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Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act generally immunizes online platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Amazon, and Uber from liability for third-party user content (for example, posts, comments, and videos) and for moderation of that content. This Article addresses an important issue overlooked by both defenders and critics of Section 230: the implications of the law and proposed reforms for Black communities in particular. By relieving tech platforms of most legal liability for third-party content, Section 230 helps facilitate Black social activism, entrepreneur ship, and artistic creativity. Section 230 also relieves platforms of most legal liability for content moderation, which boosts platforms' freedom to remove or downrank unlawful activity, as well as an array of "lawful but awful" content that government cannot constitutionally restrict--such as hate speech, white supremacy organizing, medical disinformation, and political disinformation. However, platforms' overly broad interpretations of Section 230 also incentivize platforms to allow unlawful activity directed at Black communities (such as harassment, white supremacist violence, voter intimidation, and housing and employment discrimination) and to prevent legal recourse when platforms erroneously downrank Black content. These insights provide factors that can help policymakers assess whether proposed Section 230 reforms--such as notice-and-takedown, content neutrality, and carve-outs to immunity for civil rights laws, algorithmic recommendations, or advertisements--will benefit or harm Black communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article questions a common reading of Section 230 of Beyond Good and Evil as containing a canonical statement of Nietzsche's naturalism. The section cannot be read simply as the programmatic statement of an investigative task, and is relatively vague as to its nature. Nietzsche's aim is aporetic. He presents the naturalist task as involving mental self-cruelty and a struggle with unconscious vanity, suggesting that thinkers have found no way to justify why they choose this task, unless they invoke self-descriptions which are false and belong to a metaphysical conception of truth and inquiry that naturalism must resist. In the Genealogy , Nietzsche revisits this theme and announces his task as that of calling into question these justifications of naturalist inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gory depictions of real-life violence and crimes are not confined to the dark corners of the Internet. They appear in everyday social media feeds, regularly surfacing between posts about the latest celebrity updates, political commentary, animal videos, and DIY home improvement tips. The increasing trend of users posting or livestreaming heinous and unthinkable acts online can trigger emotional distress in viewers, particularly victims’ families. Violent content spreads like virtual wildfire once it inevitably reaches virality and appears on consumers’ feeds with little to no warning, and no recourse. The current legal framework, primarily governed by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act shields social media platforms from liability while they profit from the viral dissemination of violent content. This Note delves into the intersection of online harm, social media platforms, and the legal challenges faced by victims in the United States seeking redress for this cyber-tort. Unlike traditional intentional infliction of emotional distress cases, victims in the online realm face practical barriers in pursuing monetary damages against content creators, and CDA 230 prevents a cause of action against the intermediary. The United States lags far behind global efforts, led by the European Union, Germany, and Australia to hold intermediaries accountable through legislative measures. This Note calls for U.S. legal reform with intermediary accountability at the forefront and offers an alternative approach to provide victims with avenues for redress in cases of cyber IIED. This pioneering exploration extends the traditional IIED framework to encompass violent online content and emphasizes the urgent need for legal reform to address the evolving landscape of cyber-torts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Section 230, the twenty-six words that created the internet, has become the twenty-six words that are breaking the First Amendment. Section 230's blanket liability shield for social media platforms is harming our children and our democracy. In this essay, I narrate the story of what Section 230 enabled-the rise of the virtual public square, a circumstance that the framers could never have imagined-and explore its consequences for human well-being and freedom of expression. I conclude that Section 230 must be repealed to unleash First Amendment jurisprudence to confront the threats to the republic in the age of generative AI, as well as to usher in the next round of internet innovation in service of constitutional democratic sustainability. Bipartisan legislation has been introduced to sunset Section 230 as of December 31,2025. Those who believe in the enduring promise of American constitutional democracy should support its passage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S. Court of Appeals multi-Circuit split over the proper interpretation of the intellectual property laws cited in Section 230 of the U.S. Communications Decency Act (CDA) with regard to the coverage of liability for the content published on social media platforms.

