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This study examined the effectiveness of post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism policies in preventing terror attacks and reducing casualties against American targets within and outside the United States. Monthly data on terrorism incidents from July 1981 through December 2020 were obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (N = 462). The results of monthly interrupted time-series analyses showed that within the United States, after the 9/11 attacks, the number of attacks, the number of successful attacks, and the successful attack rate statistically significantly decreased in the first month following 9/11; then, no significant increase was observed in the trend of those outcomes. Outside the United States, after the 9/11 attacks, the trend of the number of successful attacks, the number of victims, the number of nonfatal victims, and the victim rate statistically significantly decreased. The results suggest that post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism policies are effective both domestically and internationally. These findings and their policy implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intensity of the threat of terrorism, previously considered only as a potential event, is now increasing. The greatest consequence of the impact of terrorism as an asymmetric threat is its psychological dimension. Its negative impact manifests itself in the reduction of the sense of security in society, rather than in society’s actual deterioration. This often leads to a change in voting preferences in subsequent elections in a given country, and in the long run, can also lead to a reallocation of resources in a given state, changing its development prospects. The article categorizes terrorist phenomenon and their asymmetric threat factors, discussing the special nature of each threat. The authors found that terrorism also factors into the security considerations of a state. In the cases examined, a synergy effect occurs, caused by the many transnational entities responding to the emergence of this threat, numbers which continue to grow.

The intensity of the threat of terrorism, previously considered only as a potential event, is now increasing. The greatest consequence of the impact of terrorism as an asymmetric threat is its psychological dimension. Its negative impact manifests itself in the reduction of the sense of security in society, rather than in society's actual deterioration. This often leads to a change in voting preferences in subsequent elections in a given country, and in the long run, can also lead to a reallocation of resources in a given state, changing its development prospects. The article categorizes terrorist phenomenon and their asymmetric threat factors, discussing the special nature of each threat. The authors found that terrorism also factors into the security considerations of a state. In the cases examined, a synergy effect occurs, caused by the many transnational entities responding to the emergence of this threat, numbers which continue to grow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes a unique approach to the scenario where a resident terrorist group in a (fragile) developing nation poses a terrorism threat at home and abroad. The host developing nation's proactive countermeasures against the resident terrorist group not only limits terrorism at home and abroad, but also bolsters regime solidity or stability at home. A two-stage game is presented in which the developed country takes a leadership role to institute a tax-subsidy combination to discourage (encourage) proactive measures at home (abroad) in stage 1. Stage 2 involves both nations' counterterrorism choices under alternative stage-1 public-policy packages. Unlike the extant literature, we explore corner and interior solutions in both stages based on the terrorists' targeting preferences and the host nation's regime-solidity preferences. Surprisingly, the developed nation may profit from policy packages that reduce global counterterrorism while raising global terrorism. That outcome and others involve engineered counterterrorism burden shifting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spite of the growing amount of literature published on terrorism over the past 20 years, counter-terrorism is rarely considered as a subject of research by itself. Empirical or data-driven research on counter-terrorism policy is relatively rare, and theoretical approaches are even scarcer. This article first reflects on the seeming absence of ‘counter-terrorism studies’ (contrasting with the thriving ‘terrorism studies’). Then, it suggests studying counterterrorism policymaking through the lens of public policy theory. This approach offers innovative insights to our understanding of counter-terrorism and opens new horizons for the development of a theory of counter-terrorism policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the creation of the homeland security bureaucracy following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It examines how threats to the country's security have evolved since 2011, and urges reforms to counter the evolving threats. Topics discussed include U.S. President George W. Bush's creation of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the Homeland Security Council, the creation of the federal Department of Homeland Security, and the passage of the Homeland Security Act.

