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Engineers and other construction professionals need to take the lead to clarify the facts when a possible fraud in public infrastructure procurement is identified. A robust approach for producing scientific evidence to determine the presence of collusive bidding where questionable confessions need to be proven in court is presented. The concepts of game theory are used to demonstrate that economic principles support the confessions of senior executives from a cartel of 16 large construction companies. Relying on the confessions and defendants’ statements from the Brazilian Federal Police's anti-corruption investigation referred to as “Operation Car Wash,” the article demonstrates that the behavior of criminals was conscious and intentional rather than incidental, proving the mens rea necessary to establish the white-collar crime of collusion.

RESUMO A primeira parte trata dos processos de concentração e integração que ocorreram na indústria de mineração de estanho durante a década de 1920. Argumenta-se que a articulação dos setores extrativo e metalúrgico, embora permitindo uma melhor aderência ao suprimento mundial de estanho, tornou a indústria como um todo menos capaz de se ajustar às condições do mercado. A segunda parte mostra os efeitos adversos das políticas implementadas pelo Comitê Internacional de Estanho. Por fim, também é considerado o caminho que levou à nacionalização da indústria nos países produtores e as formas pelas quais as rédeas do mercado passaram para o lado do consumo. ABSTRACT The first part deals with the concentration and integration processes that took place in the tin mining industry during the 1920’s. It is argued that the articulation of the extractive and metallurgical sectors, although allowing for a better grip of world tin supply, turned the industry as a whole less capable of adjusting itself to market conditions. The second part shows the adverse effects of the policies implemented by the International Tin Committee. Finally, the path that led to the nationalization of the industry in the producing countries and the ways through which the reins of the market passed to the consumption side are also considered.

Este artículo explora la intersección entre el arte y la ciencia en el contexto de la conservación ambiental, centrándose en la creación de carteles educativos como medio para promover la conservación de la biodiversidad. El estudio investiga el papel del arte en la creación de conciencia, fomentando conexiones emocionales e inspirando cambios de comportamiento hacia la sostenibilidad ambiental. La investigación se basa en la literatura interdisciplinaria y estudios previos para establecer un marco teórico que enfatiza el potencial del arte para involucrar y comunicar conocimiento científico de manera efectiva. Además, el estudio presenta un estudio de caso que involucra la creación y evaluación de un cartel educativo para el Parque de Ciencias de Granada, España. El cartel muestra animales en peligro de extinción alojados dentro del parque y sus impactos humanos. Los hallazgos resaltan el impacto plausible del cartel en el aumento del conocimiento, la evocación de respuestas emocionales e influencia en cambios de comportamiento positivos entre el público objetivo. El artículo concluye enfatizando la importancia de incorporar el arte en los esfuerzos de conservación, ya que ofrece un medio poderoso para involucrar a audiencias diversas, transmitir conceptos científicos complejos e inspirar acciones colectivas para la protección de nuestro mundo natural., This paper explores the intersectionality between art and science in the context of environmental conservation, focusing on the creation of an educational poster as a medium for promoting biodiversity conservation. The study investigates the role of art in raising awareness, fostering emotional connections, and inspiring behavioral change toward environmental sustainability. The research draws upon interdisciplinary literature and previous studies to establish a theoretical framework that emphasizes the potential of art to engage and communicate scientific knowledge effectively. Furthermore, the study presents a case study that involves the creation and evaluation of an educational poster for the Parque de Ciencias in Granada Spain. The poster displays endangered animals housed within the park and their human impacts. The findings highlight the plausible impact of the poster in increasing knowledge, evoking emotional responses, and influencing positive behavioral changes among the target audience. The paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of incorporating art into conservation efforts, as it offers a powerful means to engage diverse audiences, convey complex scientific concepts, and inspire collective action for the protection of our natural world.

Cartel Día del Libro con el lema “Ciencia Ficción: el futuro imaginado” y las actividades que se organizan en torno al mismo.

This paper analyzes price collusion in a repeated game with two submarkets; a standard and a premium quality segment. Within this setting, we study four types of price-fixing agreement: (i) a segment-wide cartel in the premium submarket only, (ii) a segment-wide cartel in the standard submarket only, (iii) two segment-wide cartels, and (iv) an industry-wide cartel. We present a complete characterization of the collusive pricing equilibrium and examine the corresponding effeect on market shares and welfare. Partial cartels operating in a sufficiently large segment lose market share and the industry-wide cartel prefers to maintain market shares at pre-collusive levels. The impact on consumer and social welfare critically depends on the cost of producing quality. Moreover, given that there is a cartel, more collusion can be beneficial for society as a whole.

