Search

Background Despite multiple revisions of targets and timelines in polio eradication plans since 1988, including changes in supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) that increase immunity above routine immunization (RI) coverage, poliovirus transmission continues as of 2024.Methods We reviewed polio eradication plans and Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) annual reports and budgets to characterize key phases of polio eradication, the evolution of poliovirus vaccines, and the role of SIAs. We used polio epidemiology to provide context for successes and failures and updated prior modeling to show the contribution of SIAs in achieving and maintaining low polio incidence compared to expected incidence for the counterfactual of RI only.Results We identified multiple phases of polio eradication that included shifts in targets and timelines and the introduction of different poliovirus vaccines, which influenced polio epidemiology. Notable shifts occurred in GPEI investments in SIAs since 2001, particularly since 2016. Modeling results suggest that SIAs play(ed) a key role in increasing (and maintaining) high population immunity to levels required to eradicate poliovirus transmission globally.Conclusions Shifts in polio eradication strategy and poliovirus vaccine usage in SIAs provide important context for understanding polio epidemiology, delayed achievement of polio eradication milestones, and complexity of the polio endgame.

Abstract Background Poliovirus is a highly infectious enterovirus (EV) that primarily affects children and can lead to lifelong paralysis or even death. Vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) are a great threat since they are derived from the attenuated virus in the Oral Poliovirus Vaccine (OPV) and can mutate to a more virulent form. The purpose of this study was to identify VDPV serotype 2 through the year 2020–2021 via surveillance of sewage samples collected from different localities and governorates in Egypt and stool specimens from Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) cases. Both were collected through the national poliovirus surveillance system and according to the guidelines recommended by the WHO. Methods A total of 1266 sewage samples and 3241 stool samples from January 2020 to December 2021 were investigated in the lab according to World Health Organization (WHO) protocol for the presence of Polioviruses by cell culture, molecular identification of positive isolates on L20B cell line was carried out using real-time polymerase chain reactions (RT-PCR). Any positive isolates for Poliovirus type 2 and isolates suspected of Vaccine Derived Poliovirus Type 1 and type 3 screened by (VDPV1) or Vaccine Poliovirus Type 3 (VDPV3) assay in RT-PCR were referred for VP1 genetic sequencing. Results The outbreak was caused by circulating VDPV2 (cVDPV2) strains started in January 2021. By the end of February 2021, a total of 11 cVDPV2s were detected in sewage samples from six governorates confirming the outbreak situation. One additional cVDPV2 was detected later in the sewage sample from Qena (June 2021). The first and only re-emergence of VDPV2 in stool samples during the outbreak was in contact with Luxor in June 2021. By November 2021, a total of 80 VDPVs were detected. The Egyptian Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP), in collaboration with the WHO, responded quickly by launching two massive vaccination campaigns targeting children under the age of five. Additionally, surveillance systems were strengthened to detect new cases and prevent further spread of the virus. Conclusion The continued threat of poliovirus and VDPVs requires ongoing efforts to prevent their emergence and spread. Strategies such as improving immunization coverage, using genetically stable vaccines, and establishing surveillance systems are critical to achieving global eradication of poliovirus and efficient monitoring of VDPVs outbreaks.

