Objectivity * Realism * Subjectivity, The present discussion addresses some of the concerns in Professor Gorski's paper, focusing chiefly on metaethical issues. However, in the second half of this paper I comment on facts and [...]

Clear constructs are needed in the development of theories of management and researchers must accomplish this requirement to avoid rejection. Manuscripts were often rejected because reviewers felt the lack of construct clarity but they also often find it difficult to articulate precisely what it means. Each of the four subcomponents of construct clarity is also discussed.

According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgements--content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. In this paper I show that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer's version of the argument, I show that it rests on a questionable assumption--namely, that if a subject can recognize the normative bearing of a mental content upon what she should think and do, then this content must be the result of the actualization of conceptual capacities (and in this sense conceptual). I argue that considerations regarding the roles played by experience and concepts in our mental lives may require us to reject this assumption.

Peter Hare's philosophy is marked by the development of what he called "deep conceptual play." Drawing from his commitment to poetry, naturalism, and contextualism, Hare finds that many of our beliefs and values are influenced by a more primary collection of focal concepts. To the extent that figures such as William James experiment with these concepts in philosophic word play, they also loosen the bonds any single concept may have on us. As a result, deep conceptual play extends our cognitive powers by opening avenues of experience found to be otherwise inaccessible. Keywords: William James, Peter Hare, Pragmatism, Naturalism, Epistemology, Contextualism, Poetry, Conceptual Analysis, Pluralism., To those of us who appreciated Peter Hare a systematic exploration of the themes of his work is sorely overdue. However, when considering the difficulty of providing a genuine intellectual [...]

Habit plays a central role in Peirce's pragmatic account of human signification. What he means by meaning is, hence, fully intelligible only in reference to the role he accords to habit in this account. While the main focus of Peirce's critical attention is, especially in the mature articulation of his thoroughgoing pragmatism, upon deliberately acquired habits, it is reasonable to suggest that often his concern is actually with something broader in one sense and narrower in another than individual or isolated habits. Any given disposition to act in certain ways in certain circumstances is taken by him to be an integral part of more or less integrated dispositions to act, feel, and even imagine: it is not taken to be operative apart from these other habits. In this sense, then, his concern is primarily with such integrated dispositions, not isolated habits. Thus, it is broader than the inattentive reader is likely to suspect. But, since those deliberately cultivated dispositions of rational agents that are at the center of Peirce's concerns are ones specifiable only in reference to some human practice such as experimental inquiry or everyday conversations, religious worship or artistic innovation, these dispositions are appropriately taken to be not simply habits in any way whatsoever but primarily habits to act in a competent or expert manner. More simply put, these deliberately cultivated dispositions are, in many instances, best conceived as competencies or expertise. While not all habits equip agents with expert or even competent ways of addressing the shifting demands of experiential situations (that is, while not all habits are instances of competence or expertise), all cases of competence and expertise are, at bottom, more or less harmoniously integrated clusters of flexible, nuanced, and alterable habits. Accordingly, any account of Peirce's conception of habit, especially as it pertains to his pragmatic theory of meaning, must bring into sharper focus the complex relationship among habits, competence, and expertise than Peirce and even his most imaginative expositors have done thus far. The aim of this paper is to push our investigation of the Peircean notion of human habituation in precisely this direction. Against an evolutionary background, the historical foreground of historically evolved and evolving practices will be sketched. Habits in their guise as competencies and expertise will then be seen in the context of such practices, with equal emphasis on initiation into a practice and the open-ended process of acquiring ever more refined expertise. Keywords: Habit, Purpose, Clarity (or Clearness), Definition, Concepts, Legisigns, Pragmatism, and Pragmaticism., Introduction In a letter written to William James in 1909, C. S. Peirce illuminates a distinction drawn more than three decades earlier in 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear.' There [...]

Historicism contents itself with establishing a causal connection between various moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It became historical posthumously, [...]

