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CARTELS – BETWEEN THEORY, LENIENCY POLICY AND FINES

Authors :
Berinde Mihai
Source :
Annals of the University of Oradea: Economic Science, Vol 1, Iss 1, Pp 549-552 (2008)
Publication Year :
2008
Publisher :
University of Oradea, 2008.

Abstract

Among the anti-competitive practices sanctioned by competition law, cartel is the most harmful to the competitive environment. Cartel participation is sanctioned both by national and community legislation with large fines, which can reach up to 10% of the turnover of the companies involved. In order to facilitate the detection of cartels, which are, by definition, secret agreements, instructions promoting a leniency program were elaborated at European Commission level, encouraging the participants to provide information regarding the existence of a cartel. It is expected that the large fines applied in cartel cases will increase the attractiveness of the leniency program and, implicitly, to the detection of an even greater number of such practices.

Details

Language :
German, English, French, Italian
ISSN :
1222569X and 15825450
Volume :
1
Issue :
1
Database :
Directory of Open Access Journals
Journal :
Annals of the University of Oradea: Economic Science
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
edsdoj.902d1554489f45798b20a9fb98f940f4
Document Type :
article