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Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935) is the quintessential philosophical outsider. Affiliated to no institution, and associated with no traditional school, in his prose fiction and poetry, Pessoa invented a new philosophy of the human subject, arguing that imagination is key to human flourishing and human self-enrichment. Each of us, he claimed, can use our powers of imagination to “pluralise ourselves;” that is to say, to live, simultaneously and in sequence, as a plurality of distinct subjects. Calling these artefact minds “heteronyms”, Pessoan synthetic selves are new ways poetically to experience the world. In this study of the philosophical thought of Pessoa, philosopher Jonardon Ganeri highlights connections between Pessoa with earlier philosophical poets, from Keats to Shakespeare and from Coleridge to Whitman. Ganeri emphasises Pessoa's originality in his theory of the human subject as a radical departure from the history of Christian or Islamic thought, highlighting affinities with ideas from works of philosophical fiction in classical India through an examination of Pessoa's own engagement with Indian poetry and philosophy. Ganeri convincingly argues for the need to consider Pessoa's writings as a philosopher, both on their own terms and as in deep conversation with the tradition of Indian thought.

Identification of the phenomenon of marginality in The Marginal Self—the failure to become one's authentic, best self, by refusing to actualize this potential that is inherent in us all—turns on recognizing that freedom, and its misuse, underlie most human behavior, normal and pathological. Jean-Paul Sartre insisted that people don't just have freedom, they are freedom. Most philosophical anthropologies, including Freudian psychoanalysis, and the current medical model of mental illness propagated by the American Psychiatric Association and typified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), do not acknowledge this essential reality. Beyond Marginality came out first eleven years after the initial 1987 publication of The Marginal Self. The author, in the meantime, had become acquainted with the Zen philosophy of D. T. Suzuki, of whom Martin Heidegger said that if he understood this man's work correctly, Suzuki had accomplished what Heidegger had been trying to do all his life. What did Heidegger see in Suzuki's anthropology? That the Cartesian duality—ultimately the dissociation of our inner lives from the world around us and from one another—was a distortion created by us that we could overcome through Zen's actionable intuition of human wholeness. How this overcoming might be brought about is the theme of Beyond Marginality, starting with Suzuki's intuition and embracing the work of many allied thinkers. Equally compelling are vivid testimonials from those who had stumbled into marginality, some eventually recognizing the negative consequences of their misused freedom, then freely willing themselves out of their marginal states. Helping people move beyond marginality and its attendant psychic pathology parallels the present enthusiasm of the mental health community for a positive psychology. Gestalt psychologist Kurt Lewin left us with the counter-Cartesian, Zen-like insight that nothing is so practical as a good theory.

This volume showcases new and interesting ways in which the possession of civic virtues can contribute to people's abilities to engage in public life in meaningful ways.What is the role of civic virtues in public life? How does possessing civic virtues affect persons and their capacities for participation in the public order? The chapters in this volume combine philosophical and empirically informed work to show how civic virtues can be informed by larger virtue ethical perspectives. The first two chapters discuss virtues of individuals that have not received significant empirical attention—authenticity and wisdom and psychological resilience. The next two chapters address education and the ways in which civic virtues can help us to better serve schoolchildren who are socially and economically disadvantaged, as well as to broaden students'horizons with respect to character and sustainability education. The final four chapters explore the roles for virtues within various political and public realms. They offer perspectives on how virtues affect contentious politics in democratic societies, and study virtues in contexts in which democracy has been stifled or torn apart by war. Together, the chapters highlight the ever-widening impact of the virtues on our lives and in society.The Self, Civic Virtue, and Public Life will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in ethics, political philosophy, psychology, and philosophy of education.The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 International license.

Newly published lectures by Foucault on critique, Enlightenment, and the care of the self. On May 27, 1978, Michel Foucault gave a lecture to the French Society of Philosophy where he redefined his entire philosophical project in light of Immanuel Kant's 1784 text “What Is Enlightenment?” Foucault strikingly characterizes critique as the political and moral attitude consisting in the “art of not being governed like this,” one that performs the function of destabilizing power relations and creating the space for a new formation of the self within the “politics of truth.” This volume presents the first critical edition of this crucial lecture alongside a previously unpublished lecture about the culture of the self and three public debates with Foucault at the University of California, Berkeley, in April 1983. There, for the first time, Foucault establishes a direct connection between his reflections on the Enlightenment and his analyses of Greco-Roman antiquity. However, far from suggesting a return to the ancient culture of the self, Foucault invites his audience to build a “new ethics” that bypasses the traditional references to religion, law, and science.

The Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus invites us to take part in his philosophizing when he encourages his readers to think about what they think they are, as living beings, human beings, as rational beings, ethical subjects and as philosophers. He is interested in what we say about ourselves in ordinary language and notices that such ordinary experience conflicts with what the Platonic tradition claims we (truly) are. This conflict does not lead him to turn away from the human terms and expressions, but impels him to take seriously what we say about ourselves and to explain it philosophically.

Expression is typically construed as a relation between two ontologically distinct items—namely, a vehicle and a content—but it is better construed non-relationally, since the content is an intrinsic aspect or quality of the expressive vehicle. Upon this basis, The Expressive Self: The First Person in Speech and Thought argues that the distinctive nature of the first-person perspective must be accounted for in expressive, rather than epistemic, terms. For though others can report on what one expresses, one alone is able to non-relationally express oneself; one alone is able to produce vehicles that are episodes of one's self-consciousness. According to Ángel García Rodríguez, the ensuing expressive model of the self provides clarity on some prominent contemporary puzzles, notably Moore's paradox, self-deception, and McKinsey's paradox, given the duality of non-relationally expressive and reporting uses of the underlying first-person claims. Moreover, the phenomena of self-reference and first-person authority, both psychological and bodily, pose no objection to the model. Throughout, the author engages critically with alternative conceptions of the self, delivering a novel account that helps advance the debate about the nature of the self and of the first person.

Most of us are conscious of having a single and stable self, but the self is more fragmented and plastic than we care to think. David Berliner explores the captivating world of identity through an array of astonishing experiences. From Napoleon doppelgangers to Philip Roth's alter-ego Nathan Zukerman and Wonder Woman cosplayers to anthropologists going native, he delves into the kaleidoscopic nature of the self and attempts to understand the heterogenous nature of identity. But Becoming Other also discusses a great cultural controversy of our time: who has the right to play at being whom?

Why It's OK to Be Amoral argues that self-righteous moralism has replaced religion as a source of embattled and gratuitous certainties. High-minded moral convictions invoke the authority of sacred moral truths, but there are no such truths. In reality, moral passions are rooted in atavistic emotional dispositions and arbitrary social conventions.While public and private discourse is saturated with guilt, shame and righteous indignation, professional philosophers, under cover of clever argumentation, promote the utopian idea that all practical questions have uniquely right answers—providing that you adopt the right moral principles. But their justifications for those principles appeal to contested ‘foundations', among which no rational adjudication is possible. Moreover, because there are two discrepant ways of understanding motivation, our access to agents'true reasons is never sufficiently reliable to warrant moral praise or blame. Finally, every agent has a wide diversity of reasons for action, yet moralists claim that some reasons trump all others, because they are ‘moral'reasons. Since these too must be grounded in facts, that amounts to double counting some reasons.Having exposed these aspects of the institution of morality, this book suggests that if we cannot abstain altogether from moralising, we can at least try to use it against itself.Key Features Describes and criticises seven approaches to the question, Why should I do or not do X? Develops an original objection to the idea of identifying a domain of moral reasons: namely, that it amounts to the unwarranted double counting of a subset of our reasons. Describes two ways of thinking about reasons and choices, and explains how the discrepancy between them makes it impossible to assess an agent's motivation reliably enough to warrant moral praise or blame. Outlines the subtle changes in attitude involved in espousing amoralism, without giving up on rational choices and honest political commitments.

This book is a major early work of Japanese philosopher Wataru Hiromatsu (1933-1994). Originally published in 1972, the primary theme is overcoming the subject-object schema of modern philosophy. Hiromatsu seeks to replace this subject-object schema with what he calls the intersubjective fourfold structure, in which “the given is valid as something more to someone as someone more.” This fourfold structure is not a sum of four independent elements, but exists only as a functional relationship. From this relationist point of view, Hiromatsu develops his philosophical theory as a systematic critique of “reification,” defined as the hypostatizing misconception of a functional relation.

