Search

Copyright of Turkish Studies - Social Sciences is the property of Electronic Turkish Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Tort doctrine states that breach is all about conduct. Unlike in the criminal law context, where jurors must engage in amateur mindreading to evaluate mens rea, jurors are told that they can assess civil negligence by looking only at the defendant 's external behavior. But this is false . Here I explain why, by incorporating the psychology of foresight. Foreseeability is at the heart of negligence-appearing as the primary test for duty, breach, and proximate cause. And yet, it has been called a "vexing morass and a "malleable standard" because it is so poorly understood. This Article refines and advances the construct of foresight by describing it as an epistemic mental state-similar to intent, knowledge, or recklessness. We cannot ask whether a defendant should have foreseen a risk without interrogating what they subjectively perceived, realized, or remembered at the time. Indeed, the focus on actions in negligence is misleading because unreasonable actions are not necessary for negligence liability, while a negligent mental state is. It is time for negligence doctrine to "mind" accidents. Unfortunately, when we assume that foreseeability can be assessed objectively through conduct, jurors are left rudderless to engage in hindsight bias. The phrasing of "objectively reasonable foreseeability" encourages jurors to superimpose what should have been foreseen ex post on what could have been foreseen. ex ante. Further, while the outputs of mental states may be labeled reasonable or unreasonable, some of the underlying mental states themselves cannot be. There is no such thing as objectively reasonable memory" or "objectively reasonable perception." If we are committed to basing negligence on breach, we must pay more attention to whether a particular defendant is capable of foresight. This is not about eliminating the reasonable person standard, but rather recognizing that what is reasonable is constrained by what is possible. Given these insights, I propose significant revisions to negligence doctrine. I reshuffle and simplify the prima facie elements to focus the jury's attention on the descriptive aspects of breach (i. e., whether foresight and prevention were possible in this instance) and the judge's attention on the normative aspects (whether there should be duties imposed in cases like this and whether this particular defendant should be held responsible). This proposal aims to decrease hindsight bias by requiring an assessment of the defendant's capacity for foresight before asking whether the outputs of this mental process were reasonable. My proposal brings to the surface processes that are already occurring. It has the added benefit of distinguishing the tests for duty, breach, and proximate cause, which at present overlap considerably. Because breach, proximate cause, and duty all ask whether the outcome was reasonably foreseeable, courts frequently conflate the breach analysis (which should be for the jury) with that of duty (for the judge). My proposal eliminates this confusion by defining descriptive elements that are uniquely for the jury and normative elements that are uniquely for the judge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The electric grid is the bedrock of modern society, but recent climate events have highlighted that it may be vulnerable to extreme weather. One possible explanation for the grid's climate sensitivity is that its vast, interconnected hardware is exposed to the elements and has been built to withstand historical environmental conditions. Due to climate change, however, historical data regarding temperature, precipitation, and extreme weather is no longer reliably predictive of future conditions. As a result, there exists a significant and growing divergence between the level of protection afforded to existing grid infrastructure and the degree of protection needed to withstand climate change. Despite an urgent need to proactively adapt the grid to withstand future conditions, utilities and their supervising regulatory bodies have largely failed to engage in meaningful, forward-looking climate resilience. To combat this problem, this Note offers an original proposal that seeks to introduce a forward-looking mechanism--arising out of tort law's foreseeability principle--into the utility regulatory regime to catalyze climate resilience in the sector. The foreseeability principle will effectively layer a prospective valence over the ratemaking process, thereby forcing regulators and utilities alike to confront climate change's anticipated grid impacts. Under this revamped regulatory structure, utilities that continue to rely on historic climate data will be subject to regulatory holdups during the ratemaking process and may even face legal liability; this Note hypothesizes that the very threat of such setbacks is likely to induce utilities to retire legacy practices and instead embrace forward-looking climate projections as a means of informing proactive resilience measures capable of protecting the grid in the face of climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central question in the law of proximate cause is how to divide risks into parts. The leading test of proximate cause, the foreseeability test, requires the jury to decide whether the "general type" of outcome that occurred was too improbable to be foreseeable. Before the jury can address this question, though, it has to aggregate the possible outcomes of the defendant's conduct into "general types." In effect, then, the foreseeability test requires the jury to divide the risk into parts. So does a promising alternative to the foreseeability test, Judge Posner's increased-risk test. Nobody has developed a workable, determinate method of dividing risk into parts, however. Instead, adherents of both tests have settled for telling juries vaguely to aggregate possible outcomes according to the "sort of mishap" that occurred. As a consequence, both tests are fundamentally indeterminate. This Article argues that this aggregation difficulty is solvable, though only within the framework of Judge Posner's increased-risk test. The solution lies in dividing up risks as Darwin divided up life forms--according to "community of descent." Specifically, outcomes may be situated in relation to one another (1) on the basis of their "descent" from a particular mediating event; and (2) on the basis of their non-descent from a particular extrinsic condition. This method of dividing up the risks isn't just determinate. When it's used to frame the increased-risk question--that is, when it's used to define the aggregate of possible outcomes that must be characterized by increased risk--this method of dividing risk produces intuitively satisfying answers to