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Problems of understanding of criminal law protection of competition repersent a very topical subject for research. There is no uniform opinion in the criminal law doctrine on this point. However, the emergence of a common concept of competition protection could contribute, inter alia, to a more effective response to cartels, which pose a threat to the economic security of the country, other illegal forms of restricting competition. All available ideas of researchers concerning the need for independent criminal law protection of competition can be divided into two categories: 1) some authors differentiate a separate group of crimes agains competition; 2) others include them in a general or specific group of business crimes. The article substantiates the author’s opinion concerning the issues of recognition of competition as an independent object of criminal law protection and the problems arising due to it. The author has tried to find answers to existing in criminal law issues of protection of competition in other areas of knowledge and came to the conclusion that they can be justified by an economic approach to the analysis of concepts of “competition” and related to it both economic and legal processes and phenomena. By studying scientific economic views, the views that have been developed in the science of criminal law can be both confirmed and refuted. In addition, a cross-sectoral legal approach can help to address individual issues. Thus, the science of constitutional, criminal, civil and competition law, as well as law enforcement in these areas have developed and strengthened a number of ideas with regard to the regulation of economic (business) relations and their protection. One of them is based on the good faith of economic actors. An integral part of of activities of such actors is competition. The author concludes that the necessity of criminal law protection of competition is predetermined by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and other normative legal acts, and suggests that we understand fair competitive relations as an object of criminal law protection.

The subject of this research is the legislation and law enforcement in the area of criminal-legal protection of competition in the United States. The questions of counteracting encroachment upon competition alongside protection of rights of economic entities and consumers in case of unfair competition are one of the most relevant in the world. According to separate assessment, the U. S. antitrust legislation is recognized as most efficient. Its establishment, development, and application contributed to emergence of the generally accepted principles of protection of competition, such as per se and the rule of reason. Modern approaches towards restraint of violation of antitrust legislation determined the new trends in development of both, normative acts and judicial practice. Criminal legal protection of competition in the United States is characterized by strict prohibitions, high sanctions, presence of criminal-procedural authority of Antitrust Administration of the U. S. Ministry of Justice, as well as program of mitigation of responsibility for cartels. The goal of study lies in the analysis of legislation and law enforcement in the area of protection of competition in the United States for assessing the existing experience. The novelty consists in proposal of the author to take into account the U. S. experience with regards to countering encroachment upon competition, which can be valuable particularly in revision of the Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, improvement of the program of mitigation of responsibility for cartels, systematization of the compositions of crime related to unfair competition, cooperation of anti-monopoly agencies and law enforcement authorities. The research results can be used in the work of Federal Anti-Monopoly Service, as well as educational process and scientific activity.

Natural resources are not homogeneous in nature, therefore economic analysis of extractive industry fundamentally differs compared to agriculture, manufacture and services analysis. The main reason is that mineral resources are exhaustible resources; hence, in the mining industry an initial stock of reserves will exhaust over time. Therefore, this paper analysis the natural resource market according to several criteria: requirements of economic growth, future potential of environmental factors, scientific and technological progress and demographic change. Hence, this work deals with issues related to the limited character and scarcity of natural resources (supply) in relation to the development of demand (in the first part), and the mechanisms and economic laws that describe the supplydemand ratio of natural resources determined by economic and social factors (in the second part).

The dramatic spread of online social network services, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Google+, has led to increasing awareness of the power of incorporating social elements into a variety of data-centric applications. These applications, in recent years, apply various sensors with social media platforms to continuously collect massive data that can be directly associated with human interactions. This phenomenon has led to the creation of numerous social sensing systems, such as Biketastic, BikeNet, CarTel, and Pier, which use social sensors (i.e., users) for a variety of social sensing systems and applications. Social sensing has become an emerging and promising sensing paradigm that relies on the voluntary cooperation of users equipped with embedded or integrated sensors.

