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The existing social pact literature claims that governing parties offer social pact proposals because they anticipate they will receive an electoral benefit from social pact agreements. Yet the available data on social pacts inform us that in a substantial minority of cases social pact proposals fail to become social pact agreements. In an effort to better determine the political calculations made by governments before they propose a social pact, this article examines the effect of implementing reform legislation unilaterally, social pact proposals, social pact proposal failures and social pact agreements on the vote share of government parties in 15 Western European countries between 1981 and 2006. It is found that social pact proposals do not have any electoral consequences for governing parties, unilateral legislation and social pact proposal failures reduce the vote share of governing parties, and social pact agreements provide an electoral benefit to parties in minority governments only. These findings suggest that governing parties propose social pacts in a good faith effort to complete a social pact agreement; and that such an agreement is not a way for these parties to gain votes, but to avoid the electoral punishment associated with enacting unpopular reforms unilaterally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While a vast theoretical literature argues that we live in populist times, the success of populism beyond its electoral dimension is rarely investigated empirically. This paper analyses the development of populism in five Western European countries (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) from the 1970s to the 2010s. First, it measures whether political parties articulate populist discourses more and more often in their election manifestos. Second, the paper tests whether the presence of populism has increased over time in newspaper articles. The results show that populism is not a new phenomenon and that there is no linear increase over the decades. Moreover, while election manifestos are significantly more populist in the 2010s than in previous decades, populism in newspaper articles remains rather stable at a low level, suggesting that the media curb rather than foster populist discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do political parties' shifts on sociocultural issues, which signify the withdrawal of ideological commitment and disturb their supporters, cause vote loss? We argue that the negative electoral impact of positional shifts is constrained by party supporters' opinion as well as parties' ideological strength on sociocultural issues. Using data on party positions and ideologies in Western Europe from 1990 to 2008, we find that only parties holding strong ideologies on sociocultural issues lose votes by shifting their positions on these issues. Even these parties, however, do not lose votes when their position shifts in the same direction as that of their supporters. The results indicate that niche parties are straightforwardly affected by position shifts regarding sociocultural issues; they should adopt different strategies between values they endorse and those they reject; and political parties should not be worried about vote loss from position shifts as long as they follow their supporters' opinions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives This article evaluates the influence of the economic crisis (2009-2013) on the vote share of the radical right in Western European regions. I ask two questions: (1) Has the radical right electorally benefited from the recession that has hit Western Europe in the aftermath of the U.S. and European stock market crisis in 2008/2009? (2) Has it performed particularly well in areas that have been very hard hit by the crisis? Methods I evaluate both questions in a longitudinal and multivariate framework through pooled time series analysis. The analysis, which controls for immigration, the education level of the region, and population density, covers more than 150 regions in 17 European countries from 1990 to 2013. Results First, I find that the 2009 to 2013 economic crisis has merely triggered a very moderate increase of 1 percentage point in the aggregate average regional vote share of the radical right. Second, and with the exception of regions in Greece and France, my results also indicate that the radical right has had the strongest electoral gains in regions and countries that have been relatively spared from the gust of the crisis. Conclusion This quantitative study highlights that an economic crisis is no panacea for the success of the radical right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study tries to explain regional level variation in the far right-wing vote across more than 160 regions in 17 Western European countries from 1990 to 2013. With the help of a panel Tobit model, I first examine the impact of nine regional-level structural indicators on the dependent variable, the percentage of the far right-wing vote. I find that the far right performs better in territorial units with a high percentage of university-educated individuals, in rural regions and in areas that have a high percentage of foreigners. Second, I use a dynamic specification in first differences to evaluate how changes in the independent variables trigger changes in the dependent variable. The results of this second specification highlight that increases in unemployment rates and in the number of college-educated citizens trigger a better performance of the far right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fall of the communist regimes in central and eastern Europe was a shattering event for the western European radical left, causing many parties to change their names and strategies. Despite prophesies pointing to the death of radical anti-capitalist politics, radical left parties (RLPs) still