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The article analyzes the socio-practical potential of economic nationalism as a principal basis of economic strategies for modern developing countries. Based on a systematic analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of leading representatives of economic nationalism (from F. List to E. Reinert), and considering the situation of modern nation states in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, this article argues that the economic policy of Listanism is the most appropriate for practical implementation within societies that seek to develop their economic potential, rather than secure the status of raw materials in the global economy. This article analyzes the essential features of neoliberal economic policy of the "free market", which at the level of social practice does not confirm its universal status and is arguably detrimental to countries that have not put into effect their productive potential and have not formed a domestic market before opening their economy to free trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Ottoman-Turkish historiography has been largely concerned with the economic nationalism of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which consisted of four doctrines: elimination of foreign dominance on the Ottoman economy, removal of non-Muslims from the economic sphere, creation of a Turkish/Muslim bourgeoisie, and rapid industrialization. Through its focus on the economic activities of the Society for the Ottoman Navy, a CUP-affiliated charitable organization with enormous economic power, the present study investigates how the economic policies of the period can be regarded as a practice of economic nationalism. Based on archival material and in dialogue with secondary sources, this article argues that although the Unionist leadership and intelligentsia employed the language of economic nationalism, the operation of the economy in practice was considerably different from its rhetoric. War conditions, the lack of indigenous capital accumulation, and relations of the Ottoman Empire with foreign powers heavily shaped the implementation of the economic nationalism of the CUP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following paper seeks to understand Donald Trump as a "dialectical image" for the contradictions of neoliberal capitalism. Trump's management style, as described in his Art of the Deal, combines a fetishizing of entrepreneurial risk as a "lifestyle" with the insistence that it is not the entrepreneur but his targets who are ultimately exposed to risk. This suggests that we might understand the elevation of "deal-making" to a lifestyle as a characteristic of modernity that, with neoliberalism, is increasingly coming to the fore. Such a critique of modernity, I further argue, is anticipated by Fichte's Closed Commercial State with its intriguing dialectic of risk. I conclude by arguing that Trump's politics marks the rise of a new, specifically American style of Fascism—one that demands identification not with the state as supra-individual collective, but with an impersonal system governing over individual lives and rendering them precarious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia, Hungary and Poland have been at the forefront of the illiberal counter-movement to neoliberalism. However, while there is increasing knowledge about how 'populism' as a discursive strategy has brought illiberals to power, especially in Poland and Hungary, we know surprisingly little about the socioeconomic programme and guiding principles of illiberals. In this article, we argue first that there is such a programme and that – notwithstanding the differences between countries – it features a similar programmatic core in the three countries that took shape in conservative think tanks and guides socioeconomic policy recommendations. Second, this programmatic core is best understood not so much as populism, but as a combination of economic nationalism – subordinating the economy to national interests and to the imperative of protecting national identity – and conservatism, reorienting economic policies to serve the traditional family and undo the perceived wrongdoings of post-communist elites, in particular, privatisation. We call this core conservative developmental statism. Thus illiberalism is reducible neither to populism nor to the whims of the power-holders of the day, and in these countries it needs to be seen in a wider context in which rightwing intellectuals have been working in parallel with politicians to give illiberalism a conservative content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (CFPJ) is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article applies a Polanyian framework to the rise of populism in the countries of the North Atlantic and the fall of the Pink Tide governments in Latin America. By taking a global vantage point from the perspective of Latin America, we argue that haute finance has served as the fulcrum of a single political movement that has washed out governments serving the general will in the South, and washed in governments that do not in the North. As we argue, a Polanyian framework offers clarity in the muddled understanding of populism, and the recent experiences of Latin America offer greater insight into the second global neoliberal wave. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are striking similarities between today's early 21st century trade political economy and its late 19th century equivalent. Ascendant populist nationalism, escalating trade protectionism and tariff wars, growing discontent over globalization's distributional impacts and fast emerging economic superpowers disrupting the global order are features shared by both periods. This comparative historical analysis explores what lessons and conclusions we may draw from the past late 19th century world that can be applied to today. Integral to this discussion are the prospects of our early 21st century world experiencing a similar endgame of global conflict, as transpired around a century ago. In revisiting the past to better understand the present and future, this paper first evaluates empirical similarities between the trade political economies of both periods. It then applies theories and concepts of economic nationalism, globalization and interdependence in developing deeper conclusions and arguments. Brexit, Trump and their historic parallels serve as primary focal points in this study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (CFPJ) is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article reports on nationality in regard to companies and particularly multinational companies. Nationalism brought new trade barriers and industries are supported because they are seen as national industries producing national goods. Multinational companies becomes directly and even materially relevant in cross-border transactions.