This article points out the first steps of the cartel settlement and Leniency Program in European Union and positive sides of the mentioned tool for the companies participating in the anticompetitive agreements. Cartel Settlement and Leniency Program played an enormous role for the market to be undistorted and free from any type of anticompetitive practices. It is also worth to mention that introducing of Settlement notice as well as Leniency Program played crucial role for Commission and as well for undertakings to find fastest way out from the anticompetitive practices to settle and protect free and undistorted competition on the market. Both tools are very beneficial and useful for competition and its further development.

This study critically assesses the claim of the cartel party theory that the party in central office (PCO) has lost its powers to the party in public office (PPO) as parties have adapted to various changes in their operating ‘environment’. The study argues that a party’s tendency to adapt is conditioned by the party’s ‘genetic’ heritage: if the PCO assumed a prominent position during the party’s institutionalization, it can more likely stand against external pressures compared to a PCO that has been traditionally weak. The study compares the development (1983–2017) of two Finnish parties, which hail from polar ‘genetic’ traditions: a social democratic mass party and a conservative cadre party. The change of the party ‘environment’ has strongly supported PCO’s decay. Unlike earlier longitudinal studies on intra-party power balance, the study assesses all significant power dimensions and finds a contradictory development: while the distribution of leadership positions and resources increasingly favour the PPO in both parties, significant ‘genetic’ differences in the distribution of formal decision-making power have not diminished at all. If statutory regulations matter, the results suggest that the PPO cannot ‘insulate’ like the cartel model expects in parties where the PCO’s strong role has been strictly codified.

The paper provides a comparative analysis of the current level of development of programs for the release and mitigation of responsibility for participation in cartel agreements in the Russian Federation and the European Union (at the level of the entire Union). In relation to Russia, the author analyzes the relevant articles of the Administrative Offenses Code of the Russian Federation and the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, methodological recommendations of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation, as well as judicial practice and decisions of some Offices of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia. In relation to the EU, the author deals with the Regulatory Letter of the European Commission on exemption from fines and reduction of its size in cases of cartels, as well as the Guidelines on methods for calculating fines imposed in accordance with Art. 23 (2) (a) of Regulation No. 1/2003. The analysis reveals a number of fundamental differences between the two programs (for example, the EU does not provide for criminal liability for business entities in the EU, and the list of grounds for mitigating administrative responsibility in the Russian Federation is wider than in the EU). However, according to the author, the general development trend is forming in a single direction.

How competition policies interact with international trade has been one of the so-called "new issues" in the WTO. We develop a simple, general equilibrium model to examine the possible interaction between domestic competition policies and trade. In the model, cartels are allowed in that a certain set of firms collude in decision-making, and efficiency gains from a cartel exist in that the fixed costs are shared within a cartel. Then we first show, in a closed economy model, that entry deregulation that reduces the fixed costs of entry can increase the skill premium by increasing the number of firms and decreasing firm size, while an antitrust policy that reduces the size of cartels can decrease the skill premium by decreasing the number of firms and increasing firm size. We next extend the model to a two-country model. In the case of asymmetric countries, though the effects are not clear, our numerical examples show a possibility that entry deregulation and antitrust policy in one country, respectively, can increase and decrease the skill premia in both countries through trade; however, the domestic skill premium is changed by a greater percentage than the foreign one. Finally, available U.S. data show that our model does appear to be empirically relevant.

This paper examines the effect of collusion on allocative efficiency in a second-price sealed-bid auction, in which bidders' valuations have both private and common value components. We present a theoretical model which shows that explicit collusion improves average efficiency. Furthermore, a reduction in common value signal variance increases the efficiency of allocations when a cartel is present. We test for the presence of these patterns in a laboratory experiment. Subjects can choose whether to compete or to form a cartel. Colluding bidders can communicate and make side payments using a knockout auction. Our results show that a large majority of bidders joins a cartel and collusion has a negative impact on efficiency.

