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Consequently, many (if not most) philosophers offering a theory of knowledge after Gettier focused on finding the missing component, I x i , such that the concept I justified true belief i + I x i would prove to be identical to I knowledge i . In fact, many took epistemic luck to be the reason why knowledge is absent in those cases.[3] In other words, Gettier provided a framework within which philosophers argued about knowledge and justification. Virtue epistemology in this sense is also a new perspective on knowledge and justification, one that consciously tries to move past the more traditional perspective of the gettieristic literature. While the old perspective (Elgin calls it "traditionalism") holds that I knowledge i has a complete, uniquely identifying analysis, knowledge-first epistemology's new perspective holds that I knowledge i is primitive or unanalyzable. [Extracted from the article]

In recent decades, scholars have increasingly reached agreement on how to interpret Aquinas' account of the rational grounding of faith. Drawing comparisons between Aquinas' position and Alvin Plantinga's "Reformed Epistemology", many commentators hold that according to Thomas, belief that the articles of faith are divinely revealed (and thus, true) can be rational even absent naturally perceptible evidence that the articles are so revealed. In Plantinga's terms, belief in the articles of faith is "properly basic". Although this interpretation is plausible, its proponents have further argued or implied that Aquinas' account only renders basic belief in the articles rationally justified in an "externalist" sense. Thomas' observation that there is naturally perceptible evidence (e.g. miracles performed by prophets) that the articles are revealed is supposedly crucially important, because only the perception of such evidence renders belief in the articles justified in an internalist sense. In this article, I argue to the contrary that on Aquinas' account, one with basic belief in the articles can have "internalist" justification for her belief without possessing naturally perceptible evidence that the articles are revealed. Thomas' contention that basic belief in the articles of faith is rationally appropriate need not render him an "externalist" about epistemic justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Eskişehir Osmangazi University Faculty of Theology is the property of Journal of Eskisehir Osmangazi University Faculty of Theology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The study analyses the epistemologies of online breaking news, focusing on the distinctive epistemic practices and challenges in the production of continuous news updates and online live broadcast. The analytical framework identifies three central aspects of news epistemology: the articulation of knowledge claims; how journalists know what they claim to know; and the justification of knowledge claims. The study draws on data from ethnographic research at a Swedish online first. Participant observations and interviews were carried out during spring and summer 2018. The study shows differences in the epistemic claims of news updates and live broadcast, how commitments to facts are carefully balanced in the enactment of discursive resources, and how justification is related to the calculation of epistemic efforts. The implications of different temporalities in news production are analyzed. The study identifies three forms of epistemic dissonance that ultimately jeopardize the authority of news media as a provider of valuable public information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes virtual learning environments as a didactic mediation tool for integral human formation. The contemporary ways of educating deserve to originate the proper management of the resources that the new communication technologies offer, with epistemic assets that arouse knowledge as human confluence. In this relationship, ethical reflections stand out as a coincidence of intentions, justifications, reasons that encourage peaceful, supportive and democratic coexistence. It seeks to reduce the digital divide by reducing socioeconomic distances by providing tools that create just societies. It is a bibliographic investigation from the Rationalist-Deductive approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disagreement among philosophers over the proper justification for political institutions is far from a new phenomenon. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that there is substantial room for dissent on this matter within democratic theory. As is well known, instrumentalism and proceduralism represent the two primary viewpoints that democrats can adopt to vindicate democratic legitimacy. While the former notoriously derives the value of democracy from its outcomes, the latter claims that a democratic decision-making process is inherently valuable. This article has two aims. First, it introduces three variables with which we can thoroughly categorise the aforementioned approaches. Second, it argues that the more promising version of proceduralism is extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, and that extrinsically procedural accounts can appeal to other values in the justification of democracy without translating into instrumentalism. This article is organised as follows. I present what I consider to be the 'implicit view' in the justification of democracy. Then, I analyse each of the three variables in a different section. Finally, I raise an objection against procedural views grounded in relational equality, which cannot account for the idea that democracy is a necessary condition for political legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although honesty is typically conceptualized as a virtue, it often conflicts with other equally important moral values, such as avoiding interpersonal harm. In the present research, we explore when and why honesty enables helpful versus harmful behavior. Across 5 incentive-compatible