The fact/value distinction and the social sciences

Metaethics is an especially illuminating context for exploring the relation between facts and values. There are good reasons in favor of a cognitivist, realist interpretation of moral value, and some of the elements of that interpretation suggest bases for rejecting the alleged fact/value distinction in social scientific explanations. Some of the main objections to the alleged fact/value distinction and to expressivist interpretations of moral value are articulated, with a view to showing their relevance to the understanding of social phenomena more broadly. Also, the way in which rationality inevitably involves normativity is discussed because it is a crucial consideration in regard to understanding the normative aspects of issues the social sciences seek to explain. Keywords Antirealism * Cognitivism * Metaethics * Noncognitivism * Objectivity * Realism * Subjectivity
The present discussion addresses some of the concerns in Professor Gorski's paper, focusing chiefly on metaethical issues. However, in the second half of this paper I comment on facts and [...]