151. The Limits to Power without Persuasion.
- Author
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Dickinson, Matthew J. and Gubb, Jesse
- Subjects
- *
EXECUTIVE power , *EXECUTIVE orders , *PRESIDENTS , *LEGISLATION , *POLITICAL science research - Abstract
Research on executive action often assumes that presidents face an either/or decision between issuing an administrative order and seeking legislation. This premise, however, ignores differing structural characteristics of administrative and legislative policy vehicles. This paper will argue that, rather than see administrative actions as equivalent to legislation, presidents understand the distinct advantages and disadvantages each policy instrument brings and act accordingly. Using data linking executive orders and presidential legislative proposals, as well as a case study of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, we show that when presidents issue more executive orders, they do not issue fewer legislative proposals. In fact, presidents sometimes follow up on significant executive orders with proposals to enshrine them in statute. Our research supports viewing executive orders as a tool in the legislative toolbox, rather than a challenge to the legislative process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2016