exist in all parts of Europe, and in many countries they have even been able to increase their influence. This paper seeks to provide a comparative mapping of the policies and policy positions of western European RLPs before and after the fall of communism. The results of the examination indicate that although leftward trends can be observed in many RLPs in the early 2010s, the general, long-time, trend shows that the radical left family – and especially democratic socialist parties – has become less radical with regards to the core left–right dimension. Moreover, the study also shows that many RLPs – and, again, especially democratic socialist parties – have become more interested in other, non-socioeconomic, issues. Despite the rise of new left issues, the radical left is, however, still distinguishable from other parties mainly through their comparatively strong emphasis on old, traditional, left issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parties that defend the interest of one or a few ethnic groups and/or regions are, despite their differences, recurrently grouped together into a single party family. This article systematically applies the multidimensional framework offered by Mair and Mudde in order to provide an up-to-date inventory of the universe of ethnic and regionalist parties in Western Europe and assess whether they form a family. The evidence indicates that although the ethnic and regionalist family appears to be somewhat less coherent than more established families, there are clear similarities between the proposed (core) member parties. More specifically, the common denominators that distinguish the members of the ethnic and regionalist party family are their rather similar origins, sociologies, and policy orientations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies document that voters infer parties' left-right positions from governing coalition arrangements. We show that citizens extend this coalition-based heuristic to the European integration dimension and, furthermore, that citizens' coalition-based inferences on this issue conflict with alternative measures of party positions derived from election manifestos and expert placements. We also show that citizens' perceptions of party positions on Europe matter, in that they drive substantial partisan sorting in the electorate. Our findings have implications for parties' election strategies and for mass-elite policy linkages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most accounts of electoral system change tend to consider it as being driven by purely partisan interests. Political parties are expected to change the electoral rules as a way to maximise gains or minimise losses. However, little work has been done on the question of why electoral reforms are so scarce in spite of these potential benefits. In this study, a wide range of both factors that may foster ('catalysts') and ones that may hinder ('barriers') the change of electoral institutions are investigated. A statistical analysis is performed of 16 West European countries from 1975 to 2005, covering 23 reforms of the proportionality of their electoral systems. It is found that procedural barriers are more effective for explaining the likelihood of electoral reforms than (most of) the catalysts. Additionally, there are indications that courts may play a more active role in triggering reform than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been argued that political parties are in decline. While they used to be responsible for connecting citizens to the state by translating their preferences into policies, they have increasingly become part of the state, acting as governors instead. While this perspective emphasises parties' representative function, it is less clear what their role is in a more direct democratic context. Parties may gain support due to such context, but they may also be seen increasingly redundant in a situation where citizens can co-decide directly. Focusing on party membership, this study tests these rival expectations on a panel of 16 West European democracies over the period 1980-2008 and finds that parties tend to have higher levels of party membership in a direct democratic context. The usage of referendums, however, does not contribute to this effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When people say that they trust local authorities, is it simply because they have generalized trust in national government? Or is trust in local government rooted in distinctive considerations, connected to the character of local communities and the balance of power across levels of government? We explore how trust in local and national government differs across individuals and across countries in western Europe. We find that people trust local government for different reasons than those that drive trust in national government. Cross-national differences in levels of trust in government reflect the character of national institutions. While both proportional representation systems and federal systems are power-sharing designs, each has distinctive consequences for trust. When opportunities for voice in local government are high, as in decentralized systems, people report greater trust in local government. When opportunities for voice in national government are limited, as in majoritarian systems, people report lower trust for national government and higher trust in local government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented which offers a response to articles within the issue discussing the book "Impact of Extreme Right Parties on Immigration Policy: Comparing Britain, France and Italy," by this article's author. An overview of the opposition to immigration of extreme right political parties (ERPs) in Western Europe, including the Italian political party Lega Nord and British political party the British National Party's (BNP's) opposition to immigrants, is provided.