Campaña Barata que tiene como fin la recogida de alimentos a cambio de quitar sanciones en el préstamo. Es una labor conjunta entre el Vicerrectorado de Responsabilidad Social y la Biblioteca.

Cartel que promociona la colección de Còmics de la Biblioteca UPV.

Since 2018, the state of Guanajuato has been the most violent state in Mexico due to an intense conflict between criminal groups. This article analyzes an under-examined facet of the Cártel Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL), and the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG ) conflict in Guanajuato: the use of tire repair shops as fronts for criminal activity. An exclusive data set reveals that over the last ten years, at least 138 tire repair shops have been violently attacked in the state, leaving over 200 dead. An analysis of crime data, news reports, and statements of local security experts suggests that these attacks are related to the fight between organized crime groups. These groups have infiltrated tire repair shops, installing networks for merchandizing stolen fuel and methamphetamine, two key criminal markets in the state. While violence and insecurity due to conflicts between criminal groups are widespread across the nation, Guanajuato is the only state where tire repair shops have been infiltrated and systematically targeted with stunning violence. Therefore, this article aims to explain a unique trend and elucidate a key aspect of the most violent conflict in Mexico.

Cartel Día del Libro año 2014 y las actividades que se organizan entorno al mismo.

Cartell Día del Libro 2015 y las actividades organizadas para su conmemoración

Cartel Día del Libro dedicado a la conmemoración de los 50 Años de la Universitat Politècnica de València

Cartel del Día del Libro 2021 dedicado a los viajes a través de los libros.

Cartel Día del Libro con el lema "Leer, soñar, viajar: la pasión cervantina de Blasco Ibáñez" y las actividades que se organizan entorno al mismo.

Взаимодействие фирм на современных олигополистических рынках с широким распространением цифровых технологий претерпевает серьезные изменения. Источниками и причинами картелизации в современных условиях выступают накопление цифровыми платформами больших массивов данных, которые становятся особым видом актива, а также использование цифровых алгоритмов. В статье анализируется распространение картелей по отраслям и видам бизнеса, а также оценивается ущерб, приносимый их существованием национальным экономикам отдельных стран, в том числе России. Источником информации о картелях, критериях их определения в большинстве случаев становятся дела, возбужденные антимонопольными властями разных стран. Взаимный обмен практиками выявления картелей расширяет представление и подходы к эффективной антикартельной деятельности., The firms’ interaction in today's oligopolistic markets with widespread digitalization is undergoing major changes. The cartelization sources and causes in modern conditions are the large amounts of data accumulation by digital platforms as well as the use of digital algorithms. The data become a special asset type. The article analyzes the distribution of cartels by industry and type of business, as well as assesses the damage caused by their existence to the national economies of individual countries, including Russia. In most cases, the source of information about cartels and the criteria for their determination are cases initiated by the antimonopoly authorities of different countries. Mutual exchange of cartel detection practices expands the understanding and approaches to effective anti-cartel activities., Экономика и предпринимательство, Выпуск 1 (150) 2023, Pages 251-255

Spanish abstract:Las acciones consecutivas para la compensacion del dano causado por carteles representan el transito de la infraccion de la prohibicion de carteles (declarada por las autoridades de competencia) a la indemnizacion de los perjuicios provocados por la conducta de los infractores. Corresponde al perjudicado que interpone la accion indemnizatoria la prueba del dano y su conexion causal con la conducta antijuridica declarada por la autoridad de competencia. Frecuentemente, la constatacion e identificacion del dano sufrido se subsumira en la cuantificacion del mismo que figure en las pruebas aportadas por el demandante. Aun asi, puede ocurrir que esa prueba no resulte convincente al tribunal, con lo que cualquier decision debera ir precedida de la identificacion del posible dano provocado por el cartel. La decision previa de la autoridad de competencia no suele declarar ni acreditar los efectos del cartel en el mercado, aunque en la misma pueden contenerse pruebas o indicios de la produccion de danos. En todo caso, la eventual presuncion (judicial o legal) del dano es una presuncion que el demandado puede rebatir. Aunque los carteles que no provocan dano sean excepcionales, son una posibilidad, y debe reconocerse a las empresas participes en los carteles el derecho a probar el sobrecoste cero. De modo que, cuando la existencia del dano no se extraiga de la decision de la autoridad de competencia (como ocurria, por ejemplo, en el cartel del azucar o en el cartel de los sobres de papel), la salvaguarda del derecho de defensa exige permitir al demandado la prueba de la ausencia de sobrecoste, basandose en datos objetivos y de mercado (que no esten afectados por la infraccion). English abstract: Follow-on actions for cartel damages compensation represent the transition from the infringement of the cartel prohibition (declared by the competition authorities) to the compensation of damages caused by the infringers' conduct. It is up to the injured party bringing the damages claim to prove the harm and its causal connection with the unlawful conduct declared by the competition authority. Frequently, the ascertainment and identification of the harm suffered will be subsumed in the quantification of the damage that appears in the evidence provided by the plaintiff. Even so, as such evidence may not be convincing to the court, its decision will have to be preceded by the identification of the possible harm caused by the cartel. The competition authority's prior decision does not usually state or prove the cartel effects on the market, although it may contain evidence or indicia of harm. In any case, the (judicial or legal) presumption of harm can be rebutted by the defendant. Although cartels that do not cause harm are exceptional, they exist, and cartelized firms have the right to prove zero overcharge. So, where the existence of harm is not drawn from the competition authority's decision (as it was the case, for example, in the sugar cartel or the paper envelopes cartel), safeguarding the defense rights of cartelized firms requires that they are allowed to prove the absence of overcharge, based on objective and market data (not affected by the infringement).

