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In this article, I present a sociological approach to the problem of meaningful work that dwells on its broad social and cultural sources, as opposed to the focus on subjective and organizational factors currently prevailing in the field. Specifically, I consider two sociological perspectives, those of community and autonomy, as important conceptual tools for understanding the ambivalent character of modern culture in providing individuals with a sense of meaningfulness of their activities. I also review some of the existing research on meaningful work and interpret it through this conceptual distinction, both to show the latter's relevance for the field and to identify the gaps it might help fill. As a result, based on the sociological perspectives, I propose a general conceptual model and discuss five directions to further advance the theoretical comprehension of meaningful work, and I suggest some implications of these perspectives for normative business ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research suggests that free will beliefs and moral responsibility beliefs are strongly linked, yet ultimately distinct. Unfortunately, the most common measure of free will beliefs, the free will subscale (FWS) of the Free Will and Determinism Plus, seems to confound free will beliefs and moral responsibility beliefs. Thus, the present research (1,700 participants across two studies) details the development of a 2-factor FWS – the FWS-II – that divides the FWS into a free will subscale and a moral responsibility subscale. The FWS-II showed good fit compared to standard fit thresholds and superior fit compared to the original FWS. The moral responsibility subscale was moderately correlated with general punitive attitudes and specific punitive assignments, even when controlling for the free will subscale. Conversely, the free will subscale was moderately correlated with conservativism and religiosity, even when controlling for the moral responsibility subscale. These results provide evidence that the FWS is better suited – psychometrically, theoretically, and practically – as a 2-factor measure of free will beliefs and moral responsibility beliefs than as a 1-factor measure of free will beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant worries that if we are not free, morality will be nothing more than a phantasm for us. In the final section of the Groundwork, he attempts secure our freedom, and with it, morality. Here is a simplified version of his argument: A rational will is a free will A free will stands under the moral law Therefore, a rational will stands under the moral law In this paper, I attempt to defuse two prominent objections to this argument. Commentators often worry that Kant has not managed to establish that we are rational beings with wills in the first place, and that he equivocates in his use of 'free' between premise 1 and 2. I argue that both of these objections can be overcome, and thus seek to offer some hope for Kant's approach in Groundwork III. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notions of strength and weakness of will appear at central junctures in Nietzsche's philosophy, figuring, for example, into his critique of modernity (BGE 212) and his engagement with the free will debate (BGE 21). Despite the centrality of these notions for Nietzsche's philosophical project, little scholarly attention has been devoted to examining how Nietzsche actually conceives of strength and weakness of will. Instead, it is commonly assumed that Nietzsche simply follows his philosophical predecessors in identifying weakness with akrasia. In this paper, I challenge this reading, arguing that the primary kind of agential failure that Nietzsche associates with weakness is irresoluteness , understood as the failure to persist in one's intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Memory modification technology (MMT) refers to the use of neurotechnologies to intervene in memory. Some scholars oppose the application of MMT in mental health therapy because MMT undermines personal autonomy. Such judgment is based on several different reasons: (1) MMT is an inactive intervention; (2) MMT sacrifices long-term autonomy; (3) MMT promotes paternalism; (4) MMT leads users to relinquish their social relationships. This article argues that due to the philosophical complexities of the concept of autonomy, current debates have been unable to provide a valid justification for the ethical permissibility of MMT. In fact, the autonomy-based arguments against MMT focus on conceptual aspects of autonomy other than informed consent. A focus on informed consent may be of greater moral significance. We should adopt a more practical perspective of personal autonomy and focus on the informed consent issues in MMT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is intended as an essay about consciousness. The logic of morality leads humans to turn to their deepest essence, which is consciousness, as the highest faculty of human reason. Consciousness gives humans their intransitive value as the only moral beings gifted with mind, intellect, and reason, heart and soul, free will, faith, and love. Conscience is our personal god, our inner person/"homo interior", demon, oracle, and judge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the most popular versions of the flicker defense, Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) because agents in these cases are (directly) morally responsible not for making the