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The article "EDITORIAL" from the magazine Tiempo de Paz addresses the change in global geopolitics and the transition towards a new order. It mentions that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the era of globalization led by the United States. However, currently, there is a shift towards a multipolar world, with the rise of China and other countries from the global South, which is affecting the weight of the West in the world. The article reflects on the challenges that the transitioning world faces, such as climate change, the pandemic, and conflicts, and the need for institutional and normative transformations. It also analyzes the confrontation between Israel and Palestine and the role of Russia in the current context. The text presents different reflections on international issues and current concerns, such as the Arctic, the environment, gender equality, and international humanitarian law. It mentions the proposal of a Summit of the Future to strengthen global governance and analyzes the growing leadership of China and India in the transitioning world. The article invites reflection on these topics and shows an optimistic outlook towards the future. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the bipolar international system involving the U.S. and China in terms of international relations, nature and effectiveness of global governance and economic interaction among the superpowers and smaller states. Topics include how U.S. and China bipolarity will differ from the U.S. and Soviet Union bipolarity, what U.S. and China bipolarity will mean for the U.S. and its key European and Asian allies, and the alliance security dilemma dynamics that the U.S. will have to face when it comes allies who face a security threat from China.

The consequences and implications of China's rise have been analyzed and discussed from a number of perspectives. There has been little analysis that specifically evaluates the implications for the Atlantic Alliance, however, and whether an international system defined by U.S.-China bi-polarity would lead to a strengthening or a weakening of the transatlantic relationship. This article argues that China's rise will create security dynamics that likely will lead to a weakening of the Atlantic Alliance. It is unlikely that China's rise will provide NATO with a renewed purpose or give a convincing rationale for alliance cohesion the way the Soviet Union once did. Instead, China's rise will reveal divergent strategic interests and priorities among the members of the Atlantic Alliance, with a real possibility that America's rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific could intensify perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic of NATO's declining geopolitical value and relevance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Northeast Asian regional order is shifting since the old order was shattered by a decline in Cold War bipolarity and the rise in the penetrative power of global capital and corporations. The governments of China, Japan, and South Korea have been adjusting to these major external changes ever since, with each seeking to maximize their influence over the eventual structure of a new regional order, while simultaneously accommodating new domestic pressures. Initially, the adjustment process impelled the region toward economic interdependence, regional multilateralism, and reduced conflict. But recent years have seen an escalation in trilateral tensions and a resurgence of mistrust toward neighboring countries. By tracing the domestic adjustments in each of the three countries, the paper demonstrates how domestic adjustments in power, institutions and policies have been reshaping regional relations. This has triggered a recent rise in tensions rooted in an escalation of domestic nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A great historical transition is underway from American-led Globalization 1.0 to Globalization 2.0-the interdependence of plural identities where no one power or alliance of powers dominates. The G-20 is floundering as the immediate global financial crisis has receded. The United Nations and the old Bretton Woods institutions-the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO-have lost their vigor and are struggling to adjust to the global powershift with the rise of the emerging economies. While Europe is paralyzed as the historic project of integration stalls, the world's two largest economies-the United States and China-are as yet unable to figure out how to share power. The danger now is that the geopolitical vacuum will invite assertions of national self-interest that will unravel the rules-based order that enabled stability and prosperity over recent decades. America's leading geopolitical strategist, China's most outspoken strategic thinker and one of Asia's leading global thinkers from Singapore offer their reflections on this state of affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Reflexión Politica is the property of Universidad Autonoma de Bucaramanga, UNAB and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This short comment seeks to clarify what unipolar politics as usual is, and how it differs from politics as usual under alternative systemic conditions, especially bipolarity. This is an assessment 'from within', accepting Brooks and Wohlforth's description of unipolar politics as well as their central premises that America's lonely superpower status faces no immediate threat and that there is little evidence that powerful states are actively seeking to overthrow the current unipolar system. I suggest that a comparative assessment of how alternative distributions of power create different incentive structures for states yields different conclusions and policy prescriptions than those advanced by Brooks and Wohlforth. Most notably, Brooks and Wohlforth do not fully appreciate how the 'unipolar politics as usual' that they describe provides states with few incentives to cooperate with their policy prescription that the US reshape the world's institutional architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's approach towards regionalism and multilateralism is essentially driven by realpolitik paradigm. More specifically, China's tilt towards regionalism has been propelled by three reasons: one its own rise, two its domestic concerns and three change in the world-order in the aftermath of the collapse of bipolarism and the resultant emergence of new threats and insecurities. Regionalism in Chinese discourse is rooted primarily in the quest for building a China-led regional order, supporting China's peripheral diplomacy and grand strategy, than on mere rationale of economic gains. Therefore, in Chinese conceptualization realpolitik issues hold primacy over normative and liberal notions of interdependence. The web of regional security architecture, thus, evolved serves essentially China's security needs and grand strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Review of International Affairs (04866096) is the property of Institute of International Politics & Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

If an emerging Sino-Russian energy nexus becomes sufficiently robust, there could be profound geopolitical consequences, including most significantly the consolidation of a bipolar order (China versus the United States) in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's competing pipeline initiative suddenly appeared to become the front-runner in 200 , partly as a consequence of the Kremlin campaign against Yukos. Nevertheless, Russia's current plan represents a cautious strategy to preserve its flexibility and delay the difficult decision. The West should vigorously campaign for a route that reaches the shores of the Pacific, in order to enhance multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that there is a distinct and longstanding regional structure in East Asia that is of at least equal importance to the global level in shaping the region's security dynamics. Without considering this regional level neither 'unipolar' nor 'multipolar' designations can explain East Asian international security. To make this case, I deploy regional security complex theory both to characterize and explain developments in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity is well understood in thinking about how the ending of the Cold War impacted on East Asia. Less written about in Western security literature are the parallel developments at the regional level. Prominent among these are the relative empowerment of China in relation to its neighbours, and the effect of this, as well as of the growth of regional institutions, and the attachment of security significance to East Asian economic developments, in merging the security dynamics of Northeast and Southeast Asia. How China relates to its East Asian region, and how the US and China relate to each other, are deeply intertwined issues which centrally affect not only the future of East Asian, but also global, security. With the notable exception of some crisis between China and Taiwan, this whole pattern looks mainly dependent on internal developments within China and the US. Also significant is whether the basic dynamic of interstate relations in East Asia is more defined by the Westphalian principle of balancing, or by the bandwagoning imperative more characteristic of suzerain-vassal relationships. The main probability is for more of the same, with East Asian security staying within a fairly narrow band between mild conflict formation and a rather odd and weak sort of security regime in which an outside power, the US, plays the key role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If buffer states play an indispensable role in security architecture when great powers confront each other, do they become irrelevant when bipolar balances of power are eroded? The question is particularly salient to the 1990s when both global and regional bipolar systems have unraveled. This article examines the impact of rapprochement between two dyads of regional powers - Russia and China, and India and China - on weak states separating them - Mongolia and Nepal. Democratic breakthroughs in both states in the 1990s led to greater emphasis in their foreign policies on 'non-alignment' and 'equidistance.' Evidence presented in this article suggests that the leverage of such aspiring buffer states has increased slightly. But buffer status still does not entail real nonalignment or equidistance, and reconciled great powers continue to regulate the degree of neutralized sovereignty they will enjoy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]