Determinants of Authoritarian Durability.

The theory of the rentier state is one of just a handful of theories, developed by Middle East studies specialists, that is cited by scholars of comparative politics more generally. Born of the experiences of oil-rich Gulf states, rentier state theory argues that countries that are heavily reliant on external rents, like oil profits, for government revenue develop a different bond between government and the citizenry than those regimes that rely primarily on taxation and that rent-reliant states are less likely to be democratic than their tax-reliant counterparts (Luciani 1987, Anderson 1987, Richards and Waterbury 1996). The theory of the rentier state has been cited by researchers who use economic development to explain democratization but are hard pressed to explain why relatively wealthy Arab Gulf states, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others, failed to democratize despite their high levels of per capita income. Large-N statistical studies aimed at explaining the factors most conducive to democratization suggest that income is a key determinant of democracy, except where oil is the dominant export. Political scientists have long theorized that prosperity stimulates democracy, but empirically oriented studies tend to include a statistically significant variable for level of oil and natural resource exports (Barro 1999, Ross 2001). In “Does Oil Hinder Democracy,” Ross finds that oil and natural resource exports have an undemocratic effect and cites the rentier state hypothesis as one of three possible causal mechanisms for why oil and natural resource exports might have this effect. In addition, more theoretically based qualitative works also use the rentier state logic. Huntington writes that wealth resulting from the sale of oil (and other natural resources) does not contribute to democratization; further, he argues that when external rents accrue directly to the government, it reduces the need of the regime to “solicit the acquiesence of its subjects to taxation” (Huntington 1991, 65). While rentier state theory has been most frequently used to explain levels of democratization, the theory also makes predictions regarding regime stability. Governments that derive revenue from non-tax sources, like oil rents, enjoy the benefits of allocating public goods to their citizenries without taking on the more difficult task of collecting taxes. Health, education, and other social services are heavily subsidized by the government, shoring up domestic support for the regime. Luciani argues that “even limited revenue from abroad dramatically improves the state’s ability to buy legitimacy through allocation and increases regime stability” (Luciani 1987, 76). Rentier state theory generates a key hypothesis regarding regime stability: H1: Rent-dependent states should be more stable than tax-dependent states. There are at least two alternative hypotheses regarding the effect of rentier wealth on regime stability. The first is that rentier states are likely to be less stable than their non-rentier counterparts because control of a state with sources of external wealth is a “prize” that is highly valued and rivals will try to capture this wealth. The second hypothesis is one put forth by Kiren Aziz Chaudry. She argues that states that rely on taxation for revenue take on “strong” state qualities while those that are dependent on external rents are “weak” states, particularly regarding political institutions and a state’s capacity to respond to external shocks. A state with weak institutions that has difficulty responding to shocks is likely to be less stable, both on the individual and regime level. Both of these alternative theories generate the following hypothesis: H2: Measures of a country’s dependence on external rents should be associated with less stability overall. In this paper, I hope to test these two competing hypothesis using duration analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]