a wide range of proximate cause questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The possibility of autonomous-machine-caused harm generates doctrinal and theoretical challenges for assigning tort liability. With emergent capabilities, autonomous machines disrupt the structure of interpersonal rights and duties in tort law, framed by conditions of foreseeability and proximate causation. Where algorithmic processes are unintelligible, self-modifying, and unpredictable, the concern goes, algorithmic harms will be untraceable to tortious human agency. As a result, their costs will simply lie where they fall--on faultless victims. This outcome would be unfair and objectionable: A failure of tort's mechanisms of corrective justice means faultless victims would disproportionately bear the accident costs of autonomous machines. This article suggests that the doctrinal form of vicarious liability is a promising strategy to ground tort liability for autonomous-machine-caused harm. Human or corporate deployers should be held liable for tortious harm caused by autonomous machines in the course of deployment. In this account, autonomous machines constitute a novel legal category as pure legal agents without legal personhood. In reconceiving vicarious liability--and the legal classification of autonomous machines--the article seeks to promote commonsensical liability outcomes for autonomous-machinecaused harm, consistent with tort's doctrinal and theoretical structure of corrective justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The many facets of tort liability are filtered through the requirement of proximate cause, which has made the element confusing and the source of considerable controversy. Is proximate cause properly determined by the directness test or the foreseeability test, each of which has been both widely adopted and roundly criticized? Is there any defensible conception of a direct cause? Is foreseeability an adequately determinate method for limiting liability? If so, is foreseeability relevant to duty, to proximate cause, or to both elements? Disagreement about all these matters stems from the failure to fully untangle the role of proximate cause across all elements of the tort claim. In a negligence case, for example, duty determines the risks that factor into the duty to exercise reasonable care. This property implies that the duty must be limited to the risks of foreseeable harm in order for the standard of reasonable care to govern only those harms. Foreseeability for this purpose is defined by the general zones of danger or reference classes that the reasonable person would consider when estimating the likelihood of accidental harm, reducing foreseeability to a behavioral concept that is adequately determinate for resolving the issue of breach. The element of proximate cause then provides a case-specific requirement that the plaintiff's injury must be within a general category of foreseeable harms encompassed by both the tort duty and its breach-a necessary predicate for liability. The prima facie case accordingly requires the foreseeability test to establish proximate cause for the breach of a duty that is limited to the risks of foreseeable harm. Once liability has been established, the damages phase of the case requires a further inquiry to fix the full extent of compensable harm proximately caused by the tortious conduct. The foreseeability test produces inequities in the determination of damages that the directness test fairly resolves. This inquiry is structured by the uniformly adopted rule that permits full recovery for an unforeseeably large harm, such as a crushed skull, that was directly caused by a tortious force that would normally cause minor injury, such as a bump on the head. This rationale also explains why the intentional torts exclusively rely on the directness test, eliminating culpability as a confounding factor in the analysis of proximate cause. Instead of being competing formulations, the directness and foreseeability tests each address diferent components of a tort claim, explaining why each one is both widely adopted and yet roundly criticized when employed as the only method for determining proximate cause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of recent developments this article asks whether the protections offered by art.7 of the ECHR (as currently interpreted) are sllficient in respect of the criminalisation of conduct which principally takes place abroad and the extent to which domestic maximum penalties for criminal liability can be considered properly foreseeable in light of increasing cross-jurisdictional co-operation and enforcement. In particular, it argues that there is a need to give greater consideration to the impact of extra-territorial criminalisation of non-citizens and suggests that recent cases on the international enforcement ofconfiscation orders reveal a requirement for further consideration of what constitutes an "available penalty" under art.7. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The comment deals with the evaluation of (not only) Serbian law concerning taking body samples for DNA examinations. The authors share the arguments of the dissenting opinion from the judgment in question that the phrase "other medical procedures" was at that stage sufficient for such a procedure. A comparative analysis of the Polish law is also conducted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The principle of legality is one of the most fundamental principles of domestic and international criminal law. It features in some of the most prominent human rights instruments, and its application has been scrutinised by various human rights courts and international criminal tribunals. One of the principal tests used to check compliance with that principle measures the accessibility and foreseeability of the criminal law at the time of the conduct. Yet a close analysis of this test reveals a number of fundamental flaws that seem to have escaped the eyes of most commentators and practitioners. These have led to outcomes of dubious legality. In this article, I argue that those problems are serious enough to justify a revision or a substitution of that test for one which is more in line with the rationales and dictates of the legality principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Suppose that you are a doctor and that you prescribed a drug to a patient who died as a result. Suppose further that you could have known about the risks of this drug, and that you are blameworthy for your ignorance. Does the blameworthiness for your ignorance 'transfer' to blameworthiness for your ignorant action in this case? Many are inclined accept that such transfer can occur and that blameworthiness for ignorant conduct can be derivative or indirect in this way. In this paper, we motivate a new problem for transfer proponents. Extant accounts cannot satisfactorily distinguish between agents who are blameworthy for their ignorance and their resulting ignorant conduct and agents who are blameworthy for their ignorance but not for their resulting ignorant conduct. We defend a solution that we call the 'concern constraint' that clearly distinguishes these cases. Our solution is distinct from the much discussed foreseeability constraint (according to which blameworthiness transfers only when the ignorant action is foreseeable), and it is less restrictive than Holly Smith's quality of will condition (according to which blameworthiness never transfers). We argue that any account of derivative or indirect blameworthiness for ignorant action should take the concern constraint on board. