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Right from the beginning of the history of architecture, humanity's search for enclosure has always, in some respect, been in thrall to various guises of technology and the machine. Los Angeles architect Wes Jones has always been fascinated with technological forms, articulations and the philosophy of the machine. In a wide‐ranging article, he describes some of the key ideas that have influenced him and his work over the years, illustrated with some of the work from his two practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main problem in making sense of Mitsein as an aspect of Dasein in Being and Time concerns the sense in which individual Dasein is an ‘I’, given that it can be either an ‘anyone-self’ or an ‘authentic self’. Though it is clear that the anyone-self relates directly to das Man, the relation of the authentic self to others is debatable. In this paper, I reexamine the relations between self and others by making sense of the referent of each mode of selfhood, with special attention to the problem of explaining the relations between the two. The problem, I claim, can be solved by bringing into relief a certain conception of mereology (theory of parthood relations) that underlies Heidegger’s arguments. As I will demonstrate, Heidegger uses a mereological terminology that appropriates Husserl’s logic of parts and wholes from the Logical Investigations. In view of this, I suggest understanding individual Dasein, both qua anyone-self and qua authentic self, as a moment, i.e. a dependent part of an open-ended whole. The apparent gap between anyone-self and authentic self can be better understood as a shift of focus between two different aspects of being the same type of dependent part of a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Jurnal Pendidikan Indonesia is the property of Publikasi Indonesia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In my paper, I give an analytical commentary on Vasily Sesemann’s review of Martin Heidegger's treatise Being and Time (1927) published in the journal entitled The Way in 1928. The aim of this commentary is to evaluate the adequacy of Sesemann’s perception of Heidegger’s thought and the acceptability of his review for today’s reception of the Heideggerian ontological project. In my text, I state that Sesemann accurately fixes the transcendent essence of Heidegger’s ontological investigation, its basic theme and the main stages of its explication. In this regard, the Sesemann’s evaluation of the project of fundamental ontology in Heidegger is much closer to the very idea of this project in comparison to the evaluations of it given by both Edmund Husserl and Nicolai Hartmann. Sesemann also offered several successful or - at least - original translations of Heideggerian terms into Russian. Since he understands the incompleteness of the project, the results of which were presented in the initial divisions of Being and Time, Sesemann remains very far from being able to provide a final judgement about it. And yet, he points out the key achievements of Heidegger: the special significance of the differentiation of the ways of being of Dasein and the inner-worldly entities, emphasis of care-structure, which allows to grasp Dasein in its integrity and systemic essence of Heidegger’s work. I also acknowledge that although the interpretation proposed by Sesemann contains some weaknesses, f.i., the interpretation of Dasein as being-awareness and the neo-Kantian understanding of the systematic essence of the ontology of Heidegger, the review written by Vasily Sesemann is highly keen and may be valid for reception of Heideggerian philosophy up to nowadays.

The problem of 'transcendence'/'transcendental'/ 'transcendent' runs throughout Heidegger's Being and Time , and it is central to many of its core concerns. The confusion about the different meanings of using the same words in the history of philosophy from Kant to Heidegger causes not only problems in understanding but also problems in the translation of the philosophical classics, especially in a non-Indo-European language such as Chinese. Through examination of Kant's conception of the 'transcendental' and a critical textual analysis of Heidegger's reinterpretation of 'transcendence' as a temporal ecstatic Dasein's existence, this essay attempts to show that the problem of transcendence, along with the debates over the Chinese translation of the relevant terms, is not merely a problem in a traditional theory of knowledge or epistemology. Rather, it belongs primarily and essentially to fundamental ontology and thus to Heidegger's question of Being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of the European thinkers’ purity of consciousness is studied from the standpoint of the later M. Heidegger (in polemic with F.J. Gonzales and T. Sheehan). The article shows that Heidegger, having embarked upon the searching for new thinking, chooses the European thinking origins and, starting from the “Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)”, he already refuses to distinguish between being and time, that is, he is looking for a third principle (thinking) for their joint grip. We believe it is no longer the being that follows from the understanding of time, but being and time from the understanding of thinking (and even thinking of being). In this new dimension of consciousness, thinking falls