Impact of Extreme Right Parties makes a welcome contribution to the growing scholarship that assesses the impacts of extreme right parties (ERPs) on inter-party competition, public opinion and public policy. Although it commendably avoids the pitfall of overestimating the political significance of ERPs, several criticisms of the book nevertheless can be raised. First, it is disquieting that its analysis of the impacts of ERPs within its chosen three countries covers less than a decade. Second, the reader may come away questioning its ultimate contribution to our understanding of the staying power of ERPs. Third, it is reasonable to ask if in investigating the impacts of ERPs on inter-party competition and public opinion the book is simply accumulating evidence for the much more important question of their impact on public policy. Finally, it is unfortunate that the possible effects of ERPs on partisan and party system dealignment are not considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radical right-wing parties have been a constant force in party systems of Western Europe since the late 1980s, despite cycles of development and support. Still, measurement of their impact has proven difficult. Scholars assessing the impact of radical right-wing parties in recent years have produced mixed findings in terms of whether effects tend to be direct or indirect and more or less salient. The recent book by Carvalho engages existing literature on impact assessment examining the cases of the UK, France and Italy. His findings caution against overstatement of impacts on immigration policy, suggesting that effects are contingent on party system competition and mainstream party agency. This article considers the mixed results pointing to a lack of existing tools for measuring indirect party impacts. It contends that existing theory on party impact struggles to conceptualize empty spaces in political ideology, attributing agency to moving parties and not to others that may be pushing them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do extreme right parties in contemporary Europe shape policy in meaningful ways? Carvalho's book charts complicated intellectual terrain, and the author demonstrates that while radical right parties have made a modest political impact in some states, they have achieved much less than one might have expected in their central policy area (immigration). After reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of Carvalho's analysis, I suggest that his findings are consistent with the general ‘containment’ (as opposed to ‘contagion’) of the radical right in (Western) Europe. The notion that the populist right has been ‘contained’ in Europe may seem odd at first blush, but a comparison with the USA suggests that it may be a fruitful theoretical starting point. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How migration and mobilizations of difference are accommodated at the local level is a burning question. Concepts adopted by local governments and the capacities of cities to formulate and implement these have received increasing attention, but often without examining the ideas and norms that underlie local concepts and practices. This article assesses the hypothesis of local-level pragmatism, which it rejects, and develops the notion of ‘paradigmatic pragmatism’ to characterize how local-level politics address mobilizations of difference. Based on empirical findings from Amsterdam, Antwerp and Leeds, and comparing the content and the implementation of ‘diversity policies’, I argue against a dichotomy of pragmatic vs ideational politics. Instead, these cities draw on a variety of ideas and pragmatically combine them under the header of diversity. This paradigmatic pragmatism invites further research on the effects of potential incompatibilities of immigrant policy ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How does voter polarisation affect party responsiveness? Previous research has shown that political parties emphasise political issues that are important to their voters. However, it is posited in this article that political parties are not equally responsive to citizen demands across all issue areas. The hypothesis is that party responsiveness varies considerably with the preference configuration of the electorate. More specifically, it is argued that party responsiveness increases with the polarisation of issues among voters. To test these theoretical expectations, party responsiveness is analysed across nine West European countries from 1982 until 2013. Data on voter attention and voter preferences with regard to specific policy issues from a variety of national election studies is combined with Comparative Manifestos Project data on parties' emphasis of these issues in their election manifestos. The findings have major implications for understanding party competition and political representation in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a quantitative examination of how newspaper articles in the UK, France and Italy most commonly frame immigration and migrants. A developing literature on the securitisation of policy and discourse related to migration suggests the prominence of this narrative, but the prevalence of this particular portrayal of migration has not been placed into comparative context through cross-country analysis of the relative prominence of various immigration-related issues. To test the securitisation thesis I tabulate not only security narratives in the press, but also economic ones, comparing the relative frequency of these two broader narratives. The results indicate that it would be premature to speak of a pre-eminent securitised meta-narrative within the European press. I find that overt references to physical threat or crime occur relatively infrequently, with only the mention of the border being more common. Instead, issues with economic implications, such as the labour market, asylum and fiscal costs, exhibit at least equal salience, though the degree to which the press grants attention to specific economic or security issues varies substantially between countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Do electoral pressures provide an explanation for why governments offer pacts to unions and employers rather than acting through legislation when faced with the need to pass potentially unpopular reforms to welfare policies, wages, and labour markets? This article addresses that question by analysing whether governments’ pursuit of pacts affects their vote share and increases the probability that they gain re-election for 16 West European countries between 1980 and 2012. It is found that the presence of social pacts has a significant and positive effect on incumbents’ vote shares at the next election and also results in a higher probability of re-election. These results are conditioned by government type: While all types of governments benefit electorally from pacts, the electoral penalties from the pursuit of unilateral legislation on policy reforms harm single-party majorities the most, minority governments moderately, and coalition majorities the least. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