decisions they make but for making these decisions on their own, which is something they could have avoided doing. Frankfurt defenders have primarily focused on trying to show that the alternative possibility of refraining from making the relevant decisions on their own is not a robust alternative, while generally granting that this alternative cannot easily be eliminated from successful cases of this sort. In a recent issue of this journal, Stockdale (2022) attempts to sidestep the debate concerning robustness and develops a novel kind of Frankfurt-style case in which agents are unable to avoid making the relevant decisions on their own. The fundamental problem with Stockdale's argument is that it hinges on an implausible conception of acting on one's own. I help clarify the pertinent sense of what it means to do a thing on one's own in this context and show that these new cases are unable to overcome the targeted versions of the flicker defense of PAP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A life scheme can be understood as the cognitive representation of individuals' life events and their goal attainment in the past and future. We conceptualize beliefs in free will and determinism as two life schemes. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between beliefs in free will and determinism, search for meaning, and depressive symptoms. While belief in free will uniquely and negatively predicted depressive symptoms, deterministic belief was uniquely and positively associated with depressive symptoms. Moreover, a multiple mediation model revealed that beliefs in free will and determinism were indirectly associated with increased depressive symptoms via their positive relations with search for meaning. These findings are discussed in view of the relationship between inconsistent life schemes and the need to search for meaning, as well as the mediating role of the search for meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, the neuroscientific community has moved from describing the neural underpinnings of mental phenomena—as characterized by experimental psychology and philosophy of mind—to attempting to redefine those mental phenomena based on neural findings. Nowadays, many are intrigued by the idea that neuroscience might provide the "missing piece" that would allow philosophers (and, to an extent, psychologists, too) to make important advances, generating new means that these disciplines lack to close knowledge gaps and answer questions like "What is Free Will?" and "Do humans have it?." In this paper, we argue that instead of striving for neuroscience to replace philosophy in the ongoing quest to understanding human thought and behavior, more synergetic relations should be established, where neuroscience does not only inspire philosophy but also draws from it. We claim that such a collaborative coevolution, with the two disciplines nourishing and influencing each other, is key to resolving long‐lasting questions that have thus far proved impenetrable for either discipline on its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article delves into the implications of neurotechnologies for the philosophical debates surrounding free will and moral responsibility. Tracing the concept from ancient religious and philosophical roots, we discuss how recent neurotechnological advancements (e.g. optogenetics, fMRI and machine learning, predictive diagnostics, et al.) challenge traditional notions of autonomy. Although neurotechnologies aim to enhance autonomy in the strict sense – as self-determination – they risk reducing or changing the broader notion of autonomy, which involves personal authenticity. We also submit that, in a world with an altered or limited concept of free will, humans should still be held accountable for actions executed through their bodies. By examining the dynamic between choice and responsibility, we emphasize the shift in technology ethics, moral philosophy, and the broader legal landscape in response to the advancement of neurotechnologies. By bringing the neurotechnological innovations into the world, neuroscientists not only change the technological landscape but also partake in long-standing moral narratives about freedom, justice, and responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, neurophysiological research has pushed the concept of free will towards a reductionist interpretation, largely avoiding the concept of a freely willing agent. This paper explores the ongoing debate surrounding free will, highlighting the contrasting perspectives of determinism, indeterminism (libertarianism), and compatibilism. It questions how individuals, particularly those adhering to deterministic viewpoints, can ethically navigate a world defined by causal relationships. The paper argues that reductionist approaches struggle to account for ethical responsibility and the human experience of making choices. While compatibilism offers a middle ground, asserting that actions in line with one's desires are free and thus ethically accountable, this stance is scrutinized for its potential limitations in answering questions about personal responsibility. Specifically, it is argued that compatibilism may not be the ideal framework for a neurophysiologist confronted with ethical dilemmas, thus leaving room for the re-examination of indeterminism. Through this discussion, the paper aims to contribute to a nuanced understanding of free will that incorporates both the scientific and philosophical dimensions of human decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Kant-Studien