This paper discusses the behavior of political party in Deputy Governor election (Pilwagub) at Riau Islands Province (Kepri) 2017 with rational choice and cartel politic s approach . The DPRD of Riau Islands Provincial decision to to choose and assign Isdianto as Deputy Governor requires controversy , it is caused by the domination of one coalition over the other in the 2015 Governor election. This study argues that the motive for power in inter-party relations at the local level, especially those who have seats in Parliament of Riau Islands Province, tends to influence DPRD’s decision. Political parties effort at the local level through electoral changes are characterized by the pragmatism of political parties. The parties that competed in the 2015 Pilgub challenged reconciliation since the 2017 governor election. The findings of this study are those that discuss cartel policy through unseen agreements that are reflected in the DPRD's plenary decision by acclamation.

This paper takes the abduction and rape of a woman as a social situation and, by putting it in perspective with other cases, looks at how these acts of violence are commented on locally in order to grasp how they reveal the broader configuration of power. I show that this armed abduction, followed by rape, finally reduced into a conjugal quarrel, appears to be a particularly brutal and vivid version of the “continuum of sexual violence”. Locally apprehended by the category of “stealing a woman” (robo de mujer), the radicality of this porosity between armed and domestic violence refers to the singular political economy of Badiraguato, aMexican municipality considered to be “the cradle of drug trafficking” and “the base of the Sinaloa Cartel”. From a materialist feminist perspective, I argue that the extreme porosity observed in gendered violence refers to the forms of exploitation and predation that characterize an insertion into global capitalism based on exclusion and isolation. This research is based on an 18-month ethnography conducted between 2013 and 2016 in the main village, the offices of the town hall, and the poppy-producing hamlets spread across the territory. Funding This research was made possible by grants from the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, the ERC Social Dynamics of CivilWars, and the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM).

”Cargo tariffs are agreed through the IATA machinery, and in theory approved by governments….the IATA Tarff Coordination Conferences still agree cargo tariffs on over 200,000 separate routes. But these tariffs bear little relevance to what is actually charged in the marketplace ” (Doganis, 2002). ”The stipulations ICAO standards contain never supersede the primacy of national regulatory requirements. It is always the local, national regulations which are enforced in, and by, sovereign states, and which must be legally adhered to by air operators making use of applicable airspace and airports. ICAO is therefore not an international aviation regulator, just as INTERPOL is not an international police force. We cannot arbitrarily...............condemn airlines for poor safety performance or customer service……. should a country transgress a given international standard adopted through our organization, ICAO’s function in such circumstances…….is to help countries conduct any discussions, condemnations, sanctions, etc., they may wish to pursue, consistent with the Chicago Convention and the Articles and Annexes it contains under international law.”(ICAO, 2021). In spite of being a growing liberalized global industry served by many firms, we know that much of the international air cargo sector operated as an admitted cartel from 1999 through 2006. Given its visibility and importance to world trade, how did this cartel go undetected for so long? It seems that partly due to the way the cartel was uncovered, almost no empirical analysis has been done about the case. To fill this gap, we use publicly available air carrier data and examine whether a diligent anti-trust authority could have identified cartel/collusive behavior in the air cargo industry using established empirical methods. Our stark findings point to a regulatory failure in an industry whose long-standing business practices through the era of airline liberalization effectively “slipped through the cracks”, leaving the many shippers of air cargo unprotected against collusive behavior., Published by Emerald Publishing. This is an earlier draft version of the chapter.

Данное исследование ставит перед собой задачу выявить различия между картелями и честными участниками по ряду внутренних показателей компаний. Изучение участников картелей из дел ФАС показывает, что картели почти в два раза чаще указывают о себе недостоверную информацию и обладают большим индексом финансового риска и риска должной осмотрительности. This study aims to identify the differences between cartels and non- cartel participants in a number of internal indicators of companies. The study of cartel participants from FAS cases shows that cartels are almost twice as likely to indicate false information about themselves and have a large index of financial risk and due diligence risk. Исследование выполнено за счет гранта Российского научного фонда (проект № 20-71-00034).

