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This essay outlines how Islamic State repressed local communities after conquering much of Iraq's territory in 2014, and how civilians, in turn, responded to insurgent governance. While there are as many ways to survive violence as there are people affected by it, most survival strategies fall into four general categories: flight, cooperation, neutrality, and resistance. Iraqis' experience under the harsh rule of the self-declared caliphate takes center stage, but the analysis includes generalizable lessons about how ordinary civilians survive terrorism, insurgency, and civil war. The essay concludes with an analysis of the core challenges confronting postwar governance in Iraq. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates possible sociopolitical reconciliatory mechanisms to garner support for peacemaking in conflict-torn societies. Building on the Kurdish question in Turkey, associated with a four-decade-long armed conflict that has spilled over into neighboring Syria and Iraq, we identify policies and framing that can attract support for a political solution to the conflict. We highlight the need for a sociopolitical reconciliatory approach that addresses both the hopes of the warring minority and the fears of the majority. The results from an original nationwide survey indicate that minority demands can initially be addressed through a 'soft settlement,' lying between individual and collective rights. Our results point to the need to relax the concept of negotiated settlement, which has become the most frequent approach to ending internal armed conflicts in the post-Cold War era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After 2003, Iraq experienced political, social and violent sectarianism. Scholars who studied sectarianism in Iraq tried to explain it through events, narratives and official statements. However, it has not been possible to understand the impact of the sectarian identity of Sunnis and Shias on their political and social behaviour. This study aims to measure that impact by asking: how has sectarianism changed in Iraq over time from the perspective of public opinion – increase or decrease, and why? For a deeper understanding, some demographic factors, such as age, education and gender, are considered to measure how the sectarian identity has affected the behaviour of Iraqis in voting, interpersonal trust, and trusting the government and the army. By using the surveys conducted by the Arab Barometer from 2011 to 2022, it was possible to compare the responses of the public by sect and have interesting findings. In general, Sunnis and Shias have exchanged their roles after 2013. Until 2013, Shias had tended to vote and trust local and national governments more than Sunnis. However, since 2019, the surveys show that Sunnis have had greater rates of voting and trust those governments than the Shias. Also, since 2019, the interpersonal trust between Sunnis and Shias has improved more than before, which can support the social cohesion between people who belong to different sects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last 50 years, civil conflicts have grown increasingly complex due to the proliferation of new armed groups and rebel fragmentation. Yet, existing research on external support for armed groups often ignores this multi-actor dimension, overlooking the unusual amount of discretion sponsors have in deciding whom to support in any given target state. This paper explores how multi-militant conflict environments impact foreign state sponsorship decisions. Conventional wisdom predicts that shared ethnic and ideological ties increase the likelihood of external support for an armed group because these ties signal a lower risk of misuse (agency slack). In contrast, this paper highlights how an increasing number of armed groups in a conflict setting can decrease the importance of shared ties between state sponsors and militants. We argue this change occurs because multi-militant environments reduce a group's willingness to misuse support and improve a sponsor's options to shift support if misuse occurs. We utilize a mixed-methods approach to examine this logic, drawing on an original dataset of 1,402 armed groups and qualitative evidence from Iraq during Saddam Hussein's rule. The results advance understanding of the consequences of conflict fragmentation and external support for non-rebel actors. Durante los últimos cincuenta años, los conflictos civiles se han vuelto cada vez más complejos debido a la proliferación de nuevos grupos armados y a la fragmentación de los grupos rebeldes. Sin embargo, la investigación existente acerca del apoyo externo a los grupos armados ignora, a menudo, esta dimensión formada por agentes múltiples, y pasa por alto la inusual discrecionalidad de la que gozan los Estados a la hora de decidir a quién apoyar en un determinado Estado objetivo. Este artículo analiza cómo los entornos de conflicto con diversos militantes afectan las decisiones de apoyo de los Estados extranjeros. La sabiduría tradicional predice que la existencia de unos lazos étnicos e ideológicos compartidos aumenta la probabilidad de apoyo externo hacia un grupo armado debido a que