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Depuis la fin de l’année 2012, la révolution syrienne est confrontée à l’arrivée massive de combattants chiites, projetés d’Irak, d’Iran ou du Liban afin de soutenir militairement le régime de Bachar al-Assad. Au sein de l’opposition, cet afflux de mercenaires étrangers s’est traduit par la construction populaire d’une rhétorique confessionnelle, dénonçant la « menace » ou le « danger » chiite pesant désormais sur le pays. En s’appuyant sur les méthodes d’analyse discursive, l’objectif de cet article est d’examiner les représentations collectives de ces soldats issus des rangs du Hezbollah ou des Pasdarans iraniens, mais également de comprendre le réveil des dynamiques identitaires et confessionnelles désormais à l’œuvre en Syrie. Since the end of 2012, the Syrian revolution faces an influx of Shiite fighters sent from Iraq, Iran and Lebanon to fight alongside the military regime of Bashar al-Assad. Among the Syrian opposition, the involvement of foreign mercenaries in the conflict led to the construction of a sectarian rhetoric, denouncing the “Shiite threat” now weighing on the country. By analysing popular and political discourses, this paper aims to examine some collective representations of these Hizballah or Pasdaran soldiers but also to understand the awakening of sectarian dynamics and Sunni-Shia tensions in contemporary Syria.

International audience; Contrary to a widespread belief, Arab nationalism did not emerge in Syria as a purely secular ideology, considering that proto-Islamists played a key role in popularizing it from the late Ottoman era onward. This emphasis on Syria’s Arabness was perpetuated after independence by the Muslim Brotherhood: first, out of a quest for relevance in the country’s parliamentary system, notably after Nasser’s popularity grew among the conservative opinion; second, because after it was banned by the Baathist regime in 1963, the Brotherhood considered that returning to Syrian politics required to remain in tune with Arab nationalist ideas, despite the fact that the latter were increasingly vilified by conservative ulama and Islamist militants in the name of Pan-Islamic unity. The 2011 revolution and ensuing conflict had ambivalent consequences in that respect: On the one hand, alignment with the popular uprising encouraged a focus on Syrianhood as opposed to transnational identities, not only on the part of the Brotherhood, but also among hardliners like Ahrar al-Sham and, more ambiguously, the formerly al-Qaeda affiliated Hay’aTahrir al-Sham; on the other hand, the Islamic State’s unrepentant Pan-Islamists seized the new opportunity structure to proclaim the restoration of the Caliphate.