Despite the multitude of efforts to combat hate speech, it persists within our global media discourse. It appears in legacy news media content, right-wing media outlets, and social media. In some countries, defamation laws are used to punish those who publish false, defamatory statements about a group defined by its racial, religious, or national origin, gender identity, or sexual orientation. Recognizing the potential role civil defamation laws can play in mitigating the problem of hate speech in media, this article offers a comparative legal analysis of existing defamation laws in Brazil, Germany, and the United States. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether and to what extent victims of hate speech might be able to employ these laws to seek justice. Our analysis indicates that criminal libel laws are often abused by political actors, and thus civil laws are preferred. Based on Germany's experience, we also find that social media platform compliance with this process is essential. Therefore, we propose a solution that expands U.S. libel law to include group defamation and uses carveouts to CDA Section 230 to motivate platform participation in identifying and removing group libel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a result of the increased popularity of influencer marketing, various “child influencers” have risen to stardom on popular social media platforms such as YouTube, TikTok, and Instagram. To date, these children have no protections under the law to safe)guard them from the dangers of the influencer industry. Namely, there are no safeguards from financial exploitation by parents and guardians; children hold no guarantee that they can retain their earnings from social media. Further, there are no regulations in place regarding the number of hours child influencers may work and such children sometimes maintain little control over the extent of the content posted on their platforms. In fact, some parents log chronicles of their children before, during, and immediately after birth and continue to display their children’s lives as they grow and develop. This Note addresses the dangers that child influencers face and compares the current crisis to the struggles of childhood actors. Further, it recommends the expansion of child actor laws to also cover child influencers while recognizing potential oversight problems that may follow. Critics of other literature on this topic suggest that it is too difficult to track and regulate parents filming children in the home. To address oversight problems, this Note suggests further action through a three-pronged solution: (1) expand existing child actor laws to cover child influencers; (2) enact greater regulation of social media companies themselves to ensure compliance with child labor laws; and (3) increase enforcement through social media platforms’ community guidelines. Cracking down on social media companies and content posted on their platforms leads to a discussion about immunity under Section 230 of the Telecommunications Act. To that end, this Note calls for a revision of Section 230 to account for changes in the modern era. Together, these three solutions can help prevent the exploitation of children and afford them the protections they deserve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As “interactive computer services” (social media sites) expanded over the past decade, so too did the prevalence of “social bots,” software programs that mimic human behavior online. The capacity social bots have to exponentially amplify often-harmful content has led to calls for greater accountability from social media companies in the way they manage bot presence on their sites. In response, many social media companies and private researchers have developed bot-detection methodologies to better govern social bot activities. At the same time, the prevalence of harmful content on social media sites has led to calls to reform Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the law that largely immunizes social media sites from liability for third-party content on their platforms. Such reform proposals largely entail making Section 230 immunity contingent on social media companies following new requirements when moderating content. Social bots have been left out of these reform conversations, however. This Note suggests that including specific provisions regulating social bots within broader Section 230 reform will help remedy both outdated Section 230 provisions and malicious social bots’ effects. Fusing characteristics from several Section 230 reform proposals with existing bot-governance technology will help establish a legal foundation for social media companies’ new social bot management requirements. Two suggested requirements are: (1) interactive computer services must have some type of monitoring and classification system that helps users determine the “bot-ness” of social media accounts; and (2) interactive computer services must provide an accessible medium for users to view the data that its monitoring and classification system produces. These requirements will help protect the validity of organic online exchanges and reduce the potential power of deceitful influence campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document is a list of references and sources used in a commentary written by Eric Goldman. The commentary discusses various topics related to the internet, including content moderation, the history of the internet, and the role of trust and safety. The sources cited include books, research papers, news articles, and websites. The commentary was sponsored by the Center for Growth & Opportunity at Utah State University. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines the issue of whether social media companies should be held responsible for the outcomes of their recommendation algorithms. It discusses a case where Twitter was sued for allegedly allowing ISIS to use its algorithms for recruitment. The Supreme Court ruled that Twitter was not liable. The article argues that as algorithms play a more active role in content distribution, the idea that social media companies should be protected from liability should be reconsidered. It explores the history of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which shields social media companies from liability, and suggests that algorithms may be regulated as commercial speech. The article concludes that social media companies should be held accountable for the consequences of their algorithms. [Extracted from the article]

The given text discusses the interpretation of Section 230(e)(2) of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) and the circuit split between the Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit. The Ninth Circuit excludes state intellectual property laws from the immunity granted to ISPs, while the Third Circuit includes them. The article explores the arguments and policy goals behind each interpretation and suggests that Congress may need to clarify the scope of Section 230(e)(2) to resolve the circuit split. The split has implications for plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit and highlights the need for further examination and potential amendment of the statute. [Extracted from the article]

