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Nearly a year after its formation, the Nation Alliance, consisting of six opposition par­ties ("Table of Six"), finally started to act like a full-fledged electoral alliance against the ruling bloc under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The six opposition leaders have long been criticised for failing to take concrete steps towards embodying a viable po­lit­ical alternative to the People’s Alliance of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) since they publicly signed the joint manifesto for Turkey’s transition into the "Strengthened Parliamentary System" in February 2022. Although the alliance has yet to announce its joint presidential can­didate, it has manifested an unprecedentedly comprehensive joint platform in nine policy areas, including the rule of law, public administration, social policy, economy, and foreign policy. The 200-page joint document provides a comprehensive overview of what changes Turkey can be expected to go through in the short and medium terms should the Nation Alliance manage to defeat President Erdoğan's ruling bloc in the up­coming elections, which will probably take place on 14 May 2023. Even though it would not immediately offer a solution to various issues in Turkey-EU relations, a pos­sible opposition victory could bring bilateral relations back to an institutional frame­work, whereby both parties can cooperate in a productive way to work out their problems and focus on common interests. (Autorenreferat)

In a remarkable development for Turkish politics, six opposition parties signed a joint manifesto at a public ceremony on 28 February. The document outlines plans to abolish the executive presidential system and restore rule of law and civil liberties under a "strengthened parliamentary system". The successive concentration of power in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s hands has culminated in a hyper-presidential system without meaningful institutional checks. The opposition parties are determined to reverse this process by offering the electorate an alternative political plat­form supported by a single presidential candidate. If their cooperation generates a pre-electoral alliance for the upcoming elections, the opposition camp dubbed the "Table of Six" has a reasonable chance of defeating Erdoğan and his governing bloc. (author's abstract)

Millions of Turkish voters are geared up for the twin (parliamentary and presidential) elections that are scheduled to take place in June 2023 at the latest. After nearly 20 years in power, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's rule may seem unassailable to many observers of Turkish politics. However, owing to the economic downturn and rifts in his ruling party, this will be the first election in which Erdoğan is not the clear favourite. Six oppo­sition parties of different ideological origins have come together to pick a joint presidential candidate to stand against Erdoğan and to offer a common platform for restoring parliamentary democracy. Although the opposition alliance has reasonable chances of defeating Erdoğan's ruling bloc, their victory would not guarantee a smooth process of transition to parliamentary democracy. If the opposition can defeat Erdoğan, the new government would need to undertake the arduous tasks of estab­lishing a meri­tocratic bureaucracy, restructuring Turkey's diplomatic course and economic policy, and switching back to parliamentary rule. Due to the opposition alliance's diverse com­position, accomplishing these goals may be as difficult as winning the elections.

Not long ago, the Kurdish question (KQ) topped the agenda of Turkish politics. Thanks mainly to what was called the Resolution Process between 2009 and 2015, there was a tense but lively political and public discussion on this colossal problem that the Turk­ish republic has long been tackling with since its foundation. In the past few years, however, the KQ ceased to be a priority issue in Turkish politics. So much so that the "terror question", a watchword for the KQ in the daily lexicon of mainstream Turkish politics, is no longer regarded by the Turkish public as being among the country’s top political problems. However, recently, there have appeared some new signs which in­dicate that the KQ will most likely return to the political agenda. Both Turkish Presi­dent Erdoğan and the leaders of the country's opposition parties have taken steps that reveal that they will revisit the KQ as the 2023 Turkish general election approaches. (author's abstract)

Ankara adopted notably toned-down language towards Tunisian President Kaïs Saïed's power grab and avoided calling it a coup, although it considers the course of events as a potential threat that could endanger its policies towards North Africa. In fact, Turkey revised its approach to Tunisia after secular parties became more prominent in Tunisian politics following the 2014 elections. This policy adjustment consists of developing a balanced network of relations by reaching out to secular parties on the one hand, but retaining close ties with the Islamist Ennahda party on the other hand. To this end, Ankara is giving weight to defence diplomacy and soft power. This tactful approach is in line with Turkey's efforts to strengthen its geo­strategic and geo-economic ties with the Maghreb countries and overlaps with on­going normalisation efforts between Ankara and Arab capitals. But this approach is limited to a pragmatic policy adjustment. Germany and other European states should see this as an opportunity to encourage regional de-escalation and contribute to a constructive regional dialogue. (author's abstract)

