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Recent research into the public's attitude toward the use of nuclear weapons repeats long-standing mistakes in how international relations theorists think about morality. Falsely equating consequentialism with state egoism and normative obligations with restrictions on the use of weapons of mass destruction implies that ethically motivated beliefs about foreign affairs must be other-regarding and that other-regarding behavior is not utilitarian in character. Drawing on empirical research into moral psychology, we argue that liberal, other-regarding morality is only one kind of ethical foundation. Alternative moral concerns such as retribution, deference to authority, and in-group loyalty also help to determine foreign policy beliefs. We find that all three are associated with support for the use of nuclear weapons in the American public. Our survey respondents act as moral utilitarians who weigh different ethical considerations in forming their judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mounting an effective international humanitarian response to a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) event, especially if the response is undertaken on an ad hoc basis, would be extremely difficult and would pose many risks to the responders. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has created a competency-based capacity to respond to at least small-scale CBRN events, including a deployable capability to undertake operational activities. This involves informed assessments of CBRN risks, timely and competent decisions on how to respond, and effectively mobilizing appropriate resources to implement these decisions, through the creation of an emergency roster. In addition to the acquisition of technical expertise and material resources, the creation of such capacity requires the application of central processes, ensuring systematic management of CBRN response (including risk-based decision-making), standing operational procedures, and availability of and access to the necessary resources. Implementation of the ICRC's CBRN response framework as described in this article should be considered by any agency or other stakeholder preparing for international humanitarian assistance in CBRN events – especially if such events are related to armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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As demonstrated by the September 11th attacks, state-centric concepts of international security are evolving. The increased global mobility of non-state actors, weapons of mass destruction and radical fundamentalism are changing the dynamics of terrorism. Globalization amplifies both the likelihood of nuclear proliferation and the potential range of nuclear destruction. Unlike twentieth century revolutionaries or ethnonationalist guerrillas, al-Qaeda is not affiliated with any government or indigenous population. Al-Qaeda does not rely on the support of sovereign states and operates a global network, across jurisdictional and territorial boundaries. Despite these changing dynamics, nuclear proliferation strategies remain anchored in state centric legal and strategic frameworks. Under this model, the gravest threat to international nuclear security stems from states developing and proliferating weapons to terrorist syndicates in violation of a nuclear proliferation regime. This rogue state proliferation paradigm obscures the role of non-state actors and creates a phase-lag between the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime and the emerging global threat mix. This paper argues that unique challenges posed by contemporary Islamic extremism will ultimately force policy makers to abandon the unqualified conflation of rouge states with transnational terrorist syndicates and adopt market-based and other nontraditional strategies for mitigating nuclear proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the use of international political theories to address the threat posed by nuclear weapons including deterrence, nonproliferation, and counterforce. It mentions the role of international law in serving as catalyst to stop the use of nuclear weapons. It emphasizes the U.S.'s use of preemption as a mechanism to control weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. An overview of international politics paradigms concerning nuclear weapons is also presented.