into the time-like phenomenology dimension, commuting with being and time. Based on the analysis of the subsequent working of Heidegger, we can conclude that thinking must go through the metaphysics path to return to its wholeness (at the origins), but already to the existential-temporal unity. Thinking, commuting with being and time, starts to bend like the light in the black hole (according to the general theory of relativity of Einstein) and split (Heidegger uses the term “the Clearing of Being”). Existential thinking is a special case of this gap. It was that new dimension of thinking that the mystics and the Eastern sages aspired to. The topos, where being is joined to time, is the ultimate (pure) thinking that has overcome ignorance or attachment to the material world. It is through this dimension we begin to understand not only what being is, but also what time is, as thinking begins to distinguish its time, it temporalizes and starts to listen to its own “breathing” or temporalization of time (Heidegger wrote about). In such dimension, thinking turns into that original topos, when all connected with being flows inherently, be it Gods, humans, or the things grasping (everyone goes the way of being). The ideas of later Heidegger suggest that thinking can appear only where the being clearly exists (and Tao in its non-manifestation). Thinking arises only in conjunction with being and a new topos (thinking of being). Thinking is the gift of the being through the clearing (interspace), the one that allows you to grasp both the being and Tao. Nevertheless, based on the later M. Heidegger, it can therefore be concluded that almost fifty years after the writing of “Being and Time”, European thinkers still have not learned to think, since what awakens true thought, what should encourage us to think, and what is associated with pure thinking, has not yet awakened. It does look as if the later Heidegger was close to the idea that time reveals not only the being but also consciousness. In the classical dimension of thinking of being beyond the boundaries, both time and the being disappear, thereby closing the path to pure thinking (to avoid the “true”).

The pandemic provokes a radical thinking of jurisprudence. Drawing on Heidegger's Being and Time, this paper puts forward an argument for primordial analysis. Human being is inescapably bound to viral infection. Juris-prudence is primordially the 'seeing' of iuris: that which binds or obligates. Prudence is the projection forward from the condition of being bound. Viral being can be seized by Dasein as a resolute response to common suffering. Dasein's resolute response enables the fundamental link to be made between Heidegger's notion of conscience and the primordial meaning of hospital. Primordial juris-prudence thus seeks the ontological articulation of a mode of public responsibility or solidarity for the burden borne by Dasein. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The controversial issue of Martin Heidegger's Nazism has posed hermeneutic challenges since well before the philosopher's death. This essay approaches the political-philosophical conflict of Heidegger's early work not through consideration of explicitly problematic statements and writings but through comparison of the structural framework of Being and Time (1927) with Thomas Mann's roughly contemporaneous theoretical accomplishment in The Magic Mountain (1924). Specifically, the essay argues for a deep affinity between the two texts' constellations of language, temporality, and death. By demonstrating the extensively documented ties between the novel's philosophical framework and Mann's politics, the essay claims that any understanding of Heidegger's work must be contextualized alongside its concrete political valences in shifting ideological paradigms of the early Weimar Republic. This analysis suggests a new mode of ethical critique of Heidegger's magnum opus that focuses more on the text's greater theoretical edifice than on the problematization of localized passages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinua Achebe (1930-2013) published his major novel, Things Fall Apart (1958), in postcolonial Nigeria. In it he presents a colonial narrative using English as its primary mode of communication. However, his use of native Igbo words and the world they invoke problematizes a eurocentric assumption of the totality and universality of a given language, in this case, English. He employs acts of translation and introduces hybrid languages in order to engender dialogue that subverts the dominance of any one language and the world that it creates for its speakers. In a parallel fashion, this thesis uses two different theoretical approaches that have not typically been placed in dialogue with each other — postcolonial theory and hermeneutics — to view and interpret the nuances present in Achebe’s text that neither could illuminate on its own. This dialogical approach reveals insufficiencies in the independent theories and allows them to mutually supplement each other. Together these theories show how the novel subverts the presumed authority of the English language and universalizing discourses in order to identify the confrontation of lived linguistic worlds and horizons in the postcolonial context. The novel reorients those structures of understanding and interpretation around a subject that has historically been denied a voice.