Turkey's new Presidential System has failed to realise the goals that it was said to achieve with its introduction despite the disapproval of half the population. Contrary to the ruling party’s claims in favour of the new governance system, two and a half years after its introduction, parliament is weaker, separation of powers is undermined, the judiciary is politicised, institutions are crippled, economic woes are mounting and authoritarian prac­tices prevail. Despite the almost unlimited and unchecked power that the new system grants to the President over institutions, his space for political manoeuvre is, surprisingly, narrower than it was in the parliamentary system. Providing the otherwise divided opposition a joint anchor of resistance, the Presidential System unintentionally breathed life into the inertia of Turkey’s political party setting. The formation of splinter parties from the ruling party, primarily address­ing the same conservative electorate, alongside the changing electoral logic with the need to form alliances to win an election, poses a serious challenge to the ruling party and its leader - the President. Despite the oppositional alliance’s electoral victory in 2019 local elec­tions, it is at the moment unclear whether the forming parties share a common vision for steps towards democratic repair. Together with the institutional havoc caused by the Presidential System, the blurry outlook of the opposition requires caution about an easy and rapid positive transformation. While the European Union should be realistic in regard to expectations towards democratic reform, it should also strike a balance between cooperation in areas of mutual benefit and confronting Ankara when necessary to protect the interests of the Euro­pean Union and its member states. (author's abstract)

Istanbul's fiercely fought municipal election is over. The opposition candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu, won a landslide victory over his rival. The governing Justice and Develop­ment Party (AK Party) has arguably suffered its most severe defeat since coming to power in 2002. The repercussions and reverberations of this election will be deeply felt across the political spectrum in Turkey. This election will have a formative impact on this new period of Turkish politics. Turkey has gained new political actors, for exam­ple İmamoğlu, as a result of this election. The same election has also further opened the way for contestations on the conservative end of the political spectrum. Former President Abdullah Gül, former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and former Minis­ter of Economy Ali Babacan are set to break away from the AK Party and form their own political movements. (Autorenreferat)

Tayyip Erdoğan’s management of the religious realm in Turkey relies on three dif­ferent but complementary components: i) using state institutions and resources to define and control the religious discourse and life, ii) incorporating religious com­munities and organisations into the party and state institutions, and iii) forming new religious organisations and communities through family-controlled religious foun­dations (vakıf).

Bu çalışma, siyasi söylem ve söylem dışı pratiklerini muhafazakar-demokrasi şiarıyla gerçekleştiren Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi iktidarının ana akım medyada yer bulan söylemlerinde kadınlık mefhumunu ne şekilde tahayyül ettiğinin disiplinler arası bir analizini ortaya koymaktadır.Bu bağlamda, çalışmada kadının özel alandaki ve kamudaki varoluşunu ele alan marksist ve radikal feminist teoriler ile Foucault'nun biyopolitika ve biyoiktidar teorileri çerçevesinde Ak Parti iktidarı mensubu erkek sözcülerin dispozitif pratiklerinin ideal kadınlığı ne şekilde kurguladığı, kadının bedenini, cinselliğini, hane içerisinde ve emek piyasasındaki üretimini nasıl denetleyip düzenlediği ve kontrol ettiği söylem analizi vasıtasıyla açığa çıkarılmıştır. Ak Parti iktidarı zihin haritasında nasıl bir kadınlık tahayyül edildiği siyasi erk sözcülerinin ürettiği, kadının toplumsal konumuna ilişkin cinsiyetçi-ayrımcı ve dini söylemeler ile kadın bedenini ve kadının kendi insaiyatifinde olan bedensel üretimini ilgilendiren tıbbi söylemler çerçevesinde tartışılmıştır. This study sets forth an interdisciplinary analysis of how the concept of womanhood is constituted through a set of discourses on mass media by the AKP, implementing its discursive and non-discursive practices with the maxim of conservative democracy. In this context, this study uncovers how idealized womanhood is constituted and the woman's body and sexuality, and labor in the domestic sphere and labor market are regulated and controlled by the dispositive practices produced by the akp's spokesmen within the frame of radical and Marxist feminist theories as well as Foucaldian bio-power and body politics. What kind of womanhood is constituted in the akp's mind gap is discussed within the frame of sexist and discriminative as well as religious discourses concerning woman's social position and scientific and medical discourses concerning bodily production, which is under the initiative of the woman herself, produced by the spokesmen of political power. 115