Введение: в статье анализируются положения ст. 178 УК РФ, предусматривающей уголовную ответственность за посягательства на конкуренцию. В настоящее время вопрос об обоснованности криминализации преступного монополизма остается актуальным и довольно активно обсуждается в юридической литературе. Осмысление данной проблемы и его широкое обсуждение позволит избежать ошибок в межотраслевой дифференциации ответственности за посягательства на конкуренцию и будет способствовать оптимизации уголовного законодательства. Цель: выявление проблем криминализации преступного монополизма и формулирование предложений для оптимизации уголовной ответственности за посягательства на конкуренцию. Методологическая основа: основными методами исследования являются всеобщий диалектический метод познания социальных явлений и процессов, формально-юридический, а также иные частные методы научного познания: индукция и дедукция; анализ и синтез и др. Результаты: ныне действующей редакции уголовного закона известен лишь один способ преступного монополизма — картель. Иные незаконные способы ограничения конкуренции остаются за рамками уголовно-правового воздействия. Выводы: проведенное исследование дало основание полагать, что криминализация посягательств на конкуренцию является неудовлетворительной. Необоснованным является исключение из текста ст. 178 УК РФ таких деяний-последствий, как недопущение конкуренции и устранение конкуренции. В уголовном законодательстве не следует ограничивать количество способов монополизации рынка. Преступным следует признавать любое деяние, которое приводит или может привести к незаконному недопущению или устранению конкуренции, а равно ограничению конкуренции при условии причинения крупного ущерба. Предлагаем текст ч. 1 ст. 178 УК РФ изложить в следующей редакции: «Незаконное ограничение конкуренции, если эти повлекло причинение крупного ущерба физическим лицам, организациям либо государству, а равно незаконные недопущение или устранение конкуренции...». Примечание к ст. 178 УК РФ предлагаем изложить в следующей редакции: «Крупным ущербом в настоящей статье признается ущерб, причиненный физическим лицам на сумму, превышающую один миллион рублей, либо ущерб, причиненный организации или государству на сумму, превышающую десять миллионов рублей»., Background: the article analyzes the provisions of article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which provides for criminal liability for encroachments on competition. At present, the question about the validity of criminalization of criminal monopolism remains relevant and is quite actively discussed in the legal literature. Understanding of this problem and its broad discussion will allow to avoid mistakes in inter-branch differentiation of responsibility for encroachments on competition and will contribute to the optimization of criminal legislation. Objective: identification of problems of criminalization of criminal monopolism and formulation of proposals for the optimization of criminal liability for encroachments on competition. Methodology: the main methods of research are the universal dialectical method of knowledge of social phenomena and processes, formal-legal, as well as other private methods of scientific knowledge: induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, etc. Results: the current version of the criminal law knows only one method of criminal monopoly — cartel. Other illegal ways of restricting competition remain outside the scope of criminal law. Conclusions: the conducted study gave reason to believe that the criminalization of encroachments on competition is unsatisfactory. The exclusion from the text of article 178 of the Criminal Code of the RF of such acts-sequences as prevention of competition and elimination of competition is unreasonable. Criminal legislation should not limit the number of ways to monopolize the market. Any act, which leads or may lead to unlawful exclusion or elimination of competition, as well as restriction of competition on condition of causing major damage, should be recognized as a criminal offence. We propose the text of part. 1 of Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation should be revised as follows: “Unlawful restriction of competition, if this caused major damage to individuals, organizations or the state, as well as unlawful exclusion or elimination of competition...”. Note to article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is proposed to be amended as follows: “Major damage in this article is damage caused to individuals in an amount exceeding one million rubles, or damage caused to an organization or the state in an amount exceeding ten million rubles”.

This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices., CEPA Discussion Papers; 53

Dans le cadre de la réflexion sur un nouveau lieu de présentation des collections universitaires de l’Université Paul Sabatier (UPS) de Toulouse, nous présentons les cartels dans l’approche de vulgarisation ainsi que d’accessibilité. Puis nous étudions les cartels actuels de l’UPS, dans l’exposition temporaire Fragments de Sciences et nous analysons un de ces cartels en particulier. Enfin, nous proposons une classification des choix muséographiques qui se posent actuellement en termes de cartels : cartels simples, développés, vulgarisés, universels.