is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article offers a theory of disablement within contemporary capitalism by complementing and building on the UPIAS-inspired social model of disability. It first explores a variety of divergences between different models of disability, to then propose five tenets for the collective-materialist approach to disablement. These tenets are: considering disablement as both oppression and exploitation; using the "subjects of disablement" as a collective and non-identitarian concept alongside already-existing identity terms; centring the "collective" alongside the "social"; struggling for autonomy and Independent Living, and adopting an anti-productivist politics. The abolition of disabling capitalism and the transformation of the institution of work are the ultimate goals of the collective-materialist approach and its related practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that ethical features of sport strongly interact with aesthetic features of sport, such that all pro tanto ethical merits/defects count as aesthetic merits/defects. This is a much-debated topic in the philosophy of art and aesthetics literature, in which recent critics have taken to task this interactionist take on how ethical evaluative properties interact with aesthetic ones. The critics' main argument against this view is that far too many works of art than theorists of this strong interactionist kind care to admit either lack the evaluative ethical properties they claim for them, or their ethical properties do not appreciably affect their aesthetic properties. Sport, I argue, is a notable exception. That's because in sport ethical flaws in athletic performances double as aesthetic flaws with very few exceptions, or so I will argue. Unlike artworks, therefore, the interactionist thesis holds mostly true across the entire athletic spectrum, which is why, in my view, it warrants far more serious attention and appreciation than it is commonly given in both the philosophy of art and aesthetics and philosophy of sport literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral responsibility is integral to most forms of theism. Yet its coherence as a concept is contingent upon the fulfilment of certain metaphysical conditions. In this paper I argue that (1) the continued existence of the self, and (2) freedom of will and action, are necessary conditions for moral responsibility, particularly within a theistic context. I then argue that the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (or, the Many Worlds Interpretation) throws these assumptions into question in new and interesting ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political philosophy has long treated the nation-state as the starting point for normative inquiry, while paying little attention to the ongoing legacies of colonialism and imperialism. But given how most modern states emerged, normative discussions about migration, for example, need to engage with the colonial and imperial history of state immigration controls, citizenship practices, and the nation-state more generally. This article critically reviews three historical studies by Adom Getachew, Radhika Mongia, and Nandita Sharma that engage in depth with this history. The studies historicize concepts that are central to discussions in political philosophy: the categories of citizen and migrant, the concept of 'nationality,' and the principle of self-determination. I argue that this historicized form of conceptual analysis helps us challenge the default authority of concepts that are deeply embedded in the political structures that we inhabit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Germanistische Linguistik is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The history of the thesis of the guise of the good between Kant and Anscombe is not well understood. This article examines a notable disagreement over the thesis during this period, between Green and Sidgwick. It shows that Green accepts versions of the thesis concerning action and desire in one sense of “desire,” and that Sidgwick rejects the thesis concerning both action and desire. It then considers why Green accepts the thesis, and how effective Sidgwick's criticism of Green is. Despite the appearance of a mere clash of intuitions, an interesting rationale for the thesis can be found in Green's theory of free will and moral responsibility, of which I defend a broadly compatibilist interpretation. Sidgwick's criticisms either miss this rationale altogether, or do not take adequately into account Green's complex theory of free will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In appraising human actions, an important consideration is whether they are free. If they are compelled, this may be excusatory; if controlled by someone other than the agent, this may mitigate; and if selfishly motivated, this may invalidate excuses. Moral appraisals of action by non‐philosophers do not normally consider whether it can be free under determinism. Metaphysical inquiry about action, by contrast, seems incomplete if it does not consider this. Are there two free will problems, one normative and one metaphysical? If so, they share such terms as ‘could’ and ‘could not’, and thoughtful non‐philosophers question their own normative assumptions once they understand the metaphysical problem determinism poses for the philosophy of action. This paper distinguishes metaphysical from action‐theoretic elements of the free will problem but also connects the