Problem setting. Changes in the socio-economic development of the country, caused by geopolitical, technological, economic and social factors, create new challenges for the competition policy of the state. The COVID-19 pandemic added to this list, significantly affecting the activities of the business environment, households, and the world economy in general. The development of an effective competition environment in commodity markets is a prerequisite for the restoration of stable economic growth on the basis of innovation and investment development.In this regard, there is a need to rethink the mechanism and set of instruments of competition policy on their adequacy to the current situation, their effectiveness and ability to ensure the achievement of goals and objectives. Nowadays, the emphasis of competition policy is changing, caused by changes in the competition environment and the objectives of economic policy in general. At the same time, the formation of competition policy should take place as a holistic system of influence by public authorities on the activities of economic entities and commodity markets in accordance with national goals and priorities of socio-economic development.Recent research and publications analysis. The works of Ukrainian and foreign scientists, including V. Lagutin, Z. Borysenko, A. Gerasimenko, G. Filyuk, K. Kantur, T. Shvydka, Y. Yasko, T. Shcherbakova, M. Porter, O. Kilievich and others.are devoted to the study of theoretical and applied principles of competition policy.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. Despite significant developments in competition policy, there are still crucial problems to solve regarding the mechanism, tools and methods of competition policy, considering the socio-economic changes in society, changes of the emphasis in its implementation, given the existing problems, dynamics and structure of violations of competition law, the need for coordination of competition policy with the entire system of state regulation of the national economy and adaptation to competition practices in developed countries. Therefore, further research is needed to improve the state’s competition policy in the face of new challenges.The main purpose of the article is a theoretical study of competition policy, identification of the main problems in the implementation of competition policy on the basis of analysis of the Western Regional Territorial office of Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine and formulation of recommendations for their elimination.Paper main body. Competition policy is one of the most important and complex forms of economic policy of the state. In its content, it is much broader than antitrust regulation, as it aims not only to limit and terminate monopolistic practices, anticompetitive agreements between economic entities and government actions, but also to develop and maintain effective economic competition, including through the application of competition law.Nowadays, the main focus of the state’s competition policy is to strengthen its preventive nature in order to promote fair competition, as well as to end the monopolistic behavior of both enterprises and public authorities.The most important principles of competition policy, which are mainly reflected in the current legislation and correspond to the best world practices are: improving the welfare of society; flexibility of competition policy; increasing the competitiveness of the national producer; promotion of entrepreneurial activity; creating opportunities for access to the benefits created by natural monopolies; coordination of the state’s competition policy with the priorities of economic policy and the goals of state regulation in general.Analysis of antitrust authorities showed that in the total number of violations of competition law the largest share are anticompetitive concerted actions of economic entities, violations in the form of anticompetitive actions by government, local authorities, bodies of administrative management and control, which significantly reduce the effectiveness of competition policy of the state at all levels.An actual problem in the implementation of state competition policy is to ensure equal conditions for all business entities, regardless of the type of ownership. This is due to the fact that most commodity markets in Ukraine are characterized by the presence of state-owned enterprises. Thus, according to the OECD and the World Bank (as of 2018), approximately 19 commodity markets in Ukraine have at least one state-owned enterprise; The number of utility companies is constantly increasing: at the beginning of 2021, 14,174 of them were registered in Ukraine, which is 22% more than in 2018.A reflection of the existing problems is the discrepancy between the amounts of fines imposed by the regulator for violating competition law and the amounts of fines actually paid. Thus, for the period of 2017-2020, the Western Regional Territorial office of Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine imposed fines for violation of competition law in the amount of over UAH 95 million, and in fact UAH 11219543 was collected from violators, which is only 11.8%. The factors of this situation are: imperfection of legal norms and insufficient justification of penalties for business entities; low competitive culture of market participants, low responsibility of violators of competition law and “commitment” of government officials to some of them; lack of effective motives to prevent anticompetitive actions in economic activities, and lack of support and development of competition in commodity markets.Among all areas of state competition policy today, we consider the protection of competition and demonopolization of potentially competitive and monopolistic markets to be the main ones. In order to prevent collusion and counteract cartel agreements, it is necessary to establish effective interaction between the regulator and law enforcement agencies, expand the powers of the AMCU to inspect business entities, and introduce competitive conditions at all stages of public procurement. The control, transparency and targeting of state aid, as well as the cessation of discrimination in the actions of public authorities, are the key to ensuring the equality of economic entities, especially in the face of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Termination of unfair competition practices based on fair competition advocacy.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. The main task of the state’s competition policy is to ensure the effectiveness of competitive relations in commodity markets, which leads to increased competitiveness of the domestic economy. All instruments and mechanisms of state competition policy should be used solely to develop effective competition in commodity markets. Competition policy, adapted to modern requirements and challenges, should encourage competition between producers, which will improve the quality of goods, services, the formation of economically reasonable prices and reduce them, and thus increase the level of satisfaction of society’s needs.The main instruments of competition policy should be preventive measures, strengthening the level of responsibility of economic entities for violations of competition law, as well as competition advocacy aimed at forming a competitive culture of market participants, the predominance of the principles of fair, transparent competition.

