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This paper seeks to answer two interrelated questions about Islamist social mobilization in Egypt, an electoral autocracy. First, why does Egypt’s primary opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, participate in parliamentary elections? The ability to influence policy in the Egyptian parliament is highly circumscribed and parliamentary election campaigns are expensive and subject Muslim Brotherhood supporters to regime harassment. Second, how can we account for the electoral success enjoyed by the Muslim Brotherhood given the costs often incurred by individual supporters who turn out to vote? I consider both the broad socioeconomic context for Brotherhood electoral success as well as the specific factors which trigger turnout for Brotherhood candidates, including strategies used to create common knowledge about the electoral strength of the Brotherhood in a particular district. Opposition electoral participation represents an important form of social protest in authoritarian Egypt. This paper seeks to explore the micro-level dynamics of Muslim Brotherhood political mobilization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The battle for public opinion in the Middle East has been described as a new front for the US in its war on terror. The US invasion of Iraq fueled a wave of anti-American sentiment across the region, including among citizens in countries that have traditionally allied with the US. In the spring of 2003, just 1 percent of Jordanian respondents and less than 1 percent of Palestinian respondents gave a favorable rating to the US. While negative views of the US continue to prevail in much of the Islamic world, anti-Americanism is not as universal as it was 2003 just after the start of the war in Iraq; for example, in 2007, 20 percent of Jordanians and 13 percent of Palestinians offered a favorable rating of the US. This paper explains variation in anti-American sentiment across the Muslim world over time to determine how strongly individuals hold their values. In particular, we seek to map the characteristics of individuals who are highly resistant to changing their views as well as the traits of those who are willing to alter their stated opinions. To do this, we use a variant of latent class analysis, a clustering algorithm for multivariate categorical data that allows testing of over-time changes in opinion structure. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fatwa -- or a religious edict issued by an Islamic scholar -- is the primary means by which Muslim scholars provide guidance to their communities on a variety of social, economic and political issues. This paper will examine the promulgation of fatwa ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are certain types of regimes better at translating economic growth into consumption for the poor? We propose an alternative measure of transfers to the poor that innately captures distribution: average daily calorie consumption. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are some peace process negotiations accompanied by bloody political violence while others are not? Recent work on this subject suggests that when factions fear that they will not benefit or will be excluded from a negotiated settlement these groups may protect their interests by sabotaging the peace process through violent tactics, including assassinations, massacres, and armed rebellions. We compare two on-going peace processes in Africa â€" the negotiations to end armed struggles in Western Sahara and in the Sudan â€" to investigate why spoilers arise in some contexts and not others. We argue that peace process exclusivity, that is negotiations between only some of the potential parties to a conflict, is more likely to breed violence than inclusive peace negotiations where all relevant groups have a seat at the bargaining table. This finding suggests that third parties that participate in peace negotiations may need to rethink the manner in which talks are conducted in order to reduce rates of violence and secure more lasting arrangements. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do authoritarian regimes manipulate fiscal policy in the run up to semi-competitive elections?  This paper examines the existence of electoral budget cycles in Egypt. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of the rentier state is one of just a handful of theories, developed by Middle East studies specialists, that is cited by scholars of comparative politics more generally. Born of the experiences of oil-rich Gulf states, rentier state theory argues that countries that are heavily reliant on external rents, like oil profits, for government revenue develop a different bond between government and the citizenry than those regimes that rely primarily on taxation and that rent-reliant states are less likely to be democratic than their tax-reliant counterparts (Luciani 1987, Anderson 1987, Richards and Waterbury 1996). The theory of the rentier state has been cited by researchers who use economic development to explain democratization but are hard pressed to explain why relatively wealthy Arab Gulf states, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others, failed to democratize despite their high levels of per capita income. Large-N statistical studies aimed at explaining the factors most conducive to democratization suggest that income is a key determinant of democracy, except where oil is the dominant export. Political scientists have long theorized that prosperity stimulates democracy, but empirically oriented studies tend to include a statistically significant variable for level of oil and natural resource exports (Barro 1999, Ross 2001). In “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” Ross finds that oil and natural resource exports have an undemocratic effect and cites the rentier state hypothesis as one of three possible causal mechanisms for why oil and natural resource exports might have this effect. In addition, more theoretically based qualitative works also use the rentier state logic. Huntington writes that wealth resulting from the sale of oil (and other natural resources) does not contribute to democratization; further, he argues that when external rents accrue directly to the government, it reduces the need of the regime to “solicit the acquiesence of its subjects to taxation” (Huntington 1991, 65). While rentier state theory has been most frequently used to explain levels of democratization, the theory also makes predictions regarding regime stability. Governments that derive revenue from non-tax sources, like oil rents, enjoy the benefits of allocating public goods to their citizenries without taking on the more difficult task of collecting taxes. Health, education, and other social services are heavily subsidized by the government, shoring up domestic support for the regime. Luciani argues that “even limited revenue from abroad dramatically improves the state’s ability to buy legitimacy through allocation and increases regime stability” (Luciani 1987, 76). Rentier state theory generates a key hypothesis regarding regime stability: H1: Rent-dependent states should be more stable than tax-dependent states. There are at least two alternative hypotheses regarding the effect of rentier wealth on regime stability. The first is that rentier states are likely to be less stable than their non-rentier counterparts because control of a state with sources of external wealth is a “prize” that is highly valued and rivals will try to capture this wealth. The second hypothesis is one put forth by Kiren Aziz Chaudry. She argues that states that rely on taxation for revenue take on “strong” state qualities while those that are dependent on external rents are “weak” states, particularly regarding political institutions and a state’s capacity to respond to external shocks. A state with weak institutions that has difficulty responding to shocks is likely to be less stable, both on the individual and regime level. Both of these alternative theories generate the following hypothesis: H2: Measures of a country’s dependence on external rents should be associated with less stability overall. In this paper, I hope to test these two competing hypothesis using duration analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of the rentier state has been cited by researchers who use economic development to explain democratization but are hard pressed to explain why relatively wealthy Gulf states, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, failed to democratize despite their high levels of per capita income. Rentier state theory argues that countries that are heavily reliant on external rents for government revenue develop a different bond between government and the citizenry than those regimes that rely primarily on taxation and that rent-reliant states are less likely to be democratic than their tax-reliant counterparts. In addition to theorizing about levels of democratization, the theory also makes predictions regarding regime stability. Governments that derive revenue from non-tax sources enjoy the benefits of allocating public goods to their citizenries without taking on the more difficult task of collecting taxes. Health, education, and other social services are heavily subsidized by the government, shoring up domestic support for the regime. Luciani argues that even limited revenue from abroad dramatically improves the state’s ability to buy legitimacy through allocation and increases regime stability (Luciani 1987, 76). A key alternative theory regarding the effect of rentierism is put forth by various researchers, including Kiren Aziz Chaudhry. Chaudhry argues that states that rely on taxation for revenue take on strong state qualities while those that are dependent on external rents are weak states, particularly regarding political institutions and a state’s capacity to respond to external shocks. A state with weak institutions that has difficulty responding to shocks is likely to be less stable. In this paper, I hope to empirically test these two competing hypotheses using a a Bayesian survival setup. If measures of a country’s dependence on external rents are statistically associated with shorter terms of office for individual leaders this would lend support to the weak institutions hypothesis put forth by Chaudhry and others. If measures of rentierism are associated with increased regime survival, this supports the arguments made by Luciani and other traditional rentier state theorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]