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Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) has officially emerged as a coordinated strategy between the United Nations peacekeeping missions and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to enable access to people in need of assistance in complex emergencies. However, this integrated approach raises serious concerns regarding the respect of traditional principles of humanitarian action: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. While some humanitarian NGOs are opposed to any form of collaboration with the military, others believe this cooperation is very important to enable access and provide aid to civilians in needs. Using the case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), this article analyses the impact of the CIMIC integrated approach between the United Nations Peacekeeping and Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and humanitarian NGOs on the afore-mentioned principles of humanitarian action. It argues that most humanitarian NGOs that are operating in the Eastern DRC are opposed to the CIMIC’s integrated approach as it pushes them to violate the principles of neutrality, independence, and impartiality. Second, CIMIC increases the danger of humanitarian workers to be targeted by illegal armed groups. Third, despite their integrated approach, both MONUSCO and humanitarian actors have not been able to pacify the Eastern DRC, end the humanitarian needs of the population, or improve their effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The War That Doesn't Say Its Name: The Unending Conflict in the Congo" by Jason K. Stearns provides a comprehensive analysis of the ongoing violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Drawing on extensive research and interviews, Stearns challenges the prevailing narrative of inevitability and defeatism surrounding the conflict. He argues that the persistence of violence is driven by a complex interplay of factors, including the emergence of a "military bourgeoisie" for whom war has become a lifestyle, the normalization of violence, and the apathy of the international community. The book also examines the interests and motivations of various armed groups and the complicity of the international donor and peacebuilding community in perpetuating the conflict. Stearns concludes by highlighting the stories of individuals who are working towards a different kind of politics in the Congo. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Ralph Bunche, the first African American to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, was a committed anti‐imperialist, a fighter against racism and for civil rights. And yet, his action and appearance as special representative of the United Nations Secretary‐General in the Congo, made him appear as hostile to African independence and as a (neo‐colonial) "blanc," questioning the sincerity of his anti‐imperialism as well as his anti‐racism. The article argues that Bunche's dilemma is paradigmatic for the paradox that exists between the United Nations' (UN) declared anti‐racism and anti‐imperialism, on the one hand, and its politics of peacekeeping and peacebuilding which are effectively a quasi‐imperial politics of world order, on the other. The article dissects Ralph Bunche's writing and thinking on the international system, Africa and the Congo in order to understand how individual anti‐racist commitment can co‐exist, or even be co‐constitutive of, systemic racism of international politics and law. Apart from providing important insights into the thought of a central founding figure of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the article contributes, hence, to ongoing discussions on Eurocentrism and race in international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the application of complexity theory to UN peacekeeping. To date, peacekeeping has been dominated by linear models of change, assuming that conflict settings can be addressed by elite-driven peace processes, gradual improvements to state institutional capacity, and development programming. However, this article argues that complexity theory offers a far more accurate and useful lens through which to view the work of peacekeeping: conflict settings represent complex, interdependent socio-political systems with emergent qualities giving them the capacity to self-organize via feedback loops and other adaptive activity. Self-organization means such systems are highly resistant to attempts to change behaviour via top-down or input-output approaches. In fact, peacekeeping itself is endogenous to the systems it is trying to change, often displaying the same kinds of self-organization typical of complex systems elsewhere. Drawing on experience working and conducting fieldwork in the UN peacekeping mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo, this article argues that UN peacekeeping operations should view themselves as actors within the complex conflict ecosystem, looking to enable transformational change from within, rather than impose liberal Western models from without. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"States of Disorder, Ecosystems of Governance: Complexity Theory Applied to UN Statebuilding in the DRC and South Sudan"., Oxford University Press; p. 2. Chapter seven compares the two case studies and concludes that the UN has faced challenges because of its failure to understand local governance and complex systems. I States of Disorder, Ecosystems of Governance: Complexity Theory Applied to UN Statebuilding in the DRC and South Sudan i is a very ambitious undertaking examining how UN statebuilding projects have never fully comprehended the challenges and complex systems that influence many of the challenges that the UN peacekeeping missions' experience. [Extracted from the article]