estos vínculos indican un menor riesgo de uso indebido (holgura de agencia). Por el contrario, este artículo destaca cómo la existencia de un número cada vez mayor de grupos armados en un entorno de conflicto puede hacer disminuir la importancia de los lazos compartidos entre los Estados que proporcionan apoyo y los militantes. Argumentamos que este cambio ocurre porque los entornos con diversos militantes reducen la disposición de un grupo a hacer un mal uso del apoyo y mejoran las opciones de los Estados que proporcionan apoyo a la hora de modificar su apoyo en caso de la existencia de un mal uso. Utilizamos un enfoque de métodos mixtos para estudiar esta lógica. Para ello, nos basamos en un conjunto de datos originales de 1,402 grupos armados y en evidencia cualitativa obtenida de Iraq durante el gobierno de Saddam Hussein. Los resultados amplían la comprensión de las consecuencias de la fragmentación del conflicto y el apoyo externo a los agentes no rebeldes. Ces cinquante dernières années, les conflits civils se sont complexifiés à cause de la prolifération de nouveaux groupes armés et de la fragmentation des rebelles. Pourtant, les travaux de recherche existants sur le soutien externe des groupes armés ignorent souvent ces acteurs multiples, et donc omettent l'ampleur inhabituelle de la discrétion des entités quand il s'agit de décider qui soutenir dans un État cible. Cet article s'intéresse aux conséquences des environnements conflictuels aux multiples militants sur les décisions de soutien d'États étrangers. Il est généralement admis que les liens ethniques et idéologiques accroissent la probabilité de soutien externe pour un groupe armé, car ils diminuent les risques de détournement. Par opposition, cet article met en évidence qu'un nombre croissant de groupes armés au sein d'une zone de conflit est susceptible d'affaiblir l'importance relative des liens qui unissent les États soutiens aux militants. Nous affirmons que cette évolution intervient parce que les environnements aux multiples militants permettent d'orienter les soutiens différemment en cas de détournement. Les groupes sont donc moins enclins à mal agir. Nous employons une stratégie aux méthodes mixtes pour analyser cette logique, en nous appuyant sur un ensemble de données original de 1,402 groupes armés et des éléments probants qualitatifs issus d'Irak à l'époque où Saddam Hussein était au pouvoir. Les résultats enrichissent notre compréhension des conséquences de la fragmentation des conflits et du soutien externe pour des acteurs non rebelles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reflects on the founding of the journal "Civil Wars" and the motivations behind its creation. The authors discuss the prevalence of conflict and war in the 1990s, particularly the emergence of "new wars" characterized by mass atrocities and ethnic conflict. They also explore the potential for peace and the role of international intervention in resolving civil wars. The article acknowledges the complexities of religious sentiment and ideology in global politics, as well as the failures and consequences of military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors emphasize the importance of understanding the human dimension of war, particularly the impact on civilians, and challenge established orthodoxies regarding the costs of conflict. The article concludes by acknowledging the ongoing relevance of the journal in the face of current global conflicts. [Extracted from the article]

In international relations, hierarchy is generally understood as the relational contract by which two states legitimately acknowledge their superior and subordinate ranks. Empirical studies, however, show that some states experience distinctive hierarchical patterns, such as military intervention and nation-building. This study calls them the 'informal imposed hierarchy' (IIH after this) because they all install favoured leaders, governmental structures and/or troops in target states without the consent of the target states' population. Using state clusters from 1945 to 2003, we found that four sorts of states experienced IIHs: those having counter-hegemonic actors, signalling a move to the rival hierarchy, seeking an exit door from the current hierarchical system, and perceived to present new security risks (e.g. terrorism). IIH likely generates instability since it installs and protects illegitimate rulers in the target state. It can aggravate internal war in subordinate states with single-party governments or heterogeneous communities. In order to assess the model's and the arguments' explanatory power, the study selects the relevant universe cases. The next, it examines pre- and post-Soviet eras in Afghanistan and the 2001 and 2003 US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as control cases. These cross-cases illustrate the change of IIH's motives over time and across hierarchies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite having its own internal population displacement due to conflict and civil war, Iraq and the Kurdistan Region continue to accommodate large numbers of refugees from Iran, Palestine, Syria and Turkey. However, Iraq has not ratified the internationally recognized legal framework for the