Drawing upon the interpretations of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time offered by the favorable commentators such as Hubert Dreyfus, Robert Dostal, Harrison Hall, and Charles Taylor, this paper responds to Heidegger’s unsympathetic commentator Herman Philipse’s critical interpretation of Being and Time (Sections 12-18 of Division I) and shows the validity of Heidegger’s claim for the ontological priority of the practical world over the theoretical world. This has been done by showing that the practical world where readiness-to-hand is the norm, emerges from a self-correcting, transient originary situation where readiness-to-hand is primordial to us while we arrive at the theoretical aspect of presence-at-hand when we encounter the unreadiness-to-hand. This paper also shows that Heidegger’s text is coherent and consistent. This has been done by looking at the structure of Heidegger’s presentational strategies and by making links explicit in them. We have also looked afresh at how he defines certain pivotal elements of his practical world and their relationship with each other.

Martin Heidegger's existential account of care in Being and Time (2010) provides us with an opportunity to reimagine what the proper theoretical grounding of an ethic of care might be. Heidegger's account of care serves to deconstruct the two primary foundations that an ethic of care is often based upon. Namely, that we are inevitably interdependent upon one another and/or possess an innate disposition to care for fellow humans in need. Heidegger's account reveals that both positions are founded upon an ontic (meaning factual existence), as opposed to an ontological (which refers to the nature of being), understanding of care. The distinctions between an ontic and ontological understanding of care are significant. Yet, I maintain that they are not completely incompatible. Both Heidegger and care ethicists contend that our existence with others is understood through a relational ontology. Furthermore, there are certain ontological structures from Heidegger which resonate with an ethic of care. Two key existential structures are leaping-ahead and being-guilty. These existential structures are latent in care ethics, and by explicitly revealing them I reinforce the connection between Heidegger's account and care theory. Lastly, I develop the theoretical foundations of care ethics by proposing an existential ethic of care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Heidegger in Being and Time, following Kant, who considered transcendental logic as a condition for the possibility of empirical science, considers historicity as a transcendental condition of historiography. He turns the epistemological and methodological question of the historical sciences into an ontological question; that is, instead of asking “under what circumstances can the objectivity of the historical knowledge be confirmed?” he asks, “what kind of existence Dasein have that allows him to care about himself and the world, and understand the meaning of his past?” “And how is there such a thing as history at all?” In order to understand the importance of historicity in the general outline of the book, we should consider its relation to the main question of the work; “What is the meaning of Being?” Hence, this article pursues two goals; First, it tries to show the place of historicity in the whole work, in such a way that is clear how Heidegger first starts from the pre-theorical understanding of Dasein as “existence”, ang then moves toward the discovery of the main structure of existentials as “concern”; Then he introduces “temporality” as a transcendental structure of concern; And finally, it comes to this that the concrete form of temporality is “historicity”. The second goal of this article is to reinterpret this debate with regard to the question of “the meaning of Being”. In this regard, I try to explain that historicity, as a concrete form of temporality, shows the openness of Dasein as the scope of the emergence of the meaning of Being and beings is a close event, which has its beginning and end, as standing on the possibilities it is thrown to them and it takes from its heritage. From this point of view, Heidegger, following Kant’s tradition, considers meaning- giving as a finite process, but unlike Kant, who considered this finitude in terms of the dependence on sensory intuition of being in the world, and thus as the ontic, he considers it as an ontological. He Knows that it arose from the special way of existence of Dasein. Being and Time finally reaches the point that the meaning-giving process which, as the verb “temporalizing” and “hisoricizing” is expressed in trads of past, present, future, or in the other words, heritage, fate, destiny. So, historical finitude reveals the concrete form of temporal finitude. The terms of heritage, fate and destiny each confirm the finitude od Dasein, and in this way, the finitude of the meaning-giving event. In its powerlessness, Dasein in undertakes its heritage in an authentic way. Dasein cannot be its own foundation, but is thrown to its possibilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of the European thinkers' purity of consciousness is studied from the standpoint of the later M. Heidegger (in polemic with F.J. Gonzales and T. Sheehan). The article shows that Heidegger, having embarked upon the searching for new thinking, chooses the European thinking origins and, starting from the "Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)", he already refuses to distinguish between being and time, that is, he is looking for a third principle (thinking) for their joint grip. We believe it is no longer the being that follows from the understanding of time, but being and time from the understanding of thinking (and even thinking of being). In this new dimension of consciousness, thinking falls into the time-like phenomenology dimension, commuting with being and time. Based on the analysis of the subsequent working of Heidegger, we can conclude that thinking must go through the metaphysics path to return to its wholeness (at the origins), but already to the existential-temporal unity. Thinking, commuting with being and time, starts to bend like the light in the black hole (according to the general theory of relativity of Einstein) and split (Heidegger uses the