metaphysical issues with normative questions about responsibility; it critically appraises some major metaphysical arguments concerning free action; and—to the extent possible in a single paper—it provides a positive account of free action neutral toward determinism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reevaluates the theme of aging and autonomy in Samuel Beckett’s play Happy Days, focusing on the character Winnie’s experiences to challenge conventional paradigms of aging. It explores how Winnie’s experiences, monologues, and interactions with the world resonate with gerontologist perspectives of autonomy in old age, which significantly emphasizes dignity, authenticity, and interdependence rather than freedom and independence of traditional viewpoints. By analyzing Beckett’s theatrical representation of Winnie, the paper argues that through Happy Days, Beckett provides a lens to reconsider societal attitudes toward aging, advocating for recognizing older adults’ subjectivity and confronting the subtle yet pervasive ageism in modern society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The given text is a list of references and citations from various sources related to the topics of individual autonomy, social equality, and relational autonomy. The sources cover a range of perspectives and theories, including feminist critiques, philosophical analyses, and discussions on oppression and paternalism. [Extracted from the article]

In this article I draw on resources from the Global South, and particularly the African philosophical tradition, to construct a theory of human rights grounded on dignity that presents a challenge to globally dominant, autonomy-based approaches. Whereas the latter conceive of human rights violations as degradations of our rational nature, the former does so in terms of degradations of our capacity to be party to harmonious or friendly relationships. Although I have in the past presented the basics of this relational approach, in this article I present new argumentation in support of it. I defend it from criticism and also go on the offensive by arguing that understanding the human rights violations of torture and rape to be (roughly) behavior that treats innocent parties in an extremely discordant or unfriendly way is, if not more plausible than standard Kantian understandings, at least a promising alternative to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accounts of aesthetic valuing emphasize two constraints on the formation of aesthetic belief. We must form our own aesthetic beliefs by engaging with aesthetic value first‐hand (the acquaintance principle) and by using our own capacities (the autonomy principle). But why? C. Thi Nguyen's proposal is that aesthetic valuing has an inverted structure. We often care about inquiry and engagement for the sake of having true beliefs, but in aesthetic engagement this is flipped: we care about arriving at good aesthetic beliefs for the sake of the values that arise in the process of doing so. The engagement is the point, so we must use our own capacities in first‐hand encounters. Here I challenge Nguyen's account. I argue that it misconstrues the value of aesthetic belief; it conflicts with restrictions on aesthetic testimony; and it has trouble harnessing engagement‐value for a theory of aesthetic value. A better approach emphasizes the social character of aesthetic valuing. On this view, aesthetic valuing is a social practice structured around the collaborative exercise and improvement of certain special capacities. The autonomy and acquaintance principles tell us to engage these capacities in forming our aesthetic beliefs. Understood aright, and contrary to consensus, these rules are identical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The "Hand of Love (Bantuan Tangan Kasih) Assistance Program" under the leadership of Paulus Waterpauw from 2020-2022 in West Papua Province is investigated in this study. The data used here were firsthand information directly related to the implementation of the program and its implementation, along with documents, reports, and literature related to Pancasila values, regional leadership, and specific programs. The results of the research are discussed based on the policy implementation of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), which emphasizes six dimensions, namely policy goals and objectives, policy resources, characteristics of implementing agents, implementing attitudes, communication between implementing organizations, and socio-economic and political environment. The findings show that the success of the implementation process of the Hand of Love Assistance Program is greatly influenced by the characteristics of the implementers. The hedonistic lifestyle after the enactment of the Special Autonomy has eroded the morality of almost some state administrators. The "hand of love" program is a program that has been implemented by a transmigration and labor office, Bank Penyalur, as the implementer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study applies resource dependence theory to address the question of how the critical resource dependence relationship emerges in the context of a university's performance agreement. This study focuses on two Nordic universities that have adopted performance agreements while simultaneously using strong performance-based state funding. Resource dependence involves an asymmetry and power imbalance that leads an organisation to believe that it is dependent on a more powerful organisation that has