experiments in the context of advice-giving and economic games, we document four central results. First, honesty enables selfish harm: people are more likely to engage in and justify selfish behavior when selfishness is associated with honesty than when it is not. Second, people are selectively honest: people are more likely to be honest when honesty is associated with selfishness than when honesty is associated with altruism. Third, these effects are more consistent with genuine, rather than motivated, preferences for honesty. Fourth, even when individuals have no selfish incentive to be honest, honesty can lead to interpersonal harm because people avoid information about how their honest behavior affects others. This research unearths new insights on the mechanisms underlying moral choice, and consequently, the contexts in which moral principles are a force of good versus a force of evil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While in Republic (523a) Plato considers there is no need of the existence of a Finger's Form, since a no-finger can be imagined, in Book X he affirms the existence of a Bed's Form, a substantial object such as the finger. This Platonic inaccuracy related to the Form of substances is confirmed in the Parmenides, when Socrates confesses his doubts about them. But in the Sophist, a later dialogue, we find a coherent response because The Form of the Other justifies that there be an opposite to the finger, a "no-finger", which is simply something different from the finger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is clear that beliefs can be assessed both as to their justification and as to their rationality. What is not as clear, however, is how the rationality and justification of belief relate to one another. Stewart Cohen has stumped for the popular proposal that rationality and justification come to the same thing, that rational beliefs just are justified beliefs, supporting his view by arguing that 'justified belief' and 'rational belief' are synonymous. In this paper, I will give reason to think that Cohen's argument is spurious. I will show that 'rational' and 'justified' occupy two distinct semantic categories—'rational' is an absolute gradable adjective and 'justified' is a relative gradable adjective—telling against the thought that 'rational belief' and 'justified belief' are synonymous. I will then argue that the burden of proof is on those who would equate rationality and justification, making the case that those who hold this prominent position face the difficulty of explaining how rationality and justification come to the same thing even though 'rational' and 'justified' are not synonymous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) does not exhaust rules of baseline regimes; those for continental States' outlying archipelagos were set aside for development outside the Convention by negotiating States during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Today, most of the continental States possessing outlying archipelagos have applied the unity theory to such archipelagos, many by enclosing them with straight baselines, which has been protested by very few States. The application of straight baselines to big- island-dominating outlying archipelagos may be justifiable under the second limb of Article 7(1) of the LOSC or a customary rule that it reflects, thus causing a fragmentation of outlying archipelagos; however, this alternative justification remains hypothetical and, even if established, would not detract from the generality of State practice applying unity theory to outlying archipelagos without such geographical configuration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Assurance View, as advanced by Angus Ross and Richard Moran, makes the epistemology of testimony a matter of interpersonal commitments and entitlements. More specifically, I argue, their position is best understood as claiming that for someone's belief to be testimonially justified is for some speaker to bear illocutionary responsibility for its truth (while background conditions are met). With this understanding in hand, I present a problem for the view that has so far escaped attention, a problem deriving from the wide freedom we have to retract our assertions. Retraction dissolves the illocutionary responsibilities that were set up by preceding speech acts; but in some circumstances the epistemic significance of a retraction is effectively nil. We can therefore construct cases in which the responsibilities undertaken in testimony have been canceled, while the justification for belief based on it remains in place—and that shouldn't be possible, if the Assurance View has things right. I present one such case and press its implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often argued that while biases routinely influence the generation of scientific theories (in the 'context of discovery'), a subsequent rational evaluation of such theories (in the 'context of justification') will ensure that biases do not affect which theories are ultimately accepted. Against this line of thought, this paper shows that the existence of certain kinds of biases at the generation-stage implies the existence of biases at the evaluation-stage. The key argumentative move is to recognize that a scientist who comes up with a new theory about some phenomena has thereby gained an unusual type of evidence, viz. information about the space of theories that could be true of the phenomena. It follows that if there is bias in the generation of scientific theories in a given domain, then the rational evaluation of theories with reference to the total evidence in that domain will also be biased. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nils Christie's concept of 'conflicts as property' has become axiomatic within restorative justice (RJ) as justification for victim involvement and redress, offender accountability and reintegration, and community involvement in RJ conferencing practices. In this article, we revisit the concept of conflicts as property as a theoretical premise for the use of RJ. We suggest that restorative conferencing practices used to address criminal matters in most English-speaking countries or jurisdictions evidence many of the same concerns voiced by Christie four decades ago in his critique of the 'stealing' of conflicts more rightly owned by victims, offenders and communities. We further argue that the institutionalisation of RJ has embedded its practices into highly unequal justice systems, with little evidence of how RJ may enable people or communities to 'own' conflicts in ways that do not mirror existing lines of social marginalisation and inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article triangulates Schatzki's practice theory (2002) and Thévenot's (2001) 'regimes of engagement' with the nascent field of 'social futures' or future-oriented cultural sociology (e.g. Coleman and Tutton 2017; Mische 2009). We present a reading of Thévenot's regimes of engagement that is ontologically compatible with Schatzki's account of social practices and argue that practices are more or less enmeshed in distinct regimes of engagement. We aver that while people engage reality through distinct regimes of engagement they do so, to follow Schatzki, primarily in the context of social practices. We then articulate this account with Giuliana Mandich's (2019) work on the different modes of engagement with the future, or forms of reflexive projectivity, that are expressed through Thévenot's regimes: that of practical anticipation for the regime of the familiar; of probability for the regime of the plan; of possibility for the regime of justification; and of discovery for the regime of exploration. This synthesis enables a practice theoretical account of the different modes through which actors engage with the future that is, we suggest, analytically superior to both Thévenot's and Schatzki's tendency towards a mono-dimensional view of agents' projectivity towards the future. We illustrate the synthesis of practices, regimes of engagement and modes of projectivity chiefly through a study of domestic laundry practice conducted by Southerton and Mylan (2018). We suggest this theoretical development may be productively applied to practice theoretical work informing understanding of issues such as sustainable consumption, mobility and energy use, as well as social change more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (as inserted by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015) requires judges to refuse relief in judicial review of administrative decisions if it is 'highly likely' that the conduct complained of did not make a significant difference to the outcome of the decision. The strongest justification for this 'Makes No Difference' principle is provided by a 'narrow instrumental view' of fair procedures, according to which their value lies only in their producing the correct outcome. This conception of procedural fairness, however, is impoverished and flawed as a matter of political morality. Fair procedures reflect a conception of citizens as participants in their own governance and play an important communicative role in democratic legal orders. Inasmuch as it leaves no room for these aspects of the value of fair procedures, the Makes No Difference principle embodied in section 31(2A) is pro tanto unjust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inspired by French pragmatism and using Bourdieu's notion of "refraction" as an indication of a field's autonomy, we explore in‐depth what kinds of justifications visual artists deploy to legitimate their requests for government money. Based on 494 government grant proposals from visual artists between 1965 and 2015 in Belgium, we find six such justifications. The reputational, esthetic, and romantic justifications are grounded in autonomous criteria of worth, such as artistic CVs, the work of art itself, and a compulsive desire to make art. Since the 90s, social, academic, and entrepreneurial justifications bring in heteronomous criteria, or refractions of field‐external values. Artistic practices become increasingly legitimized through engagement with social/political issues, academic methods and terminology, and an entrepreneurial spirit. We empirically show how the refraction of governmental logics is multi‐faceted, yet always related to or combined with artistic concerns, which we interpret as characteristic for the artistic field's persisting autonomy in the face of heteronomous pressures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public justification in political liberalism is often conceptualized in light of Rawls's view of its role in a hypothetical well-ordered society as an ideal or idealizing form of justification that applies a putatively reasonable conception of political justice to political matters. But Rawls implicates a different idea of public justification in his doctrine of general reflective equilibrium. The paper engages this second, more fundamental idea. Public justification in this second sense is actualist and fundamental (rather than ideal or idealizing and conception-applying). It is actualist in that it fully enfranchises actual reasonable citizens. It is fundamental in that political liberalism qualifies conceptions of political justice as reasonable to begin with only if they can be accepted coherently by actual reasonable citizens. Together, these features invite the long-standing concern that actualist political liberalism is objectionably exclusionary. I argue that the exclusion objection, while plausible, is more problematic in own right than it seems if actualist and fundamental public justification hypotheticalizes and discursive respect is compatible with substantive discursive inequality. This leaves proponents and critics of political liberalism with deeper questions about the nature of permissible discursive inequality in public justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The statute of frauds requires certain categories of contracts to be evidenced by a signed writing. The original