Recent years have seen an emerging consensus on the important role non-judicial actors can play in protecting rights, and the potential benefits of integrating the compliance with constitutional standards into the legislative process. However, the study of actual practices of pre-enactment rights scrutiny has highlighted the need for deeper analysis of the factors that ultimately determine the extent to which rights considerations are effectively taken into account in policy design. The three case studies in this symposium contribute to the growing empirical literature on non-judicial constitutional review. Each article follows a particular counterterrorism legislation process and analyzes the ways in which consideration of rights effected or failed to effect policy design. These nuanced and empirically grounded perspectives on what rights review in the policymaking process actually entails help point out mechanisms that positively affect the ability to create proportionate policy, while documenting barriers at both the individual and organizational levels that can prevent rights from being afforded their optimal weight in the process. This introduction presents the main comparative insights arising from the three case studies in the symposium. The first point relates to the identity of and dynamic between the actors who engage with rights in the process, particularly the interaction between political and bureaucratic actors and its effect on the nature of the rights discourse and its impact. The second point characterizes three types of stages in the policy process—stages of deliberation, evaluation, and justification—and demonstrates how the nature of engagement with rights differs at each stage in terms of substance, scope, and influence. The third and final point relates to the ramifications of the layered nature of policymaking for the possibility of truly engaging with considerations of rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the institutions, procedures, and mechanisms of non-judicial rights review in Germany, focusing on the policy field of national security. Although there is currently a fruitful constitutional debate about the virtues and vices of non-judicial review in the Anglo-Saxon legal world, this debate has virtually gone unnoticed in German scholarship, and the role of political actors in protecting fundamental rights is neglected. This article studies how rights considerations affect the making of antiterrorism policy in Germany and what mechanisms exist in the legislative process to ensure the creation of rights-respecting antiterrorism policy. It is methodologically designed as a case study and focuses on two controversial pieces of legislation: the Data Retention Act and the Anti-Terror Database Act. The article reveals that Germany features a bureaucratic model of rights review in which rights issues are primarily negotiated between the two constitutional ministries—the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior—which are mutually entangled in an institutionalized competitive relationship. This model complements the German strong-form model of judicial review and has the effect that the role of rights is mostly mediated through the Constitutional Court's case law and the prospect of judicial review. The article further demonstrates that these non-judicial rights-review processes are surrounded by a legalistic and rather formalistic political culture that is not conducive to a principled and deliberative engagement with fundamental rights. Overall, rights are prominently considered and clearly have a constraining effect, however, often ultimately recede when weighed against the objective of ensuring collective security in the wake of the threat of terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines persuasive statements by Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump involving appeals to national identity as a rhetorical foundation for anti-terrorism policy since 9/11. Their specific rhetorical methods have included the use of memorable catchphrases, alliteration, metaphorical framing, and contrast between values of the United States and those of the terrorists. President Bush focused on rallying the nation's response against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, identifying the U.S. with "freedom itself" and invoking the phrase "War on Terror." President Obama emphasized the importance of the nation's values while denouncing the Bush administration's torture of terrorism suspects and extolling American values when announcing that U.S. forces killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of the terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks. In contrast to his predecessors, who explicitly stated that the U.S. was not at war with Islam, President Trump has tended to invoke anti-Muslim sentiment in his anti-terrorism rhetoric and his immigration policies. The presidential statements presented justifications for the actions of the Chief Executives and reflected their priorities in directing the "War on Terror". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses various aspects of the New Zealand legal system's response to the 15 March Christchurch mosques attack. It also considers New Zealand's response to the attack from the perspective of the academic literature on the policymaking process and argues that the response to date has been modest and cannot be characterised as a knee-jerk reaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article delves into the persistent continuity in U.S. counterterrorism policy post-9/11, drawing parallels to a comedic sketch's repetitive dinner routine. It examines the strategies of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, highlighting their shared commitment to externalizing the terrorism threat through military actions, drone strikes, Guantanamo detentions, and surveillance, attributing this consistency to American strategic culture.

State-sponsored cyberattacks are on the rise. With the continually growing presence of automated and autonomous technologies in our lives, the ability to harm individuals from behind a keyboard is becoming an increasingly plausible and desirable option for foreign states seeking to target persons abroad. Those particularly vulnerable to such attacks include political dissidents, activists, and any individuals deemed to be an enemy of the regime employing such cyberattacks. In recent years, U.S. nationals victimized by foreign state-sponsored cyberattacks have attempted to sue their foreign-state cyberattackers in U.S. courts under the traditional exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), to no avail. Commentators have offered a few suggestions to help these victims overcome the barrier of sovereign immunity, including an alternative interpretation of the FSIA's noncommercial tort exception or a cyberattack exception amendment to the FSIA. This Note, however, presents a more concrete and accessible solution: the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA). The recently passed JASTA creates the latest exception to the FSIA, which differs from the other exceptions in two important ways: (1) it does not require an alleged tort to have taken place in the United States, and (2) it does not require the foreign state being sued to have been officially designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the U.S. government. Thus, under JASTA, many U.S. victims of state-sponsored cyberattacks should be able to overcome sovereign immunity and attain justice against their foreign-state cyberattackers in U.S. courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The likelihood that anyone outside a war zone will be killed by an Islamist extremist terrorist is extremely small. In the United States, for example, some six people have perished each year since 9/11 at the hands of such terrorists—vastly smaller than the number of people who die in bathtub drownings. Some argue, however, that the incidence of terrorist destruction is low because counterterrorism measures are so effective. They also contend that terrorism may well become more frequent and destructive in the future as terrorists