[ES] Este Trabajo de final de máster se articula en base a una investigación teórica que pretende explorar el mundo del cartel publicitario desde sus primeros inicios a finales del siglo XIX hasta la actualidad. Con una mirada más cercana se seguirá su evolución en la historia, se conocerán referentes artísticos que han incorporado el cartel a su obra y/o que han podido influir con su estilo personal en la cartelería publicitaría del siglo XXI, se plantearán cuestiones acerca de su importancia hoy en día o en qué otro tipo de material gráfico ha derivado el cartel y en general la publicidad en formato analógico. Además, se indagará en el panorama actual dentro del campo del diseño gráfico y la publicidad para conocer quienes son los referentes actuales y los recursos que utilizan., [EN] This Master's Final Project is based on a theoretical investigation that aims to explore the world of the advertising poster from its first beginnings at the end of the 19th century to the present day. With a closer look, its evolution in history will be followed, artistic references will be known who have incorporated the poster into their work and / or who have been able to influence the advertising posters of the 21st century with their personal style, questions will be raised about their importance today or in what other type of graphic material has derived the poster and in general the advertising in analog format. In addition, the current panorama within the field of graphic design and advertising will be investigated to find out who the current references are and the resources they use.

Prosecution of the retail gasoline price-fixing cartel in Quebec was the largest and most successful criminal investigation in the history of the Competition Bureau of Canada. In June 2008 the first charges were brought against 38 individuals and 14 companies under Section 45 of the pre-2010 Competition Act. Pre-2010 means that the public prosecutor had to show that the cartel not only existed but also had the effect of “unduly lessening competition.” As an expert witness and author of the crucial economic report in the case, I review here the main challenges I faced and how I dealt with them to credibly conclude that the cartel did successfully increase prices in markets under investigation. Price data, namely the dynamic standard deviation of prices across retailers, indicated that the cartel began in early 2001, while the accusation made it start in early 2004. The best estimate of damages the city-based cartels imposed on customers ranges from $18.5M to $42.0M for the period 2001–2006, and from $6.7M to $20.9M for the period 2004–2006. Following several stays of proceedings, out-of-court settlements, and trials in criminal court, individuals pleading or found guilty were fined and received conditional prison sentences, while companies pleading or found guilty were fined.

This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.

This article focuses on how cartel disputes are being innovatively resolved in Ukraine by making agreement for settlement. Such procedure is extremely essential for economic competition fostering, taking into account how widespread and important it is from practical perspective. Another issue to mention in this regard is that cartel settlement is still the issue that is far from being properly regulated by Ukrainian legislation. The legal norms and the applicable mechanisms concerning effective dealing with anticompetitive plots among businesses for purposes of the draft law "On Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine on Ensuring the Principles of Procedural Justice and Improving the Effectiveness of Proceedings in Violation of the Law on Protection of Economic Competition" are analyzed. According to the provisions of the mentioned draft law, the settlement procedure may be initiated on the basis of the application of the defendant, which he must submit before the Antimonopoly Committee makes its preliminary conclusions on the case. The settlement procedure shall be initiated by the Committee only if it has taken a decision that applying such procedure is appropriate and sending the defendant its applicable consent to consider the defendant’s statement. At the settlement stage, the Committee and the defendant are negotiating the consequences which will follow making the settlement. Such settlement agreement may be signed if essential conditions specified in the draft law are to be fulfilled (in particular, the legal qualification of the violation, the defendant’s recognition of the violation, the circumstances of the violation, the amount of the fine). The fine for such a defendant is subject to a 20% reduction in the amount of the fine calculated in accordance with the Committee’s approach to fines. After signing the draft settlement agreement by the defendant and receiving such agreement by the Committee, the latter sends it to the Commercial Court within three working days. In case this agreement envisages all the essential conditions stipulated by the draft law, the commercial court must approve it by issuing the relevant decision or refuse its approval if the terms of the agreement contradict the requirements of the draft law, interests of the state or society, violate the rights and interests of the parties, as well as if there is a clear inability to fulfil obligations by the defendant. After approval of the agreement by the court, the Committee decides on the case in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement, which cannot be questioned by the defendant in front of the court. However, in order to implement the provisions of the agreement on the settlement of cartel disputes, it is necessary to initiate appropriate changes to the Commercial Code, which should provide for the procedure for the court approval of the settlement agreement.

