Search

The article considers the negative effects of warrantless search of an entire vehicle based on the smell of burnt marijuana by the police in the U.S. Topics discussed include the history of the Fourth Amendment which highlights the vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement, varied opinion of federal courts on the use of the smell of burnt marijuana as a probable cause to warrantless search, and the need for the Supreme Court to emphasize that smell is not considered a probable cause.

The article focuses on the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the case Commonwealth v. Mora wherein Court held that the nonstop video surveillance of a home for an extended period of time was a "search" requiring a warrant. It mentions Fourth Amendment, which has come to regulate police actions and individual privacy rights. It also mentions court deepened privacy protections for poor people and people of color by refusing to link one's expectation of privacy.

The constitutional right to privacy is enshrined in section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. It is premised on the notion that all persons should be protected from intrusions on their privacy by any person or institution. The Constitutional Court has also, on numerous occasions, held that the right to privacy is bolstered by its connection with the right to human dignity. It is undeniable that every person's right to privacy should be protected. However, a person's right to privacy is violated when police officials conduct warrantless search and seizure operations. Generally section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for warrantless search and seizure operations when a police official has a reasonable suspicion that a search warrant will be issued to him and that a delay in obtaining such a warrant would defeat the object of the search. Warrantless searches are important for the prevention of crime, but recent case law has suggested that there has been a progressive shift towards protecting the right to privacy of the individual subjected to warrantless searches, since there are a number of laws besides section 22 that regulate warrantless searches and which have been declared to be constitutionally invalid. This article seeks to demonstrate that the current regulatory framework for warrantless searches should be reviewed in order to protect the legitimacy of the police as well as the dignity and privacy of the citizens of South Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the decision of Supreme Court of Missouri in the case State v. Smith on legal background of reasonable suspicion, focusing in particular on both the constitutional provisions relating to reasonable suspicion. It mentions court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the traffic stop was justified and required by the Fourth Amendment. It also mentions Fourth Amendment has been read to require that police officers obtain warrants.

A police officer asks a person in custody to unlock their cellphone and hand it over so the officer can look at its contents. This simple interaction--which happens more and more often as cellphones dominate modern life--implicates three different constitutional doctrines. Riley v. California dictates that the officer must get a warrant or consent to search the cellphone. And Miranda v. Arizona requires that the officer inform the person of their right to remain silent before questioning them. But many might not realize that this scenario also implicates United States v. Patane, the case allowing admission of physical evidence found in violation of Miranda. And as currently interpreted, Patane means that even if an officer purposely violates Miranda, the contents of the device will likely be admissible in court. The Court decided Patane before Americans became dependent on cellphones and computers for nearly every aspect of their personal and professional lives. As courts begin to apply Patane to the contents of digital devices that law enforcement officers unlock due to a Miranda violation, police have an even greater incentive to flout Miranda, just as the dissenting justices in Patane feared. And in the quick interactions police officers use to gain access to cellphones, the Fifth Amendment question implicated by Miranda and Patane is intertwined with the Fourth Amendment question from Riley--meaning weak Fifth Amendment protections for contents on cellphones due to Patane can help police evade the warrant requirement imposed by Riley. This article argues that Patane should not apply to the contents of digital devices due to the vast difference between the traditional physical evidence examined in Patane and evidence found on cellphones and computers. This article also provides arguments advocates can use when arguing that Patane should not apply to the contents of digital devices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses legal issues on the conduct of warrantless border searches of cell phones of airline passengers in international airports in the U.S. and proposes new procedural standards in conducting said searches. Other topics include how said searches intersect the Fourth Amendment protections and the conventional warrant requirement exceptions for administrative and border searches.

