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The participation of predominantly young, Balkan Muslims in the Syrian and the Iraq conflict has become a dangerous trend. Equally alarming is the fact that many youth in the region continue to separate themselves from the mainstream religious community and move to supporting conservative Islamic ideas that cater to jihadist narratives. Drawing from the author's recent fieldwork in the Balkans, this article addresses the issues of radicalization leading to violence and suggests ways to strengthen current counter radicalization and reintegration policies, including improving the community's resistance in Kosovo and the Southern Serbian Sandjak region. The authors highlight that while "hard" power measures that focus on intelligence activities and attacking extremist ideologies are important, other counterterrorism programs that address prevention, intervention, rehabilitation and reintegration of those already on the extremist trajectory must also be considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2012, it is estimated that 2,000 French nationals have joined jihadist armed groups listed by the UN as terrorist organizations in Syria and in Iraq. Consequently, a new prosecution policy has been introduced in France. To date, more than 200 persons have been prosecuted and 1,600 persons have been placed under criminal investigation. In parallel, after the 13 November 2015 terror attacks in Paris, a State of emergency was declared. Persisting for two years, it introduced derogative administrative measures that slowly transgressed into regular criminal law. Consequently, French administrative and criminal courts, with ordinary judges and professional routines, find themselves involved in matters related to armed conflicts – a completely new phenomenon for them. What role has been performed by French criminal and administrative judges in the global fight against terrorism? This article takes a close look at France's fight against terrorism and the engagement of its domestic legal system in the context of foreign fighters and suspects of terrorism. It outlines the radicalization processes of French administrative and criminal law along with their hybridization and complementarity. While the armed conflict in Syria and Iraq and the complex geopolitical context are clearly present in French courtrooms, international humanitarian law and international criminal law frameworks are almost entirely absent. At the same time, by granting a growing power to the administration, the repressive and pre-emptive approaches introduced within criminal and administrative law transform liberal conceptions of law and justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers which legal regimes apply in cases where a Danish citizen and/or resident returns from Syria or Iraq after having taken part in the armed conflict on behalf of the group known as Islamic State, and continues his/her affiliation with the armed group. The article argues that international humanitarian law currently applies to the Danish territory and that a Danish foreign fighter may continue to be considered as taking a direct part in hostilities after having returned from Iraq or Syria. The article then considers the application of Danish criminal law to returned foreign fighters and argues that Danish counterterrorism laws do not apply to members of the armed forces of an armed group that is party to an armed conflict with Denmark. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Research Note starts by evaluating Lofland and Stark's conversion model. By comparing it with several radicalisation models, it was found that conversion and radicalisation processes have much in common. Based on this observation, the idea of a radical-conversion model is formulated. Subsequently, five hypotheses derived from the radical-conversion model are tested with a sample of foreign fighters database (n = 408). It was found that converts and non-converts can be seen as equals. The convert's involvement in suicide missions and perceived trustworthiness are relatively the same as non-converts. However, due to certain predisposition factors, differences for rank, desertion, and the role of women were found. This Research Note suggests that there are strong indications that radicalisation is a sub-type of conversion and that more research is needed on this topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite their small number, foreign fighters in jihadist groups from the country of Georgia fighting in Syria and Iraq have played a significant role in the formation and leadership of several militant organizations. This study utilizes a sample of 29 Georgian citizens who died in the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts to ascertain the overall dynamics that shape foreign fighter mobilization and recruitment in Georgia. Notably, the study finds that substantial percentages of the foreign fighters originally came from small, isolated rural villages in various regions of Georgia, had family or friendship ties to other foreign fighters prior to leaving for the Middle East, and spent time in a country outside Georgia before progressing onwards to Syria and Iraq. Close, in-person connections and similar experiences and demographics amongst the fighters in the sample provide strong evidence for the thesis that offline personal networks determine foreign fighter mobilization rather than any large-scale socio-economic factor or by "online radicalisation," thus adding to broader debates concerning foreign fighter mobilization in the post-Soviet space and around the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign fighters (FF), that is, all those people who leave their countries of origin or residence to participate in a foreign armed conflict are strongly attracted by the terrorist groups, which by their symbols and propaganda can be considered as genuine brands; their mission is to restore archaic Islam as the only possible choice and the only alternative to preserving Western values. To achieve this, it was necessary to build a strong brand to represent the founding and fundamental values of Islam, a brand that could influence the common feelings of the resurrection of Islam. In this article, we intend to explore new strategic approaches to digital marketing and tactical applications to develop a brand and new product, alternately to the more developed and more desirable terrorist group format. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hybrid war is a reality; war does not depend only on conventional means, but includes communication and propaganda strategies whose role is increasingly important. In the last few years, terrorist cells have spent and keep spending many energies in a global propaganda business. This activity is a fundamental aspect of the conflict. This promotion campaign serves several purposes: legitimating its authority, recruiting militants and motivating sympathizers, and intimidating and conditioning those whose cells they consider enemies. What draws our attention is the sophisticated level of professionalism they demonstrate in managing propaganda and terror. This paper seeks to provide a broader view of the European Foreign Fighters (FF) phenomenon by analyzing this target group from a marketing point of view in order to lay the foundations for a strategy to counteract them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three significant developments will characterize the global threat landscape in 2017. First, it is likely that the so-called Islamic State (IS) will transform itself from a caliphate-building entity into a global terrorist movement in a similar manner as Al Qaeda (AQ). Second, the death of either the IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi or AQ leader Ayman al Zawahiri, may lead to collaboration or possible unification of the most powerful terrorist groups. IS, AQ and their associates will compensate for their losses in the physical space by expanding further into cyber space

Copyright of Romanian Journal of Forensic Science is the property of Romanian Forensic Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In recent years, thousands of radical citizens and residents from Europe have joined the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS) in Syria and Iraq. Unlike other European countries, Italy has traditionally been characterised by the prevalence of individual pathways of radicalisation over group mechanisms. Nevertheless, recent cases show interesting indications of the increasing role of small groups based on pre-existing personal relationships (family and friendship ties). This kind of bond can be particularly salient for IS, a jihadist “proto-state”, which needs not only ‘foreign fighters’ but also new ‘citizens’ of different sexes and ages, including entire families. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Directive (EU) 2017/541 constitutes an important piece of legislation among the acts recently adopted by the Union's legislature, and replacing the previous Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA. This Directive has been adopted on the basis of Article 83(1) TFEU and has been considered necessary in order to align the EU legal framework with the changing international legal context, taking into account, in particular, the United Nation Security Council Resolution 2178(2014) and the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Prevention of Terrorism. Several changes have been introduced in the Union's legislation, such as the definition of terrorist group and of some terrorist activities. Moreover, the Directive establishes provisions on combating the phenomenon of foreign fighters. Finally, it also provides rules on the protection and support of victims of terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the security challenges posed by foreign fighter returnees. It argues that—contrary to popular belief—most foreign fighters do not die on battlefields or travel from conflict to conflict. They return home. This means that law enforcement, intelligence, and other security officials should expect unprecedented numbers of returnees from Syria and Iraq should a ceasefire hold. The challenge posed by returnees is threefold: Recidivism rates are uncertain, law enforcement cannot manage the numbers of prospective returnees alone, and returnees from non-Western countries also pose a threat to the United States. Findings suggest that a global architecture should be put in place to mitigate the threats from foreign fighter returnees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Research Note offers an empirical examination of the threat from terrorism abroad in the context of the Trump Administration's executive order restricting entry into the United States from certain Muslim countries. More specifically, it compares the number of foreign fighters coming from and the number of terrorist attacks in the countries listed in the executive order to the next highest producers of fighters and locations for terrorist attacks. The result is that, while some of the countries listed in the order have shown that they produce foreign fighters and experience terrorist activity, they are certainly not the only or most egregious targets under this standard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2014, Western states have been enacting reactionary policies to strip citizenship from people who are labelled a threat to national security. The action of denationalising perceived security risks is a knee-jerk response to the growing number of terrorist attacks occurring in Western states and the threat posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters. What amounts to the exportation of security threats, however, presents a new quagmire relating to state sovereignty and