Background: Poliovirus is a highly infectious enterovirus (EV) that primarily affects children and can lead to lifelong paralysis or even death. Vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) are a great threat since they are derived from the attenuated virus in the Oral Poliovirus Vaccine (OPV) and can mutate to a more virulent form. The purpose of this study was to identify VDPV serotype 2 through the year 2020–2021 via surveillance of sewage samples collected from different localities and governorates in Egypt and stool specimens from Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) cases. Both were collected through the national poliovirus surveillance system and according to the guidelines recommended by the WHO. Methods: A total of 1266 sewage samples and 3241 stool samples from January 2020 to December 2021 were investigated in the lab according to World Health Organization (WHO) protocol for the presence of Polioviruses by cell culture, molecular identification of positive isolates on L20B cell line was carried out using real-time polymerase chain reactions (RT-PCR). Any positive isolates for Poliovirus type 2 and isolates suspected of Vaccine Derived Poliovirus Type 1 and type 3 screened by (VDPV1) or Vaccine Poliovirus Type 3 (VDPV3) assay in RT-PCR were referred for VP1 genetic sequencing. Results: The outbreak was caused by circulating VDPV2 (cVDPV2) strains started in January 2021. By the end of February 2021, a total of 11 cVDPV2s were detected in sewage samples from six governorates confirming the outbreak situation. One additional cVDPV2 was detected later in the sewage sample from Qena (June 2021). The first and only re-emergence of VDPV2 in stool samples during the outbreak was in contact with Luxor in June 2021. By November 2021, a total of 80 VDPVs were detected. The Egyptian Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP), in collaboration with the WHO, responded quickly by launching two massive vaccination campaigns targeting children under the age of five. Additionally, surveillance systems were strengthened to detect new cases and prevent further spread of the virus. Conclusion: The continued threat of poliovirus and VDPVs requires ongoing efforts to prevent their emergence and spread. Strategies such as improving immunization coverage, using genetically stable vaccines, and establishing surveillance systems are critical to achieving global eradication of poliovirus and efficient monitoring of VDPVs outbreaks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Novel oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) type 2 (nOPV2) has been made available for outbreak response under an emergency use listing authorization based on supportive clinical trial data. Since 2021 more than 350 million doses of nOPV2 were used for control of a large outbreak of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) in Nigeria. Methods Using a bayesian time-series susceptible-infectious-recovered model, we evaluate the field effectiveness of nOPV2 immunization campaigns in Nigeria compared with campaigns using monovalent OPV type 2 (mOPV2). Results We found that both nOPV2 and mOPV2 campaigns were highly effective in reducing transmission of cVDPV2, on average reducing the susceptible population by 42% (95% confidence interval, 28–54%) and 38% (20–51%) per campaign, respectively, which were indistinguishable from each other in this analysis (relative effect, 1.1 [.7–1.9]). Impact was found to vary across areas and between immunization campaigns. Conclusions These results are consistent with the comparable individual immunogenicity of nOPV2 and mOPV2 found in clinical trials but also suggest that outbreak response campaigns may have small impacts in some areas requiring more campaigns than are suggested in current outbreak response procedures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the very low, but nonzero, paralysis risks associated with the use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), eradicating poliomyelitis requires ending all OPV use globally. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated cessation of Sabin type 2 OPV (OPV2 cessation) in 2016, except for emergency outbreak response. However, as of early 2023, plans for cessation of bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 OPV) remain undefined, and OPV2 use for outbreak response continues due to ongoing transmission of type 2 polioviruses and reported type 2 cases. Recent development and use of a genetically stabilized novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) leads to additional potential vaccine options and increasing complexity in strategies for the polio endgame. Prior applications of integrated global risk, economic, and poliovirus transmission modeling consistent with GPEI strategic plans that preceded OPV2 cessation explored OPV cessation dynamics and the evaluation of options to support globally coordinated risk management efforts. The 2022–2026 GPEI strategic plan highlighted the need for early bOPV cessation planning. We review the published modeling and explore bOPV cessation immunization options as of 2022, assuming that the GPEI partners will not support restart of the use of any OPV type in routine immunization after a globally coordinated cessation of such use. We model the potential consequences of globally coordinating bOPV cessation in 2027, as anticipated in the 2022–2026 GPEI strategic plan. We do not find any options for bOPV cessation likely to succeed without a strategy of bOPV intensification to increase population immunity prior to cessation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 2016, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated the cessation of all use of type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2), except for emergency outbreak response. Since then, paralytic polio cases caused by type 2 vaccine‐derived polioviruses now exceed 3,000 cases reported by 39 countries. In 2022 (as of April 25, 2023), 20 countries reported detection of cases and nine other countries reported environmental surveillance detection, but no reported cases. Recent development of a genetically modified novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) may help curb the generation of neurovirulent vaccine‐derived strains; its use since 2021 under Emergency Use Listing is limited to outbreak response activities. Prior modeling studies showed that the expected trajectory for global type 2 viruses does not appear headed toward eradication, even with the best possible properties of nOPV2 assuming current outbreak response performance. Continued persistence of type 2 poliovirus transmission exposes the world to the risks of potentially high‐consequence events such as the importation of virus into high‐transmission areas of India or Bangladesh. Building on prior polio endgame modeling and assuming current national and GPEI outbreak response performance, we show no probability of successfully eradicating type 2 polioviruses in the near term regardless of vaccine choice. We also demonstrate the possible worst‐case scenarios could result in rapid expansion of paralytic cases and preclude the goal of permanently ending all cases of poliomyelitis in the foreseeable future. Avoiding such catastrophic scenarios will depend on the development of strategies that raise population immunity to type 2 polioviruses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A novel, genetically-stabilized type 2 oral polio vaccine (nOPV2), developed to assist in the global polio eradication program, was recently the first-ever vaccine granted Emergency Use Listing by the WHO. Lot release tests for this vaccine included-for the first time to our knowledge-the assessment of genetic heterogeneity using next-generation sequencing (NGS). NGS ensures that the genetically-modified regions of the vaccine virus genome remain as designed and that levels of polymorphisms which may impact safety or efficacy are controlled during routine production. The variants present in nOPV2 lots were first assessed for temperature sensitivity and neurovirulence using molecular clones to inform which polymorphisms warranted formal evaluation during lot release. The novel use of NGS as a lot release test required formal validation of the method. Analysis of an nOPV2 lot spiked with the parental Sabin-2 strain enabled performance characteristics of the method to be assessed simultaneously at over 40 positions in the genome. These characteristics included repeatability and intermediate precision of polymorphism measurement, linearity of both spike-induced and nOPV2 lot-specific polymorphisms, and the limit-of-detection of spike-induced polymorphisms. The performance characteristics of the method met pre-defined criteria for 34 spike-induced polymorphic sites and 8 polymorphisms associated with the nOPV2 preparation; these sites collectively spanned most of the viral genome. Finally, the co-location of variants of interest on genomes was evaluated, with implications for the interpretation of NGS discussed.

Summary: In 2013, a case of immunodeficiency vaccine-derived poliovirus (iVDPV) was identified in Jiangxi Province, China. In this study, we purified 14 type 3 original viral isolates from this case and characterized the molecular evolution of these iVDPVs for 298 days. Genetic variants were found in most of the original viral isolates, with complex genetic and evolutionary relationships among the variants. A phylogenetic tree constructed based on the P1 region showed that these iVDPVs were classified into lineage A and B. The dominant lineage B represents a major trend in virus evolution. The nucleotide substitution rate at the third codon position (3CP) estimated by the BEAST program was 1.76 × 10−2 substitutions/site/year (95% HPD: 1.23-2.39 × 10−2). The initial OPV dose was given dating back to March 2013, which was close to the time of the last OPV vaccination, suggesting that OPV infection may have originated with the last dose of vaccine. Recombinant analysis showed that these iVDPVs were inter-vaccine recombinants with two recombination patterns, S3/S2/S1 and S3/S2/S3/S2/S1. Whole genome sequence analysis revealed that key nucleotide sites (C472U, C2034U, U2493C) associated with the attenuated phenotype of Sabin 3 have been replaced. Temperature sensitivity test showed that all tested strains were temperature-sensitive, except for the variant Day11-5. Interestingly, we observed that the variant Day11-5 temperature resistance properties may be associated with the Lys to Met substitution at the VP2-162 site. Serological test and whole genome sequence analysis showed that the seropositivity rate remained high, and mutations in the antigenic sites did not significantly alter neutralization ability.

