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Anti-corruption efforts are inherently political. Corruption charges can be levied against political opponents as an instrument of repression; they can also be used against troublesome allies in the same party coalition to further consolidate power. In this paper, we focus on Indonesia and ask: Do major corruption charges follow a presidential electoral cycle—and if so, how? We contend charges against prominent members of the government coalition are more likely to happen before an election, allowing the government to replace intra-party rivals with loyal allies. Conversely, charges against prominent opposition members are more likely to happen after an election when fears of retaliation are low, opportunities for credit-claiming are high, and there is an incentive to remove veto players who may inhibit implementing the government's agenda. To test this argument, we use an original, newly assembled dataset of all major corruption charges—i.e., those involving high-profile politicians and garnering international attention—in Indonesia from 1998–2015 as reported in the Associated Press. We find a significant and robust relationship between the electoral calendar and major corruption charges. This relationship is robust across presidential administrations. These results yield insights into how anti-corruption efforts can become a political tool and counsel caution about the effectiveness of “good governance,” especially in new democracies. Finally, we discuss how contextual political factors external to Indonesia's anti-corruption commission, reinforce this empirical pattern.

The territoriality principle stipulates that minority communities in a given territory should be linguistically accommodated. What are the economic effects of this principle? In this paper, we argue that the recognition of multiple languages confers respect on the minority group; it allows people to engage and participate meaningfully in society – thereby facilitating economic well-being. There is, however, a caveat: when recognition happens in areas where the minority is the overwhelming majority, there is a risk that the near-exclusive use of the minority language cuts the community off from the larger national state, which in turn stunts development. To test this, we focus on Transylvania, Romania. We leverage a legal stipulation that recognizes minority languages in areas where the minority constitutes more than 20% of the population. Using data at the municipal level, we find that recognition increases economic well-being in general – but not in areas where the minority are numerically dominant. Our results are normatively welcoming, but they also caution governments not simply to recognize minority languages but also to protect them adequately.

How can the growing personalization of power be identified and measured ex ante? Extant measures in the authoritarian literature have traditionally focused on institutional constraints and more recently on individual behaviour – such as purging opposition members from (and packing allies into) government bodies. This article offers a different strategy that examines leaders’ individual rhetoric. It focuses on patterns of pronoun usage for the first person. The author argues that as leaders personalize power, they are less likely to use ‘I’ (a pronoun linked to credit claiming and blame minimizing) and more likely to use ‘we’ (the leader speaks for – or with – the populace). To test this argument, the study focuses on all major, scheduled speeches by all chief executives in the entire Chinese-speaking world – that is, China, Singapore and Taiwan – since independence. It finds a robust pattern between first-person pronouns and political constraints. To ensure the results are not driven by the Chinese sample, the rhetoric of four other political leaders is considered: Albania's Hoxha, North Korea's Kim Il Sung, Hungary's Orbán and Ecuador's Correa. The implications of this project suggest that how leaders talk can provide insights into how they perceive their rule.

Censuses ask individuals to identify their own ethnicity. Minorities, however, may be reluctant to self-identify; and thus, censuses may underreport minority populations, raising concerns about mea...

How can leaders recover public trust and approval when government performance is low? We argue politicians use speeches evoking images of deceased predecessors to reactivate support temporarily. This distracts supporters from the poor performance and arouses empathy and nostalgia among them, causing them to perceive the current leader more favorably. We test this argument by scraping for all speeches by Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. We identify all instances when she referenced Juan Perón—the charismatic founder of the Justice Party. We find that as Kirchner’s approval rating decreases, the number of Perón references increases. To identify the causal mechanism and to ensure that endogeneity is not a concern, we employ text analysis and a natural experiment—courtesy of LAPOP. The results provide robust evidence that leaders reference their dead predecessors to evoke positive feelings. However, while doing so can improve public opinion, the effects manifest only in the short term and among supporters.

Given the importance of language for state building, many governments undertake language planning efforts to ensure their citizens can speak an – if not, the – official language. Yet the mere act of designating a language as official is not sufficient for the language to be widely spoken across the population. In this paper we ask, what explains official language spread? We argue whether citizens can speak an official language – either as a first or second language – depends on how much the government prioritizes the education ministry. Governments that allocate more resources – financial, political, and human capital – to the education ministry are more likely to spread the official language. We assess this argument first with a case study of Singapore 1965−1985. We intentionally pick a successful case to elucidate the mechanisms linking education prioritization to language spread. To demonstrate the mechanisms are not Singapore-specific, we run a second test. The statistical analysis employs original cross-national, over-time (1978–2009) measures of budget allocation ranks, minister ranks, and ministry cabinet ranks. The results suggest a strong effect between education prioritization and language spread.