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past three decades, there has been considerable interest among both researchers and the criminal justice system to reform line-up procedures to ensure eyewitness identifications are as accurate as possible. Recently, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) methodology has been adopted to analyse line-up procedures, but it has not been universally accepted in the field. This article examines the application of ROC methodology to line-up data and proposes an approach based on log-linear models as an alternative method to analyse line-up procedures. We find that log-linear models allow for non-binary classification schemes that are necessary for analysing line-up outcomes. Conditional independence relationships between variables can also be identified through a log-linear model. Log-linear models also provide a natural framework to account for multiple sources of uncertainty present in eyewitness identification data. While the ROC analysis provides valuable insight into the changes in outcomes across different decisionmaking thresholds, incorporating a log-linear analysis allows us to examine these outcomes in finer detail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mean is not necessarily the essential summary of a survey. Particularly in surveys related to taxation, many surveys are assessed at a certain number of standard deviations above or below themean. This article derives optimal sample sizes for such surveys, both with and without a finite sample correction. It also extends those results to stratified sampling, and to auditing the sample size choices of a taxation authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many legal cases require decisions about causality, responsibility or blame, and these may be based on statistical data. However, causal inferences from such data are beset by subtle conceptual and practical difficulties, and in general it is, at best, possible to identify the 'probability of causation' as lying between certain empirically informed limits. These limits can be refined and improved if we can obtain additional information, from statistical or scientific data, relating to the internal workings of the causal processes. In this article we review and extend recent work in this area, where additional information may be available on covariate and/or mediating variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The remedy of 'avoidance' under CISG is not available for every breach of contract, except for a fundamental one. Many commentators are of the view that the meaning of "fundamental breach" is vague and uncertain. The present paper analyses the dual elements of 'fundamental breach' on the basis of interpretative tools of the Convention, legislative history and an in-depth survey of judicial decisions from various countries. The paper finds that it is too drastic to say that the meaning of fundamental breach is vague but on the contrary the meaning can be refined through judicial interpretation. The paper concludes that though it will take time for case law to completely cover most situations of fundamental breach, it is clear at this stage that a number of basic principles for the determination of fundamental breach are well settled and established. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Law no. 98/2016 on public procurement provides in Chapter IV entitled Organization and conduct of the award procedure - Section 6 Qualification and selection criteria - the grounds for the exclusion of the candidate tenderer (paragraph 2). Some of these grounds may be found in the old regulation, but others take into consideration legal situations not covered by the old legislator as a basis for exclusion. These situations have already generated different ways of interpretation in practice, a circumstance that justifies the opportunity and usefulness of this approach. It should be noted that not all the reasons for exclusion shall be subject of this analysis; the content of Paragraph 2 of Section 6 of Law 98/2016 takes into account only the reasons relating to the commission or the alleged commission by the economic operator involved in the procedure of an offense belonging to those expressly mentioned in Art. 164 par. (1) letters a) - g). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A landowner's utility pipe bursts and floods the plaintiff's land. It was reasonably foreseeable that the water would cause flood damage to the plaintiff's land in case of an escape. But it was not reasonably foreseeable that the pipe would burst and, hence, that there would be an escape of water. Can the landowner be liable in nuisance? This paper explores the conceptual implications of the proposition that reasonable foreseeability of harm is an element of liability in nuisance. It argues that, if reasonable foreseeability of harm is an element of nuisance, then nuisance can no longer be thought of as a strict liability tort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Damages for breach of contract to be compensated by the debtor are based on the full compensation principle. It is now clear that the debtor is not liable for all the damages caused. The theory of the protective purpose of the contract is considered the most appropriate method of limiting damages in the event of non-performance. This theory has been subject to different interpretations by jurists in Germany and Spain, where it is used. This paper endeavours to explain how such a theory operates in both systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on current developments in judicial law, legislation, and administrative action and emergent trends in law and the legal profession in Minnesota. Topics include the court case Doe 121 v. Diocese of Winona, in which the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed claim dismissal due to insufficient pleading of foreseeability, and the court case Engstrom v. Whitebirch Inc., in which the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed claim dismissal due to insufficient pleading of damages.