Prior modeling studies showed that current outbreak management strategies are unlikely to stop outbreaks caused by type 1 wild polioviruses (WPV1) or circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) in many areas, and suggested increased risks of outbreaks with cocirculation of more than one type of poliovirus. The surge of type 2 poliovirus transmission that began in 2019 and continues to date, in conjunction with decreases in preventive supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) for poliovirus types 1 and 3, has led to the emergence of several countries with cocirculation of more than one type of poliovirus. Response to these emerging cocirculation events is theoretically straightforward, but the different formulations, types, and inventories of oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs) available for outbreak response present challenging practical questions. In order to demonstrate the implications of using different vaccine options and outbreak campaign strategies, we applied a transmission model to a hypothetical population with conditions similar to populations currently experiencing outbreaks of cVDPVs of both types 1 and 2. Our results suggest prevention of the largest number of paralytic cases occurs when using (1) trivalent OPV (tOPV) (or coadministering OPV formulations for all three types) until one poliovirus outbreak type dies out, followed by (2) using a type-specific OPV until the remaining poliovirus outbreak type also dies out. Using tOPV first offers a lower overall expected cost, but this option may be limited by the willingness to expose populations to type 2 Sabin OPV strains. For strategies that use type 2 novel OPV (nOPV2) concurrently administered with bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 OPV) emerges as a leading option, but questions remain about feasibility, logistics, type-specific take rates, and coadministration costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) faces substantial challenges with managing outbreaks of serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV2s) in 2021. A full five years after the globally coordinated removal of serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) from trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) for use in national immunization programs, cVDPV2s did not die out. Since OPV2 cessation, responses to outbreaks caused by cVDPV2s mainly used serotype 2 monovalent OPV (mOPV2) from a stockpile. A novel vaccine developed from a genetically stabilized OPV2 strain (nOPV2) promises to potentially facilitate outbreak response with lower prospective risks, although its availability and properties in the field remain uncertain. Using an established global poliovirus transmission model and building on a related analysis that characterized the impacts of disruptions in GPEI activities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, we explore the implications of trade-offs associated with delaying outbreak response to avoid using mOPV2 by waiting for nOPV2 availability (or equivalently, delayed responses waiting for national validation of meeting the criteria for nOPV2 initial use). Consistent with prior modeling, responding as quickly as possible with available mOPV2 promises to reduce the expected burden of disease in the outbreak population and to reduce the chances for the outbreak virus to spread to other areas. Delaying cVDPV2 outbreak response (e.g., modeled as no response January-June 2021) to wait for nOPV2 can considerably increase the total expected cases (e.g., by as many as 1,300 cVDPV2 cases in the African region during 2021–2023) and increases the likelihood of triggering the need to restart widescale preventive use of an OPV2-containing vaccine in national immunization programs that use OPV. Countries should respond to any cVDPV2 outbreaks quickly with rounds that achieve high coverage using any available OPV2, and plan to use nOPV2, if needed, once it becomes widely available based on evidence that it is as effective but safer in populations than mOPV2. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• OPV protects from paralysis and spread to others but requires multiple doses. • IPV prevents paralysis from all polio types with few doses but cannot stop spread. • OPV and IPV use in combination in routine immunization compensates their weaknesses. • IPV use in campaigns is resource-intensive and may miss children at highest risk. • Combination campaigns are not recommended for successful responses to type 2 outbreaks. Delivering inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) with oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in campaigns has been explored to accelerate the control of type 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks. A review of scientific literature suggests that among populations with high prevalence of OPV failure, a booster with IPV after at least two doses of OPV may close remaining humoral and mucosal immunity gaps more effectively than an additional dose of trivalent OPV. However, IPV alone demonstrates minimal advantage on humoral immunity compared with monovalent and bivalent OPV, and cannot provide the intestinal immunity that prevents infection and spread to those individuals not previously exposed to live poliovirus of the same serotype (i.e. type 2 for children born after the switch from trivalent to bivalent OPV in April 2016). A review of operational data from polio campaigns shows that addition of IPV increases the cost and logistic complexity of campaigns. As a result, campaigns in response to an outbreak often target small areas. Large campaigns require a delay to ensure logistics are in place for IPV delivery, and may need implementation in phases that last several weeks. Challenges to delivery of injectable vaccines through house-to-house visits also increases the risk of missing the children who are more likely to benefit from IPV: those with difficult access to routine immunization and other health services. Based upon this information, the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts in immunization (SAGE) recommended in October 2020 the following strategies: provision of a second dose of IPV in routine immunization to reduce the risk and number of paralytic cases in countries at risk of importation or new emergences; and use of type 2 OPV in high-quality campaigns to interrupt transmission and avoid seeding new type 2 cVDPV outbreaks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistan and Afghanistan pose risks for international transmission of polioviruses as the last global reservoir for wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) and a reservoir for type 2 circulating vaccine‐derived polioviruses (cVDPV2s). Widespread transmission of WPV1 and cVDPV2 in 2019–2020 and resumption of intensive supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) in 2020–2021 using oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) led to decreased transmission of WPV1 and cVDPV2 as of the end of 2021. Using an established dynamic disease transmission model, we explore multiple bounding scenarios with varying intensities of SIAs using bivalent OPV (bOPV) and/or trivalent tOPV (tOPV) to characterize potential die out of transmission. This analysis demonstrates potential sets of actions that may lead to elimination of poliovirus transmission in Pakistan and/or Afghanistan. Some modeled scenarios suggest that Pakistan and Afghanistan could increase population immunity to levels high enough to eliminate transmission, and if maintained, achieve WPV1 and cVDPV2 elimination as early as 2022. This requires intensive and proactive OPV SIAs to prevent transmission, instead of surveillance followed by reactive outbreak response. The reduction of cases observed in 2021 may lead to a false sense of security that polio has already or soon will die out on its own, but relaxation of immunization activities runs the risk of lowering population immunity to, or below, the minimum die‐out threshold such that transmission continues. Transmission modeling may play a key role in managing expectations and supporting future modeling about the confidence of no virus circulation in anticipation of global certification decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IntroductionDetection of poliovirus transmission and ongoing oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use continue to delay poliomyelitis eradication. In 2016, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of type 2 OPV (OPV2) for preventive immunization and limited its use to emergency outbreak response. In 2019, GPEI partners requested restart of some Sabin OPV2 production and also accelerated the development of a genetically modified novel OPV2 vaccine (nOPV2) that promised greater genetic stability than monovalent Sabin OPV2 (mOPV2).MethodsWe reviewed integrated risk, economic, and global poliovirus transmission modeling performed before OPV2 cessation, which recommended multiple risk management strategies to increase the chances of successfully ending all transmission of type 2 live polioviruses. Following OPV2 cessation, strategies implemented by countries and the GPEI deviated from model recommended risk management strategies. Complementing other modeling that explores prospective outbreak response options for improving outcomes for the current polio endgame trajectory, in this study we roll back the clock to 2017 and explore counterfactual trajectories that the polio endgame could have followed if GPEI had: (1) managed risks differently after OPV2 cessation and/or (2) developed nOPV2 before and used it exclusively for outbreak response after OPV2 cessation.ResultsThe implementation of the 2016 model-based recommended outbreak response strategies could have ended (and could still substantially improve the probability of ending) type 2 poliovirus transmission. Outbreak response performance observed since 2016 would not have been expected to achieve OPV2 cessation with high confidence, even with the availability of nOPV2 prior to the 2016 OPV2 cessation.DiscussionAs implemented, the 2016 OPV2 cessation failed to stop type 2 transmission. While nOPV2 offers benefits of lower risk of seeding additional outbreaks, its reduced secondary spread relative to mOPV2 may imply relatively higher coverage needed for nOPV2 than mOPV2 to stop outbreaks.