resources under its control. The theory reveals the central role of performance agreements and their associated instruments in the universities' relationship with the ministry and within universities. We found minor differences in Nordic university examples indicating the influence of the performance regimes within the management arena and within the material dimensions of university autonomy. Performance agreements and their related instruments are isolated from the other key realities of universities. Understanding the loose coupling between the agreements and the characteristics of universities are needed to enhance universities' ability to pursue their unique mission in society. Resource dependence theory provides a valuable framework for analysing the dynamics and dependencies that exist between organisations and within loosely coupled organisations, shedding light on the interactions and influences that shape these relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a theoretical introduction to the special issue on care, control, and surveillance. Drawing upon feminist ethics of care, this paper introduces a conceptualization of care that enables us to examine surveillance practices occurring in care relationships. We argue that care ethics is inherently performative and the conceptualization of care as good or bad is negotiated through specific care practices. In this theoretical overview, we adopt a non-ideal approach to care. This framework allows us, on the one hand, to recognize that power asymmetry and even abuse can occur in caring relationships, while on the other hand it still enables us to reject harmful and abusive practices. We argue that, in order to understand surveillance in care, we need a non-dyadic, processual, and relational understanding of care, within which the particular nature of care is constantly negotiated. We believe that vulnerability and autonomy are crucial in the dynamics of care and surveillance. Furthermore, they play a crucial role in defining what can be considered good or bad care: good care acknowledges the inherent vulnerabilities in care and should enhance the dignity and autonomy of care receivers. We conclude the paper by discussing whether and when surveillance and control can be part of good care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article aims to go through the point-by-point reading grid that Richard Rorty proposes to Michel Foucault in "Moral identity and private autonomy" (1992), a perspective that we will integrate/place in a triple evaluation register. The first coordinate considers a particular context and a set of specific readings within which Richard Rorty refers to Michel Foucault. The second layer brings to attention, according to Antonio Negri ("When and How I Read Foucault?", 2016), different ways of reading Foucault using Negri's pathways, seen as tributaries to the main targeted questions - when and how?, which we will also apply to Rorty's reading, thus formulating the meanings of his hypostasis/status as a Foucault reader. The third targeted element will consider Rorty's reading as a continued topic-debate, the act of reading Foucault becoming a multiple(icating) formula, subordinated to the reading-the-reading primacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically navigates the complex debate surrounding free will and criminal justice, challenging traditional assumptions of moral responsibility and culpability. By exploring hard incompatibilism, which denies free will, I question the ethical justification of punitive sanctions and critically analyze the alternative models such as the public health-quarantine and nonconsensual neurobiological "moral" enhancements. These alternatives, however, introduce practical and ethical concerns. Advocating for a neuro-abolitionist perspective, through the proposition of five initial principles/debates, the article suggests a shift in integrating sociological abolitionism with insights from neuroscience. The discussion extends to the implications of hard incompatibilism and the pursuit of more humane and effective approaches to deviant behavior, ultimately calling for the abolition of punitive models and criminal law itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Christian List (2014) has argued for the compatibilism of free will and determinism. Drawing on a distinction between physical possibility (used in defining determinism) and agential possibility (used in defining free will), List constructs a formal two-level model in which the two concepts are consistent. This paper's first contribution is to show that though List's model is formally consistent, philosophically it falls short of establishing a satisfactory compatibilist position. Ensuingly, an analysis of the shortcomings of the model leads to the identification of a controversial epistemological assumption implicit in the statements of both compatibilist and incompatibilist positions. Arguing that this assumption is not currently satisfied, the paper's second contribution is to show that neither the compatibilist nor the incompatibilist position is presently well-founded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We experimentally investigated psychological responses of bystanders to violations of moral codes to find out why divinity violations may be more effective for gaining victimhood status than autonomy violations in real-world intergroup conflicts. In particular, we considered how anger versus disgust responses are differentially invoked by violations of autonomy versus