This article focuses on the concept of 'time collapse' commonly used within scholarship on digital memory. Despite its intuitive appeal, I claim that the notion of a collapsed time leaves considerable room for conceptual ambiguity, which in turn hampers a deeper ethical analysis of the topic. In view of this ambiguity, the present article sets out to provide analytical rigor to, and thus unpack the ethical dimensions of, the notion of time collapse. Pursuing this goal, I introduce the concept of temporal friction, denoting informational resistance that makes moments of time perceivable as separate for an embodied epistemic agent. I argue that the concept of temporal friction offers a more flexible and precise interpretation of collapsed time, and draw on two examples – search warrants and the so-called digital remains – to illustrate its ethical significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Study objective: To qualitatively and quantitatively analyze the association between use of Angiotensin receptor blocker class of drugs and psoriasis from Canadian Adverse Reaction database and published literature. Research Design and method: Reports of psoriasis associated with use of Angiotensin receptor blocker class of drug were retrieved from public version of Canadian Adverse Reaction (CADRMP) database between January 2000 and December 2016 and analyzed for quantitative signal detection by data mining algorithms mainly reporting odds ratio (ROR), proportional reporting ratios (PRR) and 95% confidence interval (CI) of PRR. Also for qualitative analysis, reports for psoriasis associated with ARBs were obtained from literature regulatory agency reports for period from 2000 to 2016. Results: Based on CADRMP data from January 2000 and December 2016, total 9 reports were obtained for psoriasis associated with use of ARBs. Thus, as per our results obtained; value of PRR, ROR and 95% CI for PRR were found to be 17.5, 17.7 and 4.4, respectively indicating significant new signal for aggravated psoriasis associated with ARBs use, however these signals were stronger for Valsartan than other ARBs. Conclusions: Thus public version of CADRMP database as well as literatures and regulatory agency report represents an important source to detect signals of psoriasis. In particular, our present study generated significant new signals for psoriasis among ARBs for which further investigations and active surveillance are warranted. These signals should be considered in evaluating the benefit-risk profile of these drugs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three years after a homicide occurred, information about the murder weapon was discovered during court preparation. A search warrant for a Facebook account resulted in the identification of the defendant through an image of a hand holding a firearm that was the same make, model, and caliber as the murder weapon. Confirmation through the Integrated Ballistics Identification System and a comparison by a trained examiner revealed the firearm to be the murder weapon. The identification from the image, along with other evidence in the case, resulted in the defendant pleading guilty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This research examines American police operations by Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units. In this study, SWAT unit proactive search warrant deployments in Maryland over a 4-year period (2010–13) were analysed to see if they were influenced by violent crime rates, property crimes rates, vice crime rates, and the number of sworn law enforcement officers across four models (two random effects and fixed effects models). The results reveal an inverse relationship between proactive vice type arrests and SWAT unit proactive search warrant deployments. The results are discussed as they inform SWAT unit policies in a democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a recent legislative amendment, while caught in the act, the police officer is entitled to enter a dwelling or a well-defined area that belongs to or is used by an individual or a legal entity, in any way, complying with the law, without having the consent of the owner or legal representative and without any search warrant. However, question arises whether the new legal provision is sufficiently reliable to achieve the purpose of the criminal proceedings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a global beliefthat any action taken at the suspicion and evidence collection stage should not touch people's freedoms or their home's sanctity. Police's role should be limited to collecting information or listening to the suspect's statements, answers, and replies. This stage should mainly involve clarifications about the crime. Actions affecting personal freedom, such as arrest and search, can only be carried out by police in the case that an arrest order or a search warrant from the Public Prosecution is issued. Nevertheless, Article 30 of the Penal Procedures Code has defined the job of judicial officers in a very broad and vague sense. It states that judicial officers have to investigate crimes and the perpetrators of these crimes, collect evidence, and carry out the necessary examinations which facilitate the investigation process, and that they must take all necessary procedures to preserve any evidence related to the crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a court case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that evidence obtained via unlawful search could be admissible under the independent source doctrine. In the case U.S. v. Huskisson, alleged drug dealer Paul Huskisson appealed his conviction for methamphetamine possession due to warrantless entry by the police. Also cited is the provisions of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Police and federal agents generally must obtain a warrant to search the tens of thousands of devices they seize each year. But once they have a warrant, courts afford these officers broad leeway to search the entire device, every file and folder, all metadata and deleted data, even if in search of only one incriminating file. Courts avow great reverence for the privacy of personal information under the Fourth Amendment but then claim there is no way to limit where an officer might find the target files, or know where the suspect may have hidden them. These courts have a point. How can an officer know where she will find evidence of, say, drug trafficking until she has opened and at least skimmed most files? When scholars and courts try to protect privacy with ex ante limits, they engage in laudable efforts doomed to fail. Moreover, these ex ante solutions presume that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy-as-secrecy only, the right not to have the files viewed at all. True, secrecy over papers is a basic right. But the Fourth Amendment protects far more; it protects the right "to be secure" in one's "papers." This article is the first to propose an entirely new approach rooted in the ancient inventory requirement of the Warrant Clause. In the physical world, officers must prepare an inventory for the suspect of each item they seize pursuant to a warrant. I argue we should apply this inventory requirement to electronic information and, in particular, to each file officers view. Providing the inventory will further a person's right to be secure in her papers for several reasons. She will know which files officers viewed, and which they did not. She will be able to compare those files with the authorization of the warrant. Courts and individuals will, for the first time, have the ability to supervise officer's searches, and seek remedies for searches that go beyond the scope of the warrant. Finally, this threat of remedy will deter over-broad searches. This ex post protection will effect ex ante limits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In its 2018 decision, Collins v. Virginia, the Court seemingly took for granted the idea that the curtilage was part of a person's "home" under the Fourth Amendment. The result was a quick resolution of the case for the majority: if the curtilage--the area immediately surrounding the home--was the same as the home, and the driveway was part of the curtilage (and therefore was the home for constitutional purposes), then a search of a motorcycle in the driveway was in fact a search under the Fourth Amendment and required a warrant. As entering the four walls of a home without a warrant would violate the sanctity of the home, so too would entering the driveway without a warrant violate (in Justice Sotomayor's arresting phrase) "the sanctity of the curtilage." Most commentary on the case has followed Justice Sotomayor in believing that this, indeed, was a rather easy case-- almost to the point of wondering why the Court would bother to take it all. But the Court's unreflective use of the curtilage, and its obeisance to the supposed sacredness of the curtilage ignores the reality that the concept of "curtilage" is one without genuine support in either text or history. The Court has, in fact, repeatedly and consistently misread Blackstone on the curtilage. The problem, in a nutshell, is that the Court has taken Blackstone as meaning something that he clearly did not--that somehow the land near the home itself is part of the home. But Blackstone defined the "home" as including not the curtilage--the land outside the home--but only the buildings contained in the curtilage. Nor does the curtilage get much support from the Katz "reasonable expectations of privacy" test, a point somewhat better established. If the test is reasonable expectations of privacy, then labels--"curtilage" or "open fields"-- cannot replace actually looking at what those expectations are, and if they apply to the land in question. In other words, we can only call a piece of land "curtilage" after we have decided we have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that land; we cannot begin with the idea that some land is already curtilage. As a result, while the Court has long believed that curtilage finds support both in the text of the Fourth Amendment (because it is part of the "house") and in the Katz test (because the curtilage is associated with heightened expectations of privacy), it actually has support on neither ground. The stunning failure of curtilage doctrine raises deeper questions about the Court's Fourth Amendment's jurisprudence more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on key changes in the Fourth Amendment realm while presenting evidence that Arkansas is open to differentiating the state Fourth Amendment doctrine from the federal Fourth Amendment doctrine. It mentions development of the Fourth Amendment with a particular focus on the U.S. Supreme Court case Carpenter v. United States. It also mentions doctrine and create a workable doctrine to give citizens increased protection.