To date, electoral systems are conceptualised as setting an ‘upper bound’ to, or defining a ‘carrying capacity’ for, the number of parties or lists, and their effect is assessed at the district level. This article adds to the empirical study of electoral systems by analysing a vast database of district-level electoral returns. The argument focuses on the demand and supply of viable electoral candidates, which are conditioned by the interplay of strategic entry (by the party rank and file) and strategic voting (by the electorate). Drawing on a database of almost 18,000 electoral districts taken from 15 West European countries, the empirical analysis yields a number of insights: most specifically, (1) district magnitude only becomes binding and effective when a higher social demand meets a lower carrying capacity of the electoral district; (2) the provision of upper tiers undermines the emergence of Duvergerian equilibria within the primary electoral districts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Within the context of global competition for human talent, two policy shifts in favour of the promotion of high-skilled immigration (HSI) were observed in the UK and France during the 2000s. In light of similar policy inputs, this article compares the development and implementation of the British Highly Skilled Immigration Programme between 2002 and 2008 and the French Carte de Competences et Talents (Card of Competences and Talents) from 2006 to 2009. This research explores whether there was an overall convergence across these two European countries' policies towards HSI and if they have conformed to a similar client politics model. Whereas this politics model was identified in the UK, a policy gap was observed in France. This article relates the identified divergences with the political agency of the British and French policymakers, while the conclusions argue that politics trumped policy in the two selected cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electorally, Western European populist political parties have been rather successful in the last two decades. But how pervasive is their actual populist message? Although some scholars have looked at the diffusion of this message, they have only focused on the arena of party politics. Research on how widespread populism is beyond the party political sphere is still in its infancy. This study looks at populism in public debates in the media. Based on a content analysis of opinion articles in newspapers in five Western European countries, I demonstrate that these debates have become more populist over the years, and that the degree of populism is strongly related to the success of populist parties. This indicates that populism is more widespread than previously assumed. I also show that letters are more populist than other opinion articles and that debates in tabloid media are not more populist than debates in elite media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The class cleavage has been the most important structuring force in most West European countries. In the last decades, the question regarding whether the social class still influences voting behavior has been intensively debated. One strand of literature suggests a transformation of the old class divide into a new -- or reformulated -- class cleavage. However, there is still little empirical evidence about the circumstances under which this new divide may become important. The present paper contributes to fill this gap, by analyzing in how far electoral competition conditions the strength of the new class cleavage. Applying data from the Swiss National Elections 2007 and 2011 to a comparative analysis across cantons we find that the impact of the new class cleavage on electoral choice varies according to party system polarization. The proportionality of the electoral system, by contrast, does not have a clear conditional effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a 2012 Journal of Politics article, we presented a zero-intelligence model of government formation. Our intent was to provide a “null” model of government formation, a baseline upon which other models could build. We made two claims regarding aggregate government formation outcomes: first, that our model produces aggregate results on the distributions of government types, cabinet portfolios, and bargaining delays in government formation that compare favorably to those in the real world; and second, that these aggregate distributions vary in theoretically intuitive ways as the model parameters change. In this issue, Martin and Vanberg (MV) criticize our model on theoretical and empirical grounds. Here we not only show how MV’s evaluation of our model is flawed, but we also illustrate, using an analogy to common statistical practice, how one might properly attempt to falsify stochastic models such as ours at both the individual and the aggregate level. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Securing executive attention for new policy demands is notoriously difficult as governmental agendas are crowded by established or ‘core’ policy issues. This article investigates whether it is harder for new and costly policy issues to reach the government agenda when the economy is performing badly. It examines whether, and the extent to which, costly gender equality issues regarding women’s access to the labour market, equal treatment at work and care activities, are more likely to achieve executive attention when the economy is performing well. Using the Comparative Policy Agendas database, a systematic, quantitative analysis is conducted of when and why policies promoting sex equality in the division of labour reach executive agendas. The findings confirm that advocacy for costly gender equality measures is easier to make in times of economic growth. It is also found that female representation in parliament strengthens advocacy for executive attention and reduces friction on policy agenda change. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This research explores two theoretical problems that are deeply connected: the concept of control in corporation's governance and the methodological nationalism implicit in the kind of data sets used in most structural analysis of economic power. As an empirical support four networks are used: interlocking directorate's networks of French and Spanish largest firms and the networks of the same corporations in both countries related by common investors. The consequences of choosing one or another kind of relations - interlocking directorates or common investors- on the national character of nationally selected data are analyzed. It appears that the consideration of networks built using the main shareholders of each firm leads to the blurring of the initial national selection of the corporations. And also, challenges standing ideas on the concept of control of corporation's activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Protest politics is often linked to political dissatisfaction. However, much of the literature on political protest overlooks the fact that dissatisfaction originates within the political system, and therefore may depend on it. In this article, we argue that citizens who are dissatisfied with the political system are more likely to join protest actions because they have a greater incentive to change the current political situation. Moreover, we argue that the likelihood of joining protest actions also depends on the characteristics of the existing party systems. We believe that, in contexts where parties cannot serve as linkages between civil society and political institutions, dissatisfaction may be a further motivational mechanism for joining political protests. Using multilevel models and the European Value Study, we find that citizens participating in political protest activities show, on average, higher levels of political dissatisfaction, that their participation in political protests depends on the characteristics of the party systems and that, overall, the association between dissatisfaction and protest varies according to the characteristics of the party systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many years women tended to vote more conservative than men, but since the 1980s this gap has shifted direction: women in many countries are more likely than men to support left parties. The literature largely agrees on a set of political-economic factors explaining the change in women’s political orientation. In this article we demonstrate that these conventional factors fall short in explaining the gender vote gap. We highlight the importance of a religious cleavage in the party system across Western European countries, restricting the free flow of religious voters between left and right parties. Given that surveys show us a constantly higher degree of religiosity among women and a persistent impact of religion on vote choice, religion explains a substantial part of the temporal as well as cross-country variation in the transition from the more conservative to the more progressive voting behavior of women. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article assesses the impact of populist radical right parties on national party systems in Western Europe. Has the emergence of this new party family changed the interaction of party competition within Western European countries? First, I look at party system change with regard to numerical and numerical–ideological terms. Second, I evaluate the effect populist radical right parties have had on the different dimensions of party systems. Third, I assess the claim that the rise of populist radical right parties has created bipolarizing party system. Fourth, I look at the effect the rise of the populist radical right has had on the logic of coalition formation. The primary conclusion is that, irrespective of conceptualization and operationalization, populist radical right parties have not fundamentally changed party systems in Western Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Studies in different countries have shown that the media can influence the attention politicians devote to different issues. However, knowledge about the cross-national contingencies of the political agenda-setting power of the media is limited. This study compares the perceptions of journalists of the political agenda-setting power of the mass media in eight parliamentary democracies with varying media and political systems: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Building on a power balance perspective, the article looks at the autonomy of the media system (audience reach and political control) and the concentration of power in the political system (number of political parties, concentration of executive power) to contextualise the role of the media in political agenda-setting. Journalists perceive most media influence in Norway and Sweden and least in Spain. The results indicate that the power balance between the media and political actors to a large extent reflects the institutional structure of the political system, but that media characteristics such as the autonomous position of television should also be taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Why some individuals, who would clearly benefit from redistribution, do not vote for parties offering redistributive policies is an old puzzle of redistributive politics. Recent work in political economy offers an explanation based on the interplay between religious identity and party policies. Strategic parties bundle conservative moral policies with anti-redistribution positions inducing individuals with a strong religious identity to vote based on moral rather than economic preferences. I test this theory using microlevel data on