protection of refugees. Currently, the protection offered to asylum seekers in Iraq is regulated by secondary legislation, mostly in the form of administrative circulars. The lack of an applicable law regulating the status of asylum seekers has led to local‐level ad hoc policy implementation. Similarly, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has no legal provisions in its domestic legislation to regulate the status of refugees. This study presents: (a) the argument that Iraq must adopt legislation to regulate the entry, exit and stay of migrants, in line with international protection for both asylum seekers and the provision of adequate rights to refugees, and in accordance with international human rights standards; (b) a proposal for provisions for such legislation in Iraq; and (c) a timely impetus to re‐energize local strategies aimed at filling these normative legal gaps through domestic agreements rather than regional and/or international ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background & Objective: Vascular trauma constitutes a major part of the violent body injuries and accounts for one of the high incidence injuries in Iraq. We retrospectively collected the relevant data of vascular injuries and their management in our hospitals over a period of seven years, to stress early intervention to manage vascular injuries. Methodology: In this retrospective, descriptive study, the relevant data of 321 patients with upper limb vascular injuries were collected from the hospital data management system. The data were analyzed according to history, examination, investigations and methods of treatment of arterial and associated injuries. Results: Out of 321 patients, 98.13% were males and 1.87% females. The most frequent injured vessel was the brachial artery seen in 64.48% patients and end to end arterial anastomosis was done in 52.02% of the patients. The limb salvage rate was 98.75%, and was achieved in 317 patients. Conclusion: In conclusion, the limb salvage rate is increased if the vascular injury is treated within the golden period. Abbreviations: ATLS - Advanced Trauma Life Support; OR - Operating room; SSG - Split skin grafting [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Islamic Republic of Iran finds itself in an unusual paradox. It is a regime that is growing stronger in the region while weaker at home. The mullahs will stand as Persia's most dedicated and ardent imperialists, who have implanted their influence throughout the Middle East. Iran has prolonged regional civil wars, harassed Arab potentates, and reduced the once proud Arab nation of Iraq into a vassal state. Yet, it is at home that the regime faces its most significant challenges. Ebrahim Raisi, Iran's new dogmatic and unimaginative president, is facing a depleted economy, popular protests, and massive corruption. The clerical oligarchs have no answer to Iran's mounting problems. It remains unclear whether the regime can survive the many predicaments of its own making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine a principal-agents model of subversion with externalities to illustrate a novel mechanism for why diversity can be valuable to organizations: teams of diverse agents can self-manage and discourage their teammates from subversion through compromise. In contrast to standard "ally-principle" type results, I find that integrating more extreme agents can result in better-behaved teams. The model describes, among other cases, radical Islamist terror groups that use foreign fighters. Because foreign and domestic fighters have conflicting preferences over how they want to subvert, integrated teams may self-manage with efficiency gains for the principal. This model explains variation in agency problems and foreign fighter usage in major insurgent groups, including al Qaeda in Iraq, the Haqqani Network, and the Islamic State. Additionally, the theory here can explain management practices in a wide range of alternate settings, for example, where a busy or constrained principal cannot easily implement auditing or incentive contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The just-war framework neatly distinguishes between jus ad bellum, the criteria that address political leaders' decisions for waging war, and jus in bello, the criteria that address soldiers' conduct during war. Yet developments in the empirical science of civil wars, the U.S. military's recent preference that ground-level soldiers exercise initiative and autonomy, and the wartime experiences of U.S. soldiers fighting in the twenty-first century converge to reveal an unappreciated overlap between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. I examine three firsthand accounts of service in Iraq and Afghanistan to show how military leaders' contingent decisions – insofar as they choose whom to marginalize politically, befriend as allies in combat, and oppose as mortal enemies – are susceptible, theoretically if not yet practically, of jus ad bellum critique. Drawing on the work of Avishai Margalit, Michael Walzer, and James Murphy, I then argue that military designations of friend and foe implicate ethicists, political authorities, and military educators in a network of obligations. Ethicists