In 1973 Sweden entered into a free-trade agreement with the EEC. This meant that the EEC principle of prohibition of cartels met with the Swedish principle of abuse. Paper production was heavily ca...

The past 10 years witnessed rapid development in the jurisprudential framework of antitrust policy in India. The Competition Commission of India’s sector-agnostic approach in busting anti-c...

In the U.S. House of Representatives, the majority party constitutes an organizational cartel that monopolizes the selection of chamber leaders. But in state legislatures, that cartel power is sometimes circumvented by a bipartisan bloc that outvotes the leadership preferences of a majority of the majority party. Drawing from an original data set of instances of cross-party organizational coalitions at the state level, I use statistical analysis to test various hypotheses for when these coalitions are more likely to form. The analysis reveals that party ideology does not adequately explain the violation of these cartels; rather, violations depend on the costs associated with keeping the party unified and the benefits that come from selecting the chamber’s top leadership post. This finding underscores the potential vulnerability of organizational cartels and suggests that governing parties are strategic when deciding how fiercely to defend their cartel power.

In this paper, we study bargaining over collusion profits in a duopolistic industry with cost asymmetry and demand uncertainty. We consider disagreement payoffs obtained from the non-cooperative equilibrium of either the quantity competition or the supply function competition, and bargaining solutions splitting the gains from agreement either equally or proportionally. We find that each duopolist has always incentive to join a collusive agreement, and the more efficient firm (the less efficient firm) in the cartel always obtains a higher agreement payoff when the disagreement payoff is obtained from the equilibrium of supply function competition (quantity competition).

The purpose of regulating any profession is to assure competent practitioners, particularly where its absence can cause irreparable harm. Regulatory “licensing” ideally achieves such assurance, while at the same time avoiding unnecessary supply constriction. The latter can mean much higher prices and an inadequate number of practitioners. Regrettably, the universal delegation to attorneys of the power to regulate themselves has led to a lose/lose system lacking protection from incompetent practice while also diminishing needed supply. The problem is manifest in four regulatory flaws: First, state bars—in combination with the American Bar Association—require four years of largely irrelevant higher education for law school entry. Most of this coursework commonly has nothing to do with law. Second, and related, these seven-years of mandatory higher education (that only the United States requires for attorney licensure) impose extraordinary costs. Those costs now reach from $190,000 to $380,000 in tuition and room and board per student—driven by shocking tuition levels lacking competitive check. Third, attorney training focuses almost entirely on a few traditional subjects, with little attention paid to the development of useful skills in most of the 24 disparate areas of actual practice (e.g., administrative, bankruptcy, corporate, criminal, family, taxation, et al.). And schools often pay scant attention to legislation, administrative proceedings, or the distinct areas of law that will be relevant to a student’s future practice. Fourth, state bars rely on supply-constricting bar examinations of questionable connection to competence assurance. In the largest state of California, the bar examination fails about 2/3 of its examinees. This system has fostered an opportunistic cottage industry of increasingly expensive preparatory courses that further raise the cost of becoming an attorney—even after 7 years of higher education. Meanwhile, the bars regulating attorneys in the respective states: a) Do not treat negligent acts as a normal basis for discipline (outside of extreme incapacity); b) Do not require malpractice insurance—effectively denying consumer remedies for negligence; c) Do not allow clients injured by malpractice to recover from “client security funds”; d) Do not require post-licensure “legal education” in the area of an attorney’s practice; e) Do not test attorneys in the area of practice relied upon by consumers—ever; and f) Respond to cost-effective, technology-centric solutions to legal problems not by regulation to assure consumer benefit, but by attempts to categorically foreclose them in favor of total reliance on often unavailable/expensive counsel. No area of state regulation has more openly violated federal antitrust law than has the legal profession. The United States Supreme Court held in 2015 that any state body controlled by “active market participants” in a profession regulated is not a sovereign entity for antitrust purposes without “active state supervision.” Yet four years later, attorneys continue to regulate themselves without such supervision, overlooking the threat of criminal felony and civil treble damage liability.