international security. Unfortunately, momentum to proactively create more exclusionary policies is spreading in Western countries with a protectionist prerogative that counters previous international conventions. This paper seeks to illustrate the risk that these citizenship-stripping policies pose to peacebuilding and international relations. The findings of the research for this article suggest that although sovereignty is the basis of the international system, the lack of unilateral consensus on citizenship in counterterrorism policy has highlighted a gap in international law that inherently weakens peacebuilding initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The relationship between Al-Qaida and Daesh is of utmost importance for the global dynamics of terrorism since both cherish a radical Salafi -Jihadi ideology that has as a final goal to rule the world and establish the Caliphate. Furthermore, they have a worldwide audience, prone to implement their sectarian and highly anti-Western agenda. The proclamation of the Caliphate in June 2014, subsequent policy to establish worldwide provinces, and involvement in a spate of attacks targeting the West have given Daesh prominence in the competition to lead the global Jihad movement, in relation to Al-Qaida, whose activity has been marred by geographical isolation in AFPAK, static leadership and loose association with affiliated groups. Nonetheless, the relatively rapid decay of the caliphate in Syria and Iraq and inconstant success of Daesh franchises has helped promote AQ policy of cautious infiltration in areas of interest and viability of long-time plans to establish the Caliphate. To date, the two Jihadist entities cooperate on the tactical level, with the possibility of cooperation at strategic level if one of the supreme leaders is killed or in case of need to cope with a deadly setback of the Jihadist cause. Notwithstanding Al-Qaida and Daesh relevance, developments underway on the global Jihadist arena are pointing to future evolution towards a multipolar order, with several competing groupings and the phenomenon of foreign fi ghters as a persistent and multifold menace to world security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawn from a wider-ranging piece of research into radicalisation processes, this research note presents findings about the backgrounds of British jihadists travelling to fight in Syria. The research identifies biographical factors that are salient to two theories of radicalisation-Social Movement Theory (SMT) and Olivier Roy's 'youth revolt' theory and presents a short discussion on the validity of these theories in regard to British jihadists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As foreign fighters have flocked to conflicts in Syria and elsewhere, their home governments have often claimed a right not only to criminalise their doing so, but also to deprive them of the right to return. This article challenges some problematic assumptions about the intersection among political allegiance, extraterritorial jurisdiction and the right of abode. It traces the origins of today’s conventional wisdom to a particular modern experience of state–society relations, including the rise of administrative ambitions that outrun the original bounds of the territorial state. In contrast, it argues for an ‘unbundling’ of state authority, prepolitical membership in society, and cross-border political action. This position would chasten overreaching views about states’ ownership of their citizens, while still leaving other ways to deal with jihadist violence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Understanding the nature and the extent of the future threat from ISIS has been a key question for scholars, policy makers and security professionals since ISIS started losing significant grounds in Syria and Iraq. This article analyses ISIS terrorism and its possible spillover effects from a regional security perspective by presenting a strategic model to develop options for the policy makers. A strategic understanding, supported by a model that has been designed to capture all possible variables and their interaction which each other, is necessary to understand the future direction of the threat. Many scholars agree that the threat is not only about the organizational structure of ISIS but also its ideological aspect, therefore the model presented here connects the facts and the ideology with variables at three different levels: regional political level; ISIS and its organizational structure; and individual level variables. The model was designed to capture changes with relevant data thus providing a strategic data-driven understanding of the threat. Regional political developments and how ISIS reacts to those developments are the main concerns at the first two levels of analysis. Foreign fighters and other sympathizers are the most important subjects of the study at the individual level with the assumption that the future threat will diffuse through foreign fighters and self-radicalized lone actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenon of foreign fighters has become a central issue to the ongoing conflict in Syria. This article explores how members of the public answer the question ‘Why do British citizens join the conflict in Syria’ on social media sites and in response to online news articles. Building upon research on everyday narratives of security and terrorism, we analyse 807 comments, and in doing so, we argue that online comments are important in producing the discursive environment for making sense of British foreign fighters and what should be done in response to them. We find that there is a tendency to view British foreign fighters as being purely motivated by religion, and there is also a belief that British foreign fighters should be responded to through exceptional measures. We discuss the implications of such perceptions, and we highlight