Kültür ve sanatın siyasetle ilişkisini incelemeye çalışan bu tez, ilk olarak Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'ne miras kalan geleneğin izlerini bulmaya çalışmaktadır. Böylece, kültürel dinamiklerin politik alanda oynadığı rolün nedenleri açıklanabilir. Birçok başarılı seçim ve referandumun ardından, AKP, sosyal, politik ve ekonomik alanlarda hegemonya kurmayı başardı. Parti, özellikle, 2010'dan sonra kültür alanında ciddi girişimler yapmasına karşın, tam kontrolünü sağlayamadı. Siyasi alanda `Muhafazakâr Demokrasi` kavramını vurgulayan AKP'nin, kültürel alanda hegemonya kurulması adına `Muhafazakâr Sanatın İnşası` fikrini getirdiği söylenebilir.AKP'nin sanat inşasını üç başlık altında ele almak olanaklıdır. İlk olarak, Cumhuriyetin yüksek sanat kurumlarının (Devlet Tiyatroları, Güzel Sanatlar Müdürlüğü, Devlet Opera ve Balesi) kaldırmaya girşimiştir. Böylece, devlet üzerindeki yük kaldırılacak ve yeni muhafazakâr bir temel için yer yaratılacaktır. İkinci olarak, AKP, Cumhuriyet döneminde kabul gören yüksek sanat formlarına karşı kitle kültürünü devreye sokarak, popüler kültürün yayılmasına özen göstermiştir. Bu durum, estetiği göz ardı eden, gişe başarılarıyla sanat kalitesini örtüştüren yeni bir kültür inşanın habercisidir. Son olarak, AKP, ilk iki girişimin bileşkesi kabul edilen bir politikayla kültür endüstrisini kurmaya çalışır. Bu süreç, post-modern dönemin ruhuna uygun bir şekilde neo-liberal ekonomi politikalarının şekillendirdiği sanat-piyasa ilişkisiyle örtüşür. Bir başka deyişle, kültür ve sanatı hayatla birleştirdiği iddiasıyla piyasa, her alana müdahil olarak bütün ilişkileri dönüştürür. Kısaca, kültür ve sanat piyasaya dahil edilerek tüketim nesneleri haline getirir.Piyasanın kontrolünde geleneğin yeniden icat edilmesi, sanat ve politika arasındaki ilişkiyi her zamankinden daha fazla dönüştürebildi. Kültürcülük, böyle bir dönüşümün anahtar kavramdır. Kültür, bir anlamda, muhafazakâr değerlerin taşıyıcısıdır; öte yandan, sanat piyasasının öncülüğünde tarihsel değerlerin metalaştırılmasına hizmet eder. Bu süreçte, tarih, kurgu hikâyesi olarak rol oynar. Osmanlı Ocakları, Osmanlıspor, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Mağazaları, televizyon dizileri, filmler, kutlama programları, kitaplar ve benzeri etkinlikler günümüzde hızla marka değerine dönüşmektedir. Sonuç olarak, AKP, sanat inşasında muhafazakâr dili, genel ahlak kuralları kapsamında işlevsel kullanmış ve çıkardığı birçok yönetmelikte benzer kaygıları dile getirmiştir. Bununla birlikte, sponsorluk yasası örneğinde olduğu gibi birçok hukuki değişimle kültür ve sanat alanını özelleştirmeye açmıştır. AKP, kültür iktidarını bu çift yönlü bakış açısıyla kurmaya çalışmaktadır. This thesis, which tries to examine the relationship of culture and art with politics, first tries to find traces of the tradition inherited to the Justice and Development Party. Thus, the reasons of the role played by the cultural dynamics in the political sphere can be explained. After many successful elections and referendums, the AKP succeeded in establishing hegemony in the social, political and economic spheres. Although the party made serious initiatives in the field of culture, especially after 2010, it was unable to establish its full control. It can be said that the AKP, which emphasized the concept of `Conservative Democracy` in the political sphere, introduced the idea of `Construction of Conservative Art` in the name of establishing hegemony in the cultural sphere.It is possible to deal with AKP's art construction under three headings. In the first place, it attempted to abolish the high art institutions of the Republic (State Theaters, Fine Arts Directorate, State Opera and Ballet). Thus, a burden on the state will be lifted and space will be created for a new conservative foundation. Secondly, the AKP has taken care of spreading popular culture by introducing mass culture against the high forms of art recognized in the Republican era. This situation is a sign of a new cultural construction that lacks aesthetics and overlaps the box office success and the quality of art. Finally, the AKP tries to establish the culture industry with a policy adopted as the result of the first two initiatives. This process coincides with the art-market relationship shaped by neo-liberal economic policies in accordance with the spirit of the postmodern era. In other words, with the claim that it combines culture and art with life, the market transforms all relations as intervening in every field. In short, culture and art are incorporated into the market and become objects of consumption.The re-invention of tradition in the control of market has been able to transform the relationship between art and politics more than ever. Culturalism is the key concept of such a transformation. Culture, in a sense, is the bearer of conservative values, while in the other aspect it serves the commodification of historical values under the leadership of the art market. In this process, history plays its role as a fiction story. Ottoman Quarries, Osmanlıspor, Ottoman Empire Stores, television series, films, celebration programs, books and similar activities are rapidly transformed into brand value today. As a result, the AKP has used the conservative language as a function of the general code of ethics in art-building and has expressed similar concerns in many regulations. However, with many legal changes, as in the example of the sponsorship law, it opened the field of culture and art to privatization. The AKP attempts to establish the cultural power with this bi-directional perspective. 310