Since the eighteenth century, but with increased dynamism in the twentieth century, calls on consumers to buy national products have proliferated all around the world. This article discusses which historical constellations have given rise to the demand for patriotic shopping. Each case raises the question whether the demand was voiced within the framework of a broad national movement with political, cultural, and economic goals or was rather a case of business interest groups attempting to increase sales. These are not mutually exclusive alternatives: calls to buy national have often entailed an element of both. However, some have more the character of a movement beyond the immediate control of business groups, while others are just a promotional campaign. All in all, the demand for nationally minded consumption has mostly sought to establish business as deserving the solidarity of citizens. It has also displayed a patriarchal and authoritarian bent. But have such exhortations produced the desired effect? It is doubtful that any buy national campaign or movement has fundamentally changed the shopping patterns of consumers, at least if we discount physical violence and short-term success. Yet the call for patriotic consumption has often prepared the discursive ground for protectionist measures. As an effort to promote consent, they have tied into the hegemonic project of the capitalist nation state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present paper I will analyze the conflicting ideologies regarding immigration in Europe. I tried to define the contemporary historical context surrounding the issue of migration underlying the ideological rift between Western and Central-Eastern Europe. I analyzed the political, economic and cultural factors behind the ideological differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Romania's economic development in the interwar era has always generated fierce debates when it comes to economic ideology. There was an undisputed need to come up with a national strategy of development in order to insure and consolidate the country's economic independence. The economists of those times clashed their ideas and covered the full range of doctrinarian approaches from rejecting the state intervention to adopting economic dirigisme as a state policy. The reality of the insufficient development of the national productive forces was the starting point, and there were numerous attempts to draw up a strategy to modernize Romania. The issues related to the genesis of the Romanian economy captures the interest of many a great economists liberals, such as Ştefan Zeletin and Mihail Manoilescu, social-democrats (Marxist) such as Lothar Rădăceanu and Şerban Voinea, or agrarians such as Virgil Madgearu and Ion Răducanu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Economic & Political Thought / Myśl Ekonomiczna & Polityczna is the property of Lazarski University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Summary: The recent trade disputes and negotiations between the U.S. and Canada must be construed in light of a century-and-a-half-long evolution of trade relations between the two countries, profoundly marked by the mutations of American economic nationalism. In fact, Canada was for a long time more protectionist than the U.S. The main objective of this article is therefore that of contextualization: to paint a picture of the evolution of Canada-U.S. trade policies and the relationships that brings "economic nationalism" back. The main argument is that these relationships have been characterized by a constant tension between liberalization and protection, to which Canadian governments have contributed in many ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article identifies a hitherto understudied element of local food communities, namely their potential as counter-movements to nationalist discourses, practices and policies. This potential should be particularly valuable in Eastern Europe, where European integration has been severely contested over the past years by political elites. We support our argument by a closer qualitative inquiry into two cases; one with urban-rural dimensions in the metropolitan area of Budapest and one in a more sparsely populated cross-border region at the Slovak-Hungarian border. Based on 18 interviews with coordinators, producers and consumers, numerous visits to both sites, and studying the organisations' documents we conclude that the growth of local food communities contributes to strengthened solidarity in local communities. Although nationalist discourses on buying domestic are rarely contested explicitly, the lack of any reference to national movements and discourses testifies to the primary importance of the local. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this article is Estonia's post-socialist economic transition and the reasons behind the liberal nature of the country's economic policies. I argue that the self-image of a nation plays a significant role in shaping its economic policies. Objectives associated with economic nationalism can be achieved through various means that can include strategies of economic liberalism as well. Thus, the concepts of economic nationalism and economic liberalism are not a dichotomy. I examine the construction of the Estonian self-image through the discourses of radical individualism and industriousness, historical suffering, desire for freedom and return to Europe and sense of abandonment. By showing how these discourses interact with the liberal paradigm, I claim that Estonian policy-makers chose liberal economic policies because they perceived them to most effectively serve their objectives. When economic policies are examined in view of the national self-image and motivation of policy-makers, the incongruence between economic nationalism and liberal policies disappears. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The economic, energy and environmental aspects of the activities of metallurgical enterprises are analyzed in the context of the need to ensure their sustainable development. The high energy intensity of the production process, the low efficiency and irrational structure of capital expenditures for environmental protection, the dominance of material costs in the final cost of finished products at the expense of labor and social contributions are indicated. There proved the low effectiveness of the previous measures of the industrial policy of the metallurgical industry innovative development that were not in compliance with the requirements of the WTO and led to taking compensatory measures against the Ukrainian steel on world markets. The potential of economic nationalism as a system for ensuring the innovative development of the metallurgical industry is considered. There determined the priorities of the industrial policy for the development of metallurgical enterprises based on the principles of economic nationalism and taking into account the global trends in the development of trade and economic relations and Ukraine’s commitments to the WTO.