But for the Internet, many of our interactions with others would be impossible. From socializing to shopping, and, increasingly, working and attending class, the Internet greatly facilitates the ease of our daily lives. However, we frequently neglect to consider that our conduits to the Internet have the potential to lead to harm and injury. When the Internet was in its infancy, and primarily was a repository of information, Congress recognized the threat of continual lawsuits against online entities stemming from the content created by their users. The Communications Decency Act of 1996 arose to mitigate the seemingly Herculean task for online entities to moderate every piece of content posted by their users. Online entities thus became immune from suit in their capacities as publishers of content. Yet, the Internet is no longer solely a repository of information. As much as the Internet has become a nexus of our interactions with others, so too has it become a nexus for sexual predators and their victims. This case note addresses the history of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, how courts have applied Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, and how clever lawyers have skirted around its protections by instead filing suit against online entities under product liability theories--as was the case in A.M. v. Omegle.com, LLC. The product liability approach, as applied in A.M., is assessed and compared with both traditional claims against online entities as publishers and with federal human trafficking claims. Ultimately, under the present state of the law, the product liability approach best empowers the victims of crimes facilitated by defectively designed apps and websites to seek recourse for their harms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amid escalating apprehensions surrounding content regulation, the USA has discreetly integrated provisions reminiscent of its Communications Decency Act Section 230 (CDA 230) into trade agreements, offering broad immunity. This scholarly analysis critically assesses this manoeuvre by juxtaposing such CDA 230-like provisions against the UK's established legal framework governing online content and freedom of expression. Utilizing a comparative legal methodology, the paper underscores the pronounced differences between the USA and UK stances on intermediary liability for third-party content, moulded by their unique constitutional foundations and jurisprudential interpretations of free speech rights. The insertion of CDA 230-aligned clauses into trade agreements poses a potential threat to the UK's nuanced equilibrium between safeguarding free speech and upholding other paramount interests, such as privacy and reputation. An scrutiny of UK defamation statutes and content regulation protocols reveals inherent challenges in transplanting CDA 230 provisions into trade contexts. In summation, the paper ardently supports a diversified approach to online content governance and cautions against standardizing intermediary liability laws via trade agreements, especially between nations with divergent foundational beliefs. It fervently endorses a cross-disciplinary discourse involving both trade and legal specialists to ensure the preservation of free expression while concurrently recognizing the intricacies of crafting universally applicable standards for online platforms and content regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major social media platforms (SMPs), such as Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, have become the primary means of communication for billions of people worldwide. They are the largest modern news distributors and the primary curators of online public discourse. However, the expanding influence of SMPs has led many to publicly scrutinize the content moderation decisions of such platforms, as SMPs regularly remove, block, censor, and ban user-generated content (UGC), including third-party written messages, photos, and videos, at their discretion. Because SMPs exercise immense power and are largely self-regulated, there has been growing public sentiment that SMP content moderation violates Users' free speech rights. Nevertheless, SMP content moderation decisions are protected by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Congress enacted Section 230 to promote the development of the internet by granting "Good Samaritan" online services the authority to moderate UGC without potential liability. However, "Bad Samaritan" providers have also benefited from this immunity, bringing the law to the forefront of public debate regarding online free speech. Despite repeated congressional efforts to narrowly tailor Section 230's protections, the future of SMP immunity and online speech is in the hands of the United States Supreme Court. How the Court decides this question of statutory interpretation could have widespread, unintended consequences for the modern internet. That being so, because policymakers are tasked with redressing societal ills, this Note proposes that Congress articulate a specific liability standard applicable only to SMPs, drawing on the immunity framework in Section 230(c) and narrowly tailored to the unique issues arising from SMPs. This solution evades constitutional concerns and is consistent with the congressional intent to safeguard the ability of SMPs to regulate content moderation for their platforms, subject to moderately heightened standards for immunity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on analyzing the impact of broad definitions in Anti-Moderation Laws and their implications for First Amendment scrutiny, examining the governmental interests and the narrower aim of the laws as related to the concept of the public square. It further delves into the First Amendment analysis, considering the content-based or content-neutral nature of the laws and referencing Packingham v. North Carolina to argue that the extensive reach of the Anti-Moderation Laws.

