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Esta es la presentación del número especial.

Disinformation poses a very important and growing risk to our society, either alone or in association with other hybrid threats, which is being addressed at both the international and European Union (EU) as well as national level. Within the EU, a multidisciplinary and cooperative approach has been advocated between all the actors involved, in contrast to the strong regulatory perspective traditionally adopted in the history of European integration within the EU framework. For this reason, together with the inherent limitations imposed by the nature of the right to freedom of expression and information on any possible administrative censorship or criminal punishment, Spain has adopted only one recent regulation (Decree PCM/1030/2020) to establish the Spanish procedure to combat disinformation as required by European directive. Moreover, although fake news cannot be prosecuted directly in Spain outside the scope of crimes against the market and consumers, fake news can include very different types of criminal offence depending on the content and the intention with which it is disseminated. We illustrate these possibilities through some recent judicial decisions on this matter and declarations by the Office of the Attorney-General. It remains to be seen whether this soft approach to combating disinformation will be sufficient to combat this new plague on our contemporary society effectively.

espanolLa CIJ ha ido progresivamente incorporando la nocion de obligaciones erga omnes, y otorgandole un mayor alcance en su jurisprudencia. En los ultimos anos, varias decisiones han reconocido explicita o implicitamente el locus standi de los Estados no lesionados para presentar demandas ante la Corte por violaciones de obligaciones erga omnes partes. Por el momento, no se ha reconocido el locus standi derivado de obligaciones erga omnes en sentido estricto. Estos desarrollos demuestran la puesta en valor de los valores colectivos y de la comunidad internacional en el ordenamiento juridico internacional. Sin embargo, la ampliacion del locus standi derivado de las obligaciones erga omnes no lleva consigo la desaparicion de la exigencia de otras consideraciones requeridas por la naturaleza judicial de la Corte, como el de la existencia de una controversia previamente al inicio del procedimiento y de contar en la instancia con el consentimiento de todas las partes. EnglishThe ICJ has progressively incorporated the notion of obligations erga omnes, and given it greater scope in its jurisprudence. In recent years, several decisions have explicitly or implicitly recognized the locus standi of non-injured States to bring cases before the Court for violations of obligations erga omnes partes. For the time being, the locus standi arising from obligations erga omnes in the strict sense has not been recognized. These developments demonstrate the relevance of collective values and of the international community in the international legal order. However, the extension of the locus standi derived from obligations erga omnes does not imply the disappearance of the requirement of other considerations required by the judicial nature of the Court, such as the existence of a dispute prior to the commencement of the proceedings and the consent of all the Parties to the proceedings.

La operacion Sophia de la UE, que se establecio en 2015 para luchar contra el negocio del trafico y la trata de personas en el Mediterraneo, se encuentra en una situacion de paralisis, pues se ha decidido retirar los buques de la misma y, practicamente, solo tiene como cometido el adiestramiento de las fuerzas de guardacosta libias para que sean ellas las que luchen contra aquellos crimenes. En este articulo hemos repasado los resultados que ha producido hasta el momento la operacion naval de la UE y las causas de que se encuentre en la situacion actual, para determinar si se puede decir o no que ha fracasado. A la luz de nuestra investigacion, hemos llegado a la conclusion de que si se puede afirmar que no ha respondido a las expectativas que se crearon cuando nacio. No obstante, en honor de la verdad, pensamos que el fiasco de Sophia, en realidad, no es tanto un fracaso de la operacion en si misma como mas bien una manifestacion de los limites de la PCSD.

In this paper, we have studied the place that the norms that proclaim and defend human rights occupy in the juridical systems of the Council of Europe and the European Union, looking for their consensus and how they have been protected, aiming at determining whether their protection is a constituent trait of the European identity or not. In this sense, we have realized that both juridical systems try to protect human rights in a very special way, thus making credible the fact that in some provisions of their constituent treaties it is affirmed that human rights are part of the fundamental values of those organisations. Moreover, the remaining juridical mechanisms set up in order to protect human rights in the EU and the Council of Europe show the intention of their member states to place the norms that proclaim and protect human rights above the singular will of states. Therefore, the member states intent to create a sort of peremptory norms, something that allow us to conclude that the peremptory character of human rights norms is a constituent trait of the European identity.Received: 02 July 2018 Accepted: 05 September 2018 Published online: 27 February 2019

Las dos operaciones navales que ha puesto en marcha hasta ahora la UE, Atalanta y Sophia, han demostrado un creciente nivel de consenso y voluntad por parte de los Estados Miembros, de los que ha participado un gran número. Además, más claramente en el caso de Atalanta, pero también en los primeros pasos de Sophia, se puede decir que estas dos operaciones de la CSDP están resultando bastante exitosas, en atención al grado de cumplimiento de sus respectivos objetivos. Habiendo demostrado su potencial, el lanzamiento de operaciones navales para la gestión de crisis puede ser visto como un paso hacia la creación de una Unión de Seguridad y Defensa. De esta manera, el paso siguiente en la integración europea en materia de defensa puede ser la implementación de la Cooperación Estructurada Permanente prevista en el artículo 42.2 y 46 del TUE y desarrollada en el protocolo No 10 anexado al Tratado de Lisboa. Este logro podría ser el hito que genere el núcleo del que pudiera emerger una Unión de Seguridad y Defensa.Recibido: 14 diciembre 2017Aceptado: 10 enero 2018Publicación en línea: 28 marzo 2018