Abstract Background This study aimed to estimate the economic impact of replacing the current Peruvian primary immunization scheme for infants under 1 year old with an alternative scheme with similar efficacy, based on a hexavalent vaccine. Methods A cost-minimization analysis compared the costs associated with vaccine administration, adverse reactions medical treatment, logistical activities, and indirect social costs associated with time spent by parents in both schemes. A budgetary impact analysis assessed the financial impact of the alternative scheme on healthcare budget. Results Incorporating the hexavalent vaccine would result in a 15.5% net increase in healthcare budget expenditure ($48,281,706 vs $55,744,653). Vaccination costs would increase by 54.1%, whereas logistical and adverse reaction costs would be reduced by 59.8% and 33.1%, respectively. When including indirect social costs in the analysis, the budgetary impact was reduced to 8.7%. Furthermore, the alternative scheme would enable the liberation of 17.5% of national vaccines storage capacity. Conclusions Despite of the significant reduction of logistical and adverse reaction costs, including the hexavalent vaccine into the National Immunization Program of Peru in place of the current vaccination scheme for infants under 1 year of age would increase the public financial budget of the government as it would represent larger vaccine acquisition costs. Incorporating the indirect costs would reduce the budgetary impact demonstrating the social value of the alternative scheme. This merits consideration by government bodies, and future studies investigating such benefits would be informative.

Background: This study assessed seroprevalence of poliovirus antibodies in children from selected poliovirus high-risk areas of the Far North region of Cameroon which serves to monitor polio immunization program. Methods: This was a community-based cross-sectional seroprevalence survey involving collection of dried blood specimens (DBS) among children aged 12–59 months (n = 401). Multi-stage cluster sampling using GIS was applied to select the study sample. Collected DBS were analysed with microneutralization assays for poliovirus neutralizing antibody levels. Results: The overall seroprevalence of types 1, 2 and 3 neutralizing antibodies were 86.8 % (95 % confidence interval [CI]: 83.1–89.8), 74.6 % (95 % CI: 70.1–78.6) and 79.3 % (95 % CI: 75.1–83.0), respectively. Median titers (log2 scale) for type 1, 2 and 3 were 7.17 (6.5–7.5), 5.17 (4.83–5.5), and 6.17 (5.5–6.5), respectively. There was an increasing trend in median titers and seroprevalence with age, statistically significant between the youngest and oldest age groups (p

Background: Elimination of poliovirus in Pakistan and Afghanistan is challenged by notions against the role of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in eradicating contemporary wild poliovirus (WPV) strains.Methods: A total of 1055 WPV type 1 (WPV1) strains isolated between 2013 and 2018 were categorized into 68 antigenic groups and tested for neutralization by OPV-derived antibodies. Molecular docking was conducted to determine neutralization efficiency of antibodies against WPV. The clinical significance of WPV1 variants was assessed to ascertain their role in patient outcomes.Results: We found that 88% of WPV1 strains isolated from paralytic children belonged to a single antigenic lineage identical to the WPV1 strain detected in 1993. WPV1 antigenic variants were effectively neutralized by OPV-derived antibodies, with geometric mean titers comparable to the neutralization titers found for 3 strains in OPV (OPV1-3, 7.96-9.149 [95% confidence interval, 6.864-10.171]; WPV1 strains, 7.542-8.786 [6.493-9.869]). Docking examination underscored a strong antigen-antibody interaction despite variations within the viral protein 1 epitopes. There was no significant association (P = .78) with clinical prognosis among patients infected with antigenically diverse WPV1 strains and patient outcomes, including death.Conclusions: Our findings substantiate the robustness of OPV for neutralizing the contemporary WPV1 strains endemic in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Vaccination coverage must be augmented to achieve early eradication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global polio eradication initiative (GPEI) was established in 1988 as a result of the declaration of commitment by the World Health Assembly. In Pakistan, National Emergency Action Plan [NEAP] coined the strategies under government directives to play a pivotal role in line with international requirements to make poliomyelitis extinct. At the program’s initiation, there were around 350,000 cases of polio reported annually. The incidence has fallen by 99% due to the immunization of more than 2.5 billion children worldwide. Poliovirus has three serotypes; two have already been eradicated (the last case of poliovirus type 2 was reported in 1999 and of poliovirus type 3 in 2012). Poliovirus transmission has ceased with the exception of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In April 2022, two cases of acute flaccid paralysis due to poliovirus type 1 have been reported in KPK province. In this communication, insight is provided regarding the issues that have contributed to this wild poliovirus resurgence after a 15-month gap and the way forward.

BackgroundMother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is an important global health issue. We hypothesized that the live attenuated poliovirus existing in oral polio vaccine (OPV) may protect uninfected neonates born to HIV-positive mothers through the stimulation of innate immune system.ObjectiveTo test the hypothesis that countries using OPV have a lower MTCT rate (due to postnatal protection provided by the vaccine) compared with those using only inactivated polio vaccine (IPV).MethodsIn an ecological study, the incidence of HIV/AIDS in children aged