how problematic misconceptions about Islam and Muslims are not just disseminated through elite and media discourse, but through everyday narratives published by members of the public online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mounting tide of foreign fighters leaving Britain for the Middle East to fight, sacrifice or find new lives has blighted European governments and led to the further tightening up of counter-terrorism measures. Since the first British arrest of a Syrian returnee (Choudhury) in 2014, the latest figures of foreign fighter returnees have surged to approximately 800. A number of strategies aimed at thwarting these trends have surfaced including a call upon Muslim parents to scrutinise their children’s attitudes and behaviour and to be watchful of their radicalization. Based on a study in the West Midlands (in the UK), the paper provides a snapshot of how Muslim parents have received calls upon them to report their actual or potentially radicalized children to the police. We argue that current practices are likely to be ineffective unless more democratic spaces are provided for free political expression. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article reviews important differences in how Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham perceive the role of the foreign fighter and outlines local dilemmas integrating foreign fighters entails for the three movements. It shows how, in addition to boosting fighting capacity, a high number of foreigners might also represent a crucial weakness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of International Relations / Uluslararasi Iliskiler is the property of International Relations Council and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The rise of Islamic State (IS) has fundamentally altered the conception of terrorism, a development which international criminal law is arguably unprepared for. Given the scale and gravity of the group's crimes, questions abound as to how those responsible will be held accountable. In the absence of significant domestic prosecutions and short of the establishment of a dedicated accountability mechanism, the International Criminal Court (ICC) stands as the forum of last resort in which IS members could stand trial. Such a proposition is not without significant challenges, however. This article addresses some key issues facing any potential prosecutions from the perspective of: (i) jurisdiction; (ii) applicable crimes; and (iii) modes of liability. First, as Syria, Iraq, and Libya are not States Parties to the Rome Statute, the available avenues for asserting jurisdiction will be assessed, namely: a Security Council referral; jurisdiction over so called 'foreign fighters' who are State Party nationals; and jurisdiction over attacks on the territory of a State Party and whether they could be considered part of a broader series of criminal acts in IS held territory. Second, as there is no crime of terrorism in the Rome Statute, the question of prosecuting acts encapsulated in a systematic campaign of terror through existing provisions will be assessed. Third, the regime of accountability at the ICC will be analysed in light of IS's purported structure and the crimes with which it stands accused. Focus will be directed to those responsible for the propagation of genocidal propaganda and individuals who provide aid or assistance to IS which contributes to its crimes. These questions are far from theoretical. The UN has designated IS a threat to international peace and security. There follows an expectation that international criminal law should play a role in tackling one of the major criminal concerns of our time and ensure that impunity for those responsible for IS's atrocities is avoided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern international law defines a very narrow definition of mercenarism. It does not include all aspects of this phenomenon as it was known and understood for centuries. At the same time the emergence of new forms of mercenary-related activities is observed. The terms 'foreign fighters' and 'foreign terrorist fighters' should be analysed in this context inter alia from a legal perspective. A question needs to be answered if those existing regulations relating to mercenaries can apply to these terms. It is also important to note how both mercenaries and their activities are perceived under international law. The international legal analysis of factual and legal measures undertaken by states towards foreign fighters and foreign terrorist fighters is also interesting. Frequently these activities concern not just the fighters alone but apply also to all of us. This requires us to look at them in the context of international human rights law. These issues are the subject of current works undertaken within the scope of international organisations. UN Security Council adopted resolution 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014) regarding foreign terrorist fighters. The UN General Assembly and UN Human Rights Council also tackle these issues. The activity of foreign fighters and foreign terrorist fighters on one side and the activities of the states in reaction to this activity on the other side are also monitored inter alia by the UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign fighters have become inextricably linked to perceptions of human rights abuses in the Syria and Iraq wars, particularly since the Islamic State group founded its caliphate. This paper explores the human rights impact of foreign fighters in the conflicts, noting that while foreign fighters have been involved in grave human rights abuses, such behavior has not been uniform and must be differentiated by group and role. In this regard, it is argued that while foreign fighters have overwhelmingly had a negative impact on most human rights indicators, fighters in some groups have positively impacted the