The communist mining industry has been one of the main pillars of Romania’s state economy. The problems resulted from what was at the time a highly unsustainable state program constitutes the main motivation to investigate the possible consequences of Romania’s economic past. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that without serious measures, pollution continues to persist in abandoned mining areas. In order to achieve this, the quality of the environment around two mining sites with similar characteristics has been evaluated. The difference between the two sites consists of a mine water treatment plant at the Mestecaniș unit, as opposed to the mine water being directly discharged into the main stem watercourse in Isipoaia—the Isipoaia Creek. In evaluating the impact, data from the Environmental Protection Agency, SC CARTEL BAU SA Cluj Napoca, S.C. CONVERSMIN SA, was used. Two impact evaluation methods were used: a quantitative method by calculating the global pollution index (GPI) and a qualitative method with the help of the Leopold matrix, adapted to the specificities of the mining activity. This comparative impact assessment is the first of its kind for the mining area and emphasizes the urgent need for a re-evaluation of the other 39 similar mining perimeters by prioritizing and speeding up the ecological rehabilitation measures. This raises the question of what solutions are best fitted to capitalize on and to further utilize the slurry resulted from the treatment of mine waters performed for the closing of the life cycle of the mining product.

O objetivo do presente artigo é verificar, em primeiro lugar, a viabilidade de construção e desenvolvimento de técnica de screening que permita o monitoramento do comportamento das contratações públicas e, ao mesmo tempo, o apontamento de indicadores de risco que possibilitem uma rápida tomada de decisão, de modo a evitar danos, mas, ao mesmo tempo, reprimir de forma efetiva e consistente os casos graves e complexos. Em segundo lugar, o artigo discutirá as possíveis interpretações e conclusões em relação ao reconhecimento e ao tratamento do ilícito, notadamente o seu valor para a identificação de uma hipótese de investigação.

Submitted by RODOLFO DOURADO (rodolfo.ufba@gmail.com) on 2021-12-22T14:11:55Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ecossitema da Corrupção no Brasil_2021 FINAL.pdf: 2214632 bytes, checksum: 98ffc754c0a719853da9e56b77e70bde (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Isaac Viana da Cunha Araújo (isaac.cunha@ufba.br) on 2021-12-28T03:24:25Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Ecossitema da Corrupção no Brasil_2021 FINAL.pdf: 2214632 bytes, checksum: 98ffc754c0a719853da9e56b77e70bde (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-12-28T03:24:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ecossitema da Corrupção no Brasil_2021 FINAL.pdf: 2214632 bytes, checksum: 98ffc754c0a719853da9e56b77e70bde (MD5) O ambiente institucional do processo licitatório e sua propensão para fraudes é o tema sob o qual este trabalho repousa, o que chamaremos de ecossistema da corrupção – uma verdadeira caixa de pandora no que diz respeito a alocação de recursos públicos. A questão que mobiliza a pesquisa, isto é, compreender o elevado número de fraudes identificadas em licitações mesmo após a Lei no 8666/93, um instrumento pensado para inibir a captura predatória do erário, demanda um corte transversal na maquinaria dessa instituição. Dois objetivos norteiam a trajetória: primeiro, analisar as interações ilícitas entre o setor público e privado nos certames públicos; segundo, problematizar o modelo explicativo das fraudes e seus desdobramentos para disciplinar as relações entre os atores envolvidos. Por se tratar de um tema nebuloso, fontes indiretas são necessárias. No caso, os Relatórios de Fiscalização da Controladoria Geral da União figuram como a principal fonte de pesqui-sa, todos, devidamente sistematizados segundo a lógica da análise de conteúdo. Os resultados sinalizam para um comportamento ilícito nas concorrências públicas que não se origina exclusivamente no desenho da instituição. Nessa perspectiva, a licitação é mais que um simples procedimento de organização econômica de concorrência pública, especialmente nas pequenas municipalidades, local em que se torna um capital político negociável e suscetível aos estímulos de outras arenas. Frente ao padrão empírico observado, a pesquisa questiona a força do modelo explicativo usuais e os desdobramentos na literatura oficial sobre o assunto. Na grande parcela dos casos observados o Ator-Estatal, na figura do chefe do executivo municipal, interpreta o protagonista da corrupção, contrariando as expectativas de uma literatura que fielmente deposita nas confabulações de atores do mercado o surgimento das mais inescrupulosas fraudes. Enfim, para antecipar, constranger ou interpretar a atuação ilícita dos gestores municipais, torna-se crucial, para além das questões econômicas ou meramente processualísticas, considerar a dimensão política do processo licitatório. The institutional environment of the bidding process and its propensity for fraud is the theme on which this work rests, what we will call “corruption ecosystem” – a real pandora's box when it comes to the allocation of public resources. The question that mobilizes the research, that is, understanding the high number of frauds identified in biddings even after Law 8666/93, an instrument designed to inhibit the predatory capture of the treasury, it demands a cross-section in the machinery of this institution. Two objectives guide our trajectory: first, to analyze the illicit interactions between the public and private sector in public disputes; second, problematize the explanatory model of fraud and its consequences to discipline the relationships between the actors involved. As it is a nebulous topic, indirect sources are necessary, in this case, Inspection Reports made by CGU (Country Controllership) compose the main data source to the inferences made in this work, all, properly systematized according to the logic of content analysis. Results showed that the illicit behavior at public competitions does not have an exclusive origin on the design of this institution. On this perspective, bidding is more than a simple procedure of the economic organization of public competition, especially in small municipalities, where it becomes a negotiable political capital susceptible to stimuli from other arenas. Facing the empirical pattern observed, the research questions the strength of the usual explanatory model and its consequences in the “official literature” on the subject. In the large plot of the cases observed, the State Agent, in the figure of the chief of the municipal executive, interpret the protagonist of corruption, contradicting the expectations of a literature that faithfully deposits in the confabulations of “market actors” the emergence of the most unscrupulous frauds. Lastly, to anticipate, constrain or interpret the illegal actions of municipal managers, it is crucial, beyond economic or merely procedural issues, to consider the political dimension of bidding process.

(1) Background: Numerous educational interventions have been conducted to improve hand hygiene (HH) compliance and effectiveness among nursing students, with mixed results. The aim is to evaluate the effectiveness of posters as a teaching tool and factors associated with HH quality. (2) Methods: A pre-post experimental intervention study was conducted with a total of 293 nursing students randomly assigned to two groups (experimental and control) who, before and after HH, took cell culture samples from their non-dominant hands. Only the experimental group was exposed to the poster. (3) Results: In the experimental group, significant differences were observed among students older than 22 years (p = 0.017, V = 0.188), with a higher percentage of failures (15.7% vs. 3.6%). Poster displaying was associated with passing, other variables being equal, although without statistical significance (ORa = 2.07, 95% CI = 0.81–5.26). Pre-practice hand contamination was weakly associated with lower HH quality (ORa = 0.99, 95% CI = 0.99–0.99). (4) Conclusions: The use of posters as a teaching method shows indications of efficacy. Prior hand contamination slightly affects the quality of HH. Further evaluation of teaching methods is needed to ensure good technical performance of HH to prevent the spread of infectious diseases during the COVID-19 pandemic.