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The introductory paper sets the stage for the research essays in the special issue. It provides an overview of the concepts of minilateralism and the context in which minilateralism has become an alternative form of collective action by states in the international arena, in particular in the Indo-Pacific region that has emerged as the new centre of gravity in world politics. How has minilateralism become a prominent feature of inter-state cooperation in the early twenty-first century, and how is it often used to complement (and in some cases, even substitute for) traditional international organisations, which are based on more liberal and inclusive multilateral norms and principles, but suffering from functional deficits? In a world of more diffuse power, how can minilateralism offer states an expanded toolset for pursuing their policy preferences and advancing their interests? At the same time, the paper also highlights the potential negatives of (or challenges to) minilateralism, including difficulties emanating from a narrowly framed agenda that perpetuates certain narratives, a leadership vacuum that could emerge from non-hierarchical arrangements, and questions about how to achieve support and legitimacy with low institutionalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation: China does not participate in the development co‐operation reporting mechanism of the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development's (OECD) development co‐operation reporting mechanism, nor does it voluntarily publish overseas development finance data. Despite recent quantitative research on China's foreign aid to other sectors, such as health, no precedent exists for quantifying China's international education co‐operation (IEC). Purpose: This article will use AidData's Chinese Official Finance Dataset (AidData 2.0) to estimate the IEC using the OECD's internationally standardized definitions of development finance and frameworks for classifying IEC projects. Approach and methods: We thoroughly examined all types of IEC projects, including official finance projects other than those that meet the definition of official development assistance (ODA). In our comparative analysis of educational aid between China and traditional donors, we focused on ODA‐like projects and examined the number of projects and funding amounts to determine China's IEC priorities. Findings: The result shows that, between 2000 and 2017, China's IEC commitments totalled 1,524 education‐related international projects, representing 12% of the total international finance project portfolio, most of which are in Africa. Compared to the OECD framework, China prioritized higher education (n = 784, 51%) and education facilities and training (n = 244, 16%). An estimate of cumulative funding between 2000 to 2017 showed that China was the 10th largest donor of education aid to African countries, behind France, the World Bank, Germany, the United States, the EU, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands. Policy implications: The findings of this study help our understanding of China's IEC finance. With China's involvement in education development aid growing in recent years and donors looking for solutions to developing countries' debt crises, this will allow for more effective collaboration, co‐ordination, and resource mobilization for both donor and recipient countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Remote Sensing is the property of Editorial Office of Journal of Remote Sensing & Science Publishing Co. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper contributes to the growing debate about how China drives change in institutions and norms of global governance. It analyses the case study of China's approach to transnational voluntary sustainability standards as concrete tools of Western-sponsored green value chain initiatives, between integration and contestation. Engaging international political economy scholarship, the paper shows that China participates in such initiatives by reshaping their focus away from contested market-based approaches to more internationally consensual state-led ones. This stance indicates that China's reshaping of international norms and institutions conveys claims made by Global South alliances. These alliances are increasingly important for China, not only politically and militarily but also economically and for the success of key initiatives, like the Belt and Road Initiative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a conceptual and analytical framework of states' legitimacy-seeking to comprehensively investigate the motivation behind China's climate and environment policy. While previous research has largely overlooked political factors that underlie China's climate policy, this paper argues that these factors are crucial in understanding China's policy changes, which are evident at both domestic and international levels. By examining sources such as government documents, leaders' speeches and authoritative literature, this study contends that China's climate change initiatives are part of a broader effort to enhance domestic and international legitimacy. The issue of climate change has become highly politicised in China under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, and it serves as a crucial test of the ruling party and the state's capacity to govern effectively. As such, legitimacy-seeking is the key driver that links China's domestic measures and international commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a global environmentality framework to critique efforts to "green" the Belt and Road Initiative (or Green BRI) by examining the Chinese state's environmental governance of extraterritorial spaces. The article transcends a focus within governmentality studies on domestic processes to reveal the relations between governance techniques and environmental subjects, including state and nonstate actors, beyond sovereign borders. Drawing on interviews, observations, and analysis of policies and reports, we identify three ways in which global environmentalities operate and are negotiated through the Green BRI. First, the Chinese state is embracing international sustainable development criteria to gain global legitimacy while seeking to export its domestic environmental governance model, making the Green BRI a dialectic policy. Second, the state is targeting and disciplining BRI participants, including Chinese financial institutions, construction companies, the renewable industry, and foreign state actors in BRI countries. Third, Chinese and BRI partner country participants' variegated subjectivities arise out of the negotiation of their own interests, Chinese state interests, and BRI host country concerns. Our analysis contributes to understanding of how China, as a rising power, engages in global environmental governance and produces extraterritorial environmental subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's ascendant position in International Relations has sparked a debate over the future of the US-led liberal international order. As China's military, economic, ideological, and institutional influence continues to expand, apprehensions about its challenges to the existing global order and the evolution of China's role in international governance have intensified. This research is qualitative and consults both primary and secondary recourses. From the neo-Gramscian school of thought perspective, this research explores the