I argue that we can reconcile two seemingly incompatible traditions for thinking about concepts. On the one hand, many cognitive scientists assume that the systematic redeployment of representational abilities suffices for having concepts. On the other hand, a long philosophical tradition maintains that language is necessary for genuinely conceptual thought, l argue that on a theoretically useful and empirically plausible concept of 'concept', it is necessary and sufficient for conceptual thought that a thinker be able to entertain many of the potential thoughts produced by recombining her representational abilities apart from a direct confrontation with the states of affairs being represented. Such representational abilities support a cognitive engagement with the world that is flexible, abstract, and active.

The distinction between constructs and events is often overlooked in the sciences, as evidenced by a number of long-standing confusions of the former with the latter. The authors propose that the distinction between constructs and events is particularly important in the science of psychology, as psychological events have a number of unique characteristics that make this confusion more likely than is the case in other sciences. The nature of psychological events and the constructs derived from them are described in this article, along with the value of maintaining the distinction between them for the science of psychology its relations with other sciences., In a recent issue of this journal, Smith (2007) not only provided a valuable lesson on the distinction between events and constructs but also proposed a number of equally valuable [...]

This article proposes a new model of human concept learning that provides a rational analysis of learning feature-based concepts. This model is built upon Bayesian inference for a grammatically structured hypothesis space--a concept language of logical rules. This article compares the model predictions to human generalization judgments in several well-known category learning experiments, and finds good agreement for both average and individual participant generalizations. This article further investigates judgments for a broad set of 7-feature concepts--a more natural setting in several ways--and again finds that the model explains human performance. Keywords: Concept learning; Categorization; Bayesian induction; Probabilistic grammar; Rules; Language of thought

An undergraduate anthropology student came to me with an assigned reading in a philosophy course at the University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point. The student was confused. What he was learning [...]

Influences of feature-feature statistical co-occurrences and causal relations have been found in some circumstances, but not others. We hypothesized that detecting an influence of these knowledge types hinges crucially on the congruence between the task and type of knowledge. We show that both knowledge types influence tasks that tap feature relatedness. Detailed descriptions of causal theories were collected, and co-occurrence statistics were based on feature production norms. Regression analyses tested the influences of these knowledge types in untimed relatedness ratings and speeded relatedness decisions for 65 feature pairs spanning a range of correlational strength. Both knowledge types influenced both tasks, demonstrating that causal theories and statistical co-occurrences between features influence conceptual computations.

Keywords: Blau space, competition, ecology, evolution, resource partitioning Abstract For several decades, the concept of the niche has enriched sociological theory. The niche represents the position or function of an entity, such as an organization or population of organizations, within a larger community environment. Using the concept of the niche allows researchers to go beyond classifying entities to understanding (a) their life chances under different and changing environmental conditions and (b) how they interact under the competitive conditions induced by a finite environment. We briefly review the intellectual history of the niche concept as it came from bioecology to sociology. The bulk of the article reviews the two major streams of sociological research that use the niche concept: the population ecology of organizations and McPherson's ecology of affiliation. Finally, we survey commonalities between these approaches and highlight new directions, including applications that take the niche concept well beyond its origins in organizational studies.

Marco Ruffino has attempted to establish a close link between Frege's treatment of expressions of the form 'the concept F' and the privileged status Frege assigns to extensions of concepts as logical objects. It is shown that Frege's principal motive for introducing extensions into his logical theory is not to be able to make indirect statements about concepts, but rather to define all numbers as logical objects of a fundamental kind in order to ensure right cognitive access to them qua logical via Axiom V.

Nominalist views of ontology have been presented in many shapes and forms through the ages. The arguments that nominalists give against the existence of classes of entities postulated by realists […]

Although information systems (IS) problem solving involves knowledge of both the IS and application domains, little attention has been paid to the role of application domain knowledge. In this study, […]