divinity ethics. Two experiments compared autonomy versus divinity violations in interaction with two other parameters known to produce different effects: level of harm (Experiment 1) and differential intergroup power (Experiment 2). Overall, we found support for the proposed dissociation in anger versus disgust responses to autonomy versus divinity violations in a way that the anger responses to autonomy violations were amplified but disgust responses to divinity violations were not affected when the moral violation was more harmful and the perpetrator was more powerful than the victim. We discuss the implications of the cognitive processes involved in considering autonomy versus divinity violations, and the functionality for parties to intergroup conflict of accusing the opponent of divinity violations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay presents a substantive Thomist response to neurophilosophy's main experimental challenge to free will: the Libet-style experiments on the neural antecedents of conscious voluntary actions. My response to this challenge will disclose that Thomists are rationally justified in rejecting both the conclusions of neurophilosophy skeptics of free will, and more fundamentally, the rival philosophical conceptions of voluntary action and free will that were chosen to be operationalized in these neuroscientific experiments. I show how the Thomists' alternative conception of human action justifies a significantly different interpretation of Libet-style experiments, one which reveals the psychological phenomenon targeted by these experiments is miscategorized as a voluntary action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bucerius Law Journal is the property of Bucerius Law School e.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the early Christian critique of astrology, focusing on its perceived conflict with the concept of free will. Key figures such as Origen, Tatian, and Bardesanes are highlighted for their contributions to this discourse. Origen’s works, including his homilies and commentaries on the Book of Genesis, notably oppose the deterministic implications of astrology by asserting human free will and divine omnipotence. Tatian’s writings, particularly his “Oratio ad Graecos,” condemn astrology as a demonic invention that undermines Christian doctrines. Bardesanes, who is well-informed in astrology, differentiates between cosmic influences and moral decisions, arguing that ethical behavior is not determined by the stars. The article also explores the theological and philosophical foundations of these arguments, tracing influences from earlier thinkers like Philo of Alexandria and Carneades. Overall, the text provides a comprehensive analysis of how early Christian writers engaged with and refuted astrological beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Kant-Studien is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Despite the renewed significance and popularity of strategic autonomy in recent years, this term remains undertheorized. Current usage of the term makes it difficult to determine whether an actor is strategically autonomous or not, and whether a particular course of action enhances autonomy or decreases it. This article thus begins by tracing the intellectual history of strategic autonomy, and then by evaluating the way in which modern scholars use this term. Consequently, it advances a novel conceptualization of the term, arguing that instead of being a binary concept, strategic autonomy represents the highest level of autonomy on a full spectrum of autonomy. While providing a comprehensive theory of strategic autonomy is beyond the scope of this article, we offer some preliminary hypotheses on why the international system incentivizes actors to pursue strategic autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the book review titled "Digital working lives: worker autonomy and the gig-economy" by Tim Christiaens, the author explores the impact of the gig economy on worker autonomy. Christiaens argues that the gig economy has negative consequences for worker autonomy and criticizes existing political theories for failing to address this issue adequately. The book provides a diagnostic analysis of the problems with gig work, drawing on post-workerist thought, and proposes an alternative concept of "convivial autonomy" as a solution. While the book offers a valuable critique and vision for addressing the problems of gig work, there are some tensions and unresolved issues in the proposed concept of convivial autonomy. [Extracted from the article]

This article critically examines the experimental philosophy of free will, particularly the interplay between ordinary individuals' compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions. It explores key insights from research studies that propose "natural compatibilism" and "natural incompatibilism". These studies reveal a complex landscape of folk intuitions, where participants appear to exhibit both types of intuitions. Here, we examine error theories, which purport to explain the coexistence of apparently contradictory intuitions: the Affective Performance Error hypothesis, the "Free Will No Matter What" hypothesis, the Bypassing hypothesis, and the Intrusion hypothesis, and the article explores the cognitive errors that could shape individuals' inconsistent perceptions of free will. We then explore three possibilities regarding folk intuitions: most individuals may hold either compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions, both