« Connais-toi toi-même » : en tout homme, il y a un Socrate qui sommeille. Alors, réveillons-le! Sa paternité offre un voyage à travers les siècles, au fil des évolutions de la pensée occidentale jusqu'au XXIe siècle engagé entre ombres et lumières, torrents et fleuves. À la suite de Socrate, la conscience s'ouvre et s'interroge, en découvrant les parcelles de réponses qu'elle attend, espère ou à regret désespère face aux enjeux de la civilisation. L'Occident, « de l'Atlantique à l'Oural », affronte ce défi qu'il soulève et subit à la fois, en France et dans l'Europe. Le père de la pensée occidentale entraîne l'homme en lui-même, en son être au-delà de l'apparaître, dans un combat pour la vérité au risque de sa vie. Du lointain passé au présent tourné vers l'avenir, ce voyage franchit deux étapes : la première sur la nécessité d'un retour au réalisme, et la seconde, la philosophie face aux racines chrétiennes de l'Occident, retour de l'homme réconcilié avec lui-même, promoteur de vérité, de paix et d'amitié.

This volume sheds light on the affective dimensions of self-knowledge and the roles that emotions and other affective states play in promoting or obstructing our knowledge of ourselves. It is the first book specifically devoted to the issue of affective self-knowledge.The relation between self-knowledge and human emotions is an often emphasized, but poorly articulated one. While philosophers of emotion tend to give affectivity a central role in making us who we are, the philosophical literature on self-knowledge focuses overwhelmingly on cognitive states and does not give a special place to the emotions. Currently there is little dialogue between both fields or with other philosophical traditions that have important contributions to make to this topic, such as phenomenology and Asian philosophy. This volume brings together philosophers from the relevant fields to explore two related sets of questions: First, do philosophers of emotion exaggerate the importance of our affective lives in making us who we are? Or is it philosophers of self-knowledge who misunderstand emotions? Second, what is the role of emotions in self-knowledge? What sort of self-knowledge can be secured by paying attention to our emotions?Emotional Self-Knowledge is an essential resource for researchers and advanced students working on philosophy of emotion, philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophical psychology, and phenomenology.Chapter 1 and Chapter 10 of this book are freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF at http://www.taylorfrancis.com under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.

This book provides a philosophical assessment of the idea of personhood advanced in popular self-help literature. It also traces, within academic philosophy and philosophical scholarship, a self-help culture where the self is brought forth as an object of improvement and a key to meaning, progress, and profundity. Unlike other academic treatments of the topic of self-help, this book is not primarily concerned with providing a critique of popular self-help and self-transformative practices. Rather, it is concerned with how they work to shape contemporary forms and ideals of moral personhood and are conducive to moral renegotiation and change. The book consists of two parts with somewhat different argumentative strategies. Part 1 consists of an overview and reassessment of popular self-help literature and its sociological and journalistic critics, written from a moral philosophical perspective. Part 2 opens with discussion of the current attraction, among a range of philosophers, to self-transformative themes. The chapters assess the strand of self-transformative philosophy found in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault, Pierre Hadot, Stanley Cavell, and Iris Murdoch. Finally, the book concludes with a discussion of the theme of social change and moral renegotiation in contemporary societies, which is a central but underestimated undercurrent in discussions on contemporary self-transformative practices. The book's dual perspective—on both popular self-help and self-transformative currents in philosophy—enables a cultural and moral philosophical analysis of contemporary ethical ideals of personhood, as well as reflection on the literatures available for its development. The Making of the Good Person will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in moral philosophy, history of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and literary studies.

Phénoménologie de l'action présente d'une manière très originale certains des différents aspects débattus aujourd'hui dans la philosophie de l'action. Grâce au renouvellement au sein de la philosophie de l'esprit concernant la connaissance en première personne, l'analyse de la relation entre le sujet et ses actions a connu un net regain d'intérêt ces dernières années. En mobilisant à la fois la tradition anglo-américaine et la tradition européenne, l'ouvrage se focalise davantage sur la question du moi et sur celle de l'agentivité (agency). La possibilité d'un dialogue entre ces deux traditions concernant la théorie de l'action en phénoménologie constitue l'originalité du volume. Phénoménologie de l'action presents in a very innovative way some of the different aspects debated today in the philosophy of action. Thanks to the renewal within the philosophy of mind concerning first-person knowledge, the analysis of the relation between the self and its actions has undergone a revival in recent years. Drawing from both the Anglo-American and the European tradition, this book focuses mainly on the relation between self and agency. The possibility of a dialogue between these two traditions concerning the theory of action from a phenomenological standpoint constitutes the originality of this volume.