core relationship between China and the global order, delving deep into the historical context. Unlike traditional international relations theories, this research presents a historical and relational interpretation to present an alternative perspective on China's rise. Elucidating this dynamic historical progression, this paper posits that China's relationship with the world order has evolved significantly, moving from animosity and refutation in the post-independence period to compliance with Western ideals and institutions, integration into the international system and, more recently, to the pursuit of independent institution-building, global governance, and promotion of alternative world order. This paper concludes that while China has adopted a predominant role in shaping the rules of the international system, it is far from being a disruptive reformist. Thus, despite its global outreach, China does not seek to build a power centre that counters explicitly the Western liberal order but signals a gradual transition towards a multipolar order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Chinese diplomats' use of Twitter during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Although Twitter is blocked in China, Chinese officials use the platform to experiment with new public diplomacy channels and directly communicate with foreign audiences. We argue that China's utilization of Twitter in 2020 functioned as a crisis management and public relations tool and as a mechanism for disseminating a strategic narrative (SN) that articulated foreign policy priorities. To illustrate this, we apply a qualitative content analysis to a selection of tweets from two China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokespersons and divided into three stages. In each stage, distinct narrative themes emerge and construct a cohesive SN across three dimensions: issues, role identity, and the international system. This study reveals that China's public diplomacy apparatus effectively reaches global audiences with well-structured narratives but also that this effectiveness remains very limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been written about the effects of China's rising role in global economic governance, but the consequences for the development policy space have received little attention. This article examines whether China's mode of insertion in the international patent regime widens the restricted policy space of its developing country partners to shape their national patent system in a way that facilitates technical progress. Results show that China adopts a minimalist interpretation of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement as it incorporates its flexibilities at the bilateral and national levels, thus preserving and potentially widening its partners' development policy space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalization did not negate state power. It changed the toolkit. We expected the norms and incentives of the liberal economic order to push regimes in places like China and Russia to democratize. Instead, authoritarianism appears to be thriving. This article argues that authoritarians have learned how to take advantage of the institutions underpinning globalization for their own illiberal ends. They use courts in major economic powers to negate the effects of international institutions and to target their political competition. They subvert our expectations by repurposing the basic premises of liberalism – predictability and openness. The article demonstrates these claims by examining how the institutions of multiple international economic regimes, which were designed as constraints, have been turned into offensive tools. The findings illustrate that International Political Economy (IPE) scholars need to begin analyzing how governments learned these tactics and whether we can reconcile the contradictions they exploit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has become the world's largest bilateral creditor to low- and middle-income countries, and yet its participation in collective debt-relief frameworks led by western multilateral institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Paris Club—has not met those institutions' expectations. Prevailing discussion perceives China's 'reserved' participation as free-riding on or contesting the international sovereign debt regime. This article advances ongoing discussion by drawing a historical parallel between China's current debt-relief approach and that of the United States and the multilateral institutions during and after the debt crisis of the 1980s. The article finds that towards the end of the 1980s, the US transitioned from practicing a new money approach—continued financing for existing projects—to a haircut approach—increasingly writing off debts. Around the same time, multilateral institutions started to become more acceptive of debt forgiveness. Yet China's policy banks, the main financiers of its overseas projects, have been primarily practising a commercially oriented, new money approach. China's rise has therefore revitalized an approach that western private banks once commonly practised and weakened the current international sovereign debt regime that took shape in the post-1980s decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study capitalizes on documented and written input texts included in the second volume of the Encyclopaedia of China, an endeavour carried out as part of the Projects of the Institute of Political Science and International Relations "Ion I. C. Brãtianu" of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest. The article is interested in contextualizing and highlighting China's dimensions, principles, strategies, commitments and initiatives on global governance milestones as part of strategic multilateralism, by customizing two initiatives - the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This commemorative piece reviews Ian Taylor’s Stellenbosch experience and the lasting influence it has had on his own work, and that of many of his colleagues. It also considers ways in which this influence can be deepened by shifting the focus from macro to micro determinants of the persistence of inequality and deprivation in Africa – issues that deeply troubled Ian throughout his life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International lawyers have finally turned their attention to cities. However, the emerging interdisciplinary literature on International Law and Cities has largely overlooked Chinese cities cultivating in a distinct political context. Such neglect may further contribute to a crude understanding of China's growing ambition in its international legal strategy in general and Chinese cities' practice of international law in particular. This article aims to fill that gap by reflecting upon the relationship between China's central government and local governments in dealing with international legal affairs and elucidating how Chinese cities engage with international law in global politics and governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an important public product, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road has been developing well since it was proposed. Global governance is facing new situations and challenges, and the ‘four deficits’ of global governance, namely the peace deficit, the governance deficit, the security deficit, and the development deficit, have come to the fore. As an important element of global