term "the Clearing of Being"). Existential thinking is a special case of this gap. It was that new dimension of thinking that the mystics and the Eastern sages aspired to. The topos, where being is joined to time, is the ultimate (pure) thinking that has overcome ignorance or attachment to the material world. It is through this dimension we begin to understand not only what being is, but also what time is, as thinking begins to distinguish its time, it temporalizes and starts to listen to its own "breathing" or temporalization of time (Heidegger wrote about). In such dimension, thinking turns into that original topos, when all connected with being flows inherently, be it Gods, humans, or the things grasping (everyone goes the way of being). The ideas of later Heidegger suggest that thinking can appear only where the being clearly exists (and Tao in its non-manifestation). Thinking arises only in conjunction with being and a new topos (thinking of being). Thinking is the gift of the being through the clearing (interspace), the one that allows you to grasp both the being and Tao. Nevertheless, based on the later M. Heidegger, it can therefore be concluded that almost fifty years after the writing of "Being and Time", European thinkers still have not learned to think, since what awakens true thought, what should encourage us to think, and what is associated with pure thinking, has not yet awakened. It does look as if the later Heidegger was close to the idea that time reveals not only the being but also consciousness. In the classical dimension of thinking of being beyond the boundaries, both time and the being disappear, thereby closing the path to pure thinking (to avoid the "true"). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The present paper aims to show that Heidegger’s concept of “facticity” is the primary form of his Dasein concept. Firstly, it explicates the three components of facticity meaning: 1. the concretion and reality; 2. the human individual characteristics; 3. the historicality which is based on the "averageness" and "everydayness" of Dasein or facticity. The textual bases of the paper are Heidegger’s writings known as Report to Natorp (the beginning of autumn 1922) and his lecture Ontology (The Hermeneutics of Facticity) (summer 1923). Based on these two texts, the paper, secondly, argues that facticity and Dasein are identical, due to their shared characteristics: anxiety, everydayness, death, care, Being-in-the-world, language, temporality, and finally existence. The paper tries to distance methodologically from the current Heidegger’s studies, which are extremely founded on Being and Time.

The Priority of the practical approach toward the world to theoretical approach is one of the most fundamental components of Heidegger’s “Being and Time”. In fact, Heidegger believes that the first disclosure of Dasein to the world is based on practice rather than speculation and even Dasein is the same practice. Thus, according to Heidegger, the theory is only a derivative form of Praxis. Heidegger doesn’t refer to “Aristotle’s Phronesis” explicitly in “BT”. However, we can find the implicit presence of this concept all over the book to the extent that researchers like Volpi consider “BT” as a translation of Aristotle’s “Nichomachean Ethics”. I Will try, in this article, to present four tacit presences of Phronesis in “Being and Time” and to show that these four presences have founded on KAIROS that Heidegger emphasizes on it especially in the “Phenomenology of Religious Life” Lecture course.

In section 48 of Being and Time , Heidegger quotes from chapter XX of Der Ackermann aus Böhmen , a late medieval prose poem written in Early New High German, circa 1400: "As soon as a man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die." In this paper, I provide the context for the quotation. I also suggest that Heidegger's interest in Der Ackermann cannot be explained solely in terms of his believing the poem was the source of the quotation on page 245 of Being and Time. I offer a justification for this claim by showing that Heidegger's discussion of death in Being and Time employs three important images: "debt," "inheritance," and "ripeness" – all of which can be found in chapter XX Der Ackermann. I show these "borrowings" to be at once a reference to the context of the Christian/humanist heritage to which they belong and a part of the newly evolving Daseinsanalytik. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research aims to find out that education significantly influences the way people live in the world: with today's education, humans and robots have become blurred. Therefore, it is necessary to change the curriculum and education, architecture which are the main problems Heidegger's views used as a reference in this study. The solution offered to apply the future curriculum, namely STEAM, to the education system and its architecmral forms by creating creative spaces and creating architecture that exudes human existence in them with metaphorical architecture. In this study, the current incidence of CO VID-19 is taken as the context of the times humans are in, so it is necessary to make a school design responsive to Covid-19. The method applied: 1) Applying the concept of 'being' in Heidegger's philosophy; 2) Creating a creative space; 3) Creating a strategy when the Covid-19 incident in Heidegger's philosophy of 'time'. Architects need to think about the people who feel the existence of buildings in terms of form and function. The findings; how to create creative spaces to help the learning process in schools so that children can be motivated by their creativity by referring to Heidegger's views on 'being and time'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing upon the interpretations of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time offered by the favorable commentators such as Hubert Dreyfus, Robert Dostal, Harrison Hall, and Charles Taylor, this paper responds to Heidegger's unsympathetic commentator Herman Philipse's critical interpretation of Being and Time (Sections 12-18 of Division I) and shows the validity of Heidegger's claim for the ontological priority of the practical world over the theoretical world. This has been done by showing that the practical world where readiness-to-hand is the norm, emerges from a selfcorrecting, transient