Ñontemporary counter movements, universally dubbed as 'populist' differ in many respects, but they all agree on a number of significant political and economic issues. First, a condemnation of the economic polices shared until now by the major electoral parties. Second, a criticism that the economic mechanism and political process have led to social polarisation. Third, a contention that electoral democracy has delivered an oligarchic bloc of irresponsible elites who have utilised neo-liberalism to legitimate their own interests. Skepticism about the benefits of the global order is fueled by two political issues. First, the results of globalized markets do not solve many incompatibilities, and this leads to critical movements against the establishment. The second problem is that the economic mechanism must move from the coordination of the global market to public administration. If market coordination leads to booms and busts, enrichment and poverty, some form of administrative coordination is an acceptable alternative. Such political events are associated with economic nationalism. However, a globalized neoliberal economy has created many obstacles to deter governments from pursuing policies promoting economic nationalism. In addition, there are limits to the power of administration - political, constitutional and economic. Anyway, it can be assumed that if economic coordination could be carried out on the principles of planning and maximizing public welfare, many of these problems could be solved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two distinct strands of conservative Canadian economic nationalism—associated with the ideas of John Rae and Isaac Buchanan—helped to inform the country's protectionist National Policy of 1879. These strands of nationalism were much less influenced by Listian ideas than was economic nationalist thought in many other countries at this time. This study of their content, intellectual sources and influence contributes empirically and analytically to debates in Canadian political economy and international political economy, while also advancing historical scholarship. The arguments also have some potential contemporary relevance in an age when protectionist economic nationalism is rising in the US and elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the activities and roles of two state-owned enterprises of the Québec government, Hydro-Québec and the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec (CDPQ), that evolved from instruments of economic nationalism to commercial enterprises with a growing focus on international trade. The first part of the paper explores how these two agencies were created in the 1960s and the ideas that governed their growth over the remaining of the 20th century. The second part looks at their commercial dimension and the intensification of their international trade activities since the end of the last century. The conclusion highlights the paradoxical situation which Hydro-Québec and the CDPQ are facing in the present days: initially carried by a wave of economic nationalism and state modernisation, they now must face elsewhere the same nationalist and protectionist environments in which they were born. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even though the nationalist policies of the current U.S. administration have taken the appearance of a radical shift away from the (neo)liberal approaches of preceding governments, they in fact represent the latest protectionist manifestation of the American system of industrial development and trade, characterised by economic nationalism since the Civil War of 1861-1865 and beyond. Recent trade disputes between the U.S. and Canada, from this perspective, have to be construed in light of a century and a half long evolution of trade relations between the two countries, profoundly marked by the mutations of American economic nationalism. Yet, Canada itself was never immune to protectionist tendencies. In fact, Canada was for a long time during the 20th century more protectionist than the U.S., and many of its own nationalist trade policies from the 1860s onward had significant effects on commercial relationships with the latter. The main objective of this article is therefore that of contextualisation: it paints a picture of the evolution of Canada-U.S. trade policies and relationships which brings "economic nationalism" back in. Its main argument is that these relationships have been characterised by a constant tension between liberalisation and protection, to which Canadian governments have contributed in many ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent literature analysing the ideology of economic nationalism has shown how it comes in many different varieties, including even some that endorse free trade and economic liberalisation. Within this literature, less attention has been devoted to the diversity that might exist within the neomercantilist strands of economic nationalism that support strategic protectionism and other forms of government economic activism in order to bolster their nation-state's wealth and power in the world. This article explores this issue by focusing on neomercantilist ideas in the American economic nationalist tradition. The American case is important partly because of its systemic significance in an age when the Trump administration has embraced neomercantilist economic nationalist ideas. But it is also important because Trump and his supporters have suggested that their neomercantilist ideology is part of a cohesive national tradition dating back to the early days of the American republic. By focusing on the important ideas of Alexander Hamilton and Henry Carey, this article shows that that early American neomercantilism had much more diverse content than this portrayal suggests. It also highlights how Trumpian economic nationalism itself represents yet one more variety of American neomercantilism whose content differs from that of these earlier thinkers in important ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the critical Hungarian case, this article analyses the fate of embedded neoliberal