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The National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) definitions are critical for standardizing healthcare-associated infection surveillance in US healthcare facilities. However, their use in accurately detecting healthcare-associated transmission (HAT) has not been measured. Using whole-genome sequencing surveillance data, we show that the NHSN has a sensitivity of 44.4% in detecting HAT.

Background In an investigation of hospital-acquired mucormycosis cases among transplant recipients, healthcare linens (HCLs) delivered to our center were found to be contaminated with Mucorales. We describe an investigation and remediation of Mucorales contamination at the laundry supplying our center. Methods We performed monthly RODAC cultures of HCLs upon hospital arrival, and conducted site inspections and surveillance cultures at the laundry facility. Remediation was designed and implemented by infection prevention and facility leadership teams. Results Prior to remediation, 20% of HCLs were culture-positive for Mucorales upon hospital arrival. Laundry facility layout and processes were consistent with industry standards. Significant step-ups in Mucorales and mold culture-positivity of HCLs were detected at the post-dryer step (0% to 12% [P = .04] and 5% to 29% [P = .01], respectively). Further increases to 17% and 40% culture-positivity, respectively, were noted during pre-transport holding. Site inspection revealed heavy Mucorales-positive lint accumulation in rooftop air intake and exhaust vents that cooled driers; intake and exhaust vents that were facing each other; rooftop and plant-wide lint accumulation, including in the pre-transport clean room; uncovered carts with freshly-laundered HCLs. Following environmental remediation, quality assurance measures and education directed toward these sources, Mucorales culture-positivity of newly-delivered HCLs was reduced to 0.3% (P = .0001); area of lint-contaminated rooftop decreased from 918 m2 to 0 m2 on satellite images. Conclusions Targeted laundry facility interventions guided by site inspections and step-wise culturing significantly reduced Mucorales-contaminated HCLs delivered to our hospital. Collaboration between infection prevention and laundry facility teams was crucial to successful remediation.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has created widespread disruption in individuals’ personal and occupational lives all around the world. Vacationers and tourism, recreation, and leisure employees were among those who experienced substantial disruption. Cruise ships, especially, faced turmoil on a global scale for both their customers and workers. COVID-19 outbreaks were reported on cruise ships beginning in February 2020, presenting new and unique challenges for the industry. Conditions on cruise ships, including close and frequent contact between passengers and crew members, use of common areas, the confined nature of the vessels, and gathering of passengers from different countries, aided in transmitting the disease both onboard and in the community. As the pandemic evolved, federal and state governments and industries worldwide, including cruise ship companies, developed response plans. In this article, we provide a high-level overview of the US government and cruise ship industry’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as a brief commentary on lessons learned, and recommendations for the cruise ship sector going forward. The outlined suggestions may be used as a starting point to increase emergency preparedness and to inform outbreak response plans in the event of future infectious disease outbreaks.

As spikes and resurgences of COVID-19 cases continue to increase in different geographical regions across the United States, more and more companies are left with numerous questions about reopening or restarting their operations. The current pandemic in the United States poses unique challenges unlike any other for businesses and employers as they begin to reopen. Businesses and employers are forced to ensure that they are not only in compliance with federal guidances but also with state and local guidances. In addition to the complex and ever evolving guidances, we are still learning about and adapting best practices during these reopening phases. Therefore, it is crucial for businesses to stay up-to-date not only with the released guidances but also with the latest understanding and information about SARS-CoV-2. As part of reopening, it is crucial for businesses to have comprehensive reopening plans prior to restart of operation. These plans must be clear, concise, and flexible enough to include updated guidances and information. In this publication, we describe reopening frameworks, considerations, and strategies that can be used as a starting point for businesses to further optimize and tailor to their unique operations.

BackgroundWhole genome sequencing (WGS) surveillance and electronic health record data mining have the potential to greatly enhance the identification and control of hospital outbreaks. The objective was to develop methods for examining economic value of a WGS surveillance-based infection prevention (IP) program compared to standard of care (SoC).MethodsThe economic value of a WGS surveillance-based IP program was assessed from a hospital’s perspective using historical outbreaks from 2011–2016. We used transmission network of outbreaks to estimate incremental cost per transmission averted. The number of transmissions averted depended on the effectiveness of intervening against transmission routes, time from transmission to positive culture results and time taken to obtain WGS results and intervene on the transmission route identified. The total cost of an IP program included cost of staffing, WGS, and treating infections.ResultsApproximately 41 out of 89 (46%) transmissions could have been averted under the WGS surveillance-based IP program, and it was found to be a less costly and more effective strategy than SoC. The results were most sensitive to the cost of performing WGS and the number of isolates sequenced per year under WGS surveillance. The probability of the WGS surveillance-based IP program being cost-effective was 80% if willingness to pay exceeded $2400 per transmission averted.ConclusionsThe proposed economic analysis is a useful tool to examine economic value of a WGS surveillance-based IP program. These methods will be applied to a prospective evaluation of WGS surveillance compared to SoC.