originary situation where readiness-to-hand is primordial to us while we arrive at the theoretical aspect of presence-at-hand when we encounter the unreadiness-to-hand. This paper also shows that Heidegger's text is coherent and consistent. This has been done by looking at the structure of Heidegger's presentational strategies and by making links explicit in them. We have also looked afresh at how he defines certain pivotal elements of his practical world and their relationship with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even highly regarded translators cannot escape the common suspicion that philosophical ideas are not communicable in foreign languages – a suspicion that plagues philosophical translation. Translators effectively counter this distrust of translation when they explicitly claim to have collaborated with the author. This paper focuses on the Italian translation of Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) (first published in 1927; Heidegger 1986a), titled Essere e tempo (Heidegger 2006, trans. Marini), whose translator, Alfredo Marini, took particularly interesting measures to legitimate his work. This case is especially intriguing because Pietro Chiodi's earlier translation (Heidegger 1953, 1976, 2005) is still popular in Italy despite Chiodi's own complaints that the German text is untranslatable. The widespread acceptance of the earlier Italian translation presents a considerable problem of legitimation for Marini, who counters Chiodi's views by arguing for the translatability of the text and supports his argument through a rhetorically constructed scene of collaborative translation. I begin this paper by retracing Marini's strategy for presenting Essere e tempo (Heidegger 2006, trans. Marini) as a 'translaboration' (a collaborative translation), before addressing concerns that collaborative translation could hinder the translator's creativity. I show that Marini's translation achieves its most creative, and at times eccentric, effects through his close collaboration with the (deceased) philosopher, Martin Heidegger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Sarah Deyong, an associate professor and director of the architecture programme at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln, maps the complex relationships contemporary theorists and practitioners have with concepts of 'form', which can be traced back to previous avantgardes. She uses the work and publications of architectural collective WAI Think Tank as a microcosm of this complex discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Heidegger scholarship has done an admirable job accounting for Luther's influence on key Heideggerian concepts such as his method of destruction and anxiety. Yet given Heidegger's statements concerning Luther's immense personal and philosophical importance, it is likely that Luther's influence extends further and deeper than might first appear. I argue that this influence also manifests in Heidegger's concept of authentic existence. In particular, I argue that Luther's understanding of Christian freedom and servitude form ontic material from which Heidegger draws to come to his general ontological understanding of Dasein's freedom as power over its existence and servitude to its communal involvements. As Luther understands the freedom of a Christian, everything comes to aid the Christian in salvation, much like Dasein gains power over its existential possibilities in coming to authenticity. Yet this newly created freedom also creates additional ontological or existential connections with one's community. The consequence of such connections is the addition of new responsibilities, or form of servitude, to one's community wherein one aids others in coming to faith or authenticity, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question, what measures to address the shortage of transplantable organs are ethically permissible? requires careful attention because, apart from its impact on medical practice, the stance we espouse here reflects our interpretations of human freedom and mortality. To raise the number of available organs, on utilitarian grounds, bioethicists and medical professionals increasingly support mandatory procurement. This view is at odds with the Catechism of the Catholic Church (2003, p. 2296), according to which '[o]rgan donation after death is a noble and meritorious act' but ethically impermissible absent consent. Those who concur with this position, but would oppose conscription on independent philosophical grounds, have not yet found a voice in the Western tradition comparable in strength to the utilitarian basis of the policy's support, for Kantian and Aristotelian ethics, too, lend themselves to a requirement that we make our organs available to others when they can no longer serve ourselves. One finds an ethical wedge against conscription in an unexpected philosophical locale: the 'fundamental ontology' of Heidegger's Being and Time, where pertinent individual choices arc protectively over what happens post mortem. Heidegger's perspective on this issue thus meshes, not with other philosophical voices, but with Catholic doctrine—a surprising convergence of atheistic and theistic approaches to our flourishing whose ground I address in the article's conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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I am not concerned with whether Heidegger’s philosophy is a "secularisation" of primitive Christianity buried beneath the excrescence of a dead medieval Scholasticism and the "ontotheological constitution of its metaphysics". Nor I am concerned with seeking out the theological roots of Heidegger’s philosophy even though he and others may claim that his philosophy is rabidly a-theistic. To repeat, this paper is not interested in intellectual history and or a genealogical reconstruction of Heidegger’s true intentions and the contradictions that are displayed in his published works and what that could mean for the relation between theology and the philosophy of religion. We have to tread a path, making it new, as opposed to discovering a new path that has yet to be taken. Creation is harder than discovery; the former is active and intentional, albeit obscure, and the latter is passive, even accidental, albeit something that can be more readily followed.