governance, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is also faced with challenges. Despite the constraints and hindrances of the ‘four deficits,’ green development is still playing a leading role in promoting proper values and is an important way to promote global governance. This article explores and analyzes the challenges of green development in the construction of the Maritime Silk Road. These challenges mainly include the lack of green justice, the deficiencies of green development regulations, the increase in global turmoil, the lack of distributive justice, and the inherent contradiction between economic growth and green development. The causes are ideological influence, interstate game constraints, differences in economic strength, and extensive development patterns. Based on this, this article puts forward the following coping strategies: further promote the development of a human community with a shared future and alleviate the peace deficit; improve the regulations of green development and consolidate the foundation of governance; implement the global security initiative and eliminate security crises; promote green economic growth and tackle the development deficit; and promote marine ecological governance and consolidate the foundation of green development. As a successful model of global governance, the Maritime Silk Road associates it⁃ self with green development and serves as a cornerstone and path to solving the ‘four deficits’ in global governance. China will play a major role as an important participant, contributor, and leader in global governance, propose Chinese wisdom and solutions to alleviate the ‘four deficits’ in global governance, and promote the building of a ‘community of green development.’ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union and the People's Republic of China 'in principle' concluded the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). Considering that the agreement has been passed in the backdrop of dynamic multi-fora trade and investment policy-making practices, both parties' negotiations at the bilateral, multilateral and plurilateral levels require testing. This is important to understand whether the growth of bilateral and regional agreements and the fragmentation of international economic law are enablers or roadblocks to further liberalisation of international trade and investment. This Special Issue shall analyse the CAI and argue in favour of the importance of this development. It will examine the current hyper-politicisation and geo-politicisation of investment treaties to situate the symbolic importance of the CAI. In lieu of the uncertainty of final ratification of CAI and sanctions imposed by China, this article (and the whole Special Issue it introduces) are a timely academic contribution that shall trace its scope and potential effectiveness and enable much-needed discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Changzhou University (Social Science Edition) is the property of Editorial Department of Journal of Changzhou University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Sino-Russian Yamal LNG project is the first large-scale Arctic oil and gas exploration project under the construction of China’s " Polar Silk Road". In recent years, with the increasing demand for clean energy such as natural gas in China, the Yamal LNG project is conducive to alleviating China’s tension of energy demand and ensuring its energy security. However, from the perspective of energy geopolitics, Yamal project faces with risks from six risks from energy supply countries, energy transport corridors, energy international mechanisms, energy supply pricing rights and energy competitors. It can be seen that the Yamal LNG project is not only a Sino-Russian oil and gas transportation cooperation project, but also a place for energy political game among countries. At present, the "Polar Silk Road" is still in the initial stage of construction, and China has not been able to participate in Arctic governance. Therefore, China needs to effectively predict the risks faces in the Yamal LNG project, and find a practical path to deeply participate in the project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Achieving and managing economic sustainability is one of the crucial tasks for our globalized world. One of the most ambitious economic projects known to humankind claims to stand for long-term global economic sustainability including ecological, social, and cultural aspects: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in which China invites the world to join its vision of a "peaceful cooperation for the wealth and cultural exchange of all nations" (Xi Jinping 2013 in his famous speech Promote People-to-People Friendship an Create a Better Future). This invitation led to a wide range of responses, from fundamental rejection to supportive participation. Matching the participants in this megaproject—their contributions, particular prerequisites, and development interests—requires a holistic participative planning approach with solutions tailored specifically to the participating partners. This article shows how Pragmatic Identity Matching (PrIM), a scalable integration framework, can be used to meet this requirement. PrIM provides an identity-oriented infrastructure for aligned planning, implementation and communications, acknowledging, and embracing participants from different cultural backgrounds such as Asian, Arabian, African, Russian, and European cultures. As a structural-scientific approach that synthesizes elemental semiotic thinking and research in psychology and the neurosciences, PrIM provides a meta-planning structure beyond any value-driven positions and perspectives, one that imparts equivalence to information. PrIM can help the BRI avoid a spiral of non-coordinated activities, thereby preventing loss of investment. The formation of a transdisciplinary BRI Management Academy that uses PrIM would help create the necessary infrastructure for a successful and transparent implementation of the BRI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China has risen to the status of a global power, it has taken the lead in fostering several new multilateral institutional initiatives. Some of these are formal intergovernmental organizations; others are informal clubs, forums, or platforms. Collectively, these acts of institutional creation suggest that China is no longer content to "join" the existing global order but is constructing its own multilateral infrastructure. What do such institutions mean for global governance? This article provides a framework for studying such multilateral institutions and sketches an emerging research agenda. First, it provides a systematic empirical overview of China's participation in the creation of multilateral institutions between 1990 and 2017. Second, it develops analytical categories for describing types of new institutions based on their relationships with incumbent institutions. Central to this typology is (1) whether new multilateral institutions' governance functions are additive or rivalrous to those of existing ones, and (2) whether they promote congruent or distinct social purposes. Based on these characteristics, new multilateral institutions may be complementary, divergent, substitutive, or competing. Third, it considers the implications of China's multilateral institution-building for global governance in the context of an international power shift. A medida que China ha ido adquiriendo la condición de potencia mundial, ha asumido el