Background: This study aimed to estimate the economic impact of replacing the current Peruvian primary immunization scheme for infants under 1 year old with an alternative scheme with similar efficacy, based on a hexavalent vaccine.Methods: A cost-minimization analysis compared the costs associated with vaccine administration, adverse reactions medical treatment, logistical activities, and indirect social costs associated with time spent by parents in both schemes. A budgetary impact analysis assessed the financial impact of the alternative scheme on healthcare budget.Results: Incorporating the hexavalent vaccine would result in a 15.5% net increase in healthcare budget expenditure ($48,281,706 vs $55,744,653). Vaccination costs would increase by 54.1%, whereas logistical and adverse reaction costs would be reduced by 59.8% and 33.1%, respectively. When including indirect social costs in the analysis, the budgetary impact was reduced to 8.7%. Furthermore, the alternative scheme would enable the liberation of 17.5% of national vaccines storage capacity.Conclusions: Despite of the significant reduction of logistical and adverse reaction costs, including the hexavalent vaccine into the National Immunization Program of Peru in place of the current vaccination scheme for infants under 1 year of age would increase the public financial budget of the government as it would represent larger vaccine acquisition costs. Incorporating the indirect costs would reduce the budgetary impact demonstrating the social value of the alternative scheme. This merits consideration by government bodies, and future studies investigating such benefits would be informative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Afghanistan is one of two countries with endemic wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1). The oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) is the predominant vaccine used for polio eradication. Although OPV has been administered in routine childhood immunization and during frequent supplementary immunization activities, WPV1 continues to circulate in Afghanistan and case incidence has been increasing since 2017. We estimated the effectiveness of OPV in Afghanistan during 2010–2020. We conducted a matched case-control analysis using acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance data from 29,370 children < 15 years with AFP onset between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2020. We matched children with confirmed WPV1 (cases) with children with non-polio AFP (controls) by age at onset of paralysis (+/- 3 months), date of onset of paralysis (+/- 3 months), and province of residence, and compared their reported OPV vaccination history to estimate the effectiveness of OPV in preventing paralysis by WPV1 using conditional logistic regression. To account for changes in OPV formulations provided over the analysis period, we stratified the analysis based on dates of the global switch from trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) in April 2016. Between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2020, there were 329 WPV1 cases in Afghanistan. The per-dose estimated effectiveness of OPV against WPV1 was 19% (95% CI: 15%–22%) and of ≥ 7 doses was 94% (95% CI: 90%-97%). Before the global switch from tOPV to bOPV, the per-dose estimated effectiveness of OPV was 14% (95% CI: 11%-18%) and of ≥ 7 doses was 92% (95% CI: 85%-96%). After the switch, the per-dose estimated effectiveness of OPV against WPV1 was 32% (24%-39%) and of ≥ 7 doses was 96% (95% CI: 90%-99%). OPV is highly effective in preventing paralysis by WPV1; these results indicate that continued WPV1 transmission in Afghanistan is due to failure to vaccinate, not failure of the vaccine. Although difficult to implement in parts of country, improving the administration of OPV in routine immunization and supplementary immunization activities will be critical for achieving polio eradication in Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) and oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) have contributed to the rapid disappearance of paralytic poliomyelitis from developed countries despite possessing different vaccine properties. Due to cost, ease of use, and other properties, the Expanded Programme on Immunization added OPV to the routine infant immunization schedule for low-income countries in 1974, but variable vaccine uptake and impaired immune responses due to poor sanitation limited the impact. Following launch of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in 1988, poliomyelitis incidence has been reduced by >99% and types 2 and 3 wild polioviruses are now eradicated, but progress against type 1 polioviruses which are now confined to Afghanistan and Pakistan has slowed due to insecurity, poor access, and other problems. A strategic, globally coordinated replacement of trivalent OPV with bivalent 1, 3 OPV in 2016 reduced the incidence of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) but allowed the escape of type 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPV2) in areas with low immunization rates and use of monovalent OPV2 in response seeded new VDPV2 outbreaks and reestablishment of type 2 endemicity. A novel, more genetically stable type 2 OPV vaccine is undergoing clinical evaluation and may soon be deployed prevent or reduce VDPV2 emergences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Genetic variants of vaccine poliovirus type 2, imported from an unknown source, were detected in waste waters in Jerusalem, London and New York in early 2022. Wild poliovirus type 2 was globally eradicated in 1999, but vaccine virus type 2 continued for 16 more years; routine use of the vaccine was discontinued in 2016 and reintroduced occasionally on purpose. As an unintended consequence, type 2 vaccine virus variants (circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses, cVDPVs) that mimic wild viruses’ contagiousness and neurovirulence, have been emerging and spreading. To illustrate, in just the past four years (2018–2021), 2296 children developed cVDPV polio in 35 low-income countries. Many assume that virus transmission is via the faecal–oral route. Sustained virus transmission was documented in London and New York, in spite of high standards of sanitation and hygiene. Here, virus transmission cannot be attributed to faecal contamination of food or drinking water (for faecal–oral transmission). Hence, contagious transmission can only be explained by inhalation of droplets/aerosol containing virus shed in pharyngeal fluids (respiratory transmission), as was the classical teaching of polio epidemiology. If transmission efficiency of VDPV is via the respiratory route where hygiene is good, it stands to reason that it is the same case in countries with poor hygiene, since poor hygiene cannot be a barrier against respiratory transmission. By extrapolation, the extreme transmission efficiency of wild polioviruses must also have been due to their ability to exploit respiratory route transmission. These lessons have implications for global polio eradication. It was as a result of assuming faecal–oral transmission that eradication was attempted with live attenuated oral polio vaccine (OPV), ignoring its safety problems and very low efficacy in low-income countries. Inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) is completely safe and highly efficacious in protecting children against polio, with just three routine doses. Protecting all children from polio must be the interim goal of eradication, until poliovirus circulation dies out under sustained immunisation pressure. OPV should be discontinued under cover of immunity induced by IPV to stop the emergence of new lineages of VDPVs, not only type 2, but also types 1 and 3, to expedite the completion of polio eradication.

ABSTRACT Poliomyelitis is still an endemic disease in Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan despite the efforts to eradicate the disease. Therefore, there is a potential risk of international spread. Since the start of the polio eradication program by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in 1988, the incidence of polio has been reduced by 99%. In the last decade, wild poliovirus type 2 (WPV2) was eliminated and declared eradicated in 2015. Wild poliovirus type 3 (WPV3) was last reported in November 2012. These changes have allowed the removal of Sabin poliovirus type 2 from the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in April 2016 and countries either introduced bivalent OPV (bOPV) containing Sabin types 1 + 3 poliovirus or added at least one dose of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) into their routine immunization schedule. Many efforts are needed to eradicate polio, and new strategies should be implemented such as the development and approval of new genetically stable OPV, and vaccines that do not require infectious processes for virus growth, such as virus-like particles (VLPs), or packing-cell technology. IPV will increasingly be produced from Sabin strains, and further attenuated or genetically modified strains. Furthermore, there is also a need for the development of antiviral drugs to treat immunodeficient patients who are long-term excretors infected with poliovirus, thus avoiding contamination of individuals susceptible to polioviruses, due to reversal of pathogenicity. If all these measures are successfully implemented, the world will be close to the global