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It has been more than a quarter century since Congress enacted twin safe harbor provisions to help protect and encourage the growth of a nascent internet by removing some liability and regulatory uncertainty. Today, there are calls for a similar safe harbor provision for blockchain, the technology behind cryptocurrencies and smart contracts. What lessons have we learned from the implementation of the internet safe harbor provisions, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, and Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act? This Article charts the history of those provisions and their judicial construction over the decades. It also examines the criticism of these safe harbors, including that they have done too much to immunize large technology companies from the harm caused by their products. Blockchain technology shares a common history with the internet, and blockchain today is in a similar position to internet in the mid 1990s. Through cataloguing the lessons of internet regulation, this Article provides important considerations for regulators to bear in mind as they consider implementing safe harbor provisions for blockchain applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a need for a federal right of publicity statute that would maintain the policy goals of Section 23 of the Communications Decency Act while also protecting the rights of American citizens. It explains the importance of the right of publicity in the age of the internet and the historical background and significance of the Act. It also examines the decision by an appeals court not to dismiss the lawsuit of Karen Hepp against Facebook for infringing upon her publicity rights.

The article argues for halting the Communications Decency Act Section 230 defense that shields Interactive Computer Service providers who operate social media platforms from claims of online drug trafficking sales to minors. It calls for the U.S. Congress to amend Section 230 to create a legislative exception from immunity for online drug trafficking claims similar to the loophole created for sex trafficking claims. It discusses the effects of preemption doctrine application by the courts.

The modern internet is vast, with more than 2.5 quintillion bytes of data created every day. Content is created, uploaded, downloaded, and shared across an increasingly large number of platforms. Most of this content is legal; however, some is illegal, including hate speech, child sexual abuse material, and content that violates intellectual property rights. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") provides that websites are not liable for content posted to their platform by third parties. Instead, websites determine their own content moderation policies, and the law assumes that they will do just that (given that exposure to graphic or otherwise upsetting content deters the average user). This approach has been largely successful, but there are growing concerns about a proliferation of child sexual abuse material and sex trafficking content, and whether platforms are doing enough to prevent the spread of illegal content online. Adult content websites such as Pornhub and OnlyFans, which are hosts to legal pornography in addition to illegal content, have been a primary target of this concern. Congress's attempts to legislate the issue have been ineffective: FOSTA-SESTA, passed in 2018, created an exception to § 230's blanket grant of immunity for sex trafficking content, but has not been used in any prosecutions to date. Instead, private companies--most frequently, payment processors like Visa, Mastercard, and PayPal--are making decisions regarding vice and illegal content. In practice, this has involved shutting down payments to a website until the platform agrees to comply with the payment processor's policies regarding content moderation and verification. While technically effective for victims of illegal content, this approach entails the mass disenfranchisement of legal sex workers. This Note proposes a reconsideration of § 230's blanket grant of immunity through a statutory revision resembling the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The Act implements a notice-and-takedown model for copyright infringement, and a statutory revision to § 230 could do the same for illegal content. The notice-and-takedown model creates a content moderation strategy that prevents the rapid dissemination of illegal content. This Note argues that a notice-and-takedown model of liability for illegal content would respond to the needs of both victims and platforms without undermining the foundations of the free and open internet or disenfranchising legal sex workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, passed in 1996. It provides legal protections to online platforms regarding user-generated content. It shields platforms from liability for content posted by users and aimed to provide clarity and protect platforms acting as "Good Samaritans" by moderating objectionable content.

The article discusses the significance of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, highlighting its role in protecting online platforms from liability for user-generated content. It notes the expanded protections granted to service providers, leading to limited incentives for content moderation. The impact of Section 230 on the spread of health misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic is explored.

