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In addition to evaluating the long‐term and short‐term relationships between housing markets on the regional and nationwide scales, this study also explores risk diffusion associated with market integration. Data from January 1995 to July 2017 in nine regions in England and in the overall England housing market are adopted. Through simultaneous estimates of volatility in various regions, the systemic risk and overall risk of each region are evaluated. The results reveal that housing markets in the central regions diffuse risks easily, and their volatility is easily affected by stock market return and money supply changes. By contrast, the volatility of housing markets in the southern regions is easily affected by changes in the interest rate, and these markets demonstrate high transmission with the overall housing market in the short term. Notably, except for times when financial crises occurred, housing market risks in the southern regions have been lower than those of other regions. In particular, London exhibits significantly low risk and high return in its housing market and high informativeness in its house prices. The results of this paper show the patterns and the factors influencing risk diffusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The early 1620s trade crisis had a significant influence on the way public opinion in England regarded economic issues, and the pamphlets written during that period convey the impression that the supply of money was the undisputed primary concern of economic policy. However, monetary matters occupied a prominent position in the political agenda of England only during times of crisis, when the kingdom faced a perceived threat of demonetization. The paper argues that, during the first two decades of the seventeenth century, concern with a positive balance of trade was of only secondary importance, being normally overshadowed by a more fundamental goal: a well-ordered, stable, and properly managed trade. This opened the door for debates about the limits of free initiative and regulation in economic affairs, as evidenced most clearly by the debates about free trade and monopolies that permeated James I's reign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses changes in prices in England between 1170 and 1750. The author notes that this period was characterized by two eras of large inflation followed by long periods of price stability. Primary focus is given to the impact of monetary factors related to England's coin supply and the expansion and contraction of credit on the change in prices. Also given consideration is the impact of demographic change related to population growth on the size of the English economy during this period. The author concludes that price behaviors were similar in the medieval and early modern eras.

The contribution of English and Welsh lead mines to the silver supplies of mints between Domesday Book and the end of the fifteenth century is assessed in this article, comparing evidence for the size of silver production with mint output data. It is shown that the proposal that northern Pennine mines were the principal source of the silver in the late twelfth-century English currency is untenable. Welsh mines supplied limited amounts of silver to local mints around 1200. Devon silver made a significant but not predominant contribution to mint output at times of bullion scarcity in the 1290s and the mid-fifteenth century. Imported silver was usually a greater source of the metal in the English currency than locally mined silver, and gold coins constituted most of England's money supply from the mid-fourteenth century onwards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents information on financial markets. The briefest and truest way of describing Lombard Street is to say that it is by far the greatest combination of economical power and economical delicacy that the world has ever seen. Of the greatness of the power there will be no doubt. Money is economical power. Everyone is aware that England is the greatest moneyed country in the world; everyone admits that it has much more immediately disposable and ready cash than any other country. Of course the deposits of bankers are not a strictly accurate measure of the resources of a money market. On the contrary, much more cash exists out of banks in France and Germany, and in all non-banking countries, than could be found in England or Scotland, where banking is developed. In this constant and chronic borrowing, Lombard Street is the great go-between. It is a sort of standing broker between quiet saving districts of the country and the active employing districts. Money will not manage itself, and Lombard Street has a great deal of money to manage

The article attempts to cover four centuries, 1500 to 1700, and will draw on both demographic and monetary data of England. Recent medieval scholarship tends less towards single factor explanations. Demographers combine a growing mastery of their own discipline with an interest in, and tolerance of, other approaches, while historians of money are more likely to make claims for the importance of their subject than for its pre-eminence. It is often assumed that the velocity of circulation has risen steadily through the centuries as the use of money has become more widespread. One may note at the outset that if velocity did behave in this way between 1500 and 1700, then it was at variance with its well-documented behavior for the period from 1700 until the twentieth century. Modern monetary and banking historians are in no doubt that velocity fell during their period as money--in all its forms--became more plentiful. Velocity is really only a measure of how hard the money supply is being called upon to work. Accordingly, the question is best approached by an examination of the money supply and of the size of the economy which it serves.