Right to Self-Determination. Further, the paper notes that while foreign fighters have been large-scale perpetrators of human rights abuses, one must also consider the propaganda value of such acts because foreign fighter-led violence is more newsworthy globally than local-led violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the phenomenon of foreign fighters is taking new dimensions by the rise of autonomous terrorist groups, mainly the group calling itself 'Islamic state' (also known as Daesh or ISIL), most of these individuals are perceived as a serious security threat to the peace and justice in the world. Such security perception made current efforts to deal effectively with this complex problem confined within the existing counter-terrorism fora including the United Nations (UN). The U.N. framework of Mercenaries does not seem the right venue for an effective accountability framework. Beyond the conceptual debate - whether Foreign Fighters is a new form of mercenarism - the regulatory framework offer various venues for the protection of human rights. Instead of constructing an accountability mechanism from scratch, this paper calls for the application of the dual obligation to protect and respect, which focuses on victims rights, regardless the nature, the type of the author of the crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The threat of "blowback" from foreign fighters, unaffiliated volunteers who join an insurgency in a distant land, has led states to explore a variety of normative mechanisms. Among these is the international legal regime applicable to mercenaries. This short paper considers the evolution of mercenarism and the efforts to regulate it. Attempts to fit foreign fighters into that normative category are unlikely to succeed. In part this is due to the question of motivation, which is central to most definitions of mercenary and focuses on private gain. But it is also linked to the reasons for regulation in the first place: mercenaries are seen as threats in the states to which they travel, while foreign fighters are primarily deemed threats by the states to which they might return. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the adoption ofSalafijihadism by young Egyptians and its repercussions on their mobilization in the Syrian jihad after 2011. This research demonstrates thatSalafijihadis mostly were raised in religious families and argues that the post-9/11 US-led wars triggered the exploration of an alternative to non-jihadi Salafism. This exploration was facilitated by: (1) the inability of mainstream Salafism to face the post-9/11 challenge; (2) the absence of local militant groups; (3) the availability of an alternative literature on the Internet; and (4) the shared religious creed of jihadi and mainstream Salafism. This research contends that online socialization created an internally diverseSalafijihadi milieu that regulated these youths’ mobilization in the Syrian jihad after 2011. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Why is it so difficult to disrupt foreign fighter flows? Governments know that foreign fighters can be a threat to both domestic and international security, yet they struggle to prevent would be foreign fighters from leaving their country and track them subsequently. This article seeks to open up the black box of counter-mobilization by examining the ways in which states deal with foreign fighter mobilizations. It argues that there are two main reasons why they may be unable to effectively contain foreign fighter mobilizations. The first is the challenge of inter-state intelligence cooperation due to conflicts of interests between countries. Linked to this are problems in how intelligence is shared. The second reason is the tension, at the domestic level, between collection and prosecution concerns in the investigation of foreign fighter networks. Countering foreign fighting is not the same as countering terrorism, and sometimes the two objectives are in opposition to one another. The article concludes by calling for more research on how states counter foreign fighter mobilizations, particularly focusing on the activities of intelligence, security and police agencies. Counter-mobilization is an important intervening variable that shapes the scale and nature of foreign fighter mobilizations to a greater extent than hitherto reflected in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A quantitative study of 130 individuals arrested in Spain between June 2013 and August 2016 for terrorist activities related to the Islamic State (IS) shows that the vast majority of them were involved in jihadist activities together with others and not as lone actors. They were typically part of cells, groups or networks (CGN) of varied size and composition. These CGN were more often new, transnational and IS-linked than regenerated, national and only IS-inspired. Detainees who participated in CGN occupied various positions in the centre (or firsttier), in the intermediate circle (or second-tier), and the periphery, depending on their social characteristics and functions. Nearly all of them belonged to jihadist aggregates engaging in radicalisation and recruitment efforts, usually dispatching foreign fighters, raising money and distributing propaganda on behalf of IS. In addition, the majority of these individuals had either travelled to Syria and Iraq, had tried (but failed) to travel, or had the intention of doing so. About one third of the 130 individuals belonged to CGN with operational capabilities and manifested willingness to carry out attacks inside Spain. Our research on the Spanish situation shows that the threat posed by IS is highly networked and organized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The foreign fighter phenomenon in Syria and Iraq has led to many worries about the potential negative consequences that might occur in the near future. The scenario of returned