Background: A deeper understanding of coronary medial thickness is important for coronary intervention because media thickness can limit the safety and effectiveness of interventional techniques. However, there is a paucity of detailed data on human coronary medial thickness so far. Materials and methods: We investigated the thickness of the media by histologic analysis. A total of 230 sections from 10 individuals from the CVPath autopsy registry who died from non-coronary deaths were evaluated. We performed pathological analysis on 13 segments of the following primary vessels from coronary arteries: the left main trunk, proximal left anterior descending artery (LAD), mid LAD, distal LAD, proximal left circumflex artery (LCX), mid LCX, distal LCX, proximal right coronary artery (RCA), mid RCA, and the distal RCA. The following side branches were also evaluated: diagonal, obtuse margin, and posterior descending artery branches. Results: The average age of the studied individuals was 60.4±12.3 years. The median medial thickness for all sections was 0.202 (0.149–0.263) mm. The median medial thickness of the main branches was significantly higher compared to that of the side branches (p<0.001). Although the medial thicknesses of the main branch of LAD and LCX were significantly decreased from proximal to distal segments (p = 0.010, p = 0.006, respectively), the medial thickness of the main branch of RCA was not significantly decreased from proximal to distal (p = 0.170). The thickness of the media was positively correlated with vessel diameter, while it was negatively correlated with luminal narrowing (p<0.001 and p<0.001, respectively). Conclusions: The human coronary arteries demonstrate variation in medial thickness which tends to vary depending upon an epicardial coronary artery itself, as well as its segments and branches. Understanding these variations in medial thickness can be useful for both the interventionalists and interventional product development teams. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been written, and much is understood, about how and why digital platforms regulate free expression on the internet. Much less has been written— and even much less is understood—about how and why digital platforms regulate creative expression on the internet—expression that makes use of others’ copyrighted content. While § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act regulates user-generated content incorporating copyrighted works, just as § 230 of the Communications Decency Act regulates other user speech on the internet, it is, in fact, rarely used by the largest internet platforms—Facebook and YouTube. Instead, as this Article details, creative speech on those platforms is governed by a series of highly confidential licensing agreements with large copyright holders. Yet despite the dominance of private contracting in ordering how millions of pieces of digital content are made and distributed on a daily basis, little is known, and far less has been written, on just what the new rules governing creative expression are. This is, in fact, by design: these license agreements contain strict confidentiality clauses that prohibit public disclosure of any and all of their contents. This Article, however, pieces together clues from publicly available court filings, news reports, and leaked documents. The picture it reveals is a world where the substantive law of copyright is being quietly rewritten. Agreements between digital platforms and rightsholders remove the First Amendment safeguard of fair use, insert a new moral right for works previously deemed ineligible for moral rights protection, and use other small provisions to influence and reshape administrative, common, and statutory copyright law. Further still, recent changes or lobbied-for changes to copyright’s public law seek to either enshrine the primacy of such private governance or altogether remove copyright rulemaking processes from government oversight, cementing the legitimacy of the new private governors. Changing copyright’s public law to enshrine the primacy of such private governance insulates the new rules of copyright from the democratic process, transforming public participation in, and public oversight of, the laws that shape our daily lives. Creative expression on the internet now finds itself at a curious precipice: there is a seeming glut of low-cost or free content, much of it created directly by and distributed to users—yet increasingly regulated by an opaque network of rules created by a select few private parties. An understanding of the internet’s democratizing potential for creativity is incomplete without a concomitant understanding of how the new private rules of copyright may shape, and harm, that creativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing laws are insufficient to address the harms caused by deepfakes. This Note explores the characteristics of deepfakes that make preventing both the misuse of the technology and its proliferation on social media and the Internet difficult. This Note will then continue by explaining the special potential harms that deepfakes pose. The third part of this Note will address how the existing legal framework fails, includinghow Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act serves as a barrier to redress. Finally, this Note suggests potential remedies for deepfake transgressions to reduce the potential harm that deepfakes can inflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Doxing, or the sharing of one's personally identifiable information on the Internet without consent, saw a boom during the COVID-19 pandemic. It became a way for Internet users to punish people for racist, rude, or anti-masking behavior and to quench a collective thirst for justice. While some continue to view doxing as an exercise in accountability, it is a malleable tool that can suit anyone's aim. White supremacists, neo-Nazis, and the alt-right regularly resort to doxing those with whom they disagree. Beyond the harassment, financial harm, and death threats doxing victims face, it is a tactic that is counter to foundational First Amend-ment values. An omnipresent threat of doxing has the potential to closethe marketplace of ideas and suppress the free flow of thought. Presently, there is no clear protection for doxing victims. Although more and more states are considering legislation and social media websites are attempting to self-regulate, the present mechanisms remain inadequate. Jurisdictional issues, First Amendment concerns, and Section230 of the Communications Decency Act present huge barriers to effective regulation. Doxing victims pay the price and are left without clear recourse. For these reasons, this Article argues that the federal government must pass anti-doxing legislation to adequately protect against the tactic. This Article proposes a piece of model legislation that addresses doxing's unique features and First Amendment concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on how algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI) allows the amendment to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). It mentions how to regulate online speech because of its consequences in the offline world, such as harming platform users' mental health and the erosion of democracy. It also mentions proposed solutions to better enable online speech regulation through slight but impactful alterations to CDA 230.