must discern how to evaluate commanders' political decisions, polities must prepare soldiers for political work, and military educators must teach the relevant scholarship. This argument has significance for regnant conceptions of military expertise and military education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research has argued that terrorism is common in civil war because it is "effective." Surprisingly, however, only some groups use terrorism during civil wars, while many refrain altogether. We also see considerable variation in the use of terrorism over time. This article presents a theory of terrorism as a mobilization strategy in civil war, taking into account benefits, costs, and temporal dynamics. We argue that the choice and the timing of terrorism arise from the interaction between conditions for effective mobilization and battlefield dynamics. Terrorism can mobilize support when it provokes indiscriminate government repression or when it radicalizes rebels' constituency by antagonizing specific societal groups. The timing of attacks, however, is influenced by battlefield losses, which increase rebels' need to rally civilian support. The analyses of new disaggregated data on rebels' terrorist attacks during conflicts (1989–2009) and of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) tactics in Iraq and Syria support our theoretical argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iraq's political system, an elite pact justified through ethno-religious consociationalism or sectarian apportionment (Muhasasa Ta'ifiyya), was created in the aftermath of invasion and regime change in 2003. The system's legitimation was based on a very specific understanding of Iraqi society and the role of elections in managing that society. However, this system did not prevent the brutal civil war that raged in Iraq from 2004 until 2008. Once the civil war ended and communally justified violence declined, other negative consequences of the system became increasingly apparent, namely the widespread and systematically sanctioned political corruption at its core and the institutional incoherence the system created. A sustained post-civil war challenge to the system has come through a series of mass demonstrations, starting in 2009, but reaching their peak, in terms of size and ideational coherence, in 2019. In the face of its unpopularity, the majority of Iraq's politicians may have moved away from the overt promotion of sectarianism, but the political system still functions, as it has since 2003, with systemic corruption and coercion taking the place of sectarian ideology in terms of delivering elite cohesion and defending the status quo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the situation and experiences of women during a civil war between Sunni and Shiite Muslims in the region of Al Anbar, Iraq in 2013. The impact of the war had caused disruptions in terms of public order, properties and many people were killed. Although the women did not participate directly in the war, they suffered the consequences of the war. The present study was undertaken to investigate on how women attempted to cope with the situation during the war. The study was conducted based on qualitative approach using an in-depth interview method to obtain both primary and secondary data. A total of 25 informants were selected for the study. All informants had become widows as their husbands were killed during the war which resulted in destruction, murder, displacement, social circumstances and unstable political situations. The findings showed that the civil war had rendered women in Al-Anbar as widows. Women lost their honor, children and relatives as a result of immigration diseases in their attempts to escape the war. In conclusion, there was a need for the Sunni and Shiite Muslims to seriously consider the impact of war on women that required the Sunni and Shiite Muslims to put aside their respective ideological differences and to find a compromising and lasting peace in the province of Al-Anbar. In the final analysis, nobody accepts humiliation caused to women who suffered more than just killings, migration and random bombing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the counterinsurgency warfare. Despite a long and well- documented history of insurgent warfare in the world, governments that have faced insurgencies or were once insurgents themselves tend to be quick at forgetting their roots. Scholars and soldiers alike have often used the phrase "the American way of war" to describe not just a predilection, but a virtual strategic obsession, which holds that wars are fought by gathering the maximum in manpower and materiel, hurling them into the maelstrom, and counting on swift, crushing victory. Thus far in Iraq, the U.S. effort, though riot entirely devoid of successes, has been hallmarked by over- whelmed and under-prepared troops effecting heavy-handed, large-scale roundups of civilians (in some cases errantly or overzealously harming them); or the destruction of large swaths of cities and towns. All counterinsurgency scholars agree the viability of any counterinsurgency endeavor, especially one undertaken by an occupying force, depends upon this capability.