Following the 2015 Paris attacks, one of the most discussed issues is whether the Paris incidents constitute an ‘armed attack’ requisite to trigger the right of self-defence in light of the wording of Article 51 of the UN Charter of 1945. Indeed, should the responses of the Member States to the Paris attacks, activating the mutual assistance clause, be seen as a move towards the formation of a new customary rule reshaping the content of the right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of UN Charter and customary law? Or should that invocation of Article 42 (7) TEU be considered a violation of the UN Charter law of self-defence? This chapter examines the textual and contextual elements of Article 51 of the UN Charter and the practice of States since then, mainly in the context of the activity of the UN Security Council. After a careful examination of those elements, it concludes that if it can be said that the existing rule in international law in both conventional and customary law allowing states to have recourse to the use of force in self-defence can only be legally exercised in the presence of an armed attack committed by a state, it can be argued that the current practice of states appears to be heading in another direction. For the drafters of Article 51 of the UN Charter the right of self-defence was already ‘inherent’. If they had been in the current situation, they may have extended this right to cases of major terrorist attacks. In view of this context, the invocation of Article 42 (7) TEU in response to a serious terrorist attack, like those in Paris in November 2015, cannot be considered a violation of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Many of the EU Member States are prepared to entertain a new interpretation of that provision, at least that portion which respects the scope of the ratione personae.

Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent come from a multidisciplinary background in both their education and experience, combining public international law and legal theory with other disciplines of municipal law, such as administrative law and the law of fiduciaries. That background allows them to provide an original presentation of international law: the fiduciary theory, which ‘is fundamentally a legal and relational one of what it means for institutions to hold and exercise authority on behalf of others’, and ‘offers the possibility of explaining the authority and obligations of any and all institutions that purport to hold public authority’ (352). By means of the fiduciary theory, the authors have developed ‘a model for thinking about international law...

After the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, French President Francois Hollande invoked Article 42(7) TEU, requesting bilateral aid and assistance from other EU Member States. In this regard, as it was the case with the terrorist actions of 11 September 2001, one of the most disputed issues was whether the Paris incidents constituted an “armed attack”, requisite to trigger the right of self-defence in light of the wording of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. After a careful examination, we reached the conclusion that, even if it can be said that, for the time being, the existing rule in international law in both conventional law (Article 51 of the UN Charter) and customary law allowing states to have recourse to the use of force in self-defence can only be legally exercised in the presence of an armed attack committed by a state, it can also be argued that current state practice appears to be heading in another direction. It must be recalled that for the drafters of Article 51 of the UN Charter the right of self-defence was already “inherent”. Had they been in the current situation, perhaps they would have extended this right to include cases of terrorist attacks of great dimensions.

Durante la preparacion de la CVDT de 1969, la CDI advirtio, en relacion con la definicion del jus cogens, que habria que limitarse en ese momento a establecer en terminos generales que un tratado seria nulo si entrara en conflicto con tales normas y dejar que la practica estatal y la jurisprudencia de los tribunales internacionales determinara el contenido completo de esa regla. Transcurridos mas de cuarenta anos desde la adopcion de la Convencion, la practica nos brinda ya perspectiva suficiente para poder realizar ese ejercicio con garantias. Comprobamos como la nocion jus cogens se ha consolidado definitivamente. Ademas, aunque la comunidad internacional no haya senalado todavia algunas de esas normas, las instancias internacionales lo van haciendo de forma creciente. Asimismo, los efectos juridicos de esta institucion se hacen notar fuera del ambito estrictamente del Derecho de los tratados, impregnando todo el terreno de las fuentes normativas, y poco a poco tambien los de la subjetividad y la responsabilidad internacionales.

Over the past years we are witnessing a new flourishing of the phenomenon of slavery, understood in a broad sense, for what it turns out useful to examine the concept of slavery in the International Law to see whether or not it is adapted to the new forms of human exploitation that are taking place. In this respect, we have analyzed the definition contained in the 1926 Slavery Convention, which is considered to be the classic definition in International Law, and have seen its evolution in the later texts and how it has been analyzed and applied by the jurisprudence of the international courts and tribunals. After this examination, it is possible to affirm its actuality and that is an useful tool to continue the fighting against slavery nowadays.

Spanish Law 53/2007 of 28 December on control of overseas trade in defence and dual-use material seeks within the Spanish legal system to regulate a highly delicate matter, namely the fight against arms trafficking, one of humankind’s great scourges as the 21st century commences. The Act has materialised in the context of a very broad-based movement of opinion and regulation that has grown over the last few years in favour of control of sales of defence and dual-use material by international organisations and States, with more emphasis on conventional weapons, trafficking in which poses no less danger than nuclear, biological and other such weapons, known as weapons of mass destruction, which have become the object of growing attention in recent decades. Law 53/2007 contributes two essential elements to the fabric of control over overseas trade in defence and dual-use material: firstly, it takes up all the advances achieved hitherto by regulation and enshrines then in the law; and secondly it establishes parliamentary control of the system’s transparency by obliging the Government to report to the Cortes Generales on its implementation. Nevertheless, certain aspects of Law 53/2007 are open to criticism, for instance an arguably excessive margin of discretion for the JIMDDU as the administrative body in the discharge of certain of its functions, the absence of parliamentary representation on the JIMDDU, or the scant role vouchsafed to the international legal department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is possibly the government service best equipped to opine on the legality and appropriateness of transfers of defence and dual-use material.