mando de promover varias iniciativas nuevas relacionadas con las instituciones multilaterales. Algunas de estas son organizaciones intergubernamentales formales, mientras que otras son clubes, foros o plataformas informales. En conjunto, estos actos de creación institucional sugieren que China ya no está interesada en «unirse» al orden mundial actual, sino que está construyendo su propia infraestructura multilateral. ¿Qué implican dichas instituciones para la gobernabilidad mundial? Este artículo ofrece un marco para el estudio de dichas instituciones multilaterales y describe brevemente un programa de investigación emergente. En primer lugar, ofrece una visión general empírica y sistemática de la participación de China en la creación de instituciones multilaterales entre 1990 y 2017. En segundo lugar, desarrolla categorías analíticas para describir los tipos de nuevas instituciones en función de sus relaciones con las instituciones vigentes. Un aspecto clave de esta tipología es (1) si las funciones de gobernabilidad de las nuevas instituciones multilaterales se adhieren o se oponen a las de las existentes y (2) si promueven propósitos sociales congruentes o distintos. En función de estas características, las nuevas instituciones multilaterales pueden ser complementarias, divergentes, sustitutivas o competidoras. En tercer lugar, se analizan las consecuencias de la creación de instituciones multilaterales por parte de China para la gobernabilidad mundial en el contexto de un cambio de poder internacional. En s'élevant au rang de puissance mondiale, la Chine a pris la main dans l'encouragement de plusieurs nouvelles initiatives institutionnelles multilatérales. Certaines d'entre elles concernent des organisations intergouvernementales, et d'autres concernent plutôt des plateformes, forums ou clubs informels. Collectivement, ces actes de création institutionnelle suggèrent que la Chine ne contente plus de « rejoindre » l'ordre mondial existant, mais qu'elle construit sa propre infrastructure multilatérale. Que signifient de telles institutions pour la gouvernance mondiale ? Cet article propose un cadre pour l'étude de telles institutions multilatérales et esquisse un programme de recherche émergent. Il commence par fournir une présentation empirique systématique de la participation de la Chine dans la création d'institutions multilatérales entre 1990 et 2017. Il développe ensuite des catégories analytiques permettant de décrire les types de nouvelles institutions en se basant sur leurs relations avec les institutions en place. Pour cette typologie , deux questions centrales consistent à se demander (1) si les fonctions de gouvernance des nouvelles institutions multilatérales s'ajoutent ou rivalisent avec celles des institutions existantes, et (2) si elles promeuvent des objectifs sociaux congruents ou distincts. Sur la base de ces caractéristiques, les nouvelles institutions multilatérales peuvent être complémentaires, divergentes, substitutives ou concurrentes. Enfin, cet article prend en considération les implications de la construction d'institutions multilatérales de la Chine pour la gouvernance mondiale dans le contexte du changement des puissances mondiales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How China will contribute to global governance has become a critical question in international relations, amplified by the linkages between the Covid-19 pandemic, escalating geopolitical contest and multilateralism in crisis. China has been doubling down on its authoritarian model of domestic governance while becoming more internationally assertive, including in existing and new multilateral institutions. Meanwhile, the United States appeared in recent years to be undermining the institutions, norms and rules of the liberal international order that it, itself, built. The subsequent decline in international cooperation poses grave risks to public health, economic and other forms of security. Can China cooperate with other actors to contribute public goods and stabilisation of global governance in such a deteriorating international environment? While there is a wide range of institutions in which to examine China's growing role in international governance, from United Nations bodies such as the World Health Organisation and World Trade Organisation to regional initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, this paper examines the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), an example of Chinese innovation in multilateralism. Established amidst geopolitical contest, the new institution seeks to address the Asian deficit of financing for sustainable development. The bank challenges a number of prevailing norms, including replacing the disproportionate power of the US and the advanced economies in the multilateral system with a more proportionate role for China and other developing countries; a new focus on infrastructure- led development which is built on Chinese confidence in the East Asian development model; and a shift away from the Bretton Woods practices of using financing conditions to drive liberal democratic and neo-liberal economic reforms. At the same time as representing a challenge to the traditional order, the bank exhibits - at least to date - best practices in implementation and addresses previously unmet concerns of the developing world. While it is not possible to extrapolate from only one initiative to draw comprehensive conclusions about China's likely future role in global governance, the AIIB case nonetheless suggests that, at least in some fields, China will challenge liberal norms to reform rather than revolutionise the international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our series of studies would like to draw attention to the fact that China, which has so far had considerable foreign policy experience, is also forging serious capital from dealing with its own internal conflicts. A diverse, high-spread country is testing the effectiveness of 'soft power' in its provinces. Without foreign policy adventures, these locations provided the Chinese Communist Party with adequate experience in resolving certain types of conflicts. Uyghur, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Hong Kong, Macao embody archetypes of problems that pose a direct threat to the Chinese state. In addition to regional conflicts, we can also consider the problems of the Christian community of about one hundred million. Uyghur is an excellent example of how to achieve results along the fault lines of cultures and religions. The first part of the series of studies shows how Uyghurs with significant separatist traditions have been persuaded to make 'modern life' the same as accepting the Chinese order. Through the Uyghurs, China is learning how to refine its methods concerning Muslim countries in Central Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of Chinese language teaching and cultural communication activities, the Confucius Institute carries out a variety of cultural exchange activities between China and the host country, which has become an effective way for China to carry out public diplomacy and participate in global cultural governance. By analysing the concepts of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, people-to-people exchange and cultural governance, this paper summarises three typical paths of Confucius Institutes in carrying out public diplomacy: 'from the government to foreign nationals', 'from the government to Chinese citizens and then to foreign nationals', and 'from the