Byline: Per-Erik Liss (1), Olle Aspevall (2,3), Daniel Karlsson (4), Urban Forsum (3) Keywords: accompanying characteristic; communication; concept; defining characteristic; definition; recognising characteristic; uncertainty Abstract: During the last hundred years medical language has been influenced by scientific and technological progress. As a result uncertainty in medical communication is increasing. This may have serious consequences not only for health care delivery but also for medical science. Disease classification, assessment of the validity of epidemiological investigations and comparison of the results of various investigations are examples of what will become less secure. The purpose of the article is to emphasise a main source of uncertainty -- the problem of interpreting definitions. Two issues of interpretation are explored. One concerns the logical status of a statement and the other the function of a statement. It is concluded that the security of medical language can be increased through the elucidation of the logical status and functions of statements making up medical concepts. Author Affiliation: (1) Department of Health and Society, Linkoping University, SE-581 85, Linkoping, Sweden (2) Karolinska Institutet, Department of Immunology, Microbiology, Pathology and Infectious Diseases. Division of Clinical and Oral Bacteriology, Huddinge University Hospital, Huddinge, Sweden (3) Department of Molecular and Clinical Medicine, Linkoping University, Sweden (4) Department of Biomedical Engineering, Linkoping University, Sweden Article History: Registration Date: 18/10/2004

Conceptual analysis is undergoing a revival in philosophy, and much of the credit goes to Frank Jackson. Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is needed as an integral component of so-called serious metaphysics and that it also does explanatory work in accounting for such phenomena as categorization, meaning change, communication, and linguistic understanding. He even goes so far as to argue that opponents of conceptual analysis are implicitly committed to it in practice. We show that he is wrong on all of these points and that his case for conceptual analysis doesn't succeed. At the same time, we argue that the sorts of intuitions that figure in conceptual analysis may still have a significant role to play in philosophy. So naturalists needn't disregard intuitions altogether.

Contemporary human geographers must work to clarify and translate new critical theory insights for a broader audience. Better evidence will both strengthen the theory-building exercise and tender our insights more powerful in the real world of policy and action. In response to the critics of my original 'fuzzy concepts' paper, I welcome their several contributions--the case for fuzziness as a tactical move, the need for subtle rather than grand critique and the means for strengthening qualitative research methods. I pose three further questions. Who is welcomed and/or excluded as participants in the dialogue? What is the usefulness of the deductive/inductive distinction? Is there a quantitative/qualitative divide? I argue for engaging additional academic and lay participants and for moving beyond the fetishism of the two methodological dualisms. Regional concepts Methodology Regional policy Les geographes contemporains, specialistes de la geographie humaine, doivent s'efforcer d'eclaircir et de traduire pour des lecteurs d'origine plus variee les nouveaux apercus qu'apporte la theorie critique. De meilleures preuves et renforceront la construction de theories et rendront plus forts les apercus dans le monde reel de la politique et de l'action. En replique aux critiques du premier article a propos des 'concepts confus', on est heureux de recevoir les diverses contributions des auteurs mentionnes ci-dessus--a savoir, les arguments en faveur des concepts confus du point de vue tactique, le besoin d'une critique subtite plutot que d'une grande critique, et les moyens de renforcer les methodes de recherche qualitatives. Trois questions supplementaires sont posees. Quant a la participation au dialogue, qui sera inclus / exclus? A quoi sert la distinction deductive / inductive? Est-ce qu'il y a une scission quantitative / qualitative. On ex'pose les raisons pour faire participer davantage d'academiques et de profanes, et pour aller au-dela du fetichisme des deux dualismes methodologiques. Concepts regionaux Methodologie Politique regionale Zeitgenossische Vertreter der Humangeographie mussen sich bemuhen, neue kritische Theorien fur das breite Publikum zu erlautern und zu ubersetzen. Bessere Beweise werden nicht nur das Gebaude der Theorien untermauern, sondern unsern Einsichten in der wirklichen Welt der Politik und des Handelns auch mehr Einfluss verleihen. In Erwiderung der kritischen Stimmen zu dem ursprunglichen Aufsatz 'Unklare Konzeptionen' begrusst die Autorin die verschiedenen Beitrage--die Anklage der Unklarheit als taktischen Zug, die Notwendigkeit subtile statt allumfassender Kritik zu uben, und die Mittel zur Verbesserung qualitativer Forschungsmethoden. Sie stellt jedoch drei weitere Fragen: Wen heisst man willkommen als Teilnehmer am Dialog und/oder wen schliesst man aus? Wozu dient die Unterscheidung zwischen deduktivem und induktivem Ansatz? Gibt es eine qualitative/ quantitative Trennungslinie? Die Autorin tritt dafur ein, zusaitzliche akademische und Laienteilnehmer zu engagieren, und uber den Schatten des Fetischs zweier methodologischer Dualismen zu springen. Regionalkonzeptionen Methodologie Regionalpolitik

This article examines the construct of properties in relation to the study of concepts. The authors discuss the 'global form assumption' and the 'local form assumption' and argue that properties are represented locally, not globally.

