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Satisficing consequentialism is often used as a way of solving the demandingness objection, but many forms of satisficing consequentialism fail to do so. Further, those that do are vulnerable to the objections Ben Bradley outlined in Against Satisficing Consequentialism. In this paper, I present a new type of satisficing consequentialism which resolves the demandingness objection, is in-line with common intuitions about moral responsibility, and avoids Bradley's criticisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski argue in recent work that "semiotic" or "symbolic" objections to markets are unsuccessful. I counter-argue that there are indeed some semiotic limits on markets and that anti-commodification theorists are not merely expressing disgust when they disapprove of markets in certain goods on those grounds. One central argument is that, contrary to what Brennan and Jaworski claim, semiotic arguments against markets do not depend fundamentally on meanings that prevail about markets. Rather, they depend on the meanings that attach to various goods, meanings that give us moral bases on which to make judgments about their prospective commodification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal utilitarianism is attractive for practice because this field of legal thought and philosophy of law sets out a particular direction of legal policy and statutory regulation (focus on the utility principle in decision-making) that can, under certain reservations, be used to improve people's lives. Most scholars conclude that the first utilitarian was J. Bentham. However, scientific studies prevalently do not involve the analysis of earlier legal doctrines in relation to the use of utility principle. Thus, the relevance and scientific novelty of analysis of the origin of legal utilitarianism is associated with the need to develop a theoretical component of this doctrine that is of current interest for the legal policy and to enlarge the underdeveloped - in our opinion - theoretical framework of legal utilitarianism genesis. The purpose is to identify the first theory in the history of legal thought, which can be classified as legal utilitarianism, and, if such theory is the J. Bentham's utilitarianism, to determine the reasons why earlier theories based on the utility principle cannot be classified as legal utilitarianism. The theoretical basis of the article is materials such as original sources by various thinkers whose works are based on the utility principle and scientific papers of European and the US researchers. For the purpose of the article, the following methodological tools were used: metaphysical (dialectic method), general (analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction, analogy, comparison) and specific (historical and legal-historical) scientific methods. The main outcome of the research is identification of distinct features of pre-Bentham legal thought based on the utility principle and identification of pre-requisites and basis (provisions which had formed the basis) for J. Bentham's utilitarianism, as well as the answer to the question: Was J. Bentham the first legal utilitarian?.

Abstract Legal hunting of threatened species—and especially the recreational practice of “trophy hunting”—is controversial with ethical objections being increasingly voiced. Less public attention has been paid to how hunting (even of threatened species) can be useful as a conservation tool, and likely outcomes if this was stopped. As case studies, we examine the regulated legal hunting of two African rhino species in South Africa and Namibia over the last half‐century. Counter‐intuitively, removing a small number of specific males can enhance population demography and genetic diversity, encourage range expansion, and generate meaningful socioeconomic benefits to help fund effective conservation (facilitated by appropriate local institutional arrangements). Legal hunting of African rhinos has been sustainable, with very small proportions of populations hunted each year, and greater numbers of both species today in these countries than when controlled recreational hunting began. Terminating this management option and significant funding source could have negative consequences at a time when rhinos are being increasingly viewed as liabilities and revenue generation for wildlife areas is being significantly impacted by COVID‐19. Provided that there is appropriate governance, conservation of certain highly threatened species can be supported by cautiously selective and limited legal hunting.