government to foreign nationals and then to foreign nationals'. The value of the Confucius Institute in carrying out public diplomacy is reflected on the level of national diplomacy, international exchange and global governance. Furthermore, the capability of the Confucius Institute as a language and cultural communication institution initiated by China and in cooperation with other countries in carrying out public diplomacy is limited. This limitation, on one hand, originates from the nature of the Confucius Institute as a language and cultural communication organisation, and on the other hand, is related to the difficulties and challenges that China faces in its participation in global governance. Public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy are based on national interests. They also transcend national interests and, furthermore, become a way for a country to actively participate in global cultural governance. The experience of and challenges faced by the Confucius Institute can have important implications for China in participating in global cultural governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation: What motivates China to offer development finance in recipient countries? Research on Chinese development finance focuses on China's political and economic interests in allocating development finance. Few studies, however, have assessed the impact of international norms and regulation—a neo‐institutional perspective—on China's development finance. Purpose: The article tests the three sets of hypotheses on Chinese development finance, positing that countries will receive more Chinese aid if: (1) they have a UN General Assembly voting alliance with China and do not recognize Taiwan; (2) the more oil and gas reserves they have; and (3) the more memberships of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the UN agencies, and international non‐governmental organizations (INGOs), which include non‐profit organizations and charities, such as Oxfam, as well as foundations and professional associations. Approach and Methods: This study models the amount of Chinese aid received by developing countries as a function of its integration to IGOs/INGO networks. It draws on data from AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, 2000–2014. The model used is ordinary least square regression using fixed effects. Conclusions: Chinese aid allocation does not only reflect its political and economic interests. Taiwan recognition continues to be the dominant factor for Chinese development finance. IGO and INGO memberships of recipient countries increase the chance of receiving more Chinese development funding, especially for least developed countries. Policy Implications: Chinese development finance provides many developmental opportunities for less developed countries. A key aspect of getting Chinese development finance has been alliance with China. Linkages to IGOs and INGOs also matter. Countries aiming to get Chinese development finance should consider increasing their memberships to transnational networks of IGOs and INGOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2017, scholar Joseph Nye postulated that a rising China that failed to deliver global public goods could result in a 'Kindleberger Trap', failing, like the then rising United States about a century ago, to supply global public goods at a time of need. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made expanding China's role in global public goods provision a hallmark of his foreign policy. This study assesses Xi-led China's commitment to supplying global public goods using guideposts from historical examples of countries that made the shift from consumers to suppliers of global public goods. It finds that China seeks to enlarge its role in providing global public goods. However, Beijing is supplying those global public goods that it sees as maximising its interests, while simultaneously reshaping existing or constructing new modalities for their delivery. This behaviour, associated with systemic challengers, weakens confidence in China's role as a stabiliser in future global crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Social Sciences in China is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Debates over the implications of China's rise for global governance have reached an impasse, since evidence exists to support both 'revisionist' and 'status-quo' intentions. This means that neither is strictly falsifiable and hence the debate, as currently structured, is irresolvable. However, contradictions are explicable if we recognise that China is not a unitary state. Since the beginning of the reform era, its international engagements have been shaped by the uneven transformation – fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation – of state apparatuses. Contradictory international actions thus may reflect not top-down strategic direction, but conflicts, disagreements and coordination problems within China's transformed party-state. Our state transformation approach directs us away from evaluating China's approach to global governance in toto – whether it is overall a revisionist or status quo power – towards a detailed analysis of particular policy domains. This is because in each issue-area we find different constellations of actors and interests, and varying degrees of party-state transformation. We demonstrate the centrality of state transformation analysis for explaining the co-existence of revisionist and status quo behaviours through the apparently hard test case of nuclear technologies. Even in this 'high politics' domain, state transformation dynamics help explain China's inconsistent international behaviours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article briefly reviews China's past path toward accommodation of existing world norms and provides an assessment of various unconventional means as well as conventional measures Beijing recently has used to gain international influence. Building on the findings of a variety of recent studies showing the breadth and depth of the multifaceted means used by the Chinese government to expand influence abroad in ways that undermine, weaken, and challenge existing international norms favored by the United States and its allies and partners, the article concludes that the consequences of recent Chinese actions to expand influence abroad do indeed weaken US and Western leadership and open the way for legitimation and greater international acceptance of Chinese norms very much at odds with the existing status quo favored by the United States. The purpose of the article is to show the above pattern of behavior and its implications. It does not address broader questions involving Chinese and US comprehensive power and international influence or China's overall success or failure in pursuing current challenges to US interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explore whether the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has become an instrument of power led by China to fulfill her geopolitical interests. After an investigation of the AIIB's power structure, institutional design, and its 34 approved projects, this study finds that although the AIIB deviates to some extent from international standards while considering loan decisions, the bank itself does not appear to be a norm challenger so far. Instead, it has become more cooperative and inclusive, with a shifting focus towards mutually beneficial cooperation and reform of the international financial