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This testimony responds to a list of specific questions posed by the Joint Inquiry Staff to the author which are addressed in this statement for the record ad seriatim. This document is a report of the "Lessons of 9/11"., Testimony submitted for the Committee Record to the United States Joint September 11, 2001 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence on October 8, 2002.

State support or sponsorship of an insurgency as an instrument of foreign policy was common during the Cold War. The United States, the Soviet Union, and a host of regional powers backed their favored proxies, often transforming local quarrels into international contests. The end of the Cold War did not end the use of insurgents, but the dimensions and nature of outside aid and the identity of the providers have changed significantly. Hundreds of millions of dollars no longer regularly flow from Washington's and Moscow's coffers. Leading state sponsors today such as Iran, Rwanda, Angola, and Pakistan, for example, devote far smaller amounts of money and resources to their proxies. Indeed, state support is no longer the only, or necessarily the most important, game in town. Diasporas have played a particularly important role in sustaining several strong insurgencies. More rarely, refugees, guerrilla groups, or other types of non-state supporters play a significant role in creating or sustaining an insurgency, offering fighters, training, or other important forms of support. This report analyzes these changes in the nature of outside support for insurgencies starting with the end of the Cold War. It describes the nature and motivations of state backers and examines the role of diasporas, refugees, and other non-state supporters of insurgencies. The report concludes by assessing which forms of outside support are most important and also offers implications for the analysis of insurgency today.

Until last Tuesday, terrorists either in this country or abroad had killed no more than approximately 1,000 Americans total, since 1968. The enormity and sheer scale of the simultaneous suicide attacks of September 11th dwarf anything we have previously seen-either individually or in aggregate. Indeed, by the time the rubble and debris is cleared from New York City's World Trade Center, the collapsed walls of the Pentagon are stabilized and the last of the bodies are retrieved from the field in rural Pennsylvania where a fourth suicide aircraft crashed, the death toll is likely to be exponentially higher. Accordingly, for that reason alone, the events of September 11th argue for nothing less than a re-configuration of both our thinking about terrorism and of our national security architecture as well. Such a change is amply justified by the unique constellation of operational capabilities evident in that day's tragic attacks: showing a level of planning, professionalism and tradecraft rarely seen among the vast majority of terrorists and terrorist movements we have known.1 Among the most significant characteristics of the operation were its: * ambitious scope and dimensions; * consummate coordination and synchronization; * professionalism and tradecraft that kept so large an operation so secret; and * the unswerving dedication and determination of the 19 aircraft hijackers who willingly and wantonly killed themselves, the passengers and crews of the four aircraft they commandeered and the thousands of the persons working or visiting both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

Based on a firm appreciation of terrorism threats, both foreign and domestic, an overarching strategy should now be developed that ensures that the U.S. is capable of responding across the entire technological spectrum of potential adversarial attacks. The focus of U.S. counterterrorism policy in recent years has arguably been too weighted towards the "high end" threats from biological and chemical weapons and was based mainly on planning for extreme worst-case scenarios. This approach seemed to assume that, by focusing on "worst-case" scenarios involving these more exotic weapons, any less serious incident involving a different, even less sophisticated weapon, could be addressed simply by planning for the most catastrophic event. Such an assumption ignored the possibility that these less catastrophic, though still high casualty incidents, might present unique challenges of their own. The consensus from a series of first-hand interactions I had last year with state and local first responders from three different regions of the United States strongly implied-as last week's events d%the shortcomings of this approach. At each of these training sessions, complaints were voiced repeatedly that state and local authorities were unable to use federal funds earmarked for the purchase of anti- and counterterrorism equipment to obtain essential life-saving equipment such as concrete cutters, diamond (glass) cutters, and thermal imaging, body-sensing devices that would aid in the rescue of victims in building collapses caused by bombings (or, for that matter, other man-made or natural disasters). Instead, these funds apparently could only be applied to orders involving a range of paraphernalia exclusive to addressing and handling "bioterrorism" situations.

Nearly half a century ago the renowned British novelist and international traveler, Evelyn Waugh, presciently observed that, "In a few years' time the world will be divided into zones of insecurity which one can penetrate only at the risk of murder and tourist routes along which one will fly to chain hotels, hygienic, costly and second-rate." Today, many Americans would likely agree with that assessment: simultaneously comforted by the monochromatic familiarity of restaurants and hotels that have become indistinguishable from one another whether located here or abroad; while increasingly leery of a world beyond our borders seen as populated by terrorists, kidnappers, brigands and bandits. It is perhaps not surprising that such a world view of palpable threat and acute risk should exist given the seeming unrelenting litany of terrorist attacks, high-profile kidnappings, aircraft hijackings, extortions and robberies that have deliberately targeted or randomly entangled Americans either travelling or working abroad. To a large extent, this perception is grounded in an undeniable reality: for over three decades, terrorists have targeted the United States-and in turn its citizens-more often than any other country. The report of the National Commission on Terrorism last year drew attention to precisely this lamentable situation: "Terrorists attack American targets more often than those of any other country." Recent testimony before a Senate Committee respectively by the Director, Central Intelligence, George Tenet and a senior State Department official further attested to this fact: with both men agreeing that "The United States remains a number one target of international terrorism. As in previous years, close to one-third of all incidents worldwide in 2000 were directed against Americans.", Presented to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, April 3, 2001.