In this review of Gregory Conti's Parliament the Mirror of the Nation, I offer an outline of what I take to the thesis of that work: that during the mid-Victorian period, mirroring was a key goal of representation, which dominated and framed discussions of post-1832 debates on parliamentary reform. I focus, in particular, on the teleological orientation of the arguments that Conti uncovers in his systematic reconstruction of debates that Conti offers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under mounting pressure from the international communities and organizations to curb carbon emission causing disturbing climate change, and the growing pressure of domestic environmentalists and the common man in India, the government is hard-pressed to enact laws on carbon emission. However, the moot problem is whether to consider a pro-active rule of action seriously to curb carbon emission while keeping the collective scenario in view or to consider a case-by-case scenario in view. A number of people argue that a collective approach is much better, and for that matter, pro-active general rules of actions are desirable for their outcomes or consequences are good or worthwhile. This is what we now call rule consequentialism, which is much different from the case-by-case act consequentialism. In this case, the rightness of political action is determined by following some rules (or policies) which are amenable to worthwhile consequences. Similarly, we may conceive of a number of general rules of action such as "curb corruption", "curb apartheid", "curb exploitation of woman" and so on. In this paper, I would like to revisit rule consequentialism as a normative theory of rightness of action that is not immoderately overdemanding on moral agents. However, I would justify why rule consequentialism is not only overdemanding of moral agents but immoderate as well. Hence, it is an untenable normative theory of rightness of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Justifications for punishment are generally grounded in retribution or consequentialism. Retribution is rooted in and legitimized by common sense notions of free will, claiming that offenders freely and rationally choose to commit a criminal act, and are therefore deserving of punishment. Consequentialism does not necessitate a reliance on a belief in free will, and views punishment as means to a valuable end. In recent years, neuroscientific research has challenged the notion of free will, providing one pathway for a public shift away from retribution and towards consequentialism. To date, no studies have examined whether educating participants about biopsychosocial effects of trauma that are often outside of conscious awareness may contribute to free will doubt. This study used a 2 (biopsychosocial information, neutral information) × 2 (juvenile offender, adult offender) between subjects design and measured beliefs in free will, judgments of culpability, and justifications for punishment. Results showed a main effect of trauma informed psychoeducation on free will beliefs, such that individuals who watched a trauma video had lower free will beliefs compared to individuals who watched a control video. Direct effects of trauma informed psychoeducation on sentence severity and on justifications for punishment were nonsignificant. However, mediation analyses revealed that free will beliefs had an indirect effect on the relations between trauma informed psychoeducation and perceived culpability and that perceived culpability had an indirect effect on the relations between trauma informed psychoeducation and retribution, consequentialism, and punishment severity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is the ethics of punishment an important academic field? The standard answer given by philosophers, legal scholars, and other theorists is that academic engagement in the ethics of punishment is justified by the importance of informing and guiding penal practice. In this article, this view is referred to as the Impact Assumption. The purpose of the article is to consider what this assumption implies for the way research within this field should be conducted. First, I argue that the way research is currently being disseminated, the nature of the research itself, and the lack of interest among legislators and other decision-makers, constitute serious challenges to the satisfaction of the Impact Assumption. Second, I suggest that these challenges can be overcome, but that this will require a significant expansion and reorientation of the entire field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is an increasingly popular view among philosophers that moral responsibility can, in principle, be attributed to unconscious autonomous agents. This trend is already remarkable in itself, but it is even more interesting that most proponents of this view provide more or less the same argument to support their position. I argue that as it stands, the Extension Argument, as I call it, is not sufficient to establish the thesis that unconscious autonomous agents can be morally responsible. I attempt to show that the Extension Argument should overcome especially strong ethical considerations; moreover, its epistemological grounds are not too solid, partly because the justifications of its premises are in conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of the Faculty of Political Sciences / Godisnjak Fakultet Politickih Nauka Beograd is the property of University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The establishment of menstrual hygiene, specifically among the mentally disabled females, is one of the most critical concerns posing challenges for the individual, family and caretaker. Although the performance of hysterectomy among females with intellectual disabilities (ID) is now trending, but it has given rise to many ethical questions. Therefore, the study aimed to address the ethical dilemmas associated with hysterectomy among ID females, taking reference from a case of 19-year-old female, unable to practice menstrual hygiene.

Alan Gewirth’s work on moral and political philosophy attracted a great deal of attention between 1978 and 2000, but has received very little attention since then. This essay aims to revive interest in Gewirth’s work by providing a more direct and straightforward version of his core argument for objective moral rights and duties and clarifying how a Gewirthian moral and political theory can proceed beyond the conclusion of the core argument.