system. This paper argues that the AIIB's current configuration results from the decrease in China's status deficit—the gap between China's recognized international financial status and its own perception of its financial power. Quantitative and qualitative evidence shows that when the idea of the AIIB was first conceived, China's status deficit was large, which meant that in a global power struggle the AIIB was more likely to be manipulated by a dissatisfied China. As the AIIB evolved, China's international financial status gained positive recognition and the AIIB received wider acceptance; China's status deficit shrank. As a result, the AIIB has become a reform-minded multilateral financial institution that has made concessions to establish rules and has sought collaboration with its counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, there has been great debate in regards to global governance in the field of international relations. Within these documents, the research that analyzes how the Popular Republic of China has related in relation to global governance stands out. In this sense, this article deals with this discussion and seeks to answer by way of what strategy does China get involved in this process. With the objective of contributing to this debate, this research proposes to study the case of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). After analyzing the objectives behind the creation of this bank, its institutional design, its relation to other organisms, the countries that comprise it, and the way it has performed in the first three years, it has been concluded that the strategy that China has used is proposing new initiatives which adhere additional layers to global governance which complement the current institutions. Conversely to how it is posed in by a great part of the document, we make the argument that within the case study, a deep questioning of global governing is not caried out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Recent years have seen a rapid change in China's global engagement and a recognition that solving global challenges will need to take the changing role of China into account. The paper discusses China's growing involvement in global health. Health is an area where there is broad agreement over global priorities and, potentially, a fertile space to build new forms of collaboration that point the way towards the adaptation of global governance to a rapidly changing context.Results: Drawing on previous analyses of China's management of change in its domestic health reforms and interviews with a range of stakeholders in China, the UK and Switzerland, the paper argues that China's engagement in global health is developing and diversifying rapidly in response to the central government's desire to see a greater role for China in global health. This diversification is part of a pattern of change management familiar from China's domestic reform experience. Explorations underway by a range of Chinese agencies form part of a process of rapid experimentation and experiential learning that are informing China's search for (a) new global role(s).Conclusions: China is undergoing rapid institutional innovation and developing capacity for greater global engagement, including in health; however, substantial, recent leadership commitments make clear Chinese agencies' need for continued exploration, innovation and rapid learning. How China engages globally is of significance to the world, not just China. The challenge for China, other global actors and multilateral organisations is to incorporate new approaches into existing global governance arrangements, including for the management of global health. This will require a willingness on all sides to learn from each other and invest the effort needed to build governance arrangements appropriate for the coming decades. This is not only important as a means of protecting global public health, but also as a demonstration of how governance arrangements can be adapted to the needs of a pluralistic global order in a context of rapid change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With China's reintegration into the international system its involvement in multilateral initiatives, interactions with international institutions, and participation in global governance have become integral parts of Chinese foreign policy. Chinese scholars have conducted a great deal of research on these topics. The first stage of Chinese scholars' research centered on China's multilateral diplomacy and the interaction between China and international institutions, while the second stage focused on China's participation in global governance. Although some scholars have made substantial achievements, in general, most of the research only interprets the ideas and policies related to global governance proposed by the Chinese government, and has not explained China's strategies and actions in global governance. Furthermore, Chinese scholars provide little analysis on the dynamics of China's participation in different issue areas. Many scholars have articulated a series of policy recommendations, but no specific measures have been suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional wisdom in international relations is that rising powers seek additional status and influence from the hegemon. But emerging powers may also compete among themselves for status. While attempting to enhance their status vis-à-vis the West, the 'strategic triangle' of Russia, India, and China sometimes compete for status and influence within clubs such as the BRICS, SCO, and BRI. This pattern is difficult to explain in terms of neorealist, club, or constructivist theory. An explanation for this phenomenon is provided by social identity theory (SIT) from social psychology, which argues that groups seek a positively distinctive identity. The BRICS are able to cooperate when acting in terms of a superordinate identity. To avoid escalation of their rivalry, Russia and China have established niche diplomatic areas in Central Asia, an example of social cooperation. Status competition among Russia, India, and China both motivates and obstructs cooperation on global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the Chinese policies towards the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the context of global governance. Despite China's fast-growing foreign policy competence, the level of confidence held by China in engaging with global governance systems has not yet fully transmitted to the legal institutions governing human rights issues, and the ICC is such an example. This article examines specific policy concerns of China regarding the ICC in light of China's engagement with global governance, and some of the traditional concerns that have had an impact on that engagement. It discusses the extent to which these concerns should still be regarded as policy barriers preventing China's full accession to the ICC in years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global governance underlies the solution of vital problems throughout the world. How can government mechanisms at the national, regional, and global levels promote transformational approaches designed to achieve economic, social, and environmental sustainability? China's rapid growth in the international arena and its increasing influence are unprecedented. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visits to Central and Southeast Asia, has proposed a new strategic vision for trade and investment flows based on a concept of communications embodied in the ancient Silk Road. The BRI has become a powerful platform for economic growth and regional cooperation. Meanwhile, the range of financial instruments available to developing countries has been expanding with the establishment of new intergovernmental institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This new international financial institution reflects a key change in the architecture of global governance. An analysis of China's contribution to the multilateral system shows its unprecedented growth and commitment to global governance, as written into the country's 13th Five-Year Plan. The principles of the United Nations 2030 Agenda, in turn, provide an agreed and inclusive basis for working out an international political approach to sustainable development with a focus on development cooperation. Global governance offers opportunities for further implementation of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In this context, the BRI reflects China's global role as a bridge builder. The BRI can make a contribution to global governance by suggesting an effective implementation mechanism so as to move towards a more balanced, multipolar, and multilateral international architecture. The BRI's gradual multilateralism will enhance China's legitimacy and prestige. If the BRI builds on the Sustainable Development Goals, this will enhance China's impact and give it additional advantages. Success will depend on concrete actions at the global, regional, national, and subnational levels. In addition, the BRI could be a driver of sustainable development, an effective tool for achieving the SDGs. Acting in harmony with the SDGs, the BRI will be able to promote the common good of participating countries in all areas of development. In this endeavor, regional and multilateral political frameworks are an important step in providing real win-win opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to understand China's national role conceptions and strategy within the context of the World Internet Conference (WIC). The Chinese government uses this conference to promote its model of internet governance known as cyber sovereignty. The foreign policy behaviour of China (role performance) as well as role prescriptions from the US are also analysed. A novel approach based on frame analysis is taken to uncover China's national role conceptions. The related frames in this article are then categorized into national roles. China performs four national roles as part of its strategy to reshape international internet governance norms: developer, global village member, global leader, and law-abiding citizen. This article concludes that the national roles in the WIC are aimed at developing and emerging countries in order to increase China's power and win gradual support for the cyber sovereignty model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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China's rise and America's global retreat have made China's role in global governance more important than ever before. By analysing Chinese (mainly academic) literature, this article studies contemporary Chinese views of global economic governance. It finds that the 2008 financial crisis is a notable point of the Chinese discourse. In addition, dialogue platforms – the G20 in particular – rather than key institutions of global economic governance such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Word Trade Organization (WTO) win overwhelming attention in the Chinese discourse. Chinese views of global economic governance also highly value the role of the state, while paying less attention to Non Governmental Organisations (NGO) and civil society. Overall, this article highlights a diverse, shifting and sometimes contradictory Chinese discourse on global economic governance, which helps to develop a more accurate understanding of China's ambition in global economic governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's spectacular economic growth over the past decades has given rise to a more confident and proactive China in global governance. China is now an institution-builder, with new Chinese-led institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank designed to cement Beijing's central role in global economic governance. What, then, are the potential implications of a slowing economy for China's institutional power and global governance role? This article locates China's economic growth and slowdown in broader discussions about China's global position and questions about responsibility, order and governance. It argues that China's economic slowdown will not result in a drastic impact on Beijing's institutional power as there are key material, historical and ideational drivers at play here. Unless China is confronted with the prospect of an economic collapse, it will continue to pursue an active institutional role, speak the rhetoric of South-South solidarity with emerging economies and seek a leadership role in reforming global economic governance, even with a slowing economy, because this is intrinsically tied to its identity and how China now positions itself in an evolving global order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Marxist tradition as a social philosophy has sought to locate emancipation in the person of the working class or various other sub-state actors. However, it has been obvious for long that the metahistorical agency entrusted with those forces is less than viable. Offering an alternative perspective to the question of the agent of emancipatory action, the present research attempts to situate the potential of emancipatory praxis in international relations with the state acting as the primary actor for dialectical change. It holds that, if a radical shift from the contemporary conditions of economic and political subjugation to respect for sovereignty, inclusive development and peaceful coexistence is to be realized, the direction of emancipatory flow must be from international to national. Thus, through a re-contextualization of emancipation at the interstate level of analysis, this study proposes a thorough evaluation of China’s conceptualization of international governance against the backdrop of its ongoing material and ideational emergence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many observers of international politics detect a growing Chinese challenge to the rules-based, liberal international order. In particular, some saw Beijing's recent creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a threat to existing organizations governing international development financing. This article broadly concurs with more sanguine accounts emphasizing the AIIB's similarity to existing multilateral development banks. However, we go further by arguing that the full extent of China's challenge to global governance cannot be understood without reference to the ongoing transformation of the Chinese party-state: the contested fragmentation, decentralization and internationalization of state apparatuses. These processes mean that the AIIB is just one institution among many in China's messy international development financing field - alongside policy and commercial banks, functional ministries, provincial governments and state-owned enterprises. Contestation among these agencies will shape China's real challenge to global economic governance, which will often be significant, yet unintended and non-strategic, in nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the