plot and plan and learn from experience, and that terrorism, unlike bathtubs, provides no benefit and exacts costs far beyond those in the event itself by damagingly sowing fear and anxiety and by requiring policy makers to adopt countermeasures that are costly and excessive. This article finds these arguments to be wanting. In the process, it concludes that terrorism is rare outside war zones because, to a substantial degree, terrorists don't exist there. In general, as with rare diseases that kill few, it makes more policy sense to expend limited funds on hazards that inflict far more damage. It also discusses the issue of risk communication for this hazard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of research on terrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE) has increasingly questioned the lack of attention to—and myths around—women involved in extremist and political violence, while other research has drawn attention to racial and religious stereotypes that affect national security policies and practices worldwide. While Canada is often heralded as a global leader in multiculturalism and gender equality, the nation's national security sector still faces significant challenges around implicit biases related to race and gender. This study asks whether gender and racial stereotypes impeding counterterrorism and CVE in other countries are also affecting policies and practices in Canada. Using twenty-six in-depth interviews with practitioners, police officers, academics, and government officials from seven major cities across Canada, this paper argues that persistent gender and racial stereotypes are indeed a key challenge impeding Canada's efforts to adequately address radicalization into and disengagement from extremist violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following 9/11 the Australian government instituted an unprecedented raft of counter-terrorism measures, which introduced both preventative mass surveillance and pre-crime offences. We suggest that this development represents part of a broader turn in the West towards a "militant democratic" approach to countering violent extremism that, whilst not directly targeting Muslims in name, does so in practice, and has had negative unintended consequences for Muslim diaspora communities. To support our claim we draw on 23 interviews with Muslim youths in Melbourne. In doing so we utilise Ghassan Hage's application of misinterpellation to frame our analysis. We found that Muslim Australians are retreating into their ethno-religious identities as a result of a feeling of misrecognition. We also found that a climate of fear and anxiety is leading to self-censorship and that there was a sense of disconnect between the current leadership and Muslim youth, and that as a result government consultation should extend beyond Muslim peak bodies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Literature on Canada‐United States (US) counter‐terrorism (CT) cooperation from the early 2000s presumed that Canadian CT policy was driven by US security imperatives and fear, leaving little room for Canada to develop its own path in fighting terrorism. It presumed that: the Canadian government was more worried about the US reaction to terrorism than terrorism itself; Canadian security policy sought to be "separate but cooperative"; and Canadian policy was informed by "wise" understandings of the US. We argue these assumptions no longer hold. Since 2011, with the rise of the Islamic State and foreign fighter activity, the Canadian government took independent steps to address national security concerns in a multilateral environment. We use process tracing to track evolutions in the Passenger Protect Program (Canada's "no‐fly list" policy), showing how Canada has increasingly asserted agency in response to violent extremism. It suggests the prior scholarly consensus on the US role in Canadian CT policy must be rethought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has now been over 15 years since Canada enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act, codifying what we think of today as Canada's anti-terrorism criminal laws. The authors set out to canvass how these provisions have been judicially interpreted since their inception through an empirical analysis of court decisions. After exploring how courts have settled initial concerns about these provisions with respect to religious and expressive freedoms, the authors suggest that courts' interpretations of Canada's terrorism offences still leave us with many questions, particularly with respect to the facilitation and financing offences. The authors explore these questions and speculate about future challenges that may or may not be successful with the hopes of providing guidance to prosecutors and defence lawyers working in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the inadequacy of the security regulations implemented by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to protect nuclear facilities from terrorist attacks. Consequences of the destruction of nuclear facilities by terrorist attacks; Controversy on the maximum number of external attackers against which reactor owners must provide protection; Information on how the NRC responded to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

This article analyses the European Union's response to the threat of the 'returning foreign fighter' (referred to with increasing frequency as the 'foreign terrorist fighter'), arguing that it has been characterized by a move to (re)frame migration and border control as essential aspects of EU counter-terrorism policy. The article offers three important observations on the significance of this move. First, it critiques the way in which the EU's response to this problem is based upon and reinforces a narrow understanding of returning foreign fighters. Second, it argues that the EU has invoked the threat from returning foreign fighters not with the sole intention of preventing terrorism but rather as part of the ongoing securitization of migration and the EU border. Third, it suggests that the threat from returning foreign fighters has been invoked as a way of further legitimizing the EU's emerging role as a security actor and its embrace of preemptive security practice. The article argues throughout that the move to construct the returning foreign fighter issue in this way has important political and social implications for all categories of migrant, with migrant populations now deemed a potential source of terrorist threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explore the politics of counterterrorism in the UK. It argues that for a number of reasons, counterterrorism policy has been separated off from other policy areas and seen as securitised, exceptional or just different. The paper argues that such a separation from "normal" politics is problematic, both conceptually and empirically. It argues that much can be gained by considering counterterrorism policy through the lenses, concepts and debates which feature in other areas of British politics. The paper then examines two such lenses/debates – depoliticisation and neo-liberalism. An argument is developed that counterterrorism policy is not, in the main, depoliticised, but rather overt, politicised and visible. This prominence, it is argued, is due to the ways in which neo-liberalism has reduced many of the traditional roles of the state. Drawing on the work of Wacquant and Hall, the paper argues that in the absence of such traditional roles, counterterrorism offers the state an opportunity to perform its own "stateness", to visibly display its sovereign power in a context of ever more (self-imposed) diminished powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the enforcement terror and agitational terror in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Topics covered include the Israeli definition of terrorism that clashes with that of the terrorist organization Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, the Hamas perspective on non-state violence that gets at another important angle of the logomachy, and the approach of the U.S. government to combatting terrorism.