The article discusses legal issues over the use of advanced sensing technology in warrantless searches in homes by U.S. law enforcement officers. Other topics include the Constitution's Fourth Amendment provision on warrantless search, the general public use test on warrantless searches, and the case Kyllo v. U.S. as an example of a case involving the use of technology in law enforcement.

The U.S. Supreme Court's 2017 decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi purported to clarify the role of the judiciary in inferring Bivens suits directly from the Constitution, rather than a federal statute. Despite this effort, uncertainty has plagued the lower courts. While the Court's recent Bivens jurisprudence has focused on issues concerning national security, uncertainty also persists in Bivens claims in other domains. This Note examines Bivens claims seeking damages for constitutional violations by law enforcement agents who falsify evidence, lie to procure a search warrant, and commit other similar acts of misconduct. After recognizing a broad, unacknowledged circuit split on such claims, this Note offers a framework that would resolve the inconsistences that now abound while conforming to the principles of both Ziglar v. Abbasi and the original Bivens case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case United States v. Leon which held that although the exclusionary rule and evidence be admissible because the police operated in good-faith reliance on the magistrate's issuance of the search warrant. It mentions discussion of the general principles regarding the Fourth Amendment and search warrants. It also mentions circumstances of the prior improper search to the magistrate.

Forced urinary catheterization, absent or pursuant to a search warrant, is a disturbing practice that threatens the liberties of the American people. Aside from carrying many health risks, forced catheterization is highly-intrusive, painful, traumatic, and essentially useless, in light of alternative, less-intrusive methods of substance testing. However, not only has forced catheterization become widespread in many states, including the state of South Dakota, but it also has become practically immune to defeat in court. The existence of a search warrant, various exceptions to the warrant requirement, and the defense of qualified immunity either paved the way for forced catheterization to become a norm or helped shield the government against Fourth Amendment claims. There are, however, jurisdictions in this country that took a stance against the practice of forced catheterization and in favor of alternative methods of substance testing. Therefore, South Dakota should reconsider the use of forced catheterization for the purpose of evidence compilation and disallow it in its entirety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]