Various defenses of amodal symbol systems are addressed, including amodal symbols in sensory-motor areas, the casual theory of concepts, supramodal concepts, latent semantic analysis, and abstracted amodal symbols. Various aspects of perceptual symbol systems are clarified and developed, including perception, features, simulators, category structure, frames, analogy, introspection, situated action, and development. Particular attention is given to abstract concepts, language, and computational mechanisms.

Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components - not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulators of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspection (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored. Keywords: analogue processing; categories; concepts; frames; imagery; images; knowledge; perception; representation; sensory-motor representations; simulation; symbol grounding; symbol systems

It has become very popular among philosophers to attempt to discredit, or at least set severe limits to, the thesis that there exist conceptual schemes radically different from ours. This fashion is misconceived. Philosophers have attempted to justify it in two main ways: by means of arguments which are a priorist relative to the relevant linguistic and textual evidence (and either independent of or based upon positive theories of meaning, understanding, and interpretation); and by means of arguments which are a posteriorist relative to that evidence. The former approach is misconceived, not only in that its particular arguments fail, but also in principle. The latter approach, while in general the fight sort of approach to adopt to the question, arrives at its conclusion only through faulty execution, through misinterpretation of the evidence. Though quite unjustified, philosophers' hostility to the thesis of radically different conceptual schemes is easily explained, namely, in terms of a number of psychologically powerful motives which it subserves. These motives cannot step in to provide the missing justification, however. Instead, they reveal such hostility in an even shadier light.

Developments within social and exact sciences take place because scientists engage in scientific practices that allow them to further expand and refine the scientific concepts within their scientific disciplines. There is disagreement among scientists as to what the essential practices are that allow scientific concepts within a scientific discipline to expand and evolve. One group looks at conceptual expansion as something that is being constrained by rational practices. Another group, however, suggests that conceptual expansion proceeds along the lines of 'everything goes.' The goal of this paper is to test whether scientific concepts expand in a rational way within the field of organizational behaviour. We will use organizational climate and culture as examples. The essence of this study consists of two core concepts: one within organizational climate and one within organizational culture. It appears that several conceptual variations are added around these core concepts. The variations are constrained by rational scientific practices. In other terms, there is evidence that the field of organizational behaviour develops rationally. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

In this article, the authors propose that individuals' moral beliefs are linked to their implicit theories about the nature (i.e., malleability) of their social-moral reality. Specifically, it was hypothesized that when individuals believe in a fixed reality (entity theory), they tend to hold moral beliefs in which duties within the given system are seen as fundamental. In contrast, when individuals believe in a malleable reality (incremental theory), one that can be shaped by individuals, they hold moral beliefs that focus on moral principles. such as human rights, around which that reality should be organized. Results from 5 studies supported the proposed framework: Implicit theories about the malleability of one's social-moral reality predicted duty-based vs. rights-based moral beliefs.

One of the main concerns in defining health is determining its status in relation to value. The main proposals in this direction generally assume a strict dichotomy between descriptive and evaluative dimensions. This essay argues that such a dichotomy leads to a theoretical inconsistency, which becomes evident once a definition of health is practically operative. A new conceptual framework uniting these two moments is proposed as an alternative, capable of preserving the fundamental insights of both descriptive and evaluative accounts of health, and of avoiding the theoretical inconsistencies on the level of practical application. Key Words: health, objective good, theoretical consistency, value

The term 'conceptual framework' as applied to accounting, means a set of basic rules which are supposed to govern the way accounting is performed. Efforts to define the accounting conceptual framework have been many, but the varied rules and practices which stimulated attempts at reforming accounting, still remain. These attempts did not achieve their goals because they failed to consider the function of systematic knowledge in the development of practical procedures.