UN peacekeepers are often targeted by rebel groups. The violence they experience hinders the functionality of peacekeeping operations, constituting a major problem for the UN. What conditions make these attacks more likely? How does the local support for UN peacekeeping operations affect the violence against peacekeepers? Using an original data set that includes local trust sentiments towards MONUSCO's peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from October 2014 to December 2020, this study finds that peacekeepers are attacked more often when they lack local support. In the absence of local support, peacekeepers become vulnerable as they can no longer gather intelligence about rebel activities from the locals and the increased distrust for peacekeepers gives propagandist benefits to rebel groups. This study suggests to the UN that it needs to employ strategies in peacekeeping operations that would legitimize the presence of peacekeepers and cultivate more strengthened civil-military relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Nations (UN) Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has undertaken a predominantly militarised approach to peacekeeping, in particular in its stabilisation and protection activities. While military operations have achieved some short-term gains there have been a number of drawbacks, including that they have closed the door on political solutions to the conflict, while undermining the perception of the UN's impartiality, increasing risk to civilians, and drawing resources from non-military activities. Further, in spite of resources invested in military solutions, they have not been effective overall in consolidating peace. The purpose of this research is to examine the benefits and drawbacks of pursuing a predominantly militarised approach to peacekeeping, based on lessons learned in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uganda has announced the withdrawal of its troops from eastern DR Congo, where they were part of the East African Community force (EACF). The EACF, deployed in late 2022, faced criticism for failing to stop rebel-backed violence. The withdrawal of Ugandan troops follows that of soldiers from South Sudan, Kenya, and Burundi. The regional force was invited to liberate territory under rebel control, but the government deemed them ineffective and will now rely on troops from the Southern African Community (SADC). Additionally, Burundian troops have been accused of committing human rights abuses in eastern DR Congo. A political-military alliance has also been formed between Congolese opposition figures and rebel groups, leading to tensions with the Congolese government and diplomatic consequences with Kenya. Hostilities have resumed between armed groups and the DR Congo army, resulting in casualties. The situation remains volatile, with the threat of armed conflict between DR Congo and Rwanda still high. [Extracted from the article]

While United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are generally considered to reduce the likelihood of civil war recurrence, attention in recent years has shifted to understanding the dynamics unique to post‐Cold War peacekeeping, including the changing makeup and mandate of PKOs, and associated patterns of peacekeeper misconduct. While several studies of misconduct emphasize peacekeepers' implication in sexual exploitation and abuse of host country citizens, this study goes the next step by assessing peacekeeping's relationship to human trafficking more broadly—a perennial concern in post‐conflict states. Though UN PKOs are not always directly responsible for increases in human trafficking in mission host countries, this paper considers how the attributes of UN peacekeeping missions may create the conditions where trafficking is likely to flourish or flounder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), particularly in the eastern region. The M23 rebels, backed by Rwanda, have been engaged in clashes with the national army and have captured several key cities, forcing thousands of people to flee their homes. The UN peacekeeping force, MONUSCO, has announced a joint operation with the Congolese army to protect Goma and other towns from the advancing rebels. Additionally, the ADF militant group has carried out attacks in Ituri province, resulting in civilian casualties and displacement. The article also mentions the deployment of Southern African Development Community (SADC) peacekeeping troops in the east of the country. [Extracted from the article]

B Dozens are killed as troops fire on protesters. b At least 48 people, possibly over fifty, were killed in a crackdown on an anti-UN protest in eastern DR Congo, according to sources and an internal army document reviewed by I AFP i on August 31st, raising a previously reported death toll. The UN peacekeeping mission in DR Congo is one of the largest and costliest in the world, with about 16,000 uniformed personnel and an annual budget of about $1bn. The latest violence comes amid an ongoing debate over when the UN peacekeeping force in the DRC, known as B MONUSCO b , should leave the country. [Extracted from the article]

The UN peacekeeping force in DR Congo, known as B MONUSCO b , is one of the largest and costliest in the world, with an annual budget of around $1bn. According to HRW, the DRC government should seek assistance from the UN, African Union ( B AU b ), and partner governments to conduct proper exhumations, return remains to families, and hold those responsible to account. B A top UN official urges a "responsible" exit, despite continuously escalating violence. b The UN under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations, B Jean-Pierre Lacroix b , during a visit to DR Congo on June 7th said that peacekeepers should withdraw from the conflict-torn central African country "as quickly as possible" yet responsibly. [Extracted from the article]