simultaneously, or neither. Our aim is to deepen the understanding of the complex dynamics of intuitions about free will, and we close with suggestions for future studies in experimental philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is a commonplace the interpretation of Descartes as disinterested in moral issues. This is how Foucault reads him, for whom Modernity meant the separation between the new central subject of knowledge and the now secondary subject of praxis. In this article Descartes' work will be understood as a modern version of the philosophical art of living, where knowing and taking care of oneself are still united by a central axis, free will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso argue that humans are never morally responsible for their actions and take that thesis as a starting point for a project whose ultimate goal is the reform of responsibility practices, which include expressions of praise, blame, and the institution of legal punishment. This paper shares the skeptical concern that current responsibility practices can be suboptimal and in need of change, but argues that a non-skeptical pursuit of those changes is viable and more promising. The main lines of the argument are developed by assessing the prospects of implementing one of the changes favored within the skeptical project (namely, the reduction of punishment severity) in light of how human moral psychology works. An original vignette experiment (N = 180; participants from Facebook groups related to Brazilian universities) asked participants to recommend sentences for a fictitious criminal after considering alternatives to regular punishment that varied in their effectiveness to prevent reoffending. The results suggest that people can become less punitive even if they continue to believe in moral responsibility and free will. The paper further argues that reforming responsibility practices is more likely to occur without the endorsement of skepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Catherine Elgin has recently offered compatibility with autonomy as a plausible criterion for the epistemic virtues. This approach mixes elements of Kantianism with virtue theory. Sasha Mudd has criticized this combination on the grounds that it weakens the structure of Kantian autonomy and undermines its resources for responding to cultural relativism. Elgin's more recent defense of the role of autonomy has taken a more Kantian turn. Here, I defend Elgin's original claim, grounding it in a distinctively virtue theoretic account of the development of virtues. Exploring how individuals develop their epistemic virtues within a social context, I show how these virtues can be grounded in both developmental and constitutive relational autonomy. I further argue that a virtue theoretic conception of autonomy should be substantive, not just procedural, and this limits concerns about relativism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals who possess the virtue of epistemic autonomy rely upon themselves in their reasoning, judgment and decision making in virtuous ways. Philosophers working on intellectual virtue agree that if the pursuit of epistemic autonomy is not tempered by other virtues such as intellectual humility, it can lead to vices such as extreme intellectual individualism. Virtue theorists have made a number of empirical claims about the consequences of possessing this vice – e.g. that it will lead to significantly fewer epistemic goods and a greater number of faulty beliefs. This paper reports the results of two pilot studies and initial results from a larger series of studies that attempt to shed light on some of the intellectual pitfalls of pursuing unrestricted epistemic autonomy. The studies provide empirical support for the philosophical claim that epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility are mutually supporting virtues by showing that epistemic autonomy without intellectual humility leads to increased belief in misinformation, conspiracy theories and pseudoscience and decreased trust in scientific experts. They also reveal important contours of the complex and often delicate relationship between the virtue of epistemic autonomy and its more vicious cousin, strong intellectual individualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an introduction to the special issue on the philosophy of epistemic autonomy. In addition to giving some background on various conceptions of epistemic autonomy it provides brief summaries of the articles in the special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite abundant philosophical pondering and experiential evidence demonstrating the need for freedom in leading a meaningful life, the literature lacks an investigation of whether and how free will beliefs contribute to one's meaningful life as an antecedent variable. Based on the coupling of the life‐affirming hypothesis and Chinese culture, we used a manipulation experiment (Study 1, n = 242) and a two‐wave longitudinal study (Study 2, n = 378) to test the potential causality between laypeople's daily beliefs in free will and meaning in life (presence of and search for meaning) with two samples of Chinese undergraduates. The results show that belief in free will positively predicts the presence of meaning and search for meaning, immediately (Study 1) and 2 months later (Study 2). The present work corroborated that the belief in free will is an antecedent variable that imbues life with meaning and sparks actions seeking meaning, supporting the