capitalism in the wake of the global financial crisis. The changes include policies to combat foreign dominance in the financial, energy, and retail sectors, and efforts to reform and retrench the hitherto relatively generous welfare state. Nevertheless, the article finds no less evidence of continuity than of change: the politicisation of fighting dependency is combined with the quiet politics of subsidising foreign direct investment in manufacturing, and the noisy politics of protecting pensioners and middle-class families parallels the erosion of future-oriented social investment. Notwithstanding the radical turn in development rhetoric, the actual path correction has merely shifted the pattern of dependency without breaking out of it: financing socio-economic development in Hungary (as in other Visegrád states) is still largely dependent on foreign sources, albeit of a more diversified nature, including not only manufacturing FDI, but the EU's structural funds and migrant labour's remittances as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Taiwanese Journal of Political Science is the property of NTU Press & National Taiwan University, Department of Political Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

American policy towards China is now up for grabs, with hardliners and soft-liners battling for the upper hand. The hardliners view China as an existential threat to American security and interests. The soft-liners regard China as a powerful counterpart, on occasion friend, competitor, or adversary, but not an existential threat. In my view, the hardline approach – to be pursued through protectionist trade policies and aggressive technology policies — would prove disastrous, weakening the world economy and creating a self-fulfilling grave risk of future conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the views of Petty, Hamilton, and List considered the "external threat" matter of countries a fundamental dimension of their economic development, and therefore thought national economies not only in terms of economic progress, but also as an instrument for political independence, military sovereignty and national security. Thus, the "external threat" is used to prioritize strategic objectives and direct the productive structure and the generation of income to certain sectors considered more relevant. Finally, it is argued that this conception is absent in Latin American thought and originates the discipline of International Political Economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Far‐right parties are on the rise across Europe. Their shared populist rhetoric, emphasis on sovereignty and policies that promote a 'national preference' has facilitated the term 'the new nationalism'. According to an emerging consensus, this new nationalism is primarily a demand‐side phenomenon triggered by cultural grievances, i.e. a cultural backlash, driven by those on the wrong end of a new transnational cleavage. This explanation we argue tends to overlook important variations across countries and across time. As such, in this article, we contest the view that the 'new nationalism' is a linear and coherent phenomenon best understood as a cultural backlash. Specifically, our argument is threefold: (1) it is important to conceptually distinguish between populism, nationalism and the far right in order to draw meaningful conclusions about the extent to which this phenomenon is linear, coherent and comparable across cases; (2) voters' economic concerns remain pivotal within the context of the transnational cleavage, entailing that voting behaviour is structured by two dimensions of contestation; (3) the explanatory power of nationalism is in the supply, i.e. the ways in which parties use nationalism strategically in an attempt to broaden their appeal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Discussion Papers is the property of Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the main theorists of economic nationalism (Romanianization) and their ideas promoting protectionism and anti-Semitism in 1930s–1940s Romania. Trying to offer a rational scientific justification for excluding foreigners, especially Jews, and increasing the role of ethnic Romanians in the economy, major scholars of economics offered solutions toward successful Romanianization. Because some of these economists were also influential politicians and public intellectuals, their investigations and blueprints for the project gained wide publicity and provided steps for achieving it rapidly and thoroughly. These economists disseminated their theoretical and empirical constructions of Romanianization in university courses, public lectures, and publications. Some were important scholars; among them, Virgil Madgearu, Mihail Manoilescu, Gheorghe N. Leon, Ion Răducanu, and D. R. Ioaniţescu, They examined Romanianization of the economy from the 1930s to the 1940s and influenced the agenda of local elites and the general public, due to their prestigious positions as politicians, public intellectuals, and professors at local universities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to research of psychological features of society and their influence on the state’s and the national economy reformations. The historical features of the formation of the dominant economic models of the world have been considered in the article. The psychological type of Russian behavior and the Asian way of managing has been described. The objective and subjective factors of formation the psychological and economic features of Ukrainian society in different periods have been analyzed. The worldview, economic and mental values of Ukrainians in the Cossack’s age have been described. A comparative analysis of the main views of Orthodoxy and Catholicism (Protestantism) was conducted. The influence of external cultures, natural conditions and ideological beliefs on economic behavior and construction of social relations has been revealed. The basic problems of development of national society and national economy under modern conditions have been determined. Priority directions as fundamental for ensuring the