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To be published in R. Ege and H. Igersheim, (eds), Freedom and Happiness in Economics and Philosophy, London: Routledge, 2011; Based on Hume's major philosophical works and on some of his Essays, this paper discusses formally the feasibility, from a Humean point of view, of a welfare policy which would aim at promoting the highest individual happiness whereas individual decisions, like individual happiness, are determined not only by allocations of goods, but also by an emotional state. It is shown that both the intertemporal structure of the problem and the role that Hume granted to the ‘calm passion' allow solving the problem, at least in principle.

International audience; The core idea of utilitarianism for Bentham is to establish that only individual utilities count in social welfare. There can be two distinct interpretations of this apparently simple principle. According to one view, individual utilities represent the basic information for the calculation of social welfare: this is how utilitarianism works. According to a second view, social welfare is maximized if and only if individual utilities are maximized: this is what justifies utilitarianism. This aim of this paper is to show: that these two interpretations should not be confused; that they correspond to distinct definitions of welfarism; that they are likely to conflict; and that as a consequence we can draw important and surprising conclusions for political philosophy and economic science. One such conclusion is that fairness should be prior to goodness in a consistent Benthamian doctrine.

à paraître; International audience; Drawing on passages in Book II of the Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), in the Dissertation on the Passions (1757), and in some of the Essays (1777), this paper is built upon Hume's distinction between three alternative valuations of an individual position: desire (which leads to action), interest, and happiness. The difficulty comes from the fact that desire does not depend on pleasure as an impression, but on the force of an idea of pleasure, based upon a belief in the realisation of the correlative impression. Typically, this belief is linked to the underlying emotional state, expressed in the degree of violence of the passions, which governs both the individual's reactivity to pleasure, and his preference for present (compared to future) pleasures. On the contrary, interest and happiness do not depend on the distortion introduced by beliefs, and are directly linked to pleasure. It is shown that the decisional valuation only coincides with interest in the case of what Hume called a “calm passion”, which gives birth to the greatest happiness.

This paper is a study of Bentham's felicific calculus. Challenging a view that contrasts 'cardinal' to 'ordinal' calculus, we show that these two forms of calculus constitute instead different phases of a single approach. Bentham sometimes has to rely upon proxy variables because of operational constraints, and consequently upon factors other than utility. As a utilitarian, Bentham is de facto welfarist from an ethical point of view. Surprisingly however, this study shows that Bentham resorts to non-welfare information in the actual application of his calculus. His approach reconciles non-welfarism from the technical standpoint with welfarism as a fundamental moral principle., Cet article est fondé sur une étude approfondie du calcul d'utilité développé par Bentham. En premier lieu, la thèse de la dualité du calcul est critiquée et la thèse de la continuité est défendue au moyen d'arguments historiques, logiques et textuels. En second lieu, le fait que Bentham considère un mode de calcul distinct pour des raisons opérationnelles aboutit à un constat paradoxal: le welfarisme moral peut être compatible avec un non-welfarisme technique.

The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com. See http://springerlink.metapress.com/content/e8k841766581851x/fulltext.pdf; International audience