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the impact of market structure and market share on the performance of the Islamic banks operating in the Iranian banking system based on the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. Design/methodology/approach The Iranian Islamic banking system’s market structure is evaluated by using the econometrics method to test the validity of the traditional SCP paradigm. For this purpose, the authors estimate a simple regression model that is consisted of several independent variables, such as the market share, bank size, real gross domestic product, liquidity and Herfindahl-Hirschman index as a proxy variable for concentration and one dependent variable, namely, the profit as a proxy for performance. The panel data includes a data sample of 22 Islamic banks operating from 2006 to 2019. Data are extracted from the balance sheet of Islamic banks and the time-series database of the Central Bank of Iran and World Bank. Findings The study’s findings indicate that both concentration and market share have a positive impact on the performance of banks in the Iranian Islamic banking system. This result is contradicted with both traditional SCP and efficient structure hypotheses; however, it confirms the existence of oligopoly or cartel in the Iranian Islamic banking system that few banks try to gain the highest share of profit and maintain their market share by colluding with each other. This result is in contradiction with other research studies about the market structure in the Iranian banking system that claimed that banks in Iran operate under monopolistic competition. In addition, it shows that the privatization of some banks in Iran does not improve and help competition in the Iranian banking system. Originality/value This paper is a pioneer empirical study analyzing the market structure, concentration and collusion based on the SCP paradigm in Iranian Islamic banking. The results of the study support the existence of collusive behavior among the Islamic bank in Iran that is not aligned with Sharia. This study clearly shows the difference between ideal Islamic banking and Islamic banking in practice in Islamic countries. This clearly indicates that only prohibiting some operations like receiving interest, gambling and bearing excessive risk is not enough. In fact, the Islamic banking system should be based on the Sharia rule in all aspects and much more modification and study have to be done to achieve an appropriate Islamic banking system. These possible modifications to overcome the issues of cartel-like market structure and collusive behavior in the Iranian Islamic banking system include making the Iranian banking system more transparent, letting foreign banks enter the Iranian banking system and minimizing the government intervention in the Iranian banking system.

O objetivo deste artigo é expor as questões ligadas ao cartel e sua interlocução com o código de defesa do consumidor. Será apresentada uma breve narrativa acerca do histórico do Cartel, e após como ele está inserido no Código de Defesa do Consumidor e se existe a hipótese de lesão à concorrência ou se o Cartel é um mero ato ilegal. Ainda, será analisado se o cartel é crime e qual a pena e/ou multa que pode ser dada aos participantes do conluio, com base no Código de Defesa do Consumidor e na política de defesa da concorrência. Afim de alcançar tais objetivos, será utilizado recurso bibliográfico, bem como doutrinário e jurisprudencial acerca do tema proposto. Há expectativa de obter resultados concretos acerca da ilicitude e/ou crime do Cartel com substrato no Código de Defesa do Consumidor.