In 1936 Heidegger started to write down his continuous remarks to his book Being and Time. At the very beginning he discussed the methodology of his research and the character of phenomenology in general. Typically, he claimed that there never had been such a thing as phenomenology, for it was just a combination of Neo-Kantianism and psychologism. For Heidegger on the other hand, phenomenology represented a dynamism of thinking and a way of sharpening of philosophical insight. But even such a conception of phenomenology is incapable to access and explicate the question of being as appropriate to itself. Therefore Heidegger abandons phenomenology, and "ontology" in favour of the so called "history of being". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Martin Heidegger’s own interpretation of Being and Time in the Black Notebooks. The opening part addresses Heidegger’s singular notions of “thinking” and “questioning” which suggest a critically reflective stance, but involve an initiatory call to surrender to the hidden powers of Beyng. The second part addresses Heidegger’s lament in the Black Notebooks that Being and Time has not produced a “great enemy”, and his critique of the initial existentialist or “anthropological” receptions of his magnum opus. The third part looks at how Heidegger’s thought moves beyond Being and Time, in light of the central role the thinker assigns to the German people in repeating the first “inception” of preSocratic thought, in order to overcome the legacies of Roman universalism, and what Heidegger as early as 1932 was calling “Jewish Christianity”. The final part addresses Heidegger’s conception of “the history of Beyng” as it is developed in the Black Notebooks of the early 1940s, from out of the account of “temporality” in Being and Time: a “history” in which Heidegger’s postulation of a need for the “annihilation“ (Vernichtung)” of the essential enemy of the Volk become the lens through which Heidegger can read the Shoah as the “the peak of self-destruction in history”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Black Notebooks, Heidegger ascribes in 1938/9 to the Jewish race an “empty rationality and calculative ability,” in his view the cause of its “worldlessness.” To assess this characterisation, I present Heidegger’s theories of history as a decline in Being and Time and in his later history of Being. For this purpose, I discuss his notions of Rechnen (reckoning), Machenschaft (machination), and Geviert (fourfold), several existentialia from Being and Time, and Heidegger’s identification of modern machination and modern technology. Furthermore, I examine Heidegger’s attitude toward the Jews and the Holocaust. I present his alignment of the unconcealment of modernity and the Jewish race, and compare his theory of machination with the texts “Positionality” (1949) and “The Question concerning Technology” (1954). Heidegger’s notes about the Jews in the Black Notebooks after 1944 confirm that he tried “to silence Auschwitz silently,” as I already argued in a paper from 1995. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Logos: A Journal, of Religion, Philosophy Comparative Cultural Studies & Art (08687692) is the property of Logos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Cassirer is important in 20th Century philosophy for the attention he gives to the fundamental relationship between myth and language. For Cassirer, myth is a non-subjective form of discourse wherein the origin of language coincides with both the human-divine encounter and the event of being itself. In this article, I trace the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger on the nature of the magical (or “primitive”) sign, which is at the heart of mythical discourse. While Heidegger initially argues that this form of sign is structurally impossible on the basis of his accounts of signs and language in Being and Time, he later comes to recognize that he had not properly accounted for its possibility within his phenomenological deduction. I conclude by describing how Heidegger’s notion of poetry eventually comes into alignment with the way Cassirer describes the function of myth and the magical sign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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