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Transboundary water resource allocation is the core issue to alleviate water resources conflicts and realize effective management and utilization of water resources. Based on the perspective of equal negotiation, we used the Negotiation Game Model to describe the cooperation path among basin countries. Firstly, we introduced the idea of flexible weight to establish a fair and reasonable allocation mode by using a Multi-criteria Decision Model. Then, we used the negotiation game model to approximate the negotiation process of each basin country, to explore a fair and reasonable initial allocation scheme of transboundary water resources that can be generally recognized by each basin country. Taking the Lancang-Mekong River Basin (LMRB) as an example for empirical analysis, the results show that: ① The negotiation scheme proposed by each basin country based on the constraint of fair and reasonable allocation mode reflects the interest demands of each basin country, but the sum of the ideal water rights allocation ratio of each basin country does not meet the constraint condition equal to 100%, so negotiation is required. Each country bears a certain loss of water rights, and the reduction of water rights borne by each basin country ranges from zero to 5. 02%; ② The average satisfaction of the optimized allocation scheme under different preference scenarios is above 90%, which has higher satisfaction and stability compared with the negotiation scheme proposed by each basin country. It indicates that finding the optimal solution of water resource allocation based on the subject satisfaction function considers the interest demands of each basin country, which can improve the acceptability of the transboundary water rights allocation scheme; ③ Under different allocation scenarios, the proportion of transboundary water rights allocated to China and Thailand is higher, while the proportion allocated to Myanmar is lower. From the perspective of the change rate and the average satisfaction of each basin country before and after the negotiation, the transboundary water rights allocation scheme under the preference equity scenario and preference efficiency scenario is the less controversial scheme for each basin country. This study aims to improve the rationality and feasibility of transboundary water resource allocation and provide support for reducing water resource conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The Yellow River Basin is a key strategic area for China to achieve its carbon emission reduction goal. Making scientific decisions on the carbon emission quota scheme for cities in the Yellow River Basin under the requirements of the 2030 carbon emission reduction goal and clarifying the goals and responsibilities of carbon emission quotas in the areas along the Yellow River are crucial to the successful achievement of the dual goals of reaching peak carbon emissions and carbon neutrality. Most of the existing research schemes require the emission reduction areas to reduce carbon emissions only, ignoring the existence of new demand for carbon emissions in the Yellow River Basin before the due date of the goal of reaching peak carbon emissions. Furthermore, radical carbon reduction could seriously damage the safe operation of the economic development along the Yellow River. This paper took the total carbon emissions of the Yellow River Basin under the 2030 carbon emission reduction goal as the control goal and constructed a two-stage allow; cation model of carbon emission quotas for cities along the Yellow River Basin from the perspective of ensuring regional equitable development and promoting global efficiency optimization. In stage one, we established the allocation idea of ‘basic quota + added quota,’ determined the basic quota according to the current base of carbon emissions, and took into account the differences in regional emission reduction capacity, potential, responsibility, and development demand. The Entropy Weight-TOPSIS method was used to allocate the growth space of carbon emissions, and added quotas were reserved to ensure the safe operation and development of emission reduction areas. In stage two, to ensure the allocation efficiency of the quota scheme, a zero-sum game DDF model of heterogeneous grouping of cutting-edge technologies was constructed to obtain an efficiency-optimized allocation scheme while controlling the emission reduction range and reserving new quotas. The research found that: ① In the face of the goal of reducing emissions by 2030, regions along the Yellow River still have the demand and the right to increase carbon emissions. At the same time, to avoid blindly rushing to reach peak carbon emissions, these regions should undertake ‘common but differentiated; quota responsibilities. Among them, regions with high energy consumption and emissions bear relatively high pressure to reduce emissions. ② When low-carbon emission regions improve efficiency through carbon emission reduction, they should control the extent and intensity of carbon reduction to ensure the safety of the implementation of emission reduction schemes. The zero-sum game DDF model of technology frontier grouping, which overcomes the disadvantage of traditional efficiency allocation methods that could lead to extreme allocation, can not only optimize the allocation of efficiency, but also avoid radical large-scale adjustments of carbon quotas. ③ The allocation of carbon emission quotas in the upper, middle, and lower reaches of the Yellow River Basin has spatial differences. The upper reaches bear heavy ecological protection responsibilities and should shoulder higher limit responsibilities. Considering the needs of regional economic development and the difficulties of short-term adjustment of the energy structure, the middle and lower reaches should be allocated relatively high carbon emission quotas to ensure their smooth transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Agro-Environment Science is the property of Journal of Agro-Environment Science Editorial Board and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

It is a pressing matter for the Yellow River Basin to promote the intensive and economical utilization of water resources and the high-quality development. Water rights trading is an effective means to optimize the allocation of water resources and improve the efficient circulation of water resources by using market mechanism. The tradable water quantity of the transferor is one of the basic elements of water rights trading. How to scientifically calculate tradable water amount under the high-quality development mode is the key to ensure the water resource security of the transferor and the smooth realization of water right trading. This paper puts forward the calculation method of tradable water quantity in the water right transaction under high-quality development mode, providing the theoretical basis for carrying out the water right transaction and calculating the tradable water quantity in the irrigated district. First of all, considering fully the impact of water rights trading on the water security of the transferor, the tradable amount of water is defined as the amount of water in transaction on the premise of ensuring the transferor's water use for production, life and ecology. Secondly, according to the analysis of China's water rights trading policy, the tradable water comes from water-saving potential. The practice of domestic water rights trading shows that agricultural water-saving potential is the main source of tradable water at present and in the future. Thirdly, in accordance with the principles of ensuring food security and realizing water resource conservation and intensive utilization under the mode of high-quality development, the estimation method of agricultural water-saving potential is proposed. Finally, the influence factors of tradable water amount are analyzed, the adjustment coefficient is determined, and the calculation method that can be converted into tradable water amount in agricultural water-saving potential is put forward. This method has been applied to the pilot area of the national high-quality development strategy and the model of China's water rights trading-Hetao Irrigation District of Inner Mongolia, It is concluded that the agricultural water-saving potential of the area from 2021 to 2025 is 1. 107 13 billion m3, 1. 154 96 billion m3, 1.204 86 billion m\1,256 92 billion m3, and 1. 311 23 billion m5 respectively. According to the tradable water influence factors analysis of Hetao Irrigation District and water rights trading policy of Inner Mongolia, taking the adjustment coefficient of tradable water as 2/3, tradable water in Hetao Irrigation District from 2021 to 2025 is calculated to be 738.1 million m3, 770 million m3, 803,2 million n?, 837.9 million m3, 874,2 million n? respectively. It is hoped that this study can provide some reference to Hetao Irrigation District of Inner Mongolia and even the Yellow River Basin concerning the calculation of the tradable water quantity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Agro-Environment Science is the property of Journal of Agro-Environment Science Editorial Board and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Population Resources & Environment is the property of Shandong Normal University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Agro-Environment Science is the property of Journal of Agro-Environment Science Editorial Board and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)