The article examines the long-term growth of the banking sector in Great Britain and money stock in the period 1844-1880. Detailed estimates of long-term monetary and banking growth in the country exist for the years after the late 1870s, although controversy remains as to their precise accuracy, but even reasonably accurate figures for the greater part of the nineteenth century have proved elusive. It is here that this paper makes a contribution by drawing heavily upon archive material to present new estimates for England and Wales for part of that early period, 1844-80. New estimates are made for commercial bank liabilities to the public and long-term trends in the growth of the money stock are calculated. Data for the number of banks and banking offices are readily available from 1844 in the directory "Banking Almanac," providing one measure of the growth of the commercial banking sector with some breakdown as to the institutional nature and geographical location of firms within the sector. However, they can provide but a crude measure of the growth and density of banking services.

This article analyzes the reduction of the money supply in England before the Black Death. Since scholars first detected a fall in the level of prices in the later Middle Ages a number of different arguments have been put forward to explain it. Initially, it was believed that prices fell because of a shortage of money and money metals. Then in the 1950's it was argued that changes in population were the cause of falling prices and, although advocates of the monetary theory have continued to question it, it is the population thesis, which still largely holds the field. No one has done more to scatter the ranks of the monetary theorists than professor M.M. Postan, and his explanation of the economic fluctuations of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries makes a good starting point. His argument is that increasing population in the thirteenth century first stimulated the economy of Europe but later began to exert undue pressure on the food supply. Disaster was postponed by the colonization of marginal lands, but survival based on the cultivation of poorer soils became more and more precarious. In these conditions a fortuitous combination of adverse events, such as the succession of bad seasons in the second decade of the fourteenth century, was sufficient to reverse the entire trend of agricultural production and to send the population figures tumbling down.

The 1830s were years of instability for the English and Welsh money markets. The tremendous expansion of joint stock banking facilities, the rapid development of the London money market, the monetary crises of 1836-1837 and 1839, and the commercial rivalry among the established private banks, the new banking companies and the Bank of England all created great uncertainty. The problems provoked widespread comment and provided opportunities for government-inspired regulation and reform. Controversy centered on the importance of money in determining fluctuations in the rest of the economy: there was much debate but little consensus. Nevertheless, government seemed convinced by one group of theorists, the Currency School, and in 1844 took steps to regulate both the note circulation and the formation of banking companies.[2]
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of the money supply and the consequences for Bank of England policy during the decade or so immediately preceding the implementation of these regulations. The flexibility of particular components of the stock of quasi-money and their relationship to changes in Bank of England[3] liabilities are examined. Most attention is directed towards the performance of trade credit, as this played such a prominent role in contemporary economic debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comments on the control of the money supply in London, England. Criticism of the inclusion of control sales to the banks; Barriers to the application of monetary contract; Impact of regulation policies on the money market.

The article emphasizes the importance of the money market of London, England. Nowhere in the world does there exist a short money market as sensitive and as closely integrated as in London. Closely controlled during the Second World War, it has since 1951 come back into its old importance for both domestic and international short funds. While the structure of the short money market has changed from generation to generation, its essential function of providing continuous employment for short marginal funds remains the same. In the performance of this function, four closely related institutions have emerged: the acceptance houses, the discount market, the joint stock banks and Bank of England. The stock-in-trade of the acceptance house is the bill of exchange. Originally a merchant due to his reputation for integrity and financial sagacity became so established that, for a fee, he could undertake to become the acceptor, thus guaranteeing the payment of a bill. Many early merchant bankers chose their customers so wisely that they were able to give up their original business in favor of doing nothing but accepting.

In this article, the author emphasizes on the need for joined up debt management policy. He mentions the money creation program quantitative easing by the government of England which rescued the British economy from a deflationary disaster in 2009, but the management of public debt was not done in an efficient manner. He states that the Bank and the Treasury should integrate debt management into monetary policy in order to help in the delivery of macroeconomic stability.