individuals’ vote choices in 24 recent multiparty elections in 15 Western European countries. I use an integrated model of religion, economic and moral preferences, and vote choice to show that religious individuals possess less liberal economic preferences, which shapes their vote choice against redistributive parties. This holds even for individuals who would clearly benefit from redistribution. Moreover, the redistributive vote of religious individuals is primarily based on economic not moral preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It is often found that religious people are underrepresented among the radical right electorate, despite radical right parties’ claim of being defenders of the Judeo-Christian society. This study investigates this paradoxical finding and examines to what extent two dimensions of religion – practice and belief – play a role in voting for a radical right party across seven West European countries. Using the European Values Study from 2008, it was found that religiously active people are indeed less likely to vote for a radical right party, because they tend to vote for a Christian party. However, the study challenges the common wisdom that religion alone is a restraint on radical right voting and shows that orthodox believers in three countries – Belgium, Norway and Switzerland – feel more threatened by the presence of immigrants and therefore are more likely than their mainstream counterparts to vote for a radical right party. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Parliaments often elect holders of important extra-parliamentary offices such as heads of state, constitutional judges, heads of audit institutions and ombudsmen. What drives the behaviour of parliamentary actors and the outcome of such elections? This article explains actor behaviour theoretically, drawing on spatial factors, principal-agent arguments about the importance of nonspatial candidate characteristics and signaling arguments about competitive considerations beyond the specific election. Empirically, it provides the first comparative analysis of such elections outside the United States Senate using original data on 100 elections for four external offices in 14 Western European parliaments. The findings show that spatial variables, nonspatial candidate characteristics and features of the competitive context systematically affect the election outcome. The article contributes to comparative parliamentary research in general by demonstrating how parliamentary activities, other than lawmaking, can be analysed using established theories and by showing that consensual aggregate outcomes can be explained within a competition-based rational choice model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented concerning the establishment of Christian Democratic Parties (CDPs) in European democracies, how Catholic and Protestant CDPs varied in their interpretation of state sovereignty, and their relationship to strong or weak European Affairs (EACs) in European Union (EU) countries. It also discusses how EACs that formed under governments with CDPs conformed to religious norms.

By the 1920s the Netherlands was a 'cycling nation', courtesy of an extensive network of bicycle paths throughout the country, a politically influential cyclists' organisation, and a bicycle tax, which meant that cyclists were formally provided for. German cyclists' organisations never achieved the political influence of their Dutch counterpart. In the Weimar Republic the National Socialist regime produced geographically uneven traffic regulations, and promoted motorised traffic that also entailed the separation of different flows of traffic. The construction of cycling paths increased significantly but the German network remained scantily developed in the late 1930s in comparison to its Dutch counterpart. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elections involving a major scandal were unusual in the late 1970s, but today nearly half are so affected. Multilevel analyses of Eurobarometer data reveal that scandal elections once had negative net effects on satisfaction with democracy. However, as scandals have become more common, the negative effect has withered away. This 'scandal fatigue' process appears driven by changes in scandal material, rather than by changes in citizens' reactions to a given type of material. Scandals involving several politicians and parties still really matter, but these have not become markedly more common. The possibility that the increasing incidence of scandals has created a more critical approach to scandal material is discussed. As scandals accumulate, citizens may become more prone to ponder the relevance of a story and the motives of the messenger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of women’s parliamentary presence have suggested that the proportion of women parliamentarians rests on the interaction between intra-party and party external conditions, and that these can be discussed in terms of necessity and sufficiency. Still, the field lacks systematic cross-case assessments of such relationships. This research takes an explorative approach to necessity, sufficiency and interaction in the field of gender and party. Using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to study 57 individual West European parties, it demonstrates that party behaviour is a function of intra-party and party-external conditions. Furthermore, it shows that when the external factors are not present, parties are themselves able to achieve gender-balanced parliamentary delegations. The article reveals that there are several paths to gender balance, and that the absence of conditions sufficient for balance does not explain why parties do not become gender balanced. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the discourse on political corruption in early modern Amsterdam, Netherlands and Hamburg, Germany. An overview of what is known as the Wygand Affair, including Hamburg's Senat's (City Council's) accusations of embezzlement against the lawyer August Wygand for putatively purchasing the office of bailiff (Gerichtsvogt), is provided. The role that nepotism played in political corruption in Hamburg and Amsterdam, including the expectation to benefit from a family member's holding of public office, is discussed.