Language is one of the most important markers of a distinct group identity: It brings members together from the inside, and it demarcates boundaries from the outside. Accordingly, it is a common assumption in the literature on the politics of language—whether it is political science, sociology, linguistics, anthropology, or area studies—that minority groups want their languages recognized (or, at a minimum, left alone and not eradicated) by the government. But recognition of minority languages is inherently a political process. It requires the government to acknowledge that the vernacular spoken by the minority group is distinct from that of the majority (i.e., it is a language). When governments dismiss a vernacular as simply a derivative of the majority’s (i.e., it is a dialect), it suggests that speakers of that vernacular are inferior. Moreover, recognition requires some awareness to the differing language ideologies (i.e., how society should be linguistically organized). When the ideology of the politically dominant group is the only ideology in consideration, this influences the type of language policies. And whether governments acknowledge minority language ideologies and minority demands for linguistic recognition depends on a number of factors. One factor is whether the minority group is concentrated in a regional territory. Another factor is whether the political institutions in the country are generally more power sharing (e.g., proportional electoral rules and federalism). How the government accommodates minority languages—if it does, and if so, to what extent—can have far-reaching implications. Failure to accommodate minority demands can lead to intergroup social tensions, if not outright violent conflicts. Moreover, expecting minorities to learn a language that is not native to them—and especially if it is linguistically distant—can have economic ramifications, including higher levels of poverty and lower levels of literacy. However, by recognizing minority languages, governments allow for trust to build. This can manifest between members of different ethnic groups or among minorities toward the state. How governments accommodate minority languages can also affect local attitudes toward immigrants (e.g., when are they more likely to hold nativist viewpoints) and the assimilation of immigrants (e.g., what explains why some immigrant communities struggle to learn the language of the host country).

Purpose To evaluate how using models of proton therapy that incorporate variable relative biological effectiveness (RBE) versus the current practice of using a fixed RBE of 1.1 affects dosimetric indices on treatment plans for large cohorts of patients treated with intensity modulated proton therapy (IMPT). Methods and Materials Treatment plans for 4 groups of patients who received IMPT for brain, head-and-neck, thoracic, or prostate cancer were selected. Dose distributions were recalculated in 4 ways: 1 with a fast-dose Monte Carlo calculator with fixed RBE and 3 with RBE calculated to 3 different models—McNamara, Wedenberg, and repair-misrepair-fixation. Differences among dosimetric indices (D02, D50, D98, and mean dose) for target volumes and organs at risk (OARs) on each plan were compared between the fixed-RBE and variable-RBE calculations. Results In analyses of all target volumes, for which the main concern is underprediction or RBE less than 1.1, none of the models predicted an RBE less than 1.05 for any of the cohorts. For OARs, the 2 models based on linear energy transfer, McNamara and Wedenberg, systematically predicted RBE >1.1 for most structures. For the mean dose of 25% of the plans for 2 OARs, they predict RBE equal to or larger than 1.4, 1.3, 1.3, and 1.2 for brain, head-and-neck, thorax, and prostate, respectively. Systematically lower increases in RBE are predicted by repair-misrepair-fixation, with a few cases (eg, femur) in which the RBE is less than 1.1 for all plans. Conclusions The variable-RBE models predict increased doses to various OARs, suggesting that strategies to reduce high-dose linear energy transfer in critical structures should be developed to minimize possible toxicity associated with IMPT.

Process-tracing has grown in popularity among qualitative researchers. However, unlike statistical models and estimators—or even other topics in qualitative methods—process-tracing is largely bereft of guidelines, especially when it comes to teaching. We address this shortcoming by providing a step-by-step checklist for developing a research design to use process-tracing as a valid and substantial tool for hypothesis testing. This practical guide should be of interest for both research application and instructional purposes. An online appendix containing multiple examples facilitates teaching of the method.

In this article, we examine how the language spoken in a country can affect individual attitudes about gender equality and subsequently the level of legal rights afforded to women. This is because the feature of a language—specifically whether it requires speakers to make gender distinctions—can perpetuate popular attitudes and beliefs about gender inequality. To test this argument, we first identify a correlation between the gender distinction of a language and individual gender-based attitudes among World Values Survey respondents. We then isolate the causal mechanism using an experiment involving bilingual Romanian–Hungarian speakers in Transylvania, Romania. Finally, we examine one observable implication of our argument: the effects of gender distinction of official state languages on women’s rights at the national level. Our results confirm the importance of the gender distinction of language on support for gender equality and women’s rights.

Eastern Europe has witnessed an influx of Chinese newcomers. Yet this region is often-overlooked by scholars of overseas Chinese. Similarly, the Chinese remain largely absent from European migration studies. In the work that has been done, the Chinese are often depicted as a community that keeps to itself. I examine this claim by highlighting the results of surveys conducted in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Hungary. These surveys, the largest ever done in each country, focus on three broad explanations for why the Chinese seem to be isolated, which I summarize as “need not, want not, and cannot.” The results identify significant differences between the three communities — but not because of want. Instead, the community in Hungary is the least isolated because it needs to interact with the locals; conversely, the community in Bulgaria is the most isolated because of the barriers its members face in the host country. This essay calls attention to the Chinese in European migration studies and to the region of Eastern Europe among overseas Chinese scholars.近年来，东欧已然成为华人移民的新大陆，此区域却普遍被海外华人学者所忽略；而华人移民议题亦不是欧洲移民研究的重心，现有的研究更常将华人描绘成一个与世隔绝的社群。在此研究中，笔者将透过分析保加利亚、克罗地亚以及匈牙利三国史上最大规模的调查资料来检视此一主张。这些调查为华人移民社群的孤立现象提供了三种解释：不需要、不想要、以及无法融入当地社群。分析结果显示，虽然三个华人社群的隔离因素有显著差异，但「不想要」与华人社群孤立现象并无因果关系。三国之中，以匈牙利的华人社群因需要和当地人互动因而孤立程度最低；保加利亚的华人社群则由于重重障碍导致孤立程度最高。本文建议欧洲移民研究应多关注华人移民议题，海外华人学者亦应多聚焦于东欧区域的移民问题。This article is in English.