The article discusses the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's efforts to limit the doctrine of equivalents in patent infringement lawsuits as of 2015, and it mentions America's Patent Act, an unforeseeability legal exception, and the concept of foreseeability estoppel.

The article discusses American tort laws and the "Restatement (Third) of Torts" legal treatise in relation to the efforts to combat sexual assaults on U.S. college campuses as of 2015, and it mentions the relationships between colleges and students, as well as negligence standards and a foreseeability legal doctrine. University laws and American courts are examined, as well as premises liability lawsuits and burdens of proof. Causation, damages, and legal duties are also assessed.

A definition of causality introduced byHalpern&Pearl, which uses structural equations, is reviewed. A more refined definition is then considered, which takes into account issues of normality and typicality, which are well known to affect causal ascriptions. Causality is typically an all-or-nothing notion: either A is a cause of B or it is not. An extension of the definition of causality to capture notions of degree of responsibility and degree of blame, due to Chockler and Halpern, is reviewed. For example, if someone wins an election 11-0, then each person who votes for him is less responsible for the victory than if he had won 6-5. Degree of blame takes into account an agent's epistemic state. Roughly speaking, the degree of blame of A for B is the expected degree of responsibility of A for B, taken over the epistemic state of an agent. Finally, the structural-equations definition of causality is compared to Wright's NESS test. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two decades of analysis have produced a rich set of insights as to how the law should apply to the Internet's peculiar characteristics. But, in the meantime, technology has not stood still. The same public and private institutions that developed the Internet, from the armed forces to search engines, have initiated a significant shift toward developing robotics and artificial intelligence. This Article is the first to examine what the introduction of a new, equally transformative technology means for cyberlaw and policy. Robotics has a different set of essential qualities than the Internet and accordingly will raise distinct legal issues. Robotics combines, for the first time, the promiscuity of data with the capacity to do physical harm; robotic systems accomplish tasks in ways that cannot be anticipated in advance; and robots increasingly blur the line between person and instrument. Robotics will prove "exceptional" in the sense of occasioning systematic changes to law, institutions, and the legal academy. But we will not be writing on a clean slate: many of the core insights and methods of cyberlaw will prove crucial in integrating robotics and perhaps whatever technology follows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the history of New Mexico tort caselaw; discusses the development of the role of foreseeability in the duty analysis; and provides guidance to lower courts and to practitioners on crafting policy arguments for the limitation of duty when appropriate.