Recent scholarship has discerned an increasing tendency of the UN Security Council to push the boundaries of UN peacekeeping beyond traditional doctrine by equipping peace operations with ever more robust and even peace enforcement mandates. The first and most frequently cited example of this turn is the so-called Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DR Congo. Yet, a comprehensive account of the FIB experience is still missing. Authorized in March 2013 to launch offensive military operations against insurgent groups, the FIB may come to epitomize a sea change in the transition from robust peacekeeping to a qualitatively different kind of UN peace operation. Thus, studying the FIB can offer important insights about the advantages and challenges that may be in store for the UN, should the organization indeed turn towards peace enforcement. The articles analyses the origins, performance and consequences of the FIB in terms of conflict resolution and state-building. It also examines its organizational impact on the UN peace operation in which it was embedded (Monusco). It finds that the FIB has not proven to be the game changer. Instead, it had unintended negative consequences both on state-building and the performance of UN peacekeepers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Do shifts in global power affect the performance of United Nations peacekeeping? While many have studied the impact of rising powers on the global economy, none examine how they impact the structure of the UN's peacekeeping institutions. By engaging in a multi-level analysis, this article links the ascendance of India with the decreased performance of the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). By examining the performance of Indian peacekeepers in Congo before and after India's ascension to a seat on the Security Council in 2011, the article illustrates the specific mechanisms through which India's shift on peacekeeping undermined the performance of the mission in North Kivu. Drawing on interviews in Congo and India, the article links India's machinations within the Security Council over the Libyan intervention to the reduced performance of MONUSCO. Specifically, India's decision to withdraw military hardware from the mission and to end reforms designed to improve relations between peacekeepers and Congolese civilians undermined its ability to fulfill its primary mandate of civilian protection. The analysis suggests that the once firm boundary between troop-contributing countries and those that pay for missions is increasingly unstable with negative consequences for civilian protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On May 20th, opposition supporters staged an anti-government demonstration in Kinshasa that quickly descended into clashes with police officers. Addressing reporters in Kinshasa on May 23rd, Katumbi spokesman B Olivier Kamitatu b said that police officers had blocked the politician's convoy, forcing him to return to Kinshasa. B A heavy-handed police response to a demonstration sparks international criticism. b The United Nations ( B UN b ) said on May 23rd that police in DR Congo used "disproportionate" force during a recent opposition rally in the capital Kinshasa, joining a chorus of criticism over the heavy-handed response. [Extracted from the article]

A special summit of the 16-bloc Southern African Development Community (SADC), which includes B South Africa b , B Angola b and B Tanzania b , backed the deployment "to restore peace and security in eastern DRC", SADC said in a statement from the B Namibian b capital Windhoek. Speaking during a visit to B Botswana b , where the SADC has its headquarters, Tshisekedi voiced concerns of "cohabitation" between rebels and the regional force. B The SADC agrees to send troops. b Southern African countries on May 8th agreed to deploy forces to help quell violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where armed groups have terrorised civilians for decades, reported I AFP (8/5) i . [Extracted from the article]

The article presents various discussions on intelligence services, use of mass surveillance, drone warfare and peace strategies. It discusses drone program by the U.S. government under former president Barack Obama and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in counterterrorism efforts against terrorists such as Taliban and Islamic State. It discusses use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) by United Nations peacekeeping missions in Democratic Republic of the Congo and German policy on drone warfare.

Suspected ADF militants killed three civilians in an attack on Pointi and Maleki villages in Beni territory. B The ADF campaign of violence continues apace. b Residents of Mambasa centre in Ituri province shut businesses, markets, health facilities and schools on September 19th to observe a stay-at-home or "ghost town" order by activists in protest against the violence in their region. Six people were killed on September 18th by suspected ADF fighters in the localities of Masongo in Walese Vonkutu chieftaincy, Irumu territory, Ituri province. [Extracted from the article]

The article examines the United Nations' (UN) peacekeeping efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as of July 2016. A background of United Nations is provided which was established in 1945 prevent and remove threats to international peace. Also discussed are UN's establishment of the Force Intervention Brigade to disarm rebels in Congo, the role of regional organizations in addressing the rebel crisis, and military cooperation between the UN and Congo.

