Search

Common misconceptions about China's and India's increasing FDI in Africa have arisen because of a lack of systematic evidence-based analysis. Empirically-derived data, including on comparator countries, need to be rigorously analysed within an objective and coherent framework so that policy conclusions can be drawn which will benefit the many stakeholders involved.

由于缺乏系统的证据为基础的分析，引起了对中国和印度在非洲的外国直接投资增加的一些常见误解。经验得出的数据，包括在比较国得到的数据，需要在一个客观统一的框架内进行严格的分析，才可以得出政策性的结论，这将有利于涉及到的许多利益相关者的自身利益。

Common misconceptions about China's and India's increasing FDI in Africa have arisen because of a lack of systematic evidence-based analysis. Empirically-derived data, including on comparator countries, need to be rigorously analysed within an objective and coherent framework so that policy conclusions can be drawn which will benefit the many stakeholders involved.

The authors examine the impact of trade facilitation on bilateral trade flows. They examine trade facilitation and capacity-building priorities in 12 countries in the Europe and Central Asia region-eight of the current members of the European Union: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,and Slovenia, and three candidate members: Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. The results suggest that behind-the-border factors play an important role in determining bilateral trade flows (controlling for the effects of tariffs, development levels, distance, and regional characteristics of exporters and importers, among other factors). The development of new data sets to expand work related to trade facilitation, including strengthening the empirical work explored here, is a key priority without which intelligent policy and priorities cannot be made. The authors'analysis is based on data from the World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, World Competitiveness Yearbook 2000, and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002). The results indicate that more gains in exports than in imports are expected should the values of three out of the four indicators (port efficiency, regulatory regimes, and information technology infrastructure) of the new and candidate member countries improve halfway to the EU15 average. These countries would expect large trade gains as well as improvements in trade balances as their integration into the EU continues. For example, the greatest absolute trade gains-$49 billion and $62 billion respectively-could be expected if their port efficiency and information technology infrastructure reach half the average level of the EU, and 70 percent of trade gains are associated with export expansion.

The authors explorethe labor dynamics of Russian enterprise restructuring, empirically assessing how patterns of job creation and destruction are related to various aspects of enterprise restructuring across firms in different sectors and regions, and to different forms, sizes, vintages, and performance characteristics of ownership. Evidence from case studies - based on more than 50 site visits in 2000 - suggests that jobs have been destroyed, but only to a limited degree in some sectors and regions, largely because of institutional and incentive constraints and a still-widespread"socialist"corporate culture. Jobs have been created - particularly in sectors where devaluation had the most pronounced effect on important substitution and export promotion - but only slowly, mostly for lack of skilled workers and because regional mobility is limited. Labor turnover appears higher within regions than across regions. Newly available data for 1996 - 99 (provided by Goskomstat) for about 128,000 enterprises in 24 industrial sectors in Russia's 89 regions indicates that the typical firm has experienced only modest downsizing - about 12 percent - in number of employees. Smaller firms have entered, and larger, mature businesses have exited some sectors. Except for a lull in 1998, the rate of job creation has steadily increased and the rate of job destruction has declined, dropping substantially in 1998 - 99."Voluntary"worker separations remain the main - and growing - form of layoff, and the proportion of layoffs through redundancies is shrinking (now about 4 percent of total separations). Firm size and net employment growth are not statistically related, but form of ownership seems to matter. Firm size is also statistically correlated (positively) with profitability, but restructuring through changes in net employment growth appears not to be. It seems Russian restructuring needs to become more efficient.

Since its transition to a market economy began, Russia has not attracted much foreign direct investment (FDI). Inflows of FDI into Russia are much lower than those into other transition countries in the region, adjusted for population size and similar measures. Clearly, if Russia is to grow it must increase the level of FDI inflows, which is why a good deal of policy attention has focused on the problem. Equally important for achieving sustainable growth in such a large, heterogeneous economy is learning how to make the spatial distribution of FDI within Russia more even. Inflows are strikingly skewed. Close to 60 percent of FDI goes to four regions in te western part of the country--Moscow City, Moscow oblast, St. Petersburg, and Leningrad oblast--which account for only 22 percent of Russia's gross national product and only 13 percent of Russia's population. Only two of the other 85 regions account for more than 2.5 percent of the country's FDI and most account for much less. Surprisingly, neither policymakers nor observers and analysts have paid much attention to diagnosing the reason for this imbalance in FDI's distribution. The authors try to empirically unbundle the determinants of FDI's regional distribution within Russia. They find that faactors associated with market size, infrastructure development, and the policy environment seem to explain much of the observed variation in FDI flows to regions in Russia. Moreover, the explanatory power of themodel that best explains cross-regional variation in FDI flows from 1995 to 1998 changes significantly after the 1998 default and ruble devaluation--suggesting the possibility of a"structural change"in the determination of FDI after the 1998 crisis.