Life after the civil war between Sunni and Shiite has not only changed the infrastructure and situation of Al-Anbar Province, Iraq in 2013, but also it has brought social change and affected their belief system. As many people were killed, losing their families and home; people are also suffered of losing their confidence to lead a new life and it includes the shattered belief system. Indirectly, they are still suffering from the subsequences of the war even though not all has actually involved in the civil war. The objective of this study is to understand the impact of the civil war towards the society, to explore the hardship and obstacle facing by them after the civil war. This objective will be discussed mainly under the concept of social change and belief system. Al-Anbar province has been chosen for the location to be studied since it showed the highest numbers of killing, destruction, displacement, deterioration of the political situation as well as dissension among people of the same religion. The research is based on a qualitative study in which an in-depth interview will be conducted. The study includes twenty-four male informants. The data was transcribed and translated from Arabic language into English and thematic analysis was used too. The finding shows that majority of the informants believed that the religious belief in the community is strongly affected by the civil war. Most informants cited instant increase in the level of commitment towards Islam. In the face of intense danger, prayers performed more frequently than usual as believers turned to God for protection and seeking His answer in the period of adversity. Local mosques organized additional gatherings and talks to help to preserve unity among people and strengthen their integrity in faith amidst rising sectarian tension between Shiite and Sunni Muslims. As the result, civil war has created both optimist and pessimist people depending on how they have taken the new social changes that have taken place and how the new situations will shape their understanding towards their belief system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does foreign aid build peace? The answer is of paramount importance for policy makers and practitioners, given that the world's poor are growing increasingly concentrated in conflict-affected countries. Scholars have also demonstrated keen interest, primarily examining the relationship between foreign aid and civil wars. This review takes stock of the existing literature through a survey of key theoretical arguments connecting aid to the onset, dynamics, and recurrence of civil wars. It then articulates a key challenge posed by undertheorization of aid allocation, which is largely nonrandom, making the causal effects difficult to infer. I identify five areas in need of greater attention: microfoundational theoretical assumptions about aid flows; aid in the context of other foreign policy options; explicit articulation of other factors that may mediate or moderate aid's effects; levels of observation and aggregation; and measurement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last six years of insurgency, rebellion, and war have eroded territorial state sovereignty in Iraq and Syria. The scale and savagery of the war have transformed Sunni-Shia sectarianism into a zero-sum politics of survival. In other words, residents of Iraq and Syria have been forced to choose between Sunnis and Shia in order to survive. This essay explains how the diverging interests of foreign actors—Iran, the Islamic State and other Salafi-Jihadi foreign fighters, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United States—prolonged the war, providing the time and space for the belligerents in Iraq and Syria to weaponize sectarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars and policy practitioners believe that the US invasion of Iraq triggered a civil war. Several major scholarly data-sets, however, do not code a civil war, due to the challenge of coding multiple simultaneous patterns of violence. Further, many political actors have resisted the term, due to obvious political and public relations concerns. This paper analyses these discrepancies in the use of the label, arguing that, for scholars, the coding problem could limit or even bias models of civil war, while for policymakers, the failure to see Iraq’s civil war as such has contributed to major policy failures, from the Bush administration’s state of denial early in the war to the Obama administration’s withdrawal and the subsequent reescalation of violence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The utilization of chemical weapons to quash domestic rebellion is a drastic action for a regime facing domestic challengers to take, especially given the reputation costs and risk of international intervention. However, recent developments have illustrated that some regimes have contemplated and implemented extraordinary measures (including the use of chemical munitions) to quash rebellion. This study addresses the question of why some states utilize chemical weapons against