From ancient conceptions of becoming a philosopher to modern discussions of psychedelic drugs, the concept of transformation plays a fascinating part in the history of philosophy. However, until now there has been no sustained exploration of the full extent of its role.Transformation and the History of Philosophy is an outstanding survey of the history, nature, and development of the idea of transformation, from the ancient period to the twentieth century. Comprising twenty-two specially commissioned chapters by an international team of contributors, the volume is divided into four clear parts: Philosophy as Transformative: Ancient China, Greece, India, and Rome Transformation Between the Human and the Divine: Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy Transformation After the Copernican Revolution: Post-Kantian Philosophy Treatises, Pregnancies, Psychedelics, and Epiphanies: Twentieth-Century Philosophy Each of these sections begins with an introduction by the editors. Transformation and the History of Philosophy is essential reading for students and researchers in the history of western and non-western philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, and aesthetics. It will also be extremely useful for those in related disciplines such as religion, sociology, and the history of ideas.

This book provides a philosophical analysis of the notion of selfhood that underlies identity politics. It offers a unique theory of the self that combines previous scholarly work on recognition and the phenomenology of space.The politics of identity occupy the centre of a contested terrain. Marginalised and oppressed peoples continue to seek the transformation of our shared social world and our political institutions required for their lives to be liveable. Public criticism and academic treatments of identity politics often take a disparaging view that treats it as subordinate to more general political questions about justice and the organisation of society and its institutions. This book argues that these polemics ignore the numerous ways in which all politics is concerned with matters of selfhood and identity. Through a rereading of Hegel's account of recognition as an ongoing and dynamic process that constitutes the self, it presents selves—and the categories of identity that qualify these selves—as fundamentally conditioned by the environments in which they appear before themselves and others. It also argues that we do the work of identity in public spaces—particularly digital spaces—and that these spaces shape what identities we can assume and what those identities mean. Contemporary social media technologies facilitate the production of particular forms of selfhood through the combined logics of the interface, the profile, and the post.The Politics of Recognition in the Age of Digital Spaces will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in a wide range of disciplines including political philosophy, phenomenology, philosophy of technology, sociology, political theory, and critical theory. It will also appeal to anyone with an interest in contemporary identity politics, whether as a matter of study or lived experience.

The book explores ancient interpretations and usages of the famous Delphic maxim “know yourself”. The primary emphasis is on Jewish, Christian and Greco-Roman sources from the first four centuries CE. The individual contributions examine both direct quotations of the maxim as well as more distant echoes. Most of the sources included in the book have never previously been studied in any detail with a view to their use and interpretation of the Delphic maxim. Thus, the book contributes significantly to the origin and different interpretations of the maxim in antiquity as well as to its reception history in ancient philosophical and theological discourses. The chapters of the book are linked to each other by numerous cross-references which makes it possible to compare the different views of the maxim with each other. It also helps readers to notice relationships and trajectories within the material. The explorations of the relevant sources are also set in the context of ongoing debates about the shape and nature of ancient conceptions of self and self-knowledge. The book thus demonstrates the wide variety of philosophical and theological approaches in that the injunction to know oneself could be viewed and how these interpretations provide windows into ancient discourses about self and self-knowledge.

Chinese philosophy has long recognized the importance of the body and emotions in extensive and diverse self-cultivation traditions. Philosophical debates about the relationship between mind and body are often described in terms of mind-body dualism and its opposite, monism or some kind of'holism.'Monist or holist views agree on the unity of mind and body, whereas mind-body dualists take body and mind as essentially different. Debates about mind-body dualism have become important in Chinese and comparative philosophy because of claims that there was no mind-body dualism in early China, in contrast to Western traditions. This book argues that there was an important divergence in early China between two views of the self. In one, mind and spirit are closely aligned, and are understood to rule the body as a ruler rules a state. But in the other, the person is tripartite, and mind and spirit are independent entities that cannot be reduced to a material-non-material binary. In some cases, body and spirit are even aligned in opposition to mind. A Tripartite Self addresses both philosophical and technical literatures (including evidence from Chinese excavated texts) to broaden a type of inquiry that frequently is applied only to philosophical texts. Lisa Raphals surveys this divergence and argues for the importance of a tripartite model of the person or self in early Chinese texts through the Han dynasty. The book will shed light on not only important contemporary debates of mind-body dualism within Chinese philosophy but also within East-West comparative approaches to understanding the self.