Mucormycoses are invasive infections by Rhizopus species and other Mucorales. Over 10 months, four solid organ transplant (SOT) recipients at our centre developed mucormycosis due to Rhizopus microsporus (n=2), R. arrhizus (n=1) or Lichtheimia corymbifera (n=1), at a median 31.5 days (range: 13–34) post-admission. We performed whole genome sequencing (WGS) on 72 Mucorales isolates (45 R. arrhizus, 19 R. delemar, six R. microsporus, two Lichtheimia species) from these patients, from five patients with community-acquired mucormycosis, and from hospital and regional environments. Isolates were compared by core protein phylogeny and global genomic features, including genome size, guanine–cytosine percentages, shared protein families and paralogue expansions. Patient isolates fell into six core phylogenetic lineages (clades). Phylogenetic and genomic similarities of R. microsporus isolates recovered 7 months apart from two SOT recipients in adjoining hospitals suggested a potential common source exposure. However, isolates from other patients and environmental sites had unique genomes. Many isolates that were indistinguishable by core phylogeny were distinct by one or more global genomic comparisons. Certain clades were recovered throughout the study period, whereas others were found at particular time points. In conclusion, mucormycosis cases could not be genetically linked to a definitive environmental source. Comprehensive genomic analyses eliminated false associations between Mucorales isolates that would have been assigned using core phylogenetic or less extensive genomic comparisons. The genomic diversity of Mucorales mandates that multiple isolates from individual patients and environmental sites undergo WGS during epidemiological investigations. However, exhaustive surveillance of fungal populations in a hospital and surrounding community is probably infeasible.

Background Traditional methods of outbreak investigations utilize reactive whole genome sequencing (WGS) to confirm or refute the outbreak. We have implemented WGS surveillance and a machine learning (ML) algorithm for the electronic health record (EHR) to retrospectively detect previously unidentified outbreaks and to determine the responsible transmission routes. Methods We performed WGS surveillance to identify and characterize clusters of genetically-related Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections during a 24-month period. ML of the EHR was used to identify potential transmission routes. A manual review of the EHR was performed by an infection preventionist to determine the most likely route and results were compared to the ML algorithm. Results We identified a cluster of 6 genetically related P. aeruginosa cases that occurred during a 7-month period. The ML algorithm identified gastroscopy as a potential transmission route for 4 of the 6 patients. Manual EHR review confirmed gastroscopy as the most likely route for 5 patients. This transmission route was confirmed by identification of a genetically-related P. aeruginosa incidentally cultured from a gastroscope used on 4of the 5 patients. Three infections, 2 of which were blood stream infections, could have been prevented if the ML algorithm had been running in real-time. Conclusions WGS surveillance combined with a ML algorithm of the EHR identified a previously undetected outbreak of gastroscope-associated P. aeruginosa infections. These results underscore the value of WGS surveillance and ML of the EHR for enhancing outbreak detection in hospitals and preventing serious infections.

Multidrug-resistant bacteria pose a serious health threat, especially in hospitals. Horizontal gene transfer (HGT) of mobile genetic elements (MGEs) facilitates the spread of antibiotic resistance, virulence, and environmental persistence genes between nosocomial pathogens. We screened the genomes of 2173 bacterial isolates from healthcare-associated infections from a single hospital over 18 months, and identified identical nucleotide regions in bacteria belonging to distinct genera. To further resolve these shared sequences, we performed long-read sequencing on a subset of isolates and generated highly contiguous genomes. We then tracked the appearance of ten different plasmids in all 2173 genomes, and found evidence of plasmid transfer independent from bacterial transmission. Finally, we identified two instances of likely plasmid transfer within individual patients, including one plasmid that likely transferred to a second patient. This work expands our understanding of HGT in healthcare settings, and can inform efforts to limit the spread of drug-resistant pathogens in hospitals., eLife digest Bacteria are able to pass each other genes that make them invulnerable to antibiotics. This exchange of genetic material, also called horizontal gene transfer, can turn otherwise harmless bacteria into drug-resistant ‘superbugs’. This is particularly problematic in hospitals, where bacteria use horizontal gene transfer to become resistant to several antibiotics and disinfectants at once, leading to serious infections that are difficult to treat. How can scientists stop bacteria from sharing genes with one another? To answer this question, first it is important to understand how horizontal gene transfer happens in the bacteria that cause infections in hospitals. To this end, Evans et al. examined the genomes of over 2000 different bacteria, collected from a hospital over 18 months, for signs of horizontal transfer. First the experiments identified the genetic material that had potentially been transferred between bacteria, also known as ‘mobile genetic elements’. Next, Evans et al. examined the data of patients who had been infected with the bacteria carrying these mobile genetic elements to see whether horizontal transfer might have happened in the hospital. By combining genomics with patient data, it was determined that many of the mobile genetic elements identified were likely being shared among hospital bacteria. One of the mobile genetic elements identified was able to provide resistance to several drugs, and appeared to have been horizontally transferred between bacteria infecting two separate patients. The findings of Evans et al. show that the horizontal transfer of mobile genetic elements in hospital settings is likely frequent, but complex and difficult to study with current methods. The results of this study show how these events can now be tracked and analyzed, which may lead to new strategies for controlling the spread of antibiotic resistance.