reforms of the national economy of Ukraine have been identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2016, a wave of American populism triggered emotional reactions to issues like trade and immigration, and dramatically impacted the Obama administration's plans to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) during President Obama's final year in office. This article asks how do emotions infuse populism with political power, and why was populism effective in sparking American economic nationalism and retreat from free trade during the 2016 presidential campaign? Drawing on a psychoanalytic, narrative framework, the article argues that populist narratives deployed by US presidential candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders characterized the American economy as a story of the people versus corrupt elites offering greater audience resonance that ultimately derailed President Obama's plan to pass the TPP and ushered in an era of economic nationalism under President Trump. The article contributes to the literature on emotions and foreign policy and explores the under-studied emotional features of populism as a discursive narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, nations have regained prominence as central symbols of political unity and mobilization, and proved capable of serving political goals across the political spectrum. Yet, the current revival of the national extends well beyond the realm of politics; it is anchored in the logic of global capitalism, and has become inextricably intertwined with the practices of promotion and consumption. Our article seeks to map the interface between nationalism and economic life, and bring some clarity to the so far fragmented debate on the topic, which developed under diverse headings such as ‘economic nationalism’, ‘nation branding’, ‘consumer ethnocentrism’ and ‘commercial nationalism’. We focus more closely on developing the concept of consumer nationalism, which received little sustained attention in cultural studies and in social sciences and humanities more generally. We offer a definition of consumer nationalism, situate it vis-a-vis the broader phenomena of economic nationalism and political consumerism, and propose an analytical distinction between political consumer nationalism and symbolic consumer nationalism. Drawing on existing literature we then consider a range of examples and examine how these two forms of consumer nationalism become involved in the reproduction of nationalism, taking into account both consciously nationalist discourses and practices as well as the more banal, everyday forms of nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a newly constructed database on foreign trade of Sweden-Finland 1738-1805, consisting of all exports and imports that were recorded by the custom houses in this period, and is made available at www.historia.se/Swedish foreign trade 1738_1805.xlsx. The traditional view as presented by Eli Heckscher, who was very critical of the mercantilist policies of the time, was that the overseas trade of Sweden-Finland saw a trend of secular stagnation during the course of the eighteenth century. By contrast, we show that in conjunction with a substantial expansion of the population, total trade nearly increased twofold during the period of study. Despite that, there was a small decrease in the value of exports in relation to GDP, mostly explained by a drop in the relative price of bar iron. The degree of specialisation of Swedish exports saw a declining tendency in this period. While exports from Sweden had a higher degree of specialisation than Finnish exports, imported goods to Finland were more concentrated than Swedish imports. Lastly, the composition of imports did not markedly alter, meaning that a consumer revolution did not take place in either Sweden or Finland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its ambitious ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) project, protectionism and economic nationalism are on the rise in ASEAN. Protectionism, however, is not new to Southeast Asia, with governments across the region employ such an inward-looking economic policy when they enjoy economic stability, and pursue economic reform when confronted with major economic challenges. Unfortunately, embryonic industries will always exist in the region, and governments will find excuses to safeguard their existence. Consistent with the so-called 'Murdoch Schoold of critical political-economy' approach, this article mainly argues that the inclination towards protectionism in ASEDAN is primarily rooted in the domestic political-economy of ASEAN Member States. Apart from bringing about domestic regulatory changes, major economic liberalisationinitiatives of ASEAN, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area and the AEC, significantly redistribute power and resources, and ignite struggles between competing domestic economic influences, many of which are in favour of government's protection. Whilst existing technical initiatives to address protectionism are useful, major crises that encourage major structural adjustments in all AMS might be needed to overcome fundamental protectionist inclination in the region

Abstract Current efforts to teach and research the historical foundations of IPE thought in classical political economy in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries centre largely on European and American thinkers. If a more extensive 'global conversation' is to be fostered in the field today, the perspectives of thinkers in other regions need to be recognised, and brought into the mainstream of its intellectual history. As a first step towards 'globalising' the classical foundations of IPE thought, this article demonstrates some ways in which thinkers located beyond Europe and the United States engaged with and contributed to debates associated with the three well-known classical traditions on which current IPE scholarship often draws: economic liberalism, economic nationalism and Marxism. It also reveals the extensive nature of 'global conversations' about IPE issues in this earlier era.