Scenarios of underground gas pipeline failure, crater formation, dispersion of gas, explosion and subsequent fires are investigated with semi-empirical and with CFD (Computational Fluid Dynamics) modelling. In order to strengthen the accident based learning approaches present investigations are performed in the context of recent GAIL (Gas Authority of India Limited) natural gas pipeline incident occurred in India. The foreseeability of damages to lives of people and assets due to explosion overpressure and thermal radiation are assessed. The released gas is considered as slightly dense-than-air i.e. 1.5 times. Depending on the LFL (Lower Flammability Limit) of gas the dispersion diameter and heights are predicted which followed the visual evidences appropriately. The model was furthermore tested with an even denser medium and was found to be worked well there too. The estimated explosion overpressures with the standard methods and also with CFD reproduced the scenario nicely. The effects of congestion VBR (Volume Blockage Ratio) in form of vegetation on stable atmospheric boundary layer flow is analysed and its contribution towards turbulence and hazard enhancement is studied. It is found that the major source of fatalities was higher thermal radiation emitted by pool fires of methane. The estimated thermal safety distances clearly demonstrate the ignorance/under estimation of likelihood and consequence of such hazardous events. For such incidents CFD demonstrated a strong capability to assess the pre or/and post events foreseeabilities within a reasonable amount of time and with an acceptable level of accuracy meeting the industrial needs for risk analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in the 2014 case Doe 169 v. Brandon which deals with the state's tort laws, a foreseeability legal doctrine, and the determination that a church licensing body did not owe a duty to protect a minor from the intentional and tortious conduct of a third party. Negligence law and the procedural posture of the Doe 169 case are examined, along with summary judgments and legal exceptions under Minnesota law.

The article discusses several developments involving Florida's premises liability laws in the wake of the Florida Second District Court of Appeal's ruling in the 2013 case Bellevue v. Frenchy's South Beach Café Inc. which deals with what constitutes a "foreseeable crime" for the purposes of establishing premises liability. The right of invitees to demand reasonable protection against foreseeable crimes committed by third parties is mentioned, along with legal precedent and Florida criminal law.

In these pages, I seek to advance two arguments, a negative and a positive. The negative one is that leading accounts of foreseeability in duty-of-care-analysis fail to make sense of the requirement in question. And affirmatively, I shall argue that the foreseeability requirement reflects a concern for the distinctively social form of interaction between risk-creator and risk-taker, namely, that the former could form a respectful interaction with the latter. This reconstruction of the foreseeability requirement may express the view that its moral center may be a thin form of recognition between members of a liberal society. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article offers information on the judicial decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of R. v. Maybin, in which the Court examined the constitutionality of principles of causation under the criminal law of Canada. Topics discussed include the general nature of the intervening act, interpretation of the reasonable foreseeability, and the criminal code provisions.

The article focuses on accountant's liability for negligence to third parties in Georgia. Topics discussed include a claim for negligent misrepresentation brought by third parties to recover for damages caused by the accountant, Court of Appeals of Georgia case MacNerland v. Barnes addressing the traditional "privity" rule in Georgia, and cases dealing with duty owed and the foreseeability rule applied for the use of the accountants' report by an intended party.

The article discusses the limitation of liability for damages in European Contract law. Topics discussed include the damages rules within the system of the common European sales law (CSEL), the rules of European Community private law under the consumer contract law and the emergence of foreseeability in France and England. Other topics include the provision of the CESL dealing with mitigation and apportionment of damages or reduction of the creditor's claim.