purpose of the statute of frauds, indeed its titular purpose, is the prevention of the fraudulent assertion of a non-existent oral contract. Although a signed writing is the formal way in which to satisfy the statute of frauds, courts have long recognized various exceptions to the writing requirement which will be held to satisfy the statute absent a writing. The effect of such exceptions is that they constitute an alternative form of evidence for the presence of a contract. One such exception is the judicial admission of a contract - where the defendant admits in his pleadings, testimony, or otherwise in court under oath that a contract (and its terms) exists. Such judicial admission of the existence of a contract seemingly completely vindicates the primary and original purpose of the statute of frauds. A defendant that judicially admits that he or she entered into a contract, has no concern that such contract is fraudulently being asserted against him. It is, therefore, "astonishing" (to use Professor Robert Stevens's phrase) that the judicial admissions exception completely fell out of favor in England, and then the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and instead the dominant majority rule became the elimination of the exception. For the stated purposes of removing the defendant's incentive to commit perjury and falsely deny the contract in order to avoid liability, the now longstanding majority rule became that a defendant could admit the contract and yet still assert the statute of frauds defense. Such a rule is of dubious justification, which is why Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code reinstated the judicial admissions exception in the case of contracts for the sale of goods. The rule remained virtually absent in non-goods cases, however. Thankfully, and as reported by Professor Shedd in published articles in 1984 and 1991, an embryonic judicial admissions rule began to reemerge in the early twentieth century, but he observed that it remained a very small minority rule. This article updates the research to the present and observes that the rule appears to still be a minority rule although the number of adoptions has increased. Nevertheless, the rule represents sound statute of frauds policy, and should be fully implemented by case decision or statute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social media present prime opportunities for commercial brands to promote their products. Some user-generated comments, however, hamper brands' promotion efforts with fake claims. The literature on warranting theory suggests that if a company controls the dissemination of user-generated comments of its products, it may backfire against the company by reducing the warranting value of favorable comments. The current study proposes that a company's justification for their information control behavior can restore the warranting value of user-generated comments. Drawing upon the literature on fairness theory and mindlessness, the study investigated the effectiveness of two types of justifications varying in their legitimacy. Results from a web-based experiment (N = 221) with four conditions (no evidence of dissemination control vs. no justification vs. placebic justification vs. real justification) confirm that when a company offers a legitimate justification for deleting users' comments, it mitigates negative evaluations that may result from the company's information control behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reflective practice is seen as a method for professional growth and lasting learning outcomes, but what this means in the context of Higher Music Education (HME) has not received sufficient attention. This paper explores how reflection is ontologised and justified as part of performing musicians' education. The data utilised derive from a comprehensive project investigating how processes of academisation affect HME across Europe. Findings from the Swedish sub-study, comprised of fourteen leaders and teachers at four academies of music, demonstrate how reflection is discursively constructed; as based on language and cognition; as embodied, and as 'purely' musical. These ideas concerning the qualities and characteristics of reflection interact and provide basis for three forms of justification: reflection for artistic knowledge development; reflection for individual success in the profession; and reflection over the role of musicianship in relation to society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conciliationist and steadfast approaches have dominated the conversation in the epistemology of disagreement. In this paper, drawing on Jennifer Lackey's justificationist approach and the casuistry paradigm in medical ethics, I will develop a more contextual epistemology of political disagreement. On this account, a given political disagreement's scope, domain, genealogy, and consequence can be helpful for determining whether we should respond to that disagreement at the level of our confidence, beliefs, or with policy. Though some may argue that responding with policy is a practical consideration instead of an epistemic matter, I argue that even policy responses to disagreements have an epistemic dimension to them that we should not ignore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia is the property of Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

5 and 6 these forms of agent-based dependence bear on normative questions concerning a variety of epistemological issues such as epistemic authority, intellectual autonomy, epistemic rationality, testimony, disagreement, expertise or virtue epistemology. If WHO's testimony is reducible to the testimony of its members (or to some way of aggregating their individual assertions), then WHO's testimony is not distinct from the testimony of its members and hence relying on this collective to know that proposition is simply an instance of epistemic dependence on individual agents. We have considered forms of agent-based epistemic dependence in which an agent relies on another agent (whether individual or collective) to achieve an (individual or collective) epistemic goal. Knowledge, virtue and action: Putting epistemic virtues to work, ch. 11. 2013: London; Routledge 37 Kallestrup J, Pritchard DFernández M. Dispositional robust virtue epistemology versus anti-luck virtue epistemology. [Extracted from the article]