Conventional wisdom holds that languages, as ethnic markers, build communities with shared preferences and strong social networks. Consequently, ethnolinguistic homogeneity can facilitate growth. This article challenges this conception of language as a cultural marker. It argues that language is also a practical vehicle of communication; people can be multilingual, and second languages can be learned. Hence language boundaries are neither (1) congruent with ethnic boundaries nor (2) static. If true, the purported advantages of ethnolinguistic homogeneity should also be evident in countries with large populations of non-native speakers conversant in official languages. The study tests this hypothesis using an original cross-national and time-variant measure that captures both mother-tongue speakers and second-language learners. The empirical results are consistent with the understanding of language as an efficiency-enhancing instrument: countries with exogenously high levels of heterogeneity can avoid the ‘growth tragedy’1by endogenously teaching the official language in schools.

What explains minority language recognition? Why are some governments more responsive than others to minority linguistic demands? While there are reasons to believe democracies – as protectors of civil liberties – are generally more likely to recognize minority demands, I argue only those without a sizable majority extend such recognition to the highest levels. This is because the dominance of one large linguistic group electorally impedes a democratic government’s ability to grant such benefits to the smaller ones. I test this argument by using a newly constructed measure of minority language recognition. This variable identifies whether a minority language is used in public education, and if so, it differentiates between instruction of and instruction in a minority language. I find that while democracies are indeed more likely to acknowledge minority languages, the effects are conditional: only those without a majority are able or willing to accommodate minorities to the fullest extent. Otherwis...

Summary What explains the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR)? While extant research would suggest democratic governments are better constrained to protect property rights, we are agnostic about this mechanism with respect to IPR. We argue IPR—distinct from physical property by their lack of geographical boundaries—are stronger in states not because property owners have a democratic voice, but because they can exit the state as an alternative. We test this argument using a newly constructed network variable that measures the degree of linguistic compatibility between states based on languages of education. We contend that the cost of exit is lower when the language of the intellectual property owner is widely used globally; and vice versa. This linguistic network variable improves on traditional common-language measures in that it considers the same language can be spoken in more than just a pair of dyads and that the education sector is an important arena for disseminating languages that need not be official. We find that (1) democracy has a weak and usually non-significant effect but (2) high linguistic compatibility has a strong and robust effect. The results call attention to the conceptual heterogeneity of property rights and the limited theoretical linkage between regime type and these bundles of rights.

Trade has the potential to influence a wide range of political and social outcomes. Using the post-Soviet context, we examine how language policies – vital components for how minorities are treated with far-reaching economic consequences – are influenced by trade. We argue that while ethnic politics and colonial legacies are both important in shaping language laws, it is important to recognize that the Russian language remains a significant commercial lingua franca in the region. When economic exchanges between Russia and other post-Soviet republics are frequent, governments are more likely to adopt pro-Russian language laws as a practicality and to maintain favor with the Russian government and Russian-speaking businesses. Using an original dataset covering all Russian language-related laws in the former Soviet states from 1992 to 2009, we find a significant and positive relationship between trade and pro-Russian language laws. These results are robust even when we (1) instrument for Russian import levels and (2) consider the Baltic effect, spillovers from cultural affinity, and the uniqueness of fuel exports.

Monte Carlo (MC) methods are acknowledged as the most accurate technique to calculate dose distributions. However, due its lengthy calculation times, they are difficult to utilize in the clinic or for large retrospective studies. Track-repeating algorithms, based on MC-generated particle track data in water, accelerate dose calculations substantially, while essentially preserving the accuracy of MC. In this study, we present the validation of an efficient dose calculation algorithm for intensity modulated proton therapy, the fast dose calculator (FDC), based on a track-repeating technique. We validated the FDC algorithm for 23 patients, which included 7 brain, 6 head-and-neck, 5 lung, 1 spine, 1 pelvis and 3 prostate cases. For validation, we compared FDC-generated dose distributions with those from a full-fledged Monte Carlo based on GEANT4 (G4). We compared dose-volume-histograms, 3D-gamma-indices and analyzed a series of dosimetric indices. More than 99% of the voxels in the voxelized phantoms describing the patients have a gamma-index smaller than unity for the 2%/2 mm criteria. In addition the difference relative to the prescribed dose between the dosimetric indices calculated with FDC and G4 is less than 1%. FDC reduces the calculation times from 5 ms per proton to around 5 μs.