Bu tez, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi dönemi dış politikasının söylemler üzerinden nasıl inşa edildiğini temel alan kavramsal çerçeveden hareketle, AKP yönetici elitinin Türk dış politikasında ortak tarihi ve kültürel referanslar üzerinden ürettikleri `düzen kurucu` ve `sorun çözücü` söylemin bölgesel çatışmalarda nasıl yorumlanarak inşa edildiğini araştırmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, 2008 yılındaki `Gürcistan-Rusya Savaşı` ile 2008 `İsrail ile Filistin arasında yaşanan Gazze Savaşı` örnek olayları çerçevesinde bir araştırma yapılmıştır. Araştırma konusu olarak bu iki ayrı bölgesel çatışmanın seçilmesinin nedeni, aynı dönemlerde birkaç ay arayla ancak birbirlerinden farklı bölgesel coğrafyalarda yaşanan krizlere karşı Türkiye'nin `sorun-çözücü` ve `düzen kurucu` söylemlerinin işlerliğinin nasıl yansıtıldığını anlamaya çalışmak olmuştur. Bu amaçla ilk olarak, Dış Politika kavramı incelenmiş ve Dış Politika Analizinin tarihsel gelişimi ortaya konulmuştur. Temel olarak birey, devlet, sistem olmak üzere üç analiz düzeyine değinildikten sonra, yöntem olarak söylem analizi yapılacağı için temel analiz düzeyi birey olarak ele alınmıştır. Ancak, söz konusu bireylerin rasyonel varsayılması, sosyal bağlamdan kopuk, inanç, algılama, istek gibi nitelikleri görmezden gelinerek mekanik bir sürecine oturtulması sonucunu da beraberinde getirebilir. Bu sebepten, birey odaklı analiz temele alınmakla beraber, sosyal yapıları da bir ölçüde analize dahil eden bir yaklaşım ortaya konulmuş, birey düzeyinin başat olduğu çok düzeyli yaklaşım izlenmiştir. Kuramsal zeminde Dış Politika çalışmalarını anlamak adına ise Realizm, Liberalizm, İnşacılıktan bahsedilmiş, teorik çerçeveyi ise sosyal olgu olarak tanımladıkları dış politikayı dilsel analizler üzerinden inceleyip anlayan Post-Yapısalcılık oluşturmuştur.Daha sonra bu kavramsal çerçeveden hareketle, AKP'nin bir parti olarak dış politika konusunda hangi söylemler üzerinde durduğu ve söylemler altında nasıl bir tutum izlediği araştırılmıştır. İlk olarak Türkiye'nin AKP döneminde `değiştiği` varsayılan dış politikasında kendine hangi rolleri biçtiği, bu rollerin toplumun değişik kesimlerinden kabul görmesi için hangi söylemsel pratiklerin kullandığı ortaya çıkartılmıştır. Ardından, post-yapısal söylem analizi yöntemiyle, Gürcistan ve Gazze krizleri bağlamında, dış politika yapıcı elitlerinin ürettikleri söylemle kavramlaştırma, benzetme, ötekileştirme veya metaforları kullanarak çatışmaların nasıl algılanacağını belirlediği ve iletişimi kendi belirledikleri söylem üzerinden yürüttükleri tespit edilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, araştırılan örnekler, uluslararası aktörler arasındaki ilişkilerin ve uluslararası konjonktürün Türkiye'nin dış politika tepkilerini şekillendirmede oldukça etkili olduğunu ve söylemsel düzenlemelerin kurucu söylemden nispeten bağımsız olduğunu göstermiştir. With the conceptual framework based on how foreign policy was constructed by discourses during JDP term, this thesis analyses how `problem-solver` and `order-builder` discourses, which were designed on common historical and cultural references by JDP ruling elite, were constructed in regional conflicts by interpretation. In this context, Georgia-Russia War (2008) and Gaza War between Israel and Palestine (2008) were researched as a case study. The reason and the aim of choosing of these two different regional conflicts as a research topic is to understand how `problem-solver` and `order-builder` rhetorics were formed and reflected in those two regional conflicts which emerged out in different regional geographies almost in the same period. For this purpose, firstly, the concept of Foreign Policy was defined and the historical development of Foreign Policy Analysis was analysed. After mentioning three levels of analysis as individual, state, and system, the basic level of analysis was taken as an individual since discourse analysis would be applied as a method. However, the assumption of the individual as a rational actor could bring about a result of fitting into a mechanical process through ignoring such qualities as social context, belief, perception and desire. Therefore, although individual level of analysis will be centered on, it was put forward an approach involving analytical analysis of social structures in a certain extent; and a multi-level approach was conducted in which the individual level was the principal one. In order to understand foreign policy studies, Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism were mentioned, and as a theoretical framework Post-Structuralism was used which examines and understands the foreign policy as social phenomena through linguistic analysis.Then within this framework, JDP's foreign policy discourses and its attitude under those discourses were examined. Firstly, it was found out that which roles were designed for foreign policy that was considered as `changed` under JDP rule , and which discursive practices were used for acceptance from different segments of society. Then, in the context of Georgia and Gaza crises, by using post-structural discourse analysis method, it was understood the fact that the foreign policy-making elites have determined the perception of the conflicts by using conceptions, analogies, otherings, or metaphors in their discourses, and they have conducted communication according to their own discourses. In conclusion, these examples showed that the relations among international actors and the international conjuncture were effective factors in shaping Turkey's foreign policy responses and discursive arrangements were relatively independent from constitutive discourse. 282