This theory note develops a theoretical approach which integrates the negative spillovers that international institutions often impose on each other into our thinking about their normative legitimacy. Our approach draws on the political philosophy of Rainer Forst which revolves around the right to justification. It suggests that regime complexes facilitate the breakup of institution-specific orders of justification by prompting invested actors to justify negative spillovers vis-à-vis each other. Thus, regime complexes enable more encompassing justifications of negative spillovers than stand-alone international institutions. Against this backdrop, we submit that the proliferation of regime complexes represents normative progress in global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability to claim an eminent right over property was central to the parliamentary war effort. Relying on a narrative of necessity that jurists in both England and in western Europe had increasingly used since the end of the sixteenth century, MPs gave the English political public a narrative parallel to that of a beggar in extreme duress: in order for it to survive, the property rights of English subjects needed to give way. Scholars have noted the Long parliament's use of necessity in the past in order to disassociate the causes of the Civil War from a 'rule of law' ideology or to make a claim that Parliament made a novel political theory of emergency. Yet the Long parliament was not abandoning English law nor was it generating a novel theory of emergency. Instead, it was relying on legal concepts that jurists and Crown officials commonly used to advance the power of the state. This law of necessity was controversial, however, and the Long parliament's continued use of it generated conflict even as it also enabled MPs to seize control over England's armed forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political theorists had vigorous debates about nuclear weapons in the 1980s but have been largely silent about them recently. This article seeks to reopen those discussions. It evaluates the main justifications for nuclear proliferation since 1945: arguments from consistency, nationalism, democratic legitimacy, self-defense, peaceful effects, and supreme emergency. Most of these arguments are badly flawed, as are the arguments for retaining the nuclear arsenals of many of the established nuclear powers. Instead, this article proposes a first cut at a stringent standard for judging the acquisition of strategic nuclear weapons, drawing on jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traditional epistemological approach towards judgments like BACHELORS ARE UNMARRIED or ALL KNOWLEDGE IS TRUE is that they are justified or known on the basis of understanding alone. In this paper, I develop an understanding-based account which takes understanding to be a sufficient source of epistemic justification for the relevant judgments. Understanding-based accounts face the problem of the rational revisability of almost all human judgments. Williamson has recently developed a reinforced version of this problem: the challenge from expert revisability. This is the problem that even the best candidate judgments for understanding-based justification can be rationally rejected by the relevant experts, who may not even have any disposition or inclination to accept these judgments. (Consider, for instance, Graham Priest, a leading logician who rejects the law of non-contradiction.) However, I argue that expert revisability is fully compatible with the proposed understanding-based epistemology, because expert revisability is true of sufficient sources of epistemic justification in general. A remaining metaphysical worry is that understanding might end up being 'too thin' to play the envisaged epistemological role. This worry can be countered with a novel metaphysics of understanding involving second-order dispositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Note explores the persistent differences in status among federal district judges in U.S. territories. Beginning with Congress's decision to extend life tenure to federal judges in Puerto Rico in 1966, the Note traces the evolution of local and federal courts in U.S. territories over the past half century. Although universally counted within the ninety-four districts of the Article III system, the federal district courts in Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are not staffed by Article III judges. In some cases, these federal district judges can be replaced at any moment. This regime, once defended on account of the distinguishing jurisdictional features of federal courts overseas, has outgrown its prevailing justifications. Divorced from its once-plausible logic of necessity and institutional development, the present status of federal district judges in the territories is an emerging problem in federal judicial independence that exposes the federal courts to charges of exceptionalism and political interference. Focusing on judicial administration, this Note challenges the notion that all federal district judges are created equal, highlighting an underinterrogated space in the discourse on U.S. empire: the Judicial Conference of the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on causal decision theory (CDT) which is an act of choiceworthy to the extent that you expect it to promote valuable ends. It mentions evidential decision theory (EDT) and particular decisions in which causally unratifiable acts appear more choiceworthy than their causally ratifiable alternatives. It also mentions virtue of the theory that it agrees with, and helps to explain, the intuitive verdicts about these cases.

