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Chan Chi Yuen., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 246-265)., s in English and Chinese., Acknowledgements --- p.i, Table of Contents --- p.iii, p.vii, Chapter Chapter 1: --- Politics of Political Accountability in Hong Kong 一 The Research Puzzle and Questions --- p.1, Chapter 1.1 --- "Research Puzzle: Different Conception of ""Political Accountability""?" --- p.1, Chapter 1.2 --- Research Questions and Design --- p.4, Chapter 1.3 --- Significance of the Study --- p.6, Chapter Chapter 2: --- The Concept of Accountability - the Normative and Theoretical Issues --- p.8, Chapter 2.1 --- Accountability - Ideals and Actualities --- p.8, Chapter 2.2 --- Why Political Accountability? The Ideal of Rendering Account --- p.10, Chapter 2.2.1 --- The need of limited government --- p.10, Chapter 2.2.2 --- Concept of Accountability - a Kind of Political Control --- p.15, Chapter 2.2.3 --- "Rendering Account - Information, Reason and Sanctions" --- p.16, Chapter 2.3 --- Representation and Accountable Government: a Comparative Approach --- p.20, Chapter 2.4 --- The Desirability of Accountability - the Tactful Balance --- p.25, Chapter 2.5 --- The Limitation of Accountability - Informational Barrier --- p.34, Chapter Chapter 3: --- The Concept of Accountability 一 the Organizational Issues --- p.37, Chapter 3.1 --- Structural Components of Accountability --- p.37, Chapter 3.2 --- The Formal Organizational Components of Democratic Accountability --- p.40, Chapter 3.3 --- Vertical and Horizontal Accountability --- p.43, Chapter 3.4 --- Typology of Accountability --- p.46, Chapter 3.4.1 --- Classical dichotomy of political and administrative accountability --- p.46, Chapter 3.4.2 --- Political Accountability ´ؤ Vertical Accountability Agents --- p.49, Chapter 3.4.2.1 --- Elections/ Electoral sanctions --- p.51, Chapter 3.4.2.2 --- Other Popular Mechanisms --- p.57, Chapter 3.4.2.2.1 --- Pressure groups --- p.57, Chapter 3.4.2.2.2 --- Mass media --- p.60, Chapter 3.4.2.2.3 --- Political party --- p.62, Chapter 3.4.3 --- Political Accountability - Horizontal Accountability Agents --- p.63, Chapter 3.4.3.1 --- Accountability to Legislature --- p.63, Chapter 3.4.3.2 --- Presidential and Parliamentary Visions --- p.63, Chapter 3.4.3.3 --- Political accountability in British Ministerial System - the importance of Constitutional Conventions --- p.65, Chapter 3.4.3.3.1 --- Individual responsibility --- p.68, Chapter 3.4.3.3.2 --- Collective Responsibility --- p.69, Chapter 3.4.3.3.3 --- "Parliamentary Questions, Debates and Standing Committee" --- p.71, Chapter 3.4.4 --- Legal Accountability - Horizontal Accountability Agent --- p.74, Chapter 3.5 --- The Impact of New Public Management --- p.76, Chapter 3.6 --- Accountability in Today's Democratic Governance - a Convoluted Model --- p.82, Chapter 3.7 --- The Relevance to Hong Kong --- p.84, Chapter Chapter 4: --- The Principal Officials Accountability System - a Departure from the Colonial Legacy --- p.88, Chapter 4.1 --- Pre-POAS political situation of Hong Kong --- p.89, Chapter 4.2 --- The POAS Reform ´ؤ the Details and its Implications --- p.93, Chapter 4.2.1 --- "Ministerization of Bureaucratic Governance, Politicization of Administrative Governance" --- p.94, Chapter 4.2.2 --- Preservation of Civil Service Neutrality --- p.97, Chapter 4.2.3 --- Restructuring of the Executive Council --- p.99, Chapter Chapter 5: --- Structural Deficit of the POAS --- p.102, Chapter 5.1 --- The POAS: from Accountability Deficit to Structural Deficit --- p.103, Chapter 5.2 --- Institutional logic of the POAS - Centralization of Policy-making Power --- p.103, Chapter 5.3 --- Lack of vertical Sanctioning Mechanism --- p.105, Chapter 5.3.1 --- Election of the CE --- p.105, Chapter 5.3.2 --- Dual Accountability --- p.107, Chapter 5.3.3 --- Appointment of the Principal Officials --- p.110, Chapter 5.4 --- Horizontal Accountability and Lack of Constitutional Convention --- p.112, Chapter 5.5 --- Risk of Politicization of the Civil Service --- p.117, Chapter 5.6 --- Lack of Informational Accountability --- p.120, Chapter 5.7 --- Conclusions --- p.123, Chapter Chapter 6: --- Path Dependence and the Politics of Political Accountability in Hong Kong --- p.127, Chapter 6.1 --- Historical Institutionalism and Social Constructivism - Reciprocal Relationship between Structure and Agency --- p.128, Chapter 6.2 --- Endogenous Context for the POAS: Path of Hong Kong Politics --- p.130, Chapter 6.3 --- POAS: Two Phases of Institutional Evolution --- p.134, Chapter 6.3.1 --- Phase 1 - Birth of the POAS: Intra-elite Struggle for Dominance --- p.135, Chapter 6.3.1.1 --- The Legacy of Bureaucratic Government --- p.135, Chapter 6.3.1.2 --- The Internal Tension: “Presidential´ح Leadership