Modern sociology places dignity and justice at the center of social debate. In estatebased societies only the aristocrats possessed the right to dignity and honor. The article analyzes these concepts as elements of the general structure of meaning underlying the institutions of modern societies. However, the progress of society conducive to their entry into the state of modernity the right to dignity kept extending towards an ever greater number of citizens. Dignity became an element of the policy of equality that tended to override the line of distinction charted by estates or other social subjects. In the early years of equalization policy, the struggle of dignity and equality assumed the form of recognition of the so-called natural rights of man, that constituted the essence of human condition. The idea of natural rights led to a debate and later to policy measures that resulted in the modern concept of citizenship. The latter asserted the right of every human being to dignity, equality before law and freedom to engage in productive, entrepreneurial activity without interference from other actors of political or economic life. The idea of equality, embedded in citizenship, came to be expressed in the policy of inclusion that overcame social prejudice and consequently in policies that extended political recognition to ever wider social groups. In the 20th century the egalitarian policy led to a wider scope of social rights that were regarded as a necessary condition of social justice and human independence. At present the principles of dignity and justice are implemented in social policy as acquired “capabilities” — a sum of life forces and means that allow citizens to uphold their citizenship regardless of the conditions in which they find themselves. Inclusion turns into the main vector of social policy, setting out to endow citizens with equal rights and resources that are necessary for their implementation.

A prosocial action typically provides a more sizable benefit when directed at those who have less as opposed to those who have more. However, not all prosocial acts have a direct bearing on socioeconomic disadvantage, nor does disadvantage necessarily imply a greater need for the prosocial outcome. Of interest here, welfare impact may depend on the number of beneficiaries but not on their socioeconomic status. Across four preregistered studies of life-saving decisions, we demonstrate that when allocating resources, many people are benevolently partial. That is, they choose to help the disadvantaged even when this transparently implies sacrificing lives. We suggest that people construct prosocial aid as an opportunity to correct morally aversive inequalities, thus making relatively more disadvantaged recipients a more justifiable target of help. Benevolent partiality is reduced when people reflect beforehand on what aspects they will prioritize in their donation decision.

The authors investigated the relevance of consequentialism in commercial space exploration as well as in the actively developing space market. The authors conclude that space expansion and colonization of space objects will lead to a revision of the foundational consequentialism provisions. Consequentialism, formed during the history of terrestrial civilization, loses its effectiveness under conditions of space commercialization. The basics of planetary thinking are different from those of cosmic thinking. Therefore, considering the meaning of the terms “cosmic expansion” and “colonization of the cosmos” through the existing theory of consequentialism faces serious contradictions. There is a range of problems that are not explored in modern philosophy and ethics due to the lack of an empirical basis for philosophical analysis.

The authors investigated the relevance of consequentialism in commercial space exploration as well as in the actively developing space market. The authors conclude that space expansion and colonization of space objects will lead to a revision of the foundational consequentialism provisions. Consequentialism, formed during the history of terrestrial civilization, loses its effectiveness under conditions of space commercialization. The basics of planetary thinking are different from those of cosmic thinking. Therefore, considering the meaning of the terms “cosmic expansion” and “colonization of the cosmos” through the existing theory of consequentialism faces serious contradictions. There is a range of problems that are not explored in modern philosophy and ethics due to the lack of an empirical basis for philosophical analysis.

Rawlsian accounts of tort law have argued for one of two extreme positions. Sometimes it is affirmed, as does Arthur Ripstein, that tort law must remain indifferent to the distributive goals that animate most part of Rawls’s conception of justice (e.g. the difference principle). For others, like Kevin Kordana and David Tabachnick, tort law is only defensible from a Rawlsianism perspective to the extent the former’s distributive effects are desirable. Distancing itself from both these extreme views, the paper explains why parties in Rawls’s original position cannot disregard issues of convergence between law and interpersonal morality. On one hand, convergence prevents tort law from being a mere tool to the pursuit of distributive goals. On the other hand, assuring convergence between tort law and interpersonal morality still allows for some distributivism in the realm of torts.