Clearly, much has been done in recent years to ensure that America is prepared to counter the threat of terrorism. Yet, despite the many new legislative and programmatic initiatives, budgetary increases, and the intense governmental concern and attention they evince, America's capabilities to defend itself against the threat of terrorism and to preempt or respond to such attacks, arguably still remain inchoate and unfocused. Last November's suicide attack on the U. S. S. Cole tragically underscored these continued vulnerabilities. Indeed, within the United States it is by no means certain that we would be better able today to address an Oklahoma City-like bombing scenario than we were six years ago. The issue in constructing an effective counterterrorism policy is, however, no longer the question of more attention, bigger budgets and increased staffing that it once was: but of a need for greater focus, a better appreciation of the problem and firmer understanding of the threat, and, in turn, the development of a comprehensive national strategy. My testimony this morning will discuss how the absence of such a strategy has hindered our counterterrorism efforts by focusing on the critical importance of threat assessments in the development of such a national strategy., Presented to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, March 27, 2001.

Acts of terrorism are not a new threat to Washington, D.C. Over the last two centuries, there have been several organized terrorist attacks, as well as numerous assaults by unstable individuals acting alone, that have targeted the White House and U.S. Capitol building and the President or U.S. Congressmen within the city limits of the District of Columbia. It was not, however, until the 1980s that such incidents evoked heightened security around the White House, initiating a process of fortification that culminated with President Clinton's decision in April 1995 to close the section of Pennsylvania Avenue running in front of the Mansion. The research reported here considers how Pennsylvania Avenue can be re-opened while still ensuring to the greatest extent possible the safety and security of the President of the United States. The study was conducted as part of a project entitled, "Assessment of Physical Security Measures," within RAND's Criminal Justice Research Program. This work is being carried out as part of a larger undertaking by the Federal City Council a nonprofit, nonpartisan, Washington, D.C.-based organization dedicated to the improvement of the Nation's Capital aimed at reassessing and reconsidering the physical security measures that have been imposed on the District of Columbia in recent years. This document is a revised version of a previous draft that was reviewed by the client. It is currently being reviewed internally as part of RAND's quality assurance process and will shortly be published in final form as a Monograph Report (MR).

RAND's research on terrorism formally began in 1972. Two bloody terrorist incidents that year-the Japanese Red Army attack on passengers at the Lod Airport in Israel and the seizure of Israeli athletes by Black September terrorists at the Olympics in Munich-signaled dramatically to the world that a new mode of warfare had begun. Reacting to this new threat, then President Nixon created the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, a high level group to coordinate all U.S. counterterrorist efforts. The committee in turn commissioned RAND to examine the phenomenon and how it might affect American security interests. Terrorism was not a new concern for the government, at least in its particular forms-the hijacking of airliners, the kidnapping of diplomats, protest bombings. However, as is so often the case, dramatic events focused interest and mobilized resources. Nor was this entirely new territory for RAND, which previously had studied the use of terrorism in revolutionary and guerrilla warfare, already had identified the new phenomenon of urban guerrilla warfare and its inherent tendency toward the employment of terrorist tactics, and had examined the problem of airline hijackings and assassinations. Having been present at the initiation of RAND's research on terrorism, and now 27 years later being called upon to review this latest RAND volume, Countering the New Terrorism, by Ian Lesser and his colleagues, provides me an opportunity for review and reflection, as well as for pointing out some of the unanticipated consequences of our endeavor.

Since its national debut in 1987, Fresh Air with Terry Gross has been a highly acclaimed and much adored weekday magazine among public radio listeners. Each week, nearly 4.8 million people turn to Peabody Award-winning host Terry Gross for insightful conversations with the leading voices in contemporary arts and issues. The renowned program reaches a global audience, with over 620 public radio stations broadcasting Fresh Air, and 3 million podcast downloads each week. Fresh Air has broken the mold of 'talk show' by weaving together superior journalism and intimate storytelling from modern-day intellectuals, politicians and artists alike. Through probing questions and careful research, Gross's interviews are lauded for revealing a fresh perspective on cultural icons and trends. Her thorough conversations are often complemented by commentary from well-known contributors. Fresh Air is produced at WHYY-FM in Philadelphia and broadcast nationally by NPR., INT. 1: Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, BRUCE HOFFMAN. He's been studying terrorism for 20 years, and advises governments and businesses around the world about it. He has a new book about the history of terrorism is, "Inside Terrorism" (Columbia University Press). REV. : Rock critic KEN TUCKER reviews the new release by Joni Mitchell, "Taming the Tiger" (Reprise). INT. 2: Irish author, poet, and playwright SEBASTIAN BARRY. He's best known for his play, "The Steward of Christendom," as well as for his commentaries on the troubles in Ireland for the The New York Times. He's written a new novel, "The Whereabouts of Eneas McNulty" (Viking). It's about a naive Irishman who joins the British Merchant Navy during World War 1, and then is blacklisted from his beloved hometown by the Royal Irish Constabulatory. A review from Kirkus Reviews says the book is "one of the best novels out of Ireland in many a year." REV. : TV critic DAVID BIANCULLI previews the ABC telemovie "Columbo: Ashes to Ashes" starring Peter Falk. It airs tonight at 9:00.

The aerial roots of Heteropsis flexuosa (Kunth) Bunting, a hemi-epiphyte, are harvested by indigenous communities in Guyana for a developing wicker furniture market. Nibbi roots have potential as a sustainably harvested product, but there is little data to guide management. I examined nibbi biology, harvest response, product yield and use at several forest sites. H. flexuosa is a relatively abundant plant and 35% of trees (≥ 10 cm dbh) in plots were hosts. Stems exhibited mean growth rates of 1-3 cm per month. Aerial roots grew a mean 156 cm per month and some reached maturity within 6 months. With present methods, harvest does not decimate populations because 97% of colonized trees possess few harvestable roots. But, only 28% of cut roots re-generated in experiments. For indigenous harvesters at Manawarin village, nibbi harvesting is a primary source of cash income and is important in daily subsistence.