The article discusses the shortcomings in the intelligence units involved in United Nations (UN) operations including the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), known as MONUSCO. Topics include the fabricated stories of a anonymous witness Mr. X. which allowed the DRC government and MONUSCO to mislead the the international community and the Congolese people and the lack of a professional intelligence agency in UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

It is commonly argued that international peace interventions will work better and more empathetically if the prevailing separation between international interveners and local people is lessened. However, I argue that, outside the microeconomic interactions and transactional relationships that comprise the peacekeeping economy, peacekeeping is characterized by bypassing – intentional circumvention – or simple exclusion of the local. Drawing on fieldwork in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I argue that the rules and regulations, norms and architecture of UN peacekeeping all favour and are actively disposed to bypass or exclude. Accordingly, insofar as lessening the separation between internationals and locals is necessary to enable more effective and, ideally, empathetic peacekeeping, what is needed is systemic change that runs counter to the – mostly deliberate – policies that have been enacted to effectuate and retain this very separation over the past decade or more. The likelihood of such change is small. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In late 2012, a rebel force captured Goma, a provincial capital in the eastern Congo. This event spurred a renewed debate on the use of force by UN peacekeepers. These had begun in the Congo in 1960 with a UN operation led by Ralph Bunche – the UN official who largely defined UN peacekeeping. This article summarizes UN intervention in the Congo and the use of force since then. It traces the main contours of UN engagement and then draws some conclusions about when and where the use of force can be successfully employed – or best avoided – by UN peacekeepers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the nature and impacts of two intervention radio programmes broadcast on Radio Okapi - the radio service of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) managed by the Swiss-based Hirondelle Foundation. A matched randomized rechnique was used to assign Rwandan Hutus and Congolese autochthons in South Kivu province to listen to one of the two programmes within their naturalistic contexts for thirteen months. Autochthon control groups listened to Gutahuka, while Hutu control groups listened to Dialogue Entre Congolais. At the end of the treatment, participants' perceptions of barriers to peace, descriptive and prescriptive interventions; victimhood and villainy; opportunities for personal development and civic engagement were assessed in sixteen focus groups across four towns. Two critical findings have emerged from the study: first, hate contents are not only ones that are overtly hateful - messages targeted at specific groups for the purpose of achieving behavioural change can lead to alienation and hostility towards the target group by non-target groups exposed to the messages; second, contextually associated individuals or social groups do not always have homogenous interpretation of media messages. At the core of audience engagement and interpretation is the idealogical orientation of messages that audiences are exposed to and how such messages interact with local epistemes including historical and subjective realities. The paper concludes that media intervention contents that purvey a narrative without first understanding how it interacts with other epistemic narratives and metaphors on ground, run the risk of deepening rifts between groups and escalating the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

UN peacekeepers today do far more than patrol a ceasefire line. In most cases, there is no frontline, no truce, numerous parties and among them some armed groups seeking to undermine a settlement. In short, the UN is attempting to conduct peacekeeping in places where there is no peace to keep. Unfortunately the UN has failed to adequately develop the instruments to identify armed groups, and then deal with the challenge they pose. This book is a policy guide for UN missions. It analyses the nature of non-permissive UN mission environments and argues that the UN should think afresh about its approach to missions in these settings. By embracing and developing three concepts – robust peacekeeping, political processes, and the protection of civilians – the UN can arrive at a stabilisation doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

UN peacekeepers today do far more than patrol a ceasefire line. In most cases, there is no frontline, no truce, numerous parties and among them some armed groups seeking to undermine a settlement. In short, the UN is attempting to conduct peacekeeping in places where there is no peace to keep. Unfortunately the UN has failed to adequately develop the instruments to identify armed groups, and then deal with the challenge they pose. This book is a policy guide for UN missions. It analyses the nature of non-permissive UN mission environments and argues that the UN should think afresh about its approach to missions in these settings. By embracing and developing three concepts – robust peacekeeping, political processes, and the protection of civilians – the UN can arrive at a stabilisation doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Review of International Law & Politics / Uluslararasi Hukuk ve Politika is the property of International Strategic Research Organization and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Vereinte Nationen is the property of Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the conflict in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), focusing on the causes of the conflict and potential solutions. Other topics of the article include relations between DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda over rare mineral mines in DRC, Congolese militant groups such as the National Congress for the Defense of People (CNDP) and the March 23 Movement (M23), and efforts of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to create peace in eastern DRC.