The most common argument against negative utilitarianism is the world destruction argument, according to which negative utilitarianism implies that if someone could kill everyone or destroy the world, it would be her duty to do so. Those making the argument often endorse some other form of consequentialism, usually traditional utilitarianism. It has been assumed that negative utilitarianism is less plausible than such other theories partly because of the world destruction argument. So, it is thought, someone who finds theories in the spirit of utilitarianism attractive should not go for negative utilitarianism, but should instead pick traditional utilitarianism or some other similar theory such as prioritarianism. I argue that this is a mistake. The world destruction argument is not a reason to reject negative utilitarianism in favour of these other forms of consequentialism, because there are similar arguments against such theories that are at least as persuasive as the world destruction argument is against negative utilitarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article challenges Nigel Biggar's claim that there are no natural moral rights. Focusing on Biggar's analysis of torture, I argue that he does not give adequate consideration to the possibility of intrinsically wrong actions. This oversight not only leads to a problematic, consequentialist analysis of torture—it also weakens his argument against the possibility of absolute rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a growing worry (raised in some form or another by Dean Zimmerman, Eric Olson, A.P. Taylor, Mark Johnston and Alex Kaiserman) that perdurantism—and similarly ontologically abundant views—is morally untenable. For perdurantism posits that, coinciding with persons, are person-like objects, and giving them their moral due seems to require giving up prudentially driven self-sacrifice. One way to avoid this charge is to adopt consequentialism. But Mark Johnston has argued that the marriage of consequentialism and perdurantism is in moral trouble. For, depending on the nature of time, consequentialist perdurantists either are unable to do more than one good act or they are morally obliged to adopt a repugnant form of ageism. I argue both that perdurantist consequentialism doesn't have the latter implication, and that there's at least one plausible form of consequentialism that perdurantists can adopt to avoid the former implication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory that assigns value impartially to the well-being of each person. Informed Altruism, introduced in this article, is an intentionalist theory that relegates both consequentialism and impartiality to subordinate roles. It identifies morally right or commendable actions (including collective actions such as laws and policies) as those motivated by a sufficiently informed intention to benefit and not harm others. An implication of the theory is that multiple agents may perform incompatible actions and yet each be acting rightly in a moral sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within a theology that has lost its spiritual discernment, in which theologians are only seekers of the Absolute, unable to access absolute certainty, the prophecy of the laity is appealed to as well as the prophecy of the theological hierarchy. Even if the prophetic call of the laity were restricted to the realm of the temporal, inspiration is the basis of a situational moral theology of consciousness, the opening of consciousness to the spirit of the age. Even if the absolute norms defined in this way are above the circumstances, they still depend on the relativity of man and are influenced by his natural impotence. If they vary according to the current conception of man, they can no longer be called 'absolute', but dependent on the weaknesses of the human existential condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Quaestio Iuris (QI) is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Price discrimination is widely considered unethical/unfair by consumers, as has been borne out by decades of psychological research and mainstream press reporting. However, little academic work has been done to investigate the ethics of price discrimination. The work that has been done to date concludes that while price discrimination is not unethical, despite widespread lay perceptions, it is at best morally neutral. We argue price discrimination is more ethical than unitary pricing, when done 'progressively,' meaning firms charge customers as a function of their willingness-to-pay. We introduce this specific kind of price discrimination as 'Progressive Pricing' and demonstrate it ethically outperforms a 'Unitary Pricing' scheme (where everyone pays the same price, regardless of their willingness-to-pay), at least within a broadly consequentialist framework. We do this by comparing a Unitary Pricing scheme to a Progressive one, analyzing them through the lenses of four different consequentialist 'Social Welfare Functions' (Utilitarian, Egalitarian, Prioritarian, and Leximin), which are used by welfare economists and philosophers to rank the distributions of different social outcomes, concluding that Progressive Pricing is preferred regardless of which Social Welfare Function(s) one finds most plausible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some consequentialists argue that ordinary individuals are obligated to act in specific, concrete ways to address large-scale harms. For example, they argue that we should each refrain from meat-eating and avoid buying sweatshop-made clothing. The case they advance for such prescriptions can seem intuitive and compelling: by acting in those ways, a person might help prevent serious harms from being produced at little or no personal cost, and so one should act in those ways. But I argue that such reasoning often relies on an overly simplistic assessment of the costs and benefits of those prescriptions, one that misconstrues or neglects important issues. Indeed, a closer look at those costs and benefits reveals just how little we often know about a number of real-world matters that bear on the expected consequences of the prescribed individual actions. Our predicament is one of radical uncertainty: we currently lack a sound basis for concluding that the relevant actions are more likely to do good than to backfire. I distinguish this empirically grounded objection from others, which are not convincing—including one based on the mere conceivability of the actions in question backfiring and another based on the supposition