new era, it is proposed that China should be transformed from a participant and a cooperator into a designer, an impeller and a leader, continue taking an effect of responsible great power, increase public product supply, perfect a global governance system and contribute to China's wisdom and China's schemes during global governance, thus surveying and mapping geographic information takes on great mission. On the one hand, we have to timely grasp global geographic information data resources to provide an important scientific data support for China's wisdom and China's schemes. On the other hand, we have to provide surveying and mapping geographic information infrastructure construction and public products for developing countries, support location services within a global territorial scope, and realize the smoothness of talent flow, material flow and information flow between China and countries in the world. Meanwhile, external assistance and international communication and cooperation of surveying and mapping geographic information are also enhanced, and popularization and application of a geographic information technology in underdeveloped countries and regions are promoted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Chinese view, the architecture of contemporary global governance - especially that of the Bretton Woods institutions - is flawed and in need of reform. Developing nations (like China), the argument runs, need to be given a role proportionate to their global economic influence. Since the Group of Twenty (G20) became a leaders’ summit in 2008, China has used the forum to push for such reform. But today, despite some supposed progress, reform has stalled. Recognising this fact, China is increasingly emphasising regional integration in its strategy for overcoming the middle-income trap. Global reform has not been abandoned, but - given its infeasibility - is no longer a short-term priority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay I survey the key themes within China's discourse on international order, especially how China views its position and role in shaping the existing and future order. I go on to explore the possible implications of China's thinking and actions toward the existing international order. I conclude that overall, China sees no need for and hence does not seek fundamental transformation, but rather piecemeal modification of the existing order. In fact, China has been quite content with the existing order that supports globalization, despite occasional rhetoric indicating otherwise. In the near future, China will likely invest heavily in two key issue areas: (1) regionalism in East Asia and Central Asia; and (2) interregional cooperation and coordination. Perhaps unsurprisingly, China's ambitious “One Belt and One Road” initiative seeks to integrate these two issue areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the special issue on topics including the U.S.-led liberal international order (LIO), the survival of liberal internationalism, and China's effort to recast the international order to serve its own interest.

Recent data and policy analysis show that a positive policy and political culture towards non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been developed in China which will lay the foundation for the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs. The changes in global governance, both in terms of a power shift from Western countries to emerging powers and in terms of the Chinese government’s more assertive role in global governance, require that Chinese NGOs play a more active role in global affairs. In responding to the changes, the Chinese government has developed a new strategy on public diplomacy that is expected to create some political and policy support for Chinese NGOs, especially for grass-roots NGOs’ (G-R NGOs) internationalisation. However, at this initial stage, the Chinese government and G-R NGOs might not share the same understanding of the purpose and method of achieving a global role for Chinese NGOs. Meanwhile, the United Nations (UN) has made many notable efforts to pave the way for engaging with NGOs. The article argues that the UN platform would be a good starting place for Chinese G-R NGOs’ experimentation with global participation. However, their strategy will determine how far they can go. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China is challenging the international financial architecture in a number of ways. This paper highlights three that are of critical importance: the challenge of absorbing massive Chinese savings; the incorporation of China into a cohesive global financial safety net; and the organisation of China's participation in funding the demand for international investment projects. The global financial architecture needs to be reformed. But what role should China play? The paper defines the options open to China and the opportunities and barriers it will face. We argue that China can work with the established economic powers in reforming the existing architecture. At the same time, China seeks cooperation in building new institutions and organisations that fill gaps in the existing arrangements. But no matter how international financial diplomacy plays out in the near term, deep financial and economic reform at home will alone deliver China a central role in the international financial architecture. Domestic reform could also attend to some of the challenges that currently plague China's impact on the system. The success or failure of these domestic reforms will be at the crux of the strength or fragility of the international financial architecture in the years ahead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Social Sciences in China is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article addresses the importance of cultural industries for the strengthening of the soft power of the rising powers and it seeks to understand how the cultural industries allow rising powers to shape the structures of their international environment. More specifically, studying the cases of People's Republic of China and of the movie industry, my article focuses on the current evolution of the relationship between the Chinese authorities and the film industry, as well as on the development of the domestic film market. I further aim to draw up an inventory of China's role within the global governance of cultural industries. Finally, I aim to highlight the global cultural competition that China faces, emphasizing the practices of the US administration and Hollywood. I argue that even if China is the current centre of gravity within the world economy, it still has a long way to go in order to shape the distribution of resources within the global governance of cultural industries and to play a crucial role in the international battle of cultural symbols. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A great power is a rich and influential state. Among the major powers of the world, China is "an unusual pattern of power; "This country stunned the world because, currently, the only communist country that has a functioning market economy. China's rapid industrialization and impressive for its extraordinary assertion that exporting country led to the characterization of China as "another Japan" or even "a super-Japan" My paper will analyze a China's macroeconomic global investors that countries will be present, the companies and relationships in which the US and Romania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]