The Self, and Other Stories is an autoethnographic reflection on the value in the act of writing, illuminating the life of the researcher—in particular the researcher as human. Shepherd explores the multitudes of the academic, feminist self through expanding vocabularies of how scholars, researchers, writers, teachers, and academics can make sense of their worlds. At the intersection of international relations theory and the personal, Shepherd presents seven reflexive essays on aspects of being and knowing as she has encountered them. The essays are grounded in and inspired by her experiences as a way of asking readers to imagine how knowledge production in the social sciences might look different if we could create and hold space for different ways of writing, being, and knowing. The disciplining practices which produce our limited modes of academic expression can be encountered otherwise. She calls on us to reflect on academic subjectification across the interconnected spaces we simultaneously inhabit and produce.

This first of a two-volume work provides a new understanding of Western subjectivity as theorized in the Augustinian Rule. A theopolitical synthesis of Antiquity, the Rule is a humble, yet extremely influential example of subjectivity production. In these volumes, Jodra argues that the Classical and Late-Ancient communitarian practices along the Mediterranean provide historical proof of a worldview in which the self and the other are not disjunctive components, but mutually inclusive forces. The Augustinian Rule is a culmination of this process and also the beginning of something new: the paradigm of the monastic self as protagonist of the new, medieval worldview.In this volume, Jodra takes one of the most influential and pervasive commons experiments-Augustine's Rule-and gives us its Mediterranean backstory, with an eye to solving at last the riddle of socialism. In volume two, he will present his solution in full, as a kind of Augustinian communitarianism for today.These volumes therefore restore the unity of the Hellenistic and Judaic world as found by the first Christians, proving that the self and the other are two essential pieces in the construction of our world.

Situated in broader science-and-religion discussions, The Creation of Self is the first book-length defense of a creationist view of persons as souls. This book therefore serves as both a novel argument for God's creation of selves and as a critique of contemporary materialist and emergent-self alternatives, critically examining naturalistic views that argue for a regular, law-like process behind the emergence of personhood. Author Joshua Farris argues on the assumption that persons are fundamentally unique individuals that look more like singularities of nature, rather than material products grounded in regularity or predictability from past events. By extending the basic intuition that we are unique and mysterious individuals, Farris develops a sophisticated analytic defense of the soul that requires a sufficient explanation not found in nature but made by a Creator who has intentions and the power to bring about novel entities in the world. The Creation of Self gives philosophers, theologians, and the lay intellectual grounding for thinking about persons as religious beings. It aims to help readers understand why recent scientifically motivated objections to the soul are unsuccessful, and why we must consider a religious conception of persons as souls as a common starting point.

Seeing yourself, or an Other, and then recognizing them are activities of enormous complexity. From these processes we experience belonging, which in a bureaucratic sense this is analogous with citizenship, and in a broader sense, inclusion or exclusion. As long as identity springs from all kinds of social interactions, there exists a chance to create an inclusive community. This book will make clear, through case studies of migrants, that when peoples are perceived as possessing a radical Otherness, there is a high risk of exclusion if not aggression. In a rejection of the prevalent individualistic perspectives, this book pulls all of the scattered puzzle pieces back together. Through the process of clarifying misrecognition and its subsequent dehumanization, it will be possible to think about a shared and fairer society.