This article aims to analyze the extent to which the administrative sanctions applied by the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) are effective mechanisms to discourage cartels in Brazil. As demonstrated by Connor and Heimers (2007) and the OECD (2002), the presence of a cartel in the economy distorts productive allocation, impacting social welfare. Based on this assumption, the study confirms that the main measure for measuring the damage generated by the presence of the cartel is the surcharge. The study compared existing overprice calculation methods from the selected literature, presenting the different ways of measuring the amount overpaid in a cartelized environment compared to its counterfactual. Finally, the study brings the concepts of optimal dosimetry of the penalty based on the economic rationale and analyzes the history of fines imposed by CADE in cartel cases in recent years. As an empirical evaluation, the calculation of the optimal fine is presented for the case of the School Supplies cartel, corroborating the argument that the fine imposed is below that which would be necessary if the economic rationale was used in its fullness. The analysis of the cases presented shows that CADE has not been efficient in deterring the illicit practice and that the use of economic rationale for the calculation of fines is fundamental for the deterrent effect.

The subject of this study is an oligopolistic market in which three firms operate in an environment of quantitative competition known as the Cournot oligopoly model. Firms and their production are differentiated, which brings the theoretical model closer to real market conditions. The main objective was to expand the Cournot duopoly and add another firm, resulting in an oligopolistic market structure assuming a partially differentiated production and coalition strategy between two firms. This article contains an oligopolistic model specifically designed for three different types of expectations, and has been applied to find and verify the stability of the net equilibrium of oligopolists. The market of telecommunication operators in Slovakia was selected as a real market case with accessible data on an oligopoly with three companies and partial differentiation. There are studies in which the authors limit their considerations to a certain number of repetitions of oligopolistic games. An infinite time interval is considered here. Three types of future expectations were considered: a simple dynamic model (or naïve expectations) in which the oligopolist assumes that its competitors will behave in the future based on their response functions, an adaptive expectations model in which the oligopolist considers a weighted average of the quantities offered by its competitors, and real expectations in which firms behave as rational players and do not have complete information about demand and offer output based on expected marginal profit. While the presented model proved to be stable under naïve and adaptive expectations, no stable equilibrium was found under real expectations and further results indicate a chaotic behavior.

Forty percent of economic activities in Mexico weighed by sales have been investigated for illegal monopolistic practices since the Federal Competition Commission was established in 1993. By exploiting some unique features of the Mexican investigative system, and using a synthetic control approach, this paper examines the causal impact of antitrust sanctions on industry performance and aggregate outcomes. Sanctions cause sales and wages to increase and profit margins to fall in the sanctioned sectors, thus benefiting consumers and workers. Overall, antitrust enforcement contributes roughly half a percent of per capita gross domestic product growth. Outcomes of investigations that are closed without sanction fail to reject the hypothesis that some harmful conduct is not sanctioned because investigators lack resources to prove it conclusively. An implication is that the Commission could generate greater benefits with additional investigative resources.

This thematic issue assesses the organisational forms of a broad range of right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) across Europe (12 in total). It interrogates received wisdom about the supposed leader-centeredness of such parties and investigates, in particular, the extent to which the mass party, as an organisational model, remains popular among RWPPs. This introduction presents the aims, research questions, and analytical framework of the issue and justifies its selection of cases. The resilience of the mass party model highlighted in many articles challenges the dominant trend that party organisation literature has identified: a unidirectional shift towards “catch-all,” “electoral-professional,” or “cartel” organisations.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the divers and facilitators of money laundering in Ethiopia. Specifically, it looks at the risk factors that existed in the country’s economic and political system, which provide an appealing environment for money laundering to grow. Design/methodology/approach This qualitative study relies on primary data generated from interviewees drawn from the National Bank of Ethiopia, Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Center, Ethiopian Customs Commission, selected financial institutions and certain non-financial businesses and professions and law enforcement agencies, as well as secondary data from government reports, media press, statutes and other online and offline sources. Findings This study finds that the risk factors for the growth of money laundering in Ethiopia are highly reliant on the country’s economic and political system. Accordingly, the nature of Ethiopia’s economy, which is cash-intensive, loosely regulated economic growth and the raise associated criminality, the development of underground banking activities, scarcity of foreign currency reserves and the existence of societal demand for illicit goods and services are all risk factors for the growth of money laundering. The raise of an elite cartel model type of systematic corruption, limited institutional capacity to prevent and suppress money laundering and the absence of a national identity card system are also identified as risk factors for the rife of money laundering in Ethiopia. Moreover, the geopolitical location of the country, its porous borders, limited cross-border cooperation and information sharing add further fuel to the vulnerability of the country to money laundering and associated predicate offense. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper provides a first-of-its-kind analytical perspective on the risk factors for the raise of money laundering in Ethiopia.