Outbreaks of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) pose a threat to the eventual eradication of all polioviruses. In 2017, an outbreak of cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) occurred in the midst of a war in Syria. We describe vaccination-based risk factors for and the successful response to the outbreak. We performed a descriptive analysis of cVDPV2 cases and key indicators of poliovirus surveillance and vaccination activities during 2016–2018. In the absence of reliable subnational coverage data, we used the caregiver-reported vaccination status of children with non-polio acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) as a proxy for vaccination coverage. We then estimated the relative odds of being unvaccinated against polio, comparing children in areas affected by the outbreak to children in other parts of Syria in order to establish the presence of poliovirus immunity gaps in outbreak affected areas. A total of 74 cVDPV2 cases were reported, with paralysis onset ranging from 3 March to 21 September 2017. All but three cases were reported from Deir-ez-Zor governorate and 84% had received < 3 doses of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV). After adjusting for age and sex, non-polio AFP case-patients aged 6–59 months in outbreak-affected areas had 2.5 (95% CI: 1.1–5.7) increased odds of being unvaccinated with OPV compared with non-polio AFP case-patients in the same age group in other parts of Syria. Three outbreak response rounds of monovalent OPV type 2 (mOPV2) vaccination were conducted, with governorate-level coverage mostly exceeding 80%. Significant declines in both national and subnational polio vaccination coverage, precipitated by war and a humanitarian crisis, led to a cVDPV2 outbreak in Syria that was successfully contained following three rounds of mOPV2 vaccination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The inability to successfully stop all use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) as part of the polio endgame and/or the possibilities of reintroduction of live polioviruses after successful OPV cessation may imply the need to restart OPV production and use, either temporarily or permanently. Areas covered: Complementing prior work that explored the risks of potential OPV restart, we discuss the logistical challenges and implications of restarting OPV in the future, and we develop appropriate assumptions for modeling the possibility of OPV restart. The complexity of phased cessation of the three OPV serotypes implies different potential combinations of OPV use long term. We explore the complexity of polio vaccine choices and key unresolved policy questions that may impact continuing and future use of OPV and/or inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV). We then characterize the assumptions required to quantitatively model OPV restart in prospective global-integrated economic policy models for the polio endgame. Expert commentary: Depending on the timing, restarting production of OPV would imply some likely delays associated with ramp-up, re-licensing, and other logistics that would impact the availability and costs of restarting the use of OPV in national immunization programs after globally coordinated cessation of one or more OPV serotypes.

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) partners engaged modelers during the past nearly 20 years to support strategy and policy discussions and decisions, and to provide estimates of the risks, costs, and benefits of different options for managing the polio endgame. Limited efforts to date provided insights related to the validation of the models used for GPEI strategy and policy decisions. However, modeling results only influenced decisions in some cases, with other factors carrying more weight in many key decisions. In addition, the results from multiple modeling groups do not always agree, which supports selection of some strategies and/or policies counter to the recommendations from some modelers but not others. This analysis reflects on our modeling, and summarizes our premises and recommendations, the outcomes of these recommendations, and the implications of key limitations of models with respect to polio endgame strategy. We briefly review the current state of the GPEI given epidemiological experience as of early 2020, which includes failure of the GPEI to deliver on the objectives of its 2013–2018 strategic plan despite full financial support. Looking ahead, we provide context for why the GPEI strategy of global oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation to end all cases of poliomyelitis looks infeasible given the current state of the GPEI and the failure to successfully stop all transmission of serotype 2 live polioviruses within four years of the April–May 2016 coordinated cessation of serotype 2 OPV use in routine immunization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many countries use supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) with oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) to keep their population immunity to transmission high using preventive, planned SIAs (pSIAs) and outbreaks response SIAs (oSIAs). Prior studies suggested that investment in pSIAs saved substantial health and financial costs due to avoided outbreaks. However, questions remain about the benefits of SIAs, particularly with the recent introduction of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) into routine immunization in all OPV‐using countries. The mounting costs of polio eradication activities and the need to respond to oSIAs threatens the use of limited financial resources for pSIAs, including in the remaining countries with endemic transmission of serotype 1 wild poliovirus (WPV1) (i.e., Pakistan and Afghanistan). A recent updated global poliovirus transmission model suggested that the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) is not on track to stop transmission of WPV1 in Pakistan and Afghanistan. We use the updated global model to explore the role of pSIAs to achieve WPV1 eradication. We find that unless Pakistan and Afghanistan manage to increase the quality of bivalent OPV (bOPV) pSIAs, which we model as intensity (i.e., sufficiently high‐coverage bOPV pSIAs that reach missed children), the model does not lead to successful eradication of WPV1. Achieving WPV1 eradication, the global objectives of the GPEI, and a successful polio endgame depend on effective and sufficient use of OPV. IPV use plays a negligible role in stopping transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan and most other countries supported by the GPEI, and more IPV use will not help to stop transmission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