Epistocratic arrangements are widely rejected because there will be reasonable disagreement about which citizens count as epistemically superior and an epistemically superior subset of citizens may be biased in ways that undermine their ability to generate superior political outcomes. The upshot is supposed to be that systems of democratic government are preferable because they refuse to allow some citizens to rule over others. We show that this approach is doubly unsatisfactory: although representative democracy cannot be defended as a form of government that prevents some citizens from ruling over others, it can be defended as a special form of epistocracy. We demonstrate that well-designed representative democracies can, through treatment and selection mechanisms, bring forth an especially competent set of individuals to make public policy, even while circumventing the standard objections to epistocratic rule. This has implications for the justification of representative democracy and questions of institutional design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Barnett (2019) provides an interesting new challenge for Dogmatist accounts of perceptual justification. The challenge is that such accounts, by accepting that a perceptual experience can provide a distinctive kind of boost to one's credences, would lead to a form of diachronic irrationality in cases where one has already learnt in advance that one will have such an experience. I show that this challenge rests on a misleading feature of using the 0–1 interval to express probabilities and show that if we switch to using Odds or (better) Log-Odds, the misleading appearance that there is only 'a little room' for one's credences to increase evaporates. Moreover, there are familiar, independent reasons for taking the Log-Odds scale to provide a clearer picture of the confirmatory effect of evidence. Thus the Dogmatist can after all escape the charge of diachronic irrationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rules of indices, e.g. , are a particularly important part of elementary algebra. This paper reports results from a textbook analysis which examined how the shift from integer to rational exponents in the rules of indices is discussed in school textbooks. The analysis also considered related issues, such as notation and the introduction of complex numbers. A selection of popular textbooks from the period 1800–2000 was examined and the nature of the justification given for the extension of meaning to rational indices considered. In both the definition and computational rules, when extending the domain of n in to rational numbers the (potential) contraction of the domain of a to positive numbers was often quietly ignored. A wide variety of approaches are used in choosing what is to be a definition, what is to follow, and how this is justified. The difference between computational rules for practical algebraic manipulation and a formal definition was often blurred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the intense controversy surrounding the Allied bombing campaign during World War II, the extant scholarship lacks a detailed description of the law of war concerning aerial bombing as that law existed during the conflict -- a remarkable gap in the research, considering the attention that has been devoted to this topic. This paper presents a brief history of the evolution of the law of war concerning aerial bombardment prior to and during World War II. The law of war in this period was shaped primarily by the norm of reciprocity, and this norm is critical to understanding how the Allies conceived of the bombing campaign. The norm of reciprocity had several functions deserving of examination: the norm, as a moral intuition, instilled a psychological motive for the Allied peoples to support the bombing, provided a framework of values to legitimate that support and then channelled that support into a policy perceived as legally just. The norm of reciprocity was central to legal justifications for the bombing campaign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is well-known that versions of the lottery paradox and of the preface paradox show that the following three principles are jointly inconsistent: (Sufficiency) very probable propositions are justifiably believable; (Conjunction Closure) justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction; (No Contradictions) propositions known to be contradictory are not justifiably believable. This paper shows that there is a hybrid of the lottery and preface paradoxes that does not require Sufficiency to arise, but only Conjunction Closure and No Contradictions; and it argues that, given any plausible solution to this paradox, if one is not ready to deny Conjunction Closure (and analogous consistency principles), then one must endorse the thesis that justified believability is factive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly: that is, its fundamental epistemic value is determined entirely by its truth or falsity. The Swamping Problem says that Veritism is incompatible with two pre-theoretic beliefs about epistemic value: (I) a true justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a true unjustified belief; (II) a false justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a false unjustified belief. In this paper, I consider the Swamping Problem from the vantage-point of decision theory. I note that the central premise in the argument is what Stefánsson and Bradley call Chance Neutrality in Richard Jeffrey's decision-theoretic framework. And I describe their argument that it should be rejected. Using this insight, I respond to the Swamping Problem on behalf of the veritist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decisions often involve trade-offs between a more normative option and a less normative but more tempting one. The authors propose that the intrapersonal conflict that is evoked by choices involving incompatible goals can be resolved through scope-insensitive justifications. The authors describe one such mechanism, the 'mere token' effect, a new phenomenon in decision making. They demonstrate that adding a certain and immediate mere token amount to both options increases choices of the later-larger option in intertemporal choice and of the riskier-larger option in risky choice. The authors find this effect to be scope insensitive, such that the size of the token amount does not moderate the effect. They show that intrapersonal choice conflict underlies the mere token effect and that reducing the degree of conflict by increasing the psychological distance to the choice outcomes debiases the effect. Moreover, they show that the mere token effect is enhanced when (1) opposing goals in choice are made salient and (2) the choice options represent a starker contrast that generates greater conflict. The authors empirically rule out alternative explanations, including diminishing marginal utility, normative and descriptive utility-based models, liquidity constraints, and naive diversification. They discuss the direct implications of the mere token effect for the marketing of financial services and, more generally, for consumer preference toward bundles and multiattribute products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People want to have fun, and they are more likely to have fun if the situation allows them to justify it. This research studies how people's need for justifying hedonic consumption drives two choice patterns that are observed in typical purchase contexts. First, relative preferences between hedonic and utilitarian alternatives can reverse, depending on how the immediate purchase situation presents itself. A hedonic alternative tends to be rated more highly than a comparable utilitarian alternative when each is presented singly, but the utilitarian alternative tends to be chosen over the hedonic alternative when the two are presented jointly. Second, people have preferences for expending different combinations of time (effort) and money for acquiring hedonic versus utilitarian items. They are willing to pay more in time for hedonic goods and more in money for utilitarian goods. The author explores the topic through a combination of four experiments and field studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research on justification has typically focused on the differences in judgments between auditors required, or not required, to justify their decisions. However, justification memos can be prepared using different approaches. In this study we examine the impact of using three justification memos: supporting, balanced, and component. Using a comprehensive control environment case based on an actual client that experienced fraud, we find that the justification memo used can affect the judgments of auditors preparing the memos as well as the judgments of auditors who review their work. Specifically, the results indicate that auditors using an unrestricted component memo, who were required to write memos for components of their task by providing important positive and negative evidence, thought that the firm's control environment was more likely to prevent fraud as compared with the supporting and balanced memo groups. Additional analyses suggest that the reason for this result is that an unrestricted component memo focuses auditors' attention on a larger percentage of positive control environment characteristics when a firm's underlying evidence set is mostly positive. This may be problematic because firms can have more positive than negative control environment characteristics, even when fraud is present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tom Carson's recent paper on "Deception and Withholding Information in Sales" contains a critique of my contribution to sales ethics. In this response I outline the approach I develop in two earlier papers and address the four criticisms Carson makes. These criticisms are largely based on a misunderstanding of my position, I suggest that our fundamentally different approaches to applied ethics may lie at the root of Carson's misunderstanding, Carson uses what I call a theory-application model in which the search for justification in terms of fundamental rules is central, while I attempt to contextualize ethical judgments and consider alternative ways of structuring social roles. In contrasting these approaches I raise the question of which way of doing applied ethics is likely to be more fruitful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]