It is evident from recent political campaigns, such as that of Donald Trump, that the deployment of attention is crucial for political outcomes. Indeed, Trump's presidency came about in part due to realities that were produced by the media themselves, which required in turn the engagement of public attention. The implication is that the instability and capriciousness that is often associated with attention can be an important influence on the outcomes that are so produced. Drawing on the thought of Martin Heidegger, Lawrence Berger puts forward a new conception of attention as human presence, showing how its state determines the efficacy of public spaces in articulating and achieving visions of the common good. As politicians seek to amass power by capturing attention, citizens can engage in disciplines of attention such as mindfulness in producing a public power that is more appropriately oriented to the welfare of all. Berger argues that the practice of mindfulness can enable enhanced ontological bonds to form between individuals, which can be the basis for more stable and effective political realities. Such bonds are not given structures, but are rather contingent upon the state of attention, which comes about holistically by way of a hermeneutical circle of attention, language, and bodily understanding. This book is a valuable resource for scholars and students of philosophy of mind, political philosophy, phenomenology, and cognitive science.

Six études mettent en lumière l'importance de la significativité dans l'existence, en particulier de nos jours, au cœur d'une société postmoderne désenchantée, à la fois en recherche de sens et saturée d'indications en tous genres. Sont appelés à en témoigner des penseurs – de Heidegger à Blumenberg, en passant par Levinas et Winnicott –, mais aussi le champ de l'éthique des soins et la Daseinsanalyse de Binswanger.

Providing a solid media-philosophical groundwork, the book contributes to the theory of alterity in Performance Philosophy, while stimulating and inspiring future inquiries where studies in media, art, and literature intersect with philosophy. It collects a selective as well as productive diversity of philosophical, literary, and artistic figures of thought, attaining an exacting framework as a result of a clearly elaborated ethics of alterity, innovatively opened up by way of an aisthetics of existence: Touching upon the Aristotelian concept of aisthesis, the material, perceptual and sensory dimensions of everyday bodily existence are highlighted to move beyond what aesthetics in Modern Philosophy just specializes in, namely art and the beautiful. The notion of existence is therefore borrowed from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who understands it as something concrete and richly interrelated, so as to avoid the dualisms both of psychological processes of consciousness and of physiological mechanisms. It is thus made explicit such that the unity of body and soul is not any arbitrarily arranged connection between “subject” and “object” but, rather, that it is enacted at every instant in the movement of existence. Imaginatively then, the book puts into writing how alterity not only can be treated theoretically but can be also made accessible through writing as well as rendered relatable through reading. That is why it deals with exemplary interpersonal encounters in the lifeworld, in the arts, and in the media, which are initially thematized as intercorporeal experiences, so as to enable an approach for an ethics of alterity by way of, in particular, sites located within a phenomenology of perception oriented towards the lived body.

Auch wenn über den Verzicht neuerdings wieder viel geredet und vor allem viel gestritten wird: Es ist erstaunlich, dass er einen derart schlechten Ruf genießt. In der Geschichte der Ethik und in der Tradition der Religionen spielt der Verzicht dagegen eine ganz erhebliche Rolle. Otfried Höffe nimmt jene bemerkenswerten Defizite daher zum Anlass für eine Reihe von geistesgeschichtlichen Rückblicken, um uns an die Bedeutsamkeit und die historische Vielfalt von Formen und Verständnissen der Selbstbeschränkung zu erinnern. Vom Verzichten als Mäßigung der Leidenschaften oder als religiöse Askese über die rechtliche Einschränkung der eigenen Freiheit bis hin zur großen Verzichtsaufgabe, die wir im Angesicht von Klimawandel und Artensterben nicht ignorieren dürfen: Die kurze Geschichte des Verzichts zeigt, dass ein gelingendes Leben ohne die hohe Kunst der freiwilligen Selbstbeschränkung nicht auskommen kann. Die Ausflüge in die Philosophiegeschichte sind daher nicht bloß von historischem Interesse. Otfried Höffe geht es vielmehr um begriffliche Aufklärung – und um die Formulierung einer kleinen Philosophie des Verzichts: Lässt sich der Begriff rehabilitieren und für das gegenwärtige Denken wieder fruchtbar machen?

Gli esseri umani non nascono liberi, lo diventano, grazie agli altri. Grazie allo sguardo dell'altro possiamo vedere noi stessi, sviluppare la nostra autocoscienza, apprendere altri punti di vista, altre prospettive sul mondo. Rafforziamo la nostra identità ma al tempo stesso impariamo a relativizzarla. Nasce il nostro mondo interiore e anche il mondo sociale attorno a noi.