COVID‐19 led to a recent high‐profile proposal to reintroduce oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in the United States (U.S.), initially in clinical trials, but potentially for widespread and repeated use. We explore logistical challenges related to U.S. OPV administration in 2020, review the literature related to nonspecific effects of OPV to induce innate immunity, and model the health and economic implications of the proposal. The costs of reintroducing a single OPV dose to 331 million Americans would exceed $4.4 billion. Giving a dose of bivalent OPV to the entire U.S. population would lead to an expected 40 identifiable cases of vaccine‐associated paralytic polio, with young Americans at the highest risk. Reintroducing any OPV use in the U.S. poses a risk of restarting transmission of OPV‐related viruses and could lead to new infections in immunocompromised individuals with B‐cell related primary immunodeficiencies that could lead to later cases of paralysis. Due to the lack of a currently licensed OPV in the U.S., the decision to administer OPV to Americans for nonspecific immunological effects would require purchasing limited global OPV supplies that could impact polio eradication efforts. Health economic modeling suggests no role for reintroducing OPV into the U.S. with respect to responding to COVID‐19. Countries that currently use OPV experience fundamentally different risks, costs, and benefits than the U.S. Successful global polio eradication will depend on sufficient OPV supplies, achieving and maintaining high OPV coverage in OPV‐using countries, and effective global OPV cessation and containment in all countries, including the U.S. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globally coordinated cessation of all three serotypes of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) represents a critical part of a successful polio endgame, which the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) plans to conduct in phases, with serotype 2 OPV cessation completed in mid 2016. Although in 2016 the GPEI expected to globally coordinate cessation of the remaining OPV serotypes (1 and 3) by 2021, continuing transmission of serotype 1 wild polioviruses to date makes those plans obsolete. With increasing time since the last reported polio case caused by serotype 3 wild poliovirus (in November 2012) leading to high confidence about its successful global eradication, the Global Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication recently certified its eradication. Questions now arise about the optimal timing of serotype 3 OPV (OPV3) cessation. Using an integrated global model that characterizes the risks, costs, and benefits of global polio policy and risk management options, we explored the implications of different options for coordinated cessation of OPV3 prior to COVID‐19. Globally coordinating cessation of OPV3 as soon as possible offers the opportunity to reduce cases of vaccine‐associated paralytic polio globally. In addition, earlier cessation of OPV3 should reduce the risks of creating serotype 3 circulating vaccine‐derived polioviruses after OPV3 cessation, which represents a significant threat to the polio endgame given current GPEI plans to reduce preventive OPV supplemental immunization activities starting in 2019. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the globally coordinated cessation of any serotype of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), some risks remain from undetected, existing homotypic OPV‐related transmission and/or restarting transmission due to several possible reintroduction risks. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of serotype 2‐containing OPV (OPV2) in 2016. Following OPV2 cessation, the GPEI and countries implemented activities to withdraw all the remaining trivalent OPV, which contains all three poliovirus serotypes (i.e., 1, 2, and 3), from the supply chain and replace it with bivalent OPV (containing only serotypes 1 and 3). However, as of early 2020, monovalent OPV2 use for outbreak response continues in many countries. In addition, outbreaks observed in 2019 demonstrated evidence of different types of risks than previously modeled. We briefly review the 2019 epidemiological experience with serotype 2 live poliovirus outbreaks and propose a new risk for unexpected OPV introduction for inclusion in global modeling of OPV cessation. Using an updated model of global poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution with and without consideration of this new risk, we explore the implications of the current global situation with respect to the likely need to restart preventive use of OPV2 in OPV‐using countries. Simulation results without this new risk suggest OPV2 restart will likely need to occur (81% of 100 iterations) to manage the polio endgame based on the GPEI performance to date with existing vaccine tools, and with the new risk of unexpected OPV introduction the expected OPV2 restart probability increases to 89%. Contingency planning requires new OPV2 bulk production, including genetically stabilized OPV2 strains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Understanding immunogenicity and safety of monovalent type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (mOPV2) in inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV)-immunized children is of major importance in informing global policy to control circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus outbreaks.Methods: In this open-label, phase 4 study (NCT02582255) in 100 IPV-vaccinated Lithuanian 1-5-year-olds, we measured humoral and intestinal type 2 polio neutralizing antibodies before and 28 days after 1 or 2 mOPV2 doses given 28 days apart and measured stool viral shedding after each dose. Parents recorded solicited adverse events (AEs) for 7 days after each dose and unsolicited AEs for 6 weeks after vaccination.Results: After 1 mOPV2 challenge, the type 2 seroprotection rate increased from 98% to 100%. Approximately 28 days after mOPV2 challenge 34 of 68 children (50%; 95% confidence interval, 38%-62%) were shedding virus; 9 of 37 (24%; 12%-41%) were shedding 28 days after a second challenge. Before challenge, type 2 intestinal immunity was undetectable in IPV-primed children, but 28 of 87 (32%) had intestinal neutralizing titers ≥32 after 1 mOPV2 dose. No vaccine-related serious or severe AEs were reported.Conclusions: High viral excretion after mOPV2 among exclusively IPV-vaccinated children was substantially lower after a subsequent dose, indicating induction of intestinal immunity against type 2 poliovirus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: China implemented the globally synchronized switch from trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) and introduced 1 dose of inactivated poliovirus vaccine on 1 May 2016. We assessed the impact of the switch on the immunity level against poliovirus, especially type 2.Methods: Children born between 2014 and 2017, who were brought to the hospitals in Urumqi city, Xinjiang Province in 2017, were enrolled and blood samples were collected to test for antibody titers against poliovirus. A comparison of seroprevalence between the children born before (preswitch group) and after the switch (postswitch group) was performed to assess the impact of the switch on the immunity level against polio.Results: A total of 172 subjects were enrolled. The overall seroprevalences were 98.8%, 79.1%, and 98.3% for types 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Seroprevalence for type 2 significantly decreased from 91.6% in the preswitch group to 67.4% in the postswitch group, but no statistically significant change was observed for both types 1 and 3.Conclusions: The switch from tOPV to bOPV can provide high-level immunity against types 1 and 3 but not against type 2, indicating a high risk of type 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus emergence and transmission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Jornal Brasileiro de Patologia e Medicina Laboratorial is the property of Sociedade Brasileira de Patologia Clinica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Abstract Background Oral polio vaccine (OPV) containing attenuated serotype 2 polioviruses was globally withdrawn in 2016, and bivalent OPV (bOPV) containing attenuated serotype 1 and 3 polioviruses needs to be withdrawn after the certification of eradication of all wild polioviruses to eliminate future risks from vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). To minimize risks from VDPVs, the planning and implementation of bOPV withdrawal should build on the experience with withdrawing OPV containing serotype 2 polioviruses while taking into account similarities and differences between the three poliovirus serotypes. Methods We explored the risks from (i) a failure to synchronize OPV cessation and (ii) unauthorized post-cessation OPV use for serotypes 1 and 3 in the context of globally-coordinated future bOPV cessation and compared the results to similar analyses for serotype 2 OPV cessation. Results While the risks associated with a failure to synchronize cessation and unauthorized post-cessation OPV use appear to be substantially lower for serotype 3 polioviruses than for serotype 2 polioviruses, the risks for serotype 1 appear similar to those for serotype 2. Increasing population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 poliovirus transmission using pre-cessation bOPV supplemental immunization activities and inactivated poliovirus vaccine in routine immunization reduces the risks of circulating VDPVs associated with non-synchronized cessation or unauthorized OPV use. Conclusions The Global Polio Eradication Initiative should synchronize global bOPV cessation during a similar window of time as occurred for the global cessation of OPV containing serotype 2 polioviruses and should rigorously verify the absence of bOPV in immunization systems after its cessation.