domestic challengers while others refrain from this level of state repression. I argue that the utilization of chemical weapons has both domestic and international elements. Specifically, that ethnic cleavages that lead to secessionist challenges and factors associated with inter-state rivalry impact the likelihood that a state utilizes the employment of chemical munitions. I test my argument and other explanations regarding repression with a casestudy approach utilizing captured Iraqi Government documents comparing Iraq’s Al-Anfal campaigns with developments during the recent Syrian Civil War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Aims and Objectives: To collect up-to-date knowledge using a systematic review of the literature and to get evidence-based data concerning Fenethylline, and its illegal commerce in the region of the Middle East after 2003. Materials and Methods: Four main medical literature databases were scrutinized using a list of pre-specified keywords. Additionally, social networks, and other resources were utilized to retrieve relevant data. The total number of references that were used in this paper is twenty-two. Results: The literature search was conducted from the 3rd of December to the 29th of December 2015. The search was done from Baghdad, Iraq via the Earth link-Telenet Internet Service Provider (ISP). The Total Search Engine Results Pages (SERPs) were 463137. The highest SERPs were for the keywords "Amphetamine" and "Fitton." Google Scholar and PubMed were the databases that scored the highest SERPs. Captagon is a dangerous psychoactive substance. Its production was officially stopped in the 1980s. Currently, Captagon, and counterfeit Captagonare being illegally produced in South-East Europe and trafficked to the region of the Middle East. Conclusion: In the post-Saddam era of the Middle East, this substance has been traded and distributed at an exponential rate. The main explanation is that the rise of this illegal commerce is related to the chaos and the lack of order in the regions of conflict and civil war in Syria and Iraq in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the summer of 2014, the Iraqi government lost control of much of the country. Insurgents -- including the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), former Ba'thists, and an array of Sunni tribes -- captured Mosul, and then much of western Iraq. Although complex factors lay behind these developments, this article focuses on one theme of central importance: attempts to consolidate power in Baghdad and the concomitant evisceration of Iraq's constitution. When key provisions of a very decentralizing federal constitution were ignored or violated, the blowback from disenfranchised groups in Iraq brought the country to the brink of collapse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the political situation in Iraq and outlooks for a civil war outbreak as of December 2013. The author pays special attention to the U.S. military invasion in Iraq in 2003 and United States' intervention in Iraqi politics. Details are also provided so as to Iran's alleged contribution for a civil war detention in Iraq. The role of Iraqi curds, Sunnites and Shiites in domestic politics and the possible outcome from the 2014 parliamentary elections are analyzed as well.

The article offers information on 22nd Annual Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference sponsored by the National Council of the U.S. and Arab Relations that was held in the U.S. on October 22, 2013. It offers information on the civil wars in the Iraq and the withdrawal of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Discussions surrounding sectarian relations in Iraq have often been reduced to extremes of either overemphasising the Sunni-Shiʿa divide to a near Manichean level or, the other extreme, reducing them to the point of irrelevance in Iraqi history and society. This paper challenges both views and attempts an examination of the dynamics of Sunni-Shiʿa relations in Arab Iraq and how these interact with Iraqi nationalism. As will be shown, sectarian identity advances and recedes depending on wider circumstances, often at the expense, but not to the exclusion, of national identity. The post-2003 period in general and the civil war of 2006–2007 in particular offer us a wealth of highly charged sectarian discourse in the form of songs, poems, speeches and publications. I have relied on a considerable sample of such forms of public discourse to analyse the rising salience of sectarian identity in the period under consideration in a broader attempt at analysing the dynamics of Sunni-Shi‘a relations in Arab Iraq generally. It will be seen that sectarian relations are dynamic and responsive and that civil wars are not necessarily the end of the process; rather, in some cases, sectarian civil wars are merely a violent stage which many mixed communities around the world — including Iraq perhaps — have unfortunately gone through. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Civil war dynamics and outcomes are shaped by processes of change largely unaccounted for in current studies. This examination explores how the fragmentation of combatants, especially the weaker actors, affects the duration and outcomes of civil wars. Some results of a computational modelling analysis are consistent with the article's expectations, several of them are counterintuitive. They show that when combatants fragment, the duration of war does not always increase and such wars often end in negotiated agreements, contrasting with the expectations of literatures on spoilers, moderates and extremists. Empirical cases, such as Iraq, Congo, Chechnya and the Sudan, illustrate the importance of fragmentation. This study demonstrates the value of accounting for diverse changes in actors and circumstances when studying the dynamics of war. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the war in Iraq began in 2003, public debate over the war has centered on two options: either increase the number of US troops to defeat the insurgency, or withdraw US forces to reduce US losses. Empirical research on civil war termination suggests that neither of these two options is likely to produce a favorable outcome for the US or the Iraqi government. That same research points to the third option – negotiated settlement – that has been the most frequent manner in which civil wars have terminated in the post-Cold War era. I analyze what existing research on civil war termination suggests about how the civil war in Iraq can be brought to an end. Military victory over the insurgents is unlikely, but withdrawal increases the risk of state failure. A negotiated settlement would require a credible third-party mediator to broker an agreement between the government, Sunni insurgents, and Shiite militias, thereby isolating foreign jihadists to spoiler status. Implementation of the settlement and the durability of the peace would be enhanced by multinational peacekeeping forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Born in 53/673 in Basra, Yezid b. Muhelleb b. Ebi Sufra el-Ezdi found the opportunity of acquiring his first military and administrative experiences by spending his childhood and adolescence near his father. As a result of his achievements he was appointed as the governor of Horasan after the death of his father in 82/701 considering the proposal of his father with the approval of the Caliph Abdulmelik b. Mervan, but he was deposed from governorship by the efforts of governor general of Iraq Haccac b. Yusuf, who did not want his appointment to this position. After four years of prison life during the era of Velid b. Abdilmelik, Yezid escaped and entered under crown prince Suleyman b. Abdilmelik's protection, and had significant influence on the abandonment of the balance politics among the tribes and rejuvenating the spirit of racism when he became governor again during Suleyman's caliphate. After staying in prison for two years during Omer b. Abdilaziz's illness or after his death, he escaped and revolted during the period of Yezid b. Abdilmelik. His rebellion was suppressed bloodily by the government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The conventional wisdom holds that security in Iraq only improved after Gen. David Petraeus implemented a new counterinsurgency doctrine that stressed population security instead of aggressive operations against insurgent forces. This interpretation is strikingly similar to the historiography of the Huk Rebellion, the Malayan Emergency, and the Vietnam War. In each case observers criticized initial efforts as brutal and counterproductive, only to be rescued when enlightened new leaders arrived on the scene. This article challenges the familiar hero narrative, arguing that critics routinely exaggerate the importance of leadership changes because they view conflicts as experiments in counterinsurgency rather than exercises in state-building. Whereas counterinsurgency (COIN) theory emphasizes issues like public security and government legitimacy, theorists of state-building describe a bloody and protracted competition for power under conditions approaching anarchy. The upshot is that the “heroes” of late-stage COIN might actually depend on the earlier “villains” who did the dirty work of establishing political order and coercing the population into obedience. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In the civil strife of ancient Greek cities that was the model for Hobbes' state of nature, the intervention of the larger forces of Athens and Sparta, proclaiming unconditional causes-to-die-for, transformed local social differences into lethal factional enmities. Death then raged from many quarters. The same effect of anarchic violence has followed from imperial conquer-and-divide policies in modern colonial and post-colonial societies. The present paper documents the processes by which the American intervention in Iraq transformed a plural nation into a bellum omnium contra omnes. Historically, the state of nature appears as the effect of the subversion of the social contract rather than its precondition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]