vs Meritocracy --- p.137, Chapter 6.3.1.3 --- The Erosion of Performance Legitimacy of the Civil Service --- p.139, Chapter 6.3.1.4 --- The POAS: Reassertion of Executive Dominance --- p.140, Chapter 6.3.2 --- Phase 2 - Vicissitude under the POAS: Societal Struggle for Norms of Accountability --- p.141, Chapter 6.3.2.1 --- "The Nature of “Political Responsibility""" --- p.142, Chapter 6.3.2.2 --- The Lack of Institutional Guidance in Hong Kong --- p.145, Chapter 6.3.2.3 --- The Structural Divide of Mass and Elitist Politics --- p.146, Chapter 6.3.2.4 --- The Societal Tension: Efficiency vs Populist Vision of Accountability --- p.148, Chapter 6.4 --- Illustration: 3 Political Incidents --- p.150, Chapter 6.4.1 --- Penny Stocks Incident: the Debate on the Extent of Vicarious Responsibility --- p.150, Chapter 6.4.1.1 --- The Incident/ --- p.150, Chapter 6.4.1.2 --- Vicarious Responsibility --- p.152, Chapter 6.4.1.3 --- The Cleavage in the Legislature --- p.154, Chapter 6.4.1.4 --- Inquiry Panel and the Report --- p.158, Chapter 6.4.2 --- Car Buying Scandal: the Fight on the Severity of Personal Misconduct --- p.162, Chapter 6.4.2.1 --- The Incident --- p.163, Chapter 6.4.2.2 --- The Turning Point --- p.169, Chapter 6.4.2.3 --- Vote of No-confidence --- p.172, Chapter 6.4.3 --- Sloppy Handling of SARS: the Delineation of Political and Administrative Responsibility between Principal Officials and Civil Servants --- p.174, Chapter 6.4.3.1 --- The Incident --- p.174, Chapter 6.4.3.2 --- Administrative and Political Blunders --- p.176, Chapter 6.4.3.3 --- Post-SARS quest for Accountability before the July 1 Demonstration --- p.180, Chapter 6.5 --- Conclusions --- p.186, Chapter Chapter 7: --- Reconstruction of Conception: Interviews with Political Elites --- p.190, Chapter 7.1 --- The Importance of Political Conception --- p.190, Chapter 7.2 --- Methodological Issues of Elite Interview as a Research Method --- p.194, Chapter 7.3 --- The Interviews --- p.202, Chapter 7.4 --- POAS and the Conception of Political Accountability --- p.206, Chapter 7.4.1 --- Defining Political Responsibility --- p.206, Chapter 7.4.2 --- Accountability Mechanism --- p.209, Chapter 7.4.3 --- Conflicts of Representation --- p.215, Chapter 7.4.4 --- Criteria of Assessment --- p.221, Chapter 7.5 --- Conclusions --- p.225, Chapter Chapter 8: --- "Conclusions: Accountability System without Substance, Spirit and Opportunity to Maturate" --- p.227, Chapter 8.1 --- """Accountability without Democracy""? Or Something More?" --- p.227, Chapter 8.2 --- Politics of Political Accountability - the Wider Context --- p.228, Chapter 8.3 --- The POAS: Accountability System without Substance and Spirit --- p.231, Chapter 8.4 --- Politics of Accountability 一 Accountability System without the Opportunity to Maturate --- p.234, Reference --- p.239, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896447, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

The agency model is a form of government organization that is quickly gaining credibility throughout bureaucratic circles. The Government of Manitoba has subsequently embarked on its own agency model program; it has created 16 Special Operating Agencies (SOAs) and has granted these agencies certain managerial freedoms that allow them to function in a more “business-like” manner. In effect, the reforms have replaced direct ministerial control with operating charters, business plans, annual reports and performance measurement designed to keep ministers apprised of agency activities without intruding into the daily workings of the agency. Critics contend that this arrangement represents erosion of traditional principles of ministerial responsibility, and base their criticism on similar agency model programmes implemented by governments in Great Britain, New Zealand and Canada. This thesis reviews the Manitoba SOA initiative and pays specific attention to the measures implemented by the Government of Manitoba to secure ministerial responsibility. Drawing on interviews with relevant agency figures, the dynamics of the new reporting procedures will be considered with particular attention paid to ministers' ability to answer before the Legislative Assembly, agency officials compliance with roles and responsibilities outlined in operating charters, and perceptions of performance measurement as tools of prospective and retrospective control. The thesis will argue that the agency model has been cautiously applied in Manitoba thereby muting concerns associated with the loss of accountability. However, the thesis will argue that several critical components of the SOA model have not been implemented to the extent that creators of the SOA model had envisioned, and that such lapses could result in confusion should the SOA project be expanded in the future.