The article discusses the regulators' challenge in balancing the need for flexibility with the demands of foreseeability in the context of enforcing risk regulation with criminal sanctions in Europe. Topics discussed include legal inclination in favor of flexibility, using of the notion of development risk liability in combination with prospective overruling to seek equilibrium provided by foreseeability, and idea of the principle of legal certainty (lex certa) for criminal sanctions cases.

Competition law violations typically result in damage outside the vertical chain often considered the only relevant locus of analysis.A legal reduction of damages claims to the vertical chain is in part due to a narrow interpretation of the general tort principles of causality and foreseeability.A wider interpretation of these general tort principles is proposed that would be in line with the policy goal of full compensation for any individual harmed.It would allow claims to be regulated by the merits of the economic evidence presented, thereby rendering private enforcement in line with the more economic approach followed in the public enforcement of competition law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scientific evidence is proving that toxic releases have long-term, unintended, and harmful consequences for the marine environment. Though a new paradigm is emerging in the scientific literature--one demonstrating that long-term impacts from oil spills are more significant than previously thought--legal scholars, regulators, and courts have yet to consider the law's ability to remedy long-term ecological harms. While scholars have exhaustively debated causation questions related to latent injuries for toxic torts, they have overlooked the equally important and conceptually similar causation problems of long-term damages in the natural resource context. Likewise, only a few courts have considered the standards of proving causation for natural resource damages. They have not considered long-term injuries. This Article provides a foundation for developing causation frameworks that respect the complexities of long-term ecological harms. Specifically, this Article uses scientific research to illustrate the causal difficulty of proving long-term ecological injuries. In doing so, it establishes the foreseeability of long-term injuries and the inadequacy of applying a traditional torts paradigm. Ultimately, this Article looks to toxic tort law and risk-of-injury cases for possible approaches to the causation challenges raised by long-term ecological injuries--these are challenges that, like latent toxic tort injuries, raise issues of time delay, aggregate exposure, synergistic effects, and multiple possible sources of harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author argues that there are significant reasons for pursuing solutions that are flexible and nuanced in regards to the legal aspects of second-hand asbestos exposure in America as of 2014, focusing on knowledge bases and an analysis of the article "A Continuing War With Asbestos: The Stalemate Among State Courts on Liability for Take-Home Asbestos Exposure" by Meghan E. Flinn which appears in the same issue. State tort laws, an employer's duty of care, and foreseeability are examined.

The article discusses asbestos liability in America and the nation's tort law system as of 2014, focusing on the legal rights of individuals who have been exposed to asbestos fibers. Legal cases involving medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and other toxic substances are mentioned, along with settlements and the U.S. Constitution. A Kentucky Supreme Court case involving jural rights and common law is examined. Causation, foreseeability, and a duty of care are also mentioned.

The article discusses a reported split among various state courts in America in terms of liability for take-home asbestos exposure as of 2014, focusing on nonfeasance, the relationships between plaintiffs and defendants, and the legal aspects of the foreseeability of harm. A legal duty and transparency in court opinions are mentioned, along with Section 7 of the American Law Institute's "Restatement (Third) of Torts" treatise which deals with negligence, intention, and recklessness.

The article focuses on the concept of an accident for purposes of liability insurance coverage in California. Topics discussed include the section 533 of the California Insurance Code, the standard form Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy, court case Geddes & Smith Inc. v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. Other topics include California Supreme Court case Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. and accidental death insurance and foreseeability.

The article focuses on school and campus security design in the U.S. and its importance in mitigating risks and avoiding liabilities. It discusses the inclusion of crime prevention principles in school building design, federal guidance for school safety covering emergency management and prevention of crime through environmental design. Legal concepts associated with school tragedies such as duty, foreseeability and contributory fault are given along with various court cases involving schools.

The article discusses risk management in sports and various legal issues in relation to the eight and final race of the 2010 Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA) 10K Marathon Swimming World Cup which was held in Fujairah, United Arab Emirates on October 23, 2010, focusing on the death of American swimmer Fran Crippen. The foreseeability and assumption of the risk legal doctrines are mentioned, along with negligence and heatstroke-related injuries. Swimming safety is also examined.