This overview examines critically the post-9/11 empirical literature on terrorism. Major contributions by both economists and political scientists are included. We focus on five main themes: the changing nature of terrorism, the organization of terrorist groups, the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies, modern drivers or causes of terrorism, and the economic consequences of terrorism. In so doing, we investigate a host of questions that include: How do terrorist groups attract and retain members? What determines the survival of terrorist groups? Is poverty a root cause of terrorism? What counterterrorism measures work best? In the latter regard, we find that many counterterrorism policies have unintended negative consequences owing to attack transference and terrorist backlash. This suggests the need for novel policies such as service provision to counter some terrorist groups' efforts to provide such services. Despite terrorists' concerted efforts to damage targeted countries' economies, the empirical literature shows that terrorism has had little or no effect on economic growth or GDP except in small terrorism-plagued countries. At the sectoral level, terrorism can adversely affect tourism and foreign direct investment, but these effects are rather transient and create transference of activities to other sectors, thus cushioning the consequences. (JEL F21, F52, H56, K42, Z31) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, counter-terrorism legislation has been argued to be globally focused on a so called 'suspect community': the 'Muslim community'. The media, politicians and scholars speak about a new wave of terrorism where 'Islamic' is a common key denominator. Critical research, so far predominantly focused on the United Kingdom, has pointed at unintended consequences arising from political discourse in which a 'suspect community' is constructed, for society as a whole and the 'suspect community' in particular. Building on this research, this study analyses if and how Muslims are also constructed as a 'suspect community' in Dutch political discourse on terrorism in the period 2004-2015. The analysis shows that political discourse in the Netherlands has shifted significantly in this period. Whereas until 2011, terrorism was framed as a problem that originates in society and that is to be solved for society as a whole, it is currently seen as a problem that originates in Islam and which needs to be addressed by the 'Muslim community'. All members of that 'Muslim community' are now considered as potentially 'suspect' when they do not openly and explicitly adhere to Western values and take action to distance themselves from the 'Jihadist enemy'. Further societal implications of this discourse, in which the 'Muslim community' is constructed as a 'suspect community,' are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Saggar's article is concerned with the use of evidence by the UK policy community to tackle Islamist-inspired terrorism. It focuses on how evidence for such terrorism is generated, interpreted and organized, in particular pinpointing the challenges of reliability and prediction facing those with responsibility for tackling terrorism and its associated causes. Counter-terrorism policy is heavily exposed to risks of bias and distortion, but it is also vulnerable to various kinds of institutional group-think and vested interests. This article scrutinizes three such aspects of counter-terrorism evidence-based policymaking. First, there are imperfections in the evidence base, mostly arising from data limitations and practical shortcomings. These include factual gaps in knowledge, difficulties in comparing evidence about Muslims with non-Muslims, methodological weaknesses and difficulties in measuring profoundly subjective feelings about alienation and grievance. Second, the scope of the problem to which policy is addressed (and the policy paradigms that are alluded to) shape the priorities placed on the evidence base. How much weight should be given to evidence about the narrative of oppression or dissent used by extremists? Background oppositional identities are extensively researched and yet policymakers may choose to concentrate instead on factors in the foreground that have to do with actual violent conspiracies. Third, important nuances in the evidence–policy nexus arise from the implicit generalizations that are held by policymakers. Evidence describing the problem of terrorism is better accompanied by an appreciation of (and perhaps evidence about) the behavioural situation of decision-makers and decision-making structures. This involves trade-offs, bargaining and accommodations to carry different constituencies, and has a bearing on the kind of evidence that is used in counter-terrorism. Saggar closes with a discussion of the above distinctions, and concludes that there is a risk of naivety in evidence-based policymaking that is not alive to the politics of radicalization and extremism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several studies have covered wide-ranging features of terrorist groups and organization from both a state-centric and a strictly group analysis perspective. Rather than offering insights to determine the 'nature' of these forms of violence, this article focuses on states' perception and process of construction of terrorism based on allegations of being criminals, religious extremists or psychologically disturbed