"The movement led by the preacher Fethullah Gülen is regarded as the fastest-growing religious trend within Turkish Islam. This accounts also for citizens and denizens with Turkish backgrounds in Western European countries, including Germany, where approximately 300 organisations close to Gülen operate 24 state-approved private schools and around 150 extracurricular tuition centres. Against the background of the diaspora, Gülen's philosophy of adopting modern knowledge, modes of action and attitudes, climbing the social ladder and thus making an effective contribution to social moral reform assumes a new dimension. For one thing, in contrast to Turkey, personal social advancement cannot be linked with the undertaking regarding the conquest of the state. For another, and again in contrast to Turkey, to concentrate on the preservation of one's traditional religious (Muslim) and national (Turkish) identity does not automatically create harmony with the majority of the population, but is indeed at least partially opposed to the same. As a result, the Turkish-Muslim diaspora is under pressure to develop a new understanding of religious and national identity compatible with attitudes prevailing in European societies. For the movement's supporters, this is just as much a prerequisite for their individual advancement as the reconciliation of their religious world view with its scientific equivalent. Gülen's prompt that service to society constitutes a significant form of a lifestyle justifiable in the eyes of God could prove to be the key to resolving the principal conflict of interest between Islam and the West both within the European diaspora and in the USA, repeatedly emphasised by him with insistence in his early writings." (author's abstract)