foreign fighters launching attacks in the West is by far the most prominent one. This article aims to broaden the discussion on the potential fallout of the phenomenon by examining three particular dimensions: the physical threat (including the terrorist threat), ideological consequences, and societal consequences. After presenting these dimensions, three historical cases of jihadi foreign fighting (Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia) are examined to see to what extent different types of fallout materialized. The final part of the article attempts to gauge which indicators or signs of potential fallout are already observable in the case of the on-going conflict in Syria and Iraq. If we seek to prepare ourselves for the future fallout of today's foreign fighter phenomenon, we must look beyond the terrorist threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the gap in labour market and school outcomes between non-EU immigrants and natives in European countries. It then correlates the related socio-economic data with the number of foreign fighters per million inhabitants as well as per million non-EU immigrants. It emerges that larger gaps correlate with higher numbers of foreign fighters, with Belgium emerging as the worst performer in the sample. While not offering a full, causal and micro-level model to understand the link completely, the present analysis nevertheless finds a clear and robust pattern across much of Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While several studies of radicalization processes and recruitment to jihadi organizations have been undertaken in European countries, very few are based on interviews with foreign fighters that have been fighting in Syria and/or Iraq. Hence, actual knowledge about the foreign fighters' inner narratives and motivations remain scarce. This article aims to shed light on how foreign fighters from jihadi organizations in Syria and/or Iraq understand their own actions and behaviour, and what we might overlook when designing counter radicalization measures. Drawing upon 16 in-depth interviews with returned and current foreign fighters from Denmark, the study suggests that while many previous studies emphasize the role of structural socio-economic factors in pushing foreign fighters to travel, several pull factors-some rather counter-intuitive-are also at play. Thus, the very idea of an Islamic State seems to have a significant pull effect on Danish jihadi-travellers, being a driving force in the radicalization process, in the recruitment to jihadist organizations, and on the battlefield. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the extent to which Islamic State (IS) has affected jihadi terrorism in Europe. We look at the scope of attack activity, perpetrators and their networks, modus operandi and funding. For all the talk of a new threat we argue that, apart from scope, less is new than most assume. IS wants largely the same as al-Qaida did by attacking Europe. Their tactics are similar and their networks overlap in time and space. The core dynamics of the threat endure. It is premature to talk of a new paradigm in recruitment, but more terrorists are instructed online than before. Patterns in funding remain relatively stable, but there is an increase in plots financed from abroad. Despite military setbacks, IS remains a formidable terrorist actor, with territorial control, economic muscle and thousands of Europeans in its ranks. These things, combined with the group's skillful social media usage, are exhausting European security services' capacities. So is the refugee situation, which is exploited by IS to transfer personnel. If IS's territorial control persists, we foresee attempts at large-scale operations, including attempts at using improvised chemical or radiological devices. If IS continues to lose ground, small-scale attacks by single actors will become even more frequent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses discourses on Islamist radicalisation and threats of terrorism in Norway, with a focus on a new category of people known as “Syria travellers”, i.e. young Norwegians who go to Syria to fight for the Islamic State. Our analysis of debates in the media, policy documents and parliamentary discussions revealed two main narratives regarding the authorities’ response to Syria travellers: the first emphasises legal sanctions, and the second highlights the reintegration of returnees. We found that contentions about how to react to the new kind of people (the Syria travellers) are intertwined with the way these people are portrayed, understood or “made up”. In the political realm, there is also a striking consensus on the need for both reintegrative and legislative responses. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Terrorism and violent extremism are usually the top national security risks amongst the five Central Asian states. Although each state has its own approach to countering violent extremism and terrorism, they tend to broadly agree on the nature of the threat. Their definitions of “terrorism” and “extremism” are relatively broad in both legal definition and in practice, and they are often geared towards protecting the political and social status quo. A key challenge is that both religion and religiously-inclined, usually Islamic, groups have become blanket tools of blame to cover a range of actions and the perceived threat of actions deemed “terrorist” and “extremist”. This article looks at how “terrorism” is defined by the five Central Asian States and in what ways those descriptions are simplistic or problematic. It examines the drivers of radicalisation in the region, as well as the strategies used to prevent radicalisation and counter terrorism. The article argues that overall a more nuanced approach to understanding the context of radicalisation and violent extremism is key. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]