people. It does so by reconstructing the determinants of the way French policy-makers have understood, communicated and approached the terrorist enemy since the 9/11 attacks. More than 150 documents, including parliamentary debates and strategic documents, have been analysed so as to understand the evolution of the image of the threat, its connection to crime and the political implications of this representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminologists and terrorism specialists alike have conducted research on the deterrent effect of policies; however, to date, only criminologists have thoroughly examined the associated displacement of crime and diffusion of benefits. Using data from the Eco-Incidents Database, this study first examines the deterrent effect of government efforts targeting animal rights and environmental terrorism over several years. Next, it extends this application by examining nonterrorist actions by both terrorist groups and nonterrorist groups to see if deterrent actions have any unintended consequences. Results show no evidence of displacement, but rather that several government actions evidenced a diffusion of benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of September 11 attacks, China has not been immune to the global trend ofdestructive terrorism. However, China's perceptions of terrorism and legal responses to it greatly diverge from those of other countries. This Article first seeks to understand the cause, source, and impact of terrorist threats in China, known as "Three Evils"--terrorism, extremism, and separatism, through a critical inquiry of the country's ethnic and religious policies. It then proceeds to delineate China's legal framework for combating the "Three Evils " to explore the cultural characteristics of the government's approach against these rising threats. Tracing the evolution of the country's counter-terrorism laws and policies, this Article argues that China has developed an operational infrastructure composed of four strands to fight terrorism: crackdown, criminalization, control, and cooperation. This framework of "four Cs" operates within a vertically coordinated system by deploying diverse strategies and measures to regulate terrorism-related acts according to their level of severity and risk. While crackdown and criminalization serve mainly as reactive responses to terrorist violence through repression and retribution, control and cooperation are largely used as pre-emptive instruments to prevent substantial terrorist acts through incapacitation and community policing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK Government's PREVENT strategy to counter radicalisation and extremism has been the subject of criticism. Concerns arise over clarity of purpose, clarity of terminology used and potential human rights impacts. Where the policy engages with schools, one human right potentially engaged is the right of parents to transfer their religious beliefs to their children. This paper looks at how PREVENT risks negatively impacting on this right. It proposes a way that this risk can be reduced by adopting a proactive approach to the Government's security concerns which is centred on human rights education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author offers insights on the religious aspects of the Prevent counter-terrorism strategy of the British government. Topics discussed include the need for the government to consider the religious beliefs and prejudices of individuals, the response of the Muslim community to the May 2017 Manchester Arena terrorist attack in England, and the rejection of all forms of extremism in the teachings of Islam.

The author offers insights on the religious aspects of the Prevent counter-terrorism strategy of the British government. Topics discussed include the need for the government to consider the religious beliefs and prejudices of individuals, the response of the Muslim community to the May 2017 Manchester Arena terrorist attack in England, and the rejection of all forms of extremism in the teachings of Islam.

This article explores the construction of extremism in media discourse, the factors driving specific constructions and the implications of these constructions for counterterrorism policy. We contend that extremism has predominantly and increasingly been framed as a security issue. This article explores the implications of this practice through the framework of securitisation. We measure the average intensity of security framing in 38,616 articles found in three major US newspapers, New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Los Angeles Times, between 20 January 1993 and 19 January 2017 comprising the Clinton, Bush and Obama presidencies, and look at factors influencing the shift in intensity over time. Through our analysis, we show that it is possible to return to a pre-9/11 discourse but that the confluence of real-world events and the strategic choices of political actors have so far prevented this from fully occurring. We then explore the effect of securitisation on public perceptions of the threat from terrorism, finding that increases in the intensity of security framing artificially increases the public's worry about becoming a victim of terrorism. We conclude by discussing implications for the communication of counterterrorism policy and the requirements for an after, after 9/11 approach [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]