that such actions cannot make a difference in addressing the massive problems at issue. The upshot is that, at least for now, consequentialist arguments for many specific individual actions aimed at addressing large-scale harms are inconclusive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work sets out to consider the effects of consumption from a new angle. While much has been written about the economic and political implications of chain stores, little has been devoted to their social costs on consumers. Focusing on the American experience, this work argues that such stores take an unquantifiable toll on those who use their services that often goes unnoticed. The terminology developed by Kapp of "social costs," is adopted here to describe the effects of these stores on their consumers. These social costs, it is argued, must be factored in to the prevailing—consequentialist—economic assessment of chain stores that highlights their reduced prices and increased range. Any properly consequentialist account of such stores must consider other costs alongside these economic benefits before accepting the merits of chain stores and their proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do we have stronger duties to assist in emergencies than in nonemergencies? According to Peter Singer and Peter Unger, we do not. Emergency situations, they suggest, merely serve to make more salient the very extensive duties to assist that we always have. This view, while theoretically simple, appears to imply that we must radically revise common-sense emergency norms. Resisting that implication, theorists like Frances Kamm, Jeremy Waldron, and Larry Temkin suggest that emergencies are indeed normatively exceptional. While their approach is more in line with common-sense, however, it is theoretically less simple, and it is has proven difficult to justify the exception. In this paper we propose a model of emergencies that we call the Informal-Insurance Model, and explain how this can be used to combine theoretical simplicity with common-sense emergency norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Pravnik is the property of Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of State & Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We defend a scalar theory of the relationship between material scarcity and justice. As scarcity increases beyond a specified threshold, we argue that deontological egalitarian constraints should be gradually relaxed and consequentialist considerations should increasingly determine distributions. We construct this theory by taking a bottom-up approach that is guided by principles of medical triage. Armed with this theory, we consider the range of conditions under which justice (of any form) applies. We argue that there are compelling reasons for thinking that justice applies under a far broader range of conditions than is standardly supposed, including those that could sensibly be labelled as conditions of extreme rather than moderate scarcity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consequentialists often assume rational monism: the thesis that options are always made rationally permissible by the maximization of the selfsame quantity. This essay argues that consequentialists should reject rational monism and instead accept rational pluralism: the thesis that, on different occasions, options are made rationally permissible by the maximization of different quantities. The essay then develops a systematic form of rational pluralism which, unlike its rivals, is capable of handling both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision theory and the unstable problems that challenge causal decision theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the proposal of a person‐affecting version of the principle of Procreative Beneficence. Such a principle has been stated by Savulescu & Kahane in an impersonal form and balanced with a person‐affecting principle of harm to address the moral problem of the selection of future children. The paper aims to show some differences between Person‐affecting Procreative Beneficence and Savulescu & Kahane's hybrid position, and to distinguish the former from other pro‐selection perspectives. Moreover, it explores the extension of such a principle beyond selection to other issues of reproductive ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Justice understood as a practical principle and virtue has remained an understudied subject in the anthropology of morality. Moral anthropology has explored the moral or ethical as a space of freedom and creativity, whereas justice has often been associated with rule-following or even the law. In contrast, my paper explores justice as a virtue whose social dynamic can initiate moral change in ordinary life. This virtue, as I understand it, comprises not only a disposition to conform to established norms but also a capacity to reformulate these in the pursuit of social justice. My ethnography of Chinese peasant lawyers' moral agency suggests that their understanding of justice as an essentially social, rule-governed and outcome-oriented virtue can grant new insights into the dynamics of moral innovation that arise in ordinary life. The peasant lawyers of rural northern China pursue moral change through combining moral reasoning about justice with principled action for justice and the provision of benefits for victims of injustice. It is the concern with the consequences of principled action that distinguishes justice as a social virtue from the other virtues, and the justice motif from alternative drivers of social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The consideration of the problem of healthcare allocation as a special case of distributive justice is especially alluring when we only consider consequentialist theories. I articulate here an alternative Rawlsian non-consequentialist theory which prioritizes the fairness of healthcare allocation procedures rather than directly setting distributive parameters. The theory in question stems from Rawlsian commitments that, it is argued, have a better Rawlsian pedigree than those considered as such by Tännsjö. The alternative framework is worthy of consideration on its own merits, but it also casts light on two related difficulties with Tännsjö's approach: (i) the limits of his supposedly ecumenical methodology, which is revealed to be dialectically suspect and (ii) issues with the type of abstraction and idealization from actual judgements and preferences which the approach requires. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]