The article presents a report on the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations (UN) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Afghanistan for the period June-September 2013. Also presented is the 2098 Security Council Resolution authorizing the establishment of an intervention brigade to neutralize armed groups in Eastern DRC.

Arguing that the International Criminal Court (ICC) lacks sufficient resources to conduct investigation activities, the author suggests that cooperation between United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations and the Court is paramount not only in relation to the arrest of indicted individuals — the enforcement pillar of the ICC — but also with respect to the judicial pillar. This pattern of cooperation has been implemented in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and is analysed in this article. The author first discusses the legal framework applicable to cooperation between the ICC and the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, renamed MONUSCO), pointing out some contradictions in the Security Council mandate, due to divergent opinions among its members. The author then focuses on the memorandum of understanding signed by the two organizations and analyses its implementation, describing some activities undertaken in this context, although underlining the lack of transparency and the unavailability of precise official information. While reporting positively on some aspects, the author expresses concern on some unresolved outcomes of the first two judgments rendered by the ICC in the Ngudjolo Chui and Lubanga cases. Finally, the author addresses the recent Resolution 2098 of 2013, in which the Security Council finally agreed to explicitly authorize full cooperation between MONUSCO and the ICC. By doing so, it implicitly recognized the success of past activities and paved the way for possible future similar partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses international relations, with a focus on ongoing warfare in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the assembly of coalition fighting forces to counter violence, and the history of failed Western interventions. Topics include war on the border of Rwanda, U.S. support for and against Congolese dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, and the displacement of civilians. Additional information is presented on the United Nations' (UN) peacekeeping operations, the UN Security Council, and treaties.

Perceptions of peace and conflict differ among various actors. Exploring them can enhance our understanding of meanings that international and local actors ascribe to a conflict, and what strategies are chosen to respond to it. Drawing on academic literature and empirical data gathered in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), this article analyses how perceptions of the conflict in the DRC influenced the different local and international peacebuilding strategies and the outcomes of their interaction. The international community's priority was the restoration of the state because they saw the conflict as a breakdown of authority at the national level. The liberal state that the international community had foreseen was however hybridized with local authority structures in the course of its interaction with local perceptions and experiences. At the same time, international strategies eschewed or only belatedly included local priorities, such as reconciliation between antagonistic communities and land conflicts. The article thus argues that the interplay of priorities – the space where friction occurs – remains dominated by international actors. As a consequence, it suggests exploring more carefully and pragmatically the potential intermediary role that local peacebuilding actors can play in rendering international strategies more relevant at the local level. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) following the election of President Joseph Kabila in 2006. The work of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) is noted in relation to ongoing civil conflicts. Also addressed are the DRC's position on environmental exploitation, the DRC's diplomatic positions in relation to those of the West, and security concerns in Africa's Great Lakes Region. It is said that the DRC has returned to involvement in the organization African Union.