Background Manual white blood cell (WBC) differential counts as a predictor for neonatal sepsis development in a low-resource setting have not been thoroughly evaluated. We hypothesized that manual differentiation (specifically immature:total [I:T] neutrophil ratios) would be feasible and useful as an adjunct to predict early-onset neonatal sepsis (EONS). Secondarily, we hypothesized that vaccination with bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) and oral polio vaccine (OPV) could alter WBC differential counts and thus might reduce its predictive performance. Methods We performed a prospective cohort study within a randomized trial, randomizing healthy, high-risk newborns admitted to the nursery at the national hospital in Guinea-Bissau 1:1 to BCG+OPV at admission or at discharge (usual practice). Thin capillary blood films were prepared at 2 d of age in a subset of 268 neonates. WBC counts were assessed by microscopy and neonates were followed up for sepsis development within 2 weeks. Results Ninety-eight percent (264/268) of smears provided interpretable reads. Of the 264 children, 136 had been randomized to receive BCG+OPV prior to sampling; the remaining 128 were vaccinated at discharge. The I:T ratio (average 0.017) was lower among children who did not develop clinical sepsis but did not predict sepsis (p=0.70). Only three children had an I:T ratio >0.2 (associated with a higher probability of clinical sepsis in previous studies) but did not develop sepsis. Immunization did not alter WBC composition. Conclusions Manual WBC differentials are feasible in low-resource settings. WBC differentials are not affected by standard newborn immunization. However, the I:T ratio had no value in predicting subsequent development of sepsis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Primary B-cell immunodeficiencies are risk factors for the generation of vaccine-derived polioviruses. We report immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus serotype 3 in an 11-week-old boy with X-linked agammaglobulinemia. Unique characteristics of this case include early age of presentation, high viral evolutionary rate, and the child's perinatal exposure to human immunodeficiency virus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Response to and monitoring of viral outbreaks can be efficiently focused when rapid, quantitative, kinetic information provides the location and the number of infected individuals. Environmental surveillance traditionally provides information on location of populations with contagious, infected individuals since infectious poliovirus is excreted whether infections are asymptomatic or symptomatic. Here, we describe development of rapid (1 week turnaround time, TAT), quantitative RT-PCR of poliovirus RNA extracted directly from concentrated environmental surveillance samples to infer the number of infected individuals excreting poliovirus. The quantitation method was validated using data from vaccination with bivalent oral polio vaccine (bOPV). The method was then applied to infer the weekly number of excreters in a large, sustained, asymptomatic outbreak of wild type 1 poliovirus in Israel (2013) in a population where >90% of the individuals received three doses of inactivated polio vaccine (IPV). Evidence-based intervention strategies were based on the short TAT for direct quantitative detection. Furthermore, a TAT shorter than the duration of poliovirus excretion allowed resampling of infected individuals. Finally, the method documented absence of infections after successful intervention of the asymptomatic outbreak. The methodologies described here can be applied to outbreaks of other excreted viruses such as severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), where there are (1) significant numbers of asymptomatic infections; (2) long incubation times during which infectious virus is excreted; and (3) limited resources, facilities, and manpower that restrict the number of individuals who can be tested and re-tested.

The oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), which prevents person-to-person transmission of poliovirus by inducing robust intestinal immunity, has been a crucial tool for global polio eradication. However, polio outbreaks, mainly caused by type 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2), are increasing worldwide. Meanwhile, immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus (iVDPV) is considered another risk factor during the final stage of global polio eradication. Patients with primary immunodeficiency diseases are associated with higher risks for long-term iVDPV infections. Although a limited number of chronic iVDPV excretors were reported, the recent identification of a chronic type 2 iVDPV (iVDPV2) excretor in the Philippines highlights the potential risk of inapparent iVDPV infection for expanding cVDPV outbreaks. Further research on the genetic characterizations and molecular evolution of iVDPV2, based on comprehensive iVDPV surveillance, will be critical for elucidating the remaining risk of iVDPV2 during the post-OPV era.

Abstract Background Despite progress in recent years, Afghanistan is lagging behind in realizing the full potential of immunization. The country is still endemic for polio transmission and measles outbreaks continue to occur. In spite of significant reductions over the past decade, the mortality rate of children under 5 years of age continues to remain high at 91 per 1000 live births. Methods The study was a descriptive community-based cross sectional household survey. The survey aimed to estimate the levels of immunization coverage at national and province levels. Specific objectives are to: establish valid baseline information to monitor progress of the immunization program; identify reasons why children are not immunized; and make recommendations to enhance access and quality of immunization services in Afghanistan. The survey was carried out in all 34 provinces of the country, with a sample of 6125 mothers of children aged 12–23 months. Results Nationally, 51% of children participating in the survey received all doses of each antigen irrespective of the recommended date of immunization or recommended interval between doses. About 31% of children were found to be partially vaccinated. Reasons for partial vaccination included: place to vaccinate child too far (23%), not aware of the need of vaccination (17%), no faith in vaccination (16%), mother was too busy (15%), and fear of side effects (11%). Conclusion The innovative mechanism of contracting out delivery of primary health care services in Afghanistan, including immunization, to non-governmental organizations is showing some positive results in quickly increasing coverage of essential interventions, including routine immunization. Much ground still needs to be covered with proper planning and management of resources in order to improve the immunization coverage in Afghanistan and increase survival and health status of its children.

In May 2016, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated the cessation of all use of type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2), except for emergency outbreak response. Since then, paralytic polio cases caused by type 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses now exceed 3,000 cases reported by 39 countries. In 2022 (as of April 25, 2023), 20 countries reported detection of cases and nine other countries reported environmental surveillance detection, but no reported cases. Recent development of a genetically modified novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) may help curb the generation of neurovirulent vaccine-derived strains; its use since 2021 under Emergency Use Listing is limited to outbreak response activities. Prior modeling studies showed that the expected trajectory for global type 2 viruses does not appear headed toward eradication, even with the best possible properties of nOPV2 assuming current outbreak response performance. Continued persistence of type 2 poliovirus transmission exposes the world to the risks of potentially high-consequence events such as the importation of virus into high-transmission areas of India or Bangladesh. Building on prior polio endgame modeling and assuming current national and GPEI outbreak response performance, we show no probability of successfully eradicating type 2 polioviruses in the near term regardless of vaccine choice. We also demonstrate the possible worst-case scenarios could result in rapid expansion of paralytic cases and preclude the goal of permanently ending all cases of poliomyelitis in the foreseeable future. Avoiding such catastrophic scenarios will depend on the development of strategies that raise population immunity to type 2 polioviruses., (© 2023 Society for Risk Analysis.)