Multidrug-resistant bacterial pathogens pose a serious public health threat, especially in hospital settings. Horizontal gene transfer (HGT) of mobile genetic elements (MGEs) contributes to this threat by facilitating the rapid spread of genes conferring antibiotic resistance, enhanced virulence, and environmental persistence between nosocomial pathogens. Despite recent advances in microbial genomics, studies of HGT in hospital settings remain limited in scope. The objective of this study was to identify and track the movement of MGEs within a single hospital system using unbiased methods. We screened the genomes of 2,173 bacterial isolates from healthcare-associated infections collected over an 18-month time period to identify nucleotide regions that were identical in the genomes of bacteria belonging to distinct genera. These putative MGEs were found in 196 isolates belonging to 11 different genera; they grouped into 51 clusters of related elements, and they were most often shared between related genera. To resolve the genomic locations of the most prevalent MGEs, we performed long-read sequencing on a subset of representative isolates and generated highly contiguous, hybrid-assembled genomes. Many of these genomes contained plasmids and chromosomal elements encoding one or more of the MGEs we identified, which were often arranged in a mosaic fashion. We then tracked the appearance of ten MGE-bearing plasmids in all 2,173 genomes, and found evidence supporting the transfer of plasmids between patients independent from bacterial transmission. Finally, we identified two instances of likely plasmid transfer across genera within individual patients. In one instance, the plasmid appeared to have subsequently transferred to a second patient. By surveying a large number of bacterial genomes sampled from infections at a single hospital in a systematic and unbiased manner, we were able to track the independent transfer of MGEs over time. This work expands our understanding of HGT in healthcare settings, and can inform efforts to limit the spread of drug-resistant pathogens in hospitals.

The carbapenem class of antibiotics is invaluable for the treatment of selected multidrug-resistant Gram-negative pathogens. The continued transmission of carbapenem-resistant bacteria such as ST258 K. pneumoniae is of serious global public health concern, as treatment options for these infections are limited. This genomic epidemiologic investigation traced the natural history of ST258 K. pneumoniae in a single health care setting over nearly a decade. We found that distinct ST258 subpopulations have caused both device-associated and ward-associated outbreaks, and some of these populations remain endemic within our hospital to the present day. The finding of virulence determinants among emergent ST258 clones supports the idea of convergent evolution of drug-resistant and virulent CRKP strains and highlights the need for continued surveillance, prevention, and control efforts to address emergent and evolving ST258 populations in the health care setting., Carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae (CRKP) strains belonging to sequence type 258 (ST258) are frequent causes of hospital-associated outbreaks and are a major contributor to the spread of carbapenemases. This genetic lineage emerged several decades ago and remains a major global health care challenge. In this study, genomic epidemiology was used to investigate the emergence, evolution, and persistence of ST258 carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae outbreak-causing lineages at a large tertiary care hospital over 8 years. A time-based phylogenetic analysis of 136 ST258 isolates demonstrated the succession of multiple genetically distinct ST258 sublineages over the 8-year period. Ongoing genomic surveillance identified the emergence and persistence of several distinct clonal ST258 populations. Patterns of multidrug resistance determinants and plasmid replicons were consistent with continued evolution and persistence of these populations. Five ST258 outbreaks were documented, including three that were caused by the same clonal lineage. Mutations in genes encoding effectors of biofilm production and iron acquisition were identified among persistent clones. Two emergent lineages bearing K. pneumoniae integrative conjugative element 10 (ICEKp10) and harboring yersiniabactin and colibactin virulence factors were identified. The results show how distinct ST258 subpopulations have evolved and persisted within the same hospital over nearly a decade.