This document explores the application of Section 230(e) of the Communications Decency Act to state intellectual property claims, specifically the right of publicity. It discusses the jurisdictional split among different circuits regarding the interpretation of Section 230(e) and its carve-out exception. The document also examines the implications for non-domiciliary plaintiffs and the different types of state statutes governing the right of publicity for such plaintiffs. It suggests that a uniform federal right of publicity statute would be the best solution to ensure equal protection across all states. The document concludes by mentioning the possibility of a Supreme Court opinion in 2023 that could expand the carve-out exception for intellectual property under Section 230. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses Section 230 of the U.S. Communications Decency Act. Topics discussed include suggestions and possible solutions that have been made in an effort to combat the issue of false election information; solutions to the dissemination of "fake news" that were put forward during her 2020 Presidential Election Campaign; and Facebook's proposal to amend Section 230 for legal efficacy.

The paper explores the evolution of private powers in the digital landscape, developing a quadrangular systematisation of such a phenomenon based on four main aspects: space, values, (private) actors, and (digital) constitutional remedies. Taking a trans‐Atlantic approach, the paper shows how these categories, typical of constitutionalism, apply to the context of the Internet and of new digital technologies both in the United States and in Europe. On the one hand, the United States has up to now maintained the supremacy of the notorious Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. On the other hand, European legislation has undergone a significant change, moving from a phase of digital liberalism, of which the 2000 E‐Commerce Directive is the emblem, towards a new era of digital constitutionalism, passing through the age of judicial activism of European courts. In this sense, Europe has increasingly attempted to introduce limits to private (digital) powers, with a view to better protect and enforce (also horizontally) users' fundamental rights. Additionally, the evolution of digital constitutionalism, from a vertical‐sectoral approach to a horizontal and procedure‐based one, significantly showcased by the recent Digital Services Package, is underscored, signalling the recent movement of the EU into its second phase of digital constitutionalism. In this respect, the paper argues that the great benefit of stressing the procedural dimension, which may be defined as a European application of "due (data) process" to the relationship between individuals and private powers, is that it is potentially able to help consolidate a (necessary) trans‐Atlantic bridge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Section 230 has come under scrutiny from academics and politicians, leading to calls on lawmakers to limit, or even end, Section 230's immunity for Internet corporations; however, less attention has been given to the effects of Section 230 on the legal landscape in local, off-line communities. Online providers of shortterm rental (STR) services such as Airbnb have used Section 230's protection to shift the burden of complying with local laws and lease agreements onto the users listing STRs. By wielding Section 230 as both a sword and shield in litigation over their listings that violate local laws and lease agreements, these providers leave landlords and local governments seemingly without recourse. The PLAN Act (the Bill for Protecting Local Authority and Neighborhoods Act), proposed in the House in the 117th Congress in 2021, would remedy this overlooked and unjust result of Section 230's protection. This article seeks to demonstrate why the PLAN Act must be passed to prevent further unfair application of Section 230. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the legislative history and interpretation of Section 230 of the U.S. Communications Decency Act (CDA) with regard to the state rights of publicity claim in the 2021 court case Hepp v. Facebook. Topics explored include the elements required for the claim to be actionable such as the use of an individual's persona without consent, comparison between Section 230 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and the origins and development of the right of publicity.

The article focuses on issue over internet services provider (ISP) liability in the intellectual property exception. It mentions battle that split a panel of Third Circuit Court of Appeals judges over whether Facebook was immune from Hepp's claim under section 230 the Communications Decency Act (CDA). It also mentions path of internet censorship companies that have websites upon which anyone can post have come to be known as 'platforms," avoiding the liability.