In Europa und den USA wird vor einem Abdriften der Türkei in einen neuen Autoritarismus gewarnt. Indizien für diesen Trend seien ausufernde Polizeigewalt gegen Demonstrantinnen und Demonstranten, Einschränkungen der Presse- und Internetfreiheit, Interventionen der Regierung in die Justiz, Säuberungswellen in der Bürokratie und eine bisweilen offen europafeindliche Rhetorik. Mit Verwunderung wird registriert, dass der alte Ministerpräsident und neue Staatspräsident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan trotz handfester Korruptionsvorwürfe, schwerer Auseinandersetzungen im konservativen Lager und außenpolitischer Misserfolge bei der letzten Wahl erneut einen Stimmenzuwachs verbuchen konnte. Erdoğan selbst spricht von der »Neuen Türkei«, die die alte, autoritäre kemalistische Republik abgelöst und eine progressive Demokratie verwirklicht habe. Wie groß ist der Rückhalt von Erdoğans Gerechtigkeits- und Entwicklungspartei (AKP) in der Gesellschaft? Wie ist die neue Regierung einzuschätzen? Wie grundlegend wird das politische System umgebaut? Was bedeutet dieser Umbau für die Zukunft der Demokratie? Und wie kann und soll Europa auf ihn reagieren? (Autorenreferat)

"European and American commentators warn that Turkey is drifting back into authoritarianism, citing excessive police violence against demonstrators, restrictions on freedom of the press and internet, government interference in the judiciary, purges in the bureaucracy, and an anti-European policy shift. They note with astonishment that former prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was able to win the presidency on an increased share of the vote despite credible accusations of corruption, strife within the conservative camp and foreign policy failures. Erdoğan himself speaks of the 'New Turkey' having succeeded the old, authoritarian Kemalist republic and brought forth a progressive democracy. How broad is support for Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) across society? What can be expected of the new government? How fundamental is the reconstruction of the political system, and what does the it mean for the future of democracy? How can and should Europe respond?" (author's abstract)

Am 30. März 2014 fanden in der Türkei landesweit Kommunalwahlen statt, die sowohl von der Regierung als auch von der Opposition zu einem Referendum über Ministerpräsident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan und seine Regierung hochgespielt wurden. Während der Premier sich als Opfer »dunkler ausländischer Mächte« und ihrer »inländischen Handlanger« stilisierte und von einem »neuen Unabhängigkeitskrieg« sprach, kaprizierte sich die Opposition fast ausschließlich auf Korruptionsvorwürfe gegen die Regierung. Trotz Stimmeneinbußen von rund fünf Prozentpunkten ist die AKP aus den Kommunalwahlen als eindeutige Siegerin hervorgegangen. Doch Erdoğan sitzt nicht so fest im Sattel, wie allgemein angenommen wird. Sowohl in der Innen- als auch in der Außenpolitik stehen ihm schwierige Zeiten bevor. (Autorenreferat)

Die Bewegung des Predigers Fethullah Gülen ist die größte nichtamtliche Strömung im türkischen Islam. In Westeuropa gilt sie als die am schnellsten wachsende religiöse Gemeinde unter Bürgern mit türkischen Wurzeln. Allein in Deutschland betreiben circa 300 Vereine, die Gülen nahestehen, 24 staatlich anerkannte Privatschulen und etwa 150 außerschulische Nachhilfeeinrichtungen. In der europäischen Diaspora gewinnt Gülens Appell an die Muslime, sich Wissen, Handlungsformen und Habitus der Moderne anzueignen, sozial aufzusteigen und gerade dadurch effektiv zur Versittlichung der Gesellschaft beizutragen, eine neue Dimension. Zum einen kann hier der eigene soziale Aufstieg - anders als in der Türkei - nicht mit dem Projekt der Eroberung des Staates verbunden werden. Zum zweiten bürgt in der Diaspora - erneut anders als in der Türkei - eine Lebenshaltung, die auf die Konservierung der eigenen religiösen und nationalen Identität gerichtet ist, nicht ohne weiteres dafür, mit der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung in Harmonie zu leben. Die türkisch-muslimische Diaspora steht deshalb unter dem Druck, ein neues, mit den Haltungen der europäischen Gesellschaften kompatibles Verständnis von religiöser und nationaler Identität zu entwickeln. Gülens Vorgabe, dass der Dienst an der Gesellschaft eine wesentliche Form einer vor Gott gerechtfertigten Lebensführung ist, könnte in der europäischen Diaspora (sowie in den USA) geradewegs der Schlüssel dafür sein, den prinzipiellen Interessengegensatz zwischen dem Islam und dem Westen aufzuheben, den Gülen in seinen frühen Schriften wiederholt mit eindringlichen Worten beschworen hat. (Autorenreferat)