This investigation explored the meaning, measurement, and validity of the ego-resiliency construct (ER, J. H. Block & J. Block) in 3 samples. Study 1 explored the internal structure of ER in observer and self-report data, and the development of a self-report measure is described. Study 2 tested convergent and discriminant relations of ER with personality attributes. Study 3 investigated implications of ER for adjustment and effective functioning in adulthood. Components of ER obtained through exploratory factor analyses - confident optimism, productive and autonomous activity, interpersonal warmth and insight, and skilled expressiveness - formed a unitary construct and mirrored the relations found between ER and other trait domains. Across samples, there were strong relations between ER and effective functioning in diverse areas of life. ER is discussed in relation to generally accepted criteria of adjustment and effective functioning.

The absence of associativity in the mean aggregation operation of a collection of n numbers increases the problem of extending mean of the n numbers to n + 1 numbers. Self identity and the centering property concepts are essential for extending mean aggregation operators. One of the main characteristics of these operators is the possession of an idempotency property. The selection of an element on the basis of the performance of a random experiment can be taken as a mean aggregation operation.

The different conceptions used by chemistry students to understand solubility should form the basis of the educational curricula and lesson planning. Most students use everyday experiences rather than class experiences to understand solubility. The students extend the macroscopic concepts to the microscopic level. The usage of scientific language needs to be emphasized as most students use everyday language to express scientific concepts. Teachers and educational researchers should develop a curricula that will increase the students' understanding of chemistry.

A three-dimensional visualization and methodological obstacle approach suitably explains misconceptions among students regarding the geometry and polarity of bonds. About 356 grade 12, first year, and final year undergraduate chemistry students are studied, through a questionnaire, to determine their misconceptions about the geometry and polarity of molecules. The utilization of counter examples eliminates the students' tendency toward functional reductions. The questionnaire is discussed.

Sense generation is a formal process of studying concepts and concept combination which considers the restrictions from the different cognitive sciences. The method differs from other theories regarding the representation and classification of concepts. The approach suggests that the top-down requisites on communication interact with bottom-up rules of concept combination, with a stringent bottom-up priority.

A previous article on theory construction in mathematics considered the application of social pragmatism to conceptual practice. The discussion was generally persuasive, but a few criticisms are in order. First, 'the mangle of practice' presented as a process for locating concepts in a field of agency is problematic. Second, the role of agency in the discussion is questionable. Third, the point that mathematical thinking will always give rise to unanswerable metaphysical questions.

Criticisms of a previous article on conceptual practice touched on three issues: the definition of 'the mangle of practice,' the role of agency and the question of metaphysics in mathematical thinking. However, the original article explained that 'the mangle of practice' is a dynamic process that transforms interactive cultural elements, and is not a particular 'thing' in itself. Moreover, criticisms regarding the role of agency are flawed by the conventional humanist perspective. Finally, metaphysical speculation is not necessarily required in mathematical analysis.

We all operate with many concepts as if they were axioms. We do not want to take the trouble to check whether our interlocutor is of one mind with us [...]

The present article begins with an examination of where collective knowledge construction is likely to occur. After a brief discussion of the conditions necessary for inventing rather than simply reproducing knowledge through social interaction (horizontal information flow, prior domain knowledge, and availability of intellectual tools), a prototype of such interaction is offered -- a class taught using the Hypothesis-Experiment-Instruction method. Experimental data are then presented on the effects of discussion on college students' ability to learn the concept of buoyancy. Finally, it is proposed that conceptual acquisition or change is induced through social interaction, such as a science activity, although the acquisition or change occurs in the individual's mind. The role that metacognitive beliefs play in scientific knowledge is emphasized.

A study of school children, over a period of two years, who used the concept mapping method was conducted in 1991-92. A majority of students felt that concept mapping was useful in understanding and analyzing a book and helped them prepare for tests and examinations. They opined that there were several correct ways to make a concept map. Some 50% of the number of students felt that reflecting on concept mapping was helpful, while others believed that writing and reflecting were repetitive functions.