life‐affirming hypothesis instead of the deficit‐correcting hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the architectural typology of the verandah by following its use in residential buildings during the post-Ottoman British colonization and Independence periods in Sudan and differentiating between the concepts of climate determinism and climate consciousness. It brings new archival family photographs and fieldwork to discuss a modern Sudan that is curiously absent from the scholarship of both African and Islamic architecture in order to write the global history of modernism in higher resolution. It shows that the verandah was a British colonial architectural device in the context of a distinct town planning strategy, conceived after the racist segregation of "white men" from "natives" and used for cooling purposes for the sake of colonizers' comfort in perceived tropical climates. Comparing Abdel Moneim Mustafa's designs to those of colonial architects such as Gordon Brock Bridgman and independence-era architects such as Peter Muller, the article defines climate consciousness as a position that resists colonial inequalities of climate determinism but does not reject international connections and the modern know-how of climatization. It shows that the colonial connotations of the verandah were transformed after Sudanese independence, thanks to its creative use by architects who critically employed the technical know-how progressed under the field of tropical architecture. The article identifies this approach as the search for a more equitable internationalism that struggled for self-determination in order to undo the domination of global empires but not foreclose cosmopolitanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay locates an origin story for American literary studies in the takedown of a 1920s Boston medium named Margery, first by Harry Houdini and then by a Harvard English instructor. Her twice-over debunking lets us see literary studies' professionalism as a takeover of two competing practices: mediums talking to the dead and magicians disproving such talk. Focusing on the New Critics, the essay argues that a literary scholar's professional autonomy depended on judging a text's aesthetic autonomy, namely its capacity to speak for the dead. This essay urges us to keep performing and teaching the value of that labor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perspectives on freedom, liberty, agency, creativity, and free will have a rich and varied history in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and psychoanalysis. Central to psychoanalysis, we want nothing for our patients, nor from our patients, if not the expansion of their personal freedom, agency, individuality, creativity, and self-ownership. What is freedom, exactly? What does it mean to have and to exercise free will? What does it mean to be truly creative? Do we have true choices, or are we overdetermined puppets faltering under the illusion of self-generated acts of freedom? Does feeling free to choose, and then perhaps acting to choose, equate with actual freedom? These perspectives and questions are examined in light of how we think about emotional health and the phenomenology of therapeutic action. This article explores an emergence theory of free will and the centrality of self-ownership in understanding and experiencing freedom of choice. A clinical example is offered in the spirit of what it might look like and what it might mean to enable authentic free choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the contemporary debate on free will, most philosophers assume that the defense of libertarianism implies the defense of the notion of alternative possibilities. This article discusses this presupposition by showing that it is possible to build a libertarianism without alternative possibilities, apparently more robust than libertarianism with alternative possibilities. Inspired by Bergson, this nonclassical libertarianism challenges the idea that all causation implies the actualization of a predetermined possibility (an idea shared by determinism and classical libertarianism). Moreover, it challenges the idea that free will is a mere choice between prefixed possibilities: for this libertarianism, free will is the result of a creative process of the mind—an entirely causal process whose outcome is not, however, predetermined. This nonclassical libertarianism describes the process of forming a will in a more realistic way than classical libertarianism does. Furthermore, it is not threatened by the problem of chance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Right to Mental Autonomy: Its Nature and Scope" is an article that delves into the concept of the right to mental autonomy and its implications. The author presents a hypothetical scenario involving the use of technology to manipulate someone's mind and argues that this violates their right to bodily and mental autonomy. The article explores different perspectives on the nature and limits of the right to mental autonomy, highlighting real-world examples of violations. It suggests that the right to mental autonomy should be understood as the right to form attitudes based on reasons and discusses various scenarios where this right may be violated, such as through non-reason-giving advertising or nudging in public policy. The text concludes that mental autonomy is a complex concept that requires careful consideration in different contexts and that non-rational interference violates this right. [Extracted from the article]