Barack Obama hat die Beziehungen zwischen den USA und der Türkei gleich zu Beginn seiner Präsidentschaft als „Modellpartnerschaft“ aufgewertet und eine enge Arbeitsbeziehung mit Ministerpräsident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan geknüpft. Er reagierte damit auf tiefgreifende Veränderungen im Kontext des bilateralen Verhältnisses, die ihre Ursache nicht nur in innenpolitischen Entwicklungen in beiden Ländern haben, sondern auch in den politischen Transformationsprozessen in den arabischen Staaten und im Bedeutungszuwachs des Schwellenlands Türkei im regionalen und internationalen Umfeld. Zwar mündete das Konzept der „Modellpartnerschaft“ bislang nicht in eine ausformulierte Strategie. Die vorliegende Studie zeigt jedoch, dass die USA damit konkrete strategische Interessen verfolgen. Denn die Attraktivität der bilateralen Kooperation für Washington gründet darauf, dass am Bosporus besonders viele amerikanische Interessen zusammenlaufen. Dies macht die strategische Partnerschaft aus Sicht der USA mehrdimensional – und damit besonders wertvoll. Die Studie fordert dazu auf, insbesondere in der Nahostpolitik die trilaterale Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU, den USA und der Türkei zu verstärken. Eine solche Kooperation böte zudem neue Impulse für die transatlantischen Beziehungen. Denn sie würde die Möglichkeit eröffnen, sich gemeinsam mit den USA den Herausforderungen zu stellen, die sich aus dem Aufstieg der Schwellenländer im internationalen System ergeben. Die Türkei ist dafür ein besonders geeigneter Partner. Keine andere „Emerging Power“ pflegt so enge wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche und historische Bande nach Europa wie die Türkei, bietet eine Nato-Mitgliedschaft und eine derartig große kulturelle und geografische Nähe zu Regionen, gegenüber denen es eine weitgehende Gemeinsamkeit strategischer Interessen gibt. (Autorenreferat)

Viele hatten weitaus mehr von dem »Demokratiepaket« erwartet, das der türkische Premierminister Recep Tayyip Erdogan am 30. September angekündigt hatte. Schließlich wurde es fast ein Jahr nach Aufnahme der informellen Friedensgespräche beschlossen, die die Regierung mit Abdullah Öcalan führt, dem inhaftierten Führer der Arbeiterpartei Kurdistans (PKK). Doch anstelle von Reformen zur Lösung der Kurdenfrage stellte Erdogan lediglich allgemeine Maßnahmen in Aussicht, die dazu dienen sollen, türkische Gesetze mit dem Acquis der Europäischen Union (EU) zu harmonisieren. Mit der formalen Öffnung von Kapitel 22 im Rahmen der Verhandlungen über den Beitritt der Türkei zur EU ist auch die europäische Politik gefordert, Einfluss auf den Friedensprozess zu nehmen. Denn dieses Kapitel betrifft die Regionalpolitik, die eng mit der Frage der Dezentralisierung zusammenhängt. (Autorenreferat)

In 79 von 81 Provinzhauptstädten der Türkei demonstrierten in den letzten Wochen insgesamt 2,5 Millionen Menschen gegen den türkischen Regierungschef Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Doch Erdogan ist auch der Ministerpräsident, der wie kein zweiter in der 90-jährigen Geschichte der Republik Türkei Rückhalt in der Bevölkerung genießt. Seit der Einführung des Mehrparteiensystems 1946 ist es seine Gerechtigkeits- und Entwicklungspartei (AKP), die das Land bisher am längsten ununterbrochen allein regiert hat, und sie kann sich begründete Hoffnungen machen, auch aus den nächsten Wahlen als stärkste politische Kraft hervorzugehen. Was verrät diese Konstellation von extremer Gegnerschaft zu Erdogan bei gleichzeitiger außergewöhnlich starker Unterstützung für ihn über die politische Struktur der Türkei? Und welche Folgen hat Erdogans unduldsame Reaktion auf die Proteste für seine Zukunft und die seiner Partei? (Autorenreferat)