Background Vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) are a major cause of hospital-acquired infections. The risk of infection from interventional radiology (IR) procedures is not well documented. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) surveillance of clinical bacterial isolates among hospitalized patients can identify previously unrecognized outbreaks. Methods We analyzed WGS surveillance data from November 2016 to November 2017 for evidence of VRE transmission. A previously unrecognized cluster of 10 genetically related VRE (Enterococcus faecium) infections was discovered. Electronic health record review identified IR procedures as a potential source. An outbreak investigation was conducted. Results Of the 10 outbreak patients, 9 had undergone an IR procedure with intravenous (IV) contrast ≤22 days before infection. In a matched case-control study, preceding IR procedure and IR procedure with contrast were associated with VRE infection (matched odds ratio [MOR], 16.72; 95% confidence interval [CI], 2.01 to 138.73; P = .009 and MOR, 39.35; 95% CI, 7.85 to infinity; P < .001, respectively). Investigation of IR practices and review of the manufacturer’s training video revealed sterility breaches in contrast preparation. Our investigation also supported possible transmission from an IR technician. Infection prevention interventions were implemented, and no further IR-associated VRE transmissions have been observed. Conclusions A prolonged outbreak of VRE infections related to IR procedures with IV contrast resulted from nonsterile preparation of injectable contrast. The fact that our VRE outbreak was discovered through WGS surveillance and the manufacturer’s training video that demonstrated nonsterile technique raise the possibility that infections following invasive IR procedures may be more common than previously recognized.

Background:Identifying routes of transmission among hospitalized patients during a healthcare-associated outbreak can be tedious, particularly among patients with complex hospital stays and multiple exposures. Data mining of the electronic health record (EHR) has the potential to rapidly identify common exposures among patients suspected of being part of an outbreak.Methods:We retrospectively analyzed 9 hospital outbreaks that occurred during 2011–2016 and that had previously been characterized both according to transmission route and by molecular characterization of the bacterial isolates. We determined (1) the ability of data mining of the EHR to identify the correct route of transmission, (2) how early the correct route was identified during the timeline of the outbreak, and (3) how many cases in the outbreaks could have been prevented had the system been running in real time.Results:Correct routes were identified for all outbreaks at the second patient, except for one outbreak involving >1 transmission route that was detected at the eighth patient. Up to 40 or 34 infections (78% or 66% of possible preventable infections, respectively) could have been prevented if data mining had been implemented in real time, assuming the initiation of an effective intervention within 7 or 14 days of identification of the transmission route, respectively.Conclusions:Data mining of the EHR was accurate for identifying routes of transmission among patients who were part of the outbreak. Prospective validation of this approach using routine whole-genome sequencing and data mining of the EHR for both outbreak detection and route attribution is ongoing.

Mucormycosis outbreaks have been linked to contaminated linen. We performed fungal cultures on freshly-laundered linens at 15 transplant and cancer hospitals. At 33% of hospitals, the linens were visibly unclean. At 20%, Mucorales were recovered from >10% of linens. Studies are needed to understand the clinical significance of our findings.

Background Contamination of healthcare linens can contribute to healthcare-associated infections (HAIs). Although home-laundered scrubs are often worn by healthcare staff during activities such as commuting, no studies have examined scrub contamination following public exposure. This study describes the microbial contamination of scrubs worn solely in the public environment. Methods For this multi-center pilot study, we recruited office employees to wear new scrubs for one full workday and track activities. Worn scrubs were packaged in sterile bags and sent to a certified laboratory within 48 hours, along with new sets of scrubs for comparison. Scrub fabric was tested for multiple microbial pathogens using a stick sponge method. Chi Square and non-parametric tests for differences were conducted (α=0.05) to describe contamination. Results Worn scrubs (n=37) were contaminated with Staphylococcus aureus (83.8%, median: 220 colony-forming units [CFU]), Bacillus (51.4%, median: 60 CFU), Enterobacteriaceae (48.7%, median: 52 CFU), Aspergillus (5.4%, median: 50 CFU), and Acinetobacter (2.7%, median: 20 CFU). Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Candida auris, and Clostridioides difficile were not detected. Worn scrubs had a total aerobic count above the level of detection (LOD) (median: 5,200 CFU), and 83.8% had detectable total fungi (median: 100 CFU). Among new scrubs (n=3), one was contaminated with Staphylococcus aureus (80 CFU), and two had a total aerobic count above the LOD. Prevalence of microbial contamination significantly differed by transportation method, and interaction with animals and children. Conclusions Our pilot study confirmed that wearing scrubs in the public environment results in contamination with common healthcare-associated pathogens, which may be influenced by daily activities. Healthcare staff who wear scrubs in the public environment risk bringing pathogens into the patient environment. Indeed, healthcare linens are not assumed to be sterile. However, by implementing further controls such as healthcare-certified laundering, facilities may help to reduce microbial risk thereby promoting patient safety and the mitigation of HAIs.