Explanations for the persistence of violence in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo blame the incendiary actions of domestic and regional leaders, as well as the inefficacy of international peace-building efforts. Based on several years of ethnographic research, this article adds another piece to the puzzle, emphasizing the perverse consequences of well-meaning international efforts. I argue that three narratives dominate the public discourse on Congo and eclipse the numerous alternative framings of the situation. These narratives focus on a primary cause of violence, illegal exploitation of mineral resources; a main consequence, sexual abuse of women and girls; and a central solution, extending state authority. I elucidate why simple narratives are necessary for policy makers, journalists, advocacy groups, and practitioners on the ground, especially those involved in the Congo. I then consider each narrative in turn and explain how they achieved prominence: they provided straightforward explanations for the violence, suggested feasible solutions to it, and resonated with foreign audiences. I demonstrate that the focus on these narratives and on the solutions they recommended has led to results that clash with their intended purposes, notably an increase in human rights violations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In 2008, the UN faced a military and humanitarian crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and asked the EU to send a rapid-reaction force to help stabilize the situation. The EU failed to do so. This article analyses the immediate circumstances and consequences of this non-deployment. It also identifies longer-term flaws in the EU–UN relationship which contributed to European inaction in this crisis. The article argues that the events of 2008 meant that over-inflated expectations of European rapid-reaction capabilities have been replaced with an assumption that the EU is no longer a significant military player in sub-Saharan Africa. Studying this ‘non-event’ provides a clearer understanding of the wider EU–UN relationship than can be derived from studying examples of successful inter-institutional cooperation alone. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since December 2008, protection of civilians has been the primary task of the United Nations (UN) mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Guidance on how UN military units can contribute to the protection of civilians has been lacking, however. This has necessitated a bottom-up approach to protection of civilians in which the mission and its partners have developed a series of cross-cutting protection initiatives. The UN military plays a key role in many of them. Based on the findings of a 2010 field study conducted in the DRC, the paper discusses how UN military units can contribute to protection of civilians in three dimensions, namely civil-military cooperation, the use of intelligence, and the use of military force. The aim is to inform the preparation of military contributions to future missions mandated to protect civilians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Nations Organisation Stablisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) finds itself operating in an environment that is becoming increasingly complex. Its current involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) may signify a realisation that the drafters of the mission's mandate may not have come to terms with significant shifts in the geopolitical landscape of the Great Lakes region. The anticipated drawdown and withdrawal of MONUSCO is expected to have serious implications for stability and peace in the DRC. Unless an internal solution with unequivocal support from the Congolese people is found, the continent will continue to be faced with a problematic Great Lakes region. Africa's cautious approach to the Congolese crisis will require it to deal with increasingly more difficult questions that may require radical reponses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The case of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) Ituri district both supports and challenges Severine Autesserre's contention made in The trouble with the Congo, namely that conflict persists in the eastern DRC because the dominant United Nations (UN) peacebuilding culture does not adequately address local conflicts. Local conflicts that started in 1999 in a small corner of Ituri grew into a brutal, prolonged conflict because of manipulation and mismanagement by local, national, and regional powers. The UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) succeeded in bringing peace to Ituri through robust military and diplomatic actions, but unresolved local conflicts could lead to a resumption of war. The failure to address local disputes has less to do with the UN, however, than it does with the poor governance by Kabila loyalists that has characterised the post-conflict phase in Ituri. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the peacekeeping situation and other political developments in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2009, and also presents the text of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1863 pertaining to Somalia. Regarding Somalia, where an insurgency was ongoing and the security situation remained volatile, the UN expressed its intent to establish a peacekeeping mission to take over from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Also discussed is the situation of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC).

This article discusses the attempts at state-building by international actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It uses this experience to discuss some of the obstacles and dilemmas facing external state-builders. I argue that attempts at state-building by foreign actors in the DRC have not had much success, and point out four reasons. First, insufficient resources have been provided. Second, donors have used a standardized approach that does not take local context sufficiently into account. Third, domestic power relations have been such that state-building has not served the interests of key actors. Finally, the policy has been based on a fixed, non-negotiable conception of what the state eventually should look like. Although all these factors have contributed to the failure to create a liberal state in the DRC, the last two appear to be more fundamental than the first and the second. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Democratic Republic of Congo has been plagued by continued conflict and violence in the East despite the official ending of the war. And civilians have borne the brunt of this conflict. Security sector reform (SSR) is a critical element in ensuring security, stability and sustainable peace. This article examines security sector reform conducted by the UN Mission in Congo, and also refers to other actors involved in the process, focusing primarily on the East where insecurity is prevalent due to the non-integrated Congolese forces, the Armed Forces of the DRC, other armed groups and foreign, mainly Rwandan, troops. It contends that SSR is vital to protect civilians and that thus far MONUC has not fulfilled its mandate of protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the EU's partnership with the UN in building effective multilateralism through an analysis of the EU operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 2003 and 2006. The EU has offered a range of tools in the field of civilian and military crisis management to MONUC, the UN Organization Mission in the DRC, thus representing the first case of full partnership on the ground between the two organizations. This pioneering peace operation can offer insights into possible future collaboration between the two organizations in peace and security matters. The argument of the article is that it is possible to establish a 'partner model' from the example of cooperation in the DRC: in the case of a UN deficit, the EU may intervene as supporting organization. However, since the EU is keen to be considered as an independent global actor, it seems focused on a pragmatic rather than institutionalized approach in its cooperation with the UN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]