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CARTELS – BETWEEN THEORY, LENIENCY POLICY AND FINES
- Source :
- Annals of the University of Oradea: Economic Science, Vol 1, Iss 1, Pp 549-552 (2008)
- Publication Year :
- 2008
- Publisher :
- University of Oradea, 2008.
-
Abstract
- Among the anti-competitive practices sanctioned by competition law, cartel is the most harmful to the competitive environment. Cartel participation is sanctioned both by national and community legislation with large fines, which can reach up to 10% of the turnover of the companies involved. In order to facilitate the detection of cartels, which are, by definition, secret agreements, instructions promoting a leniency program were elaborated at European Commission level, encouraging the participants to provide information regarding the existence of a cartel. It is expected that the large fines applied in cartel cases will increase the attractiveness of the leniency program and, implicitly, to the detection of an even greater number of such practices.
Details
- Language :
- German, English, French, Italian
- ISSN :
- 1222569X and 15825450
- Volume :
- 1
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Directory of Open Access Journals
- Journal :